# Williams v. The GEO Group, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Florida · September 10, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767254

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 10, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767254

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that deliberate 9 indifference requires a plaintiff to allege facts that show prison officials “acted with more than gross negligence”
- applying Monell to a private company that operated as the “functional equivalent of a municipality”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 23-cv-81157-Damian/McCabe

ESSIE MAE WILLIAMS,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Cedric Levon Williams,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE GEO GROUP, INC.,

Defendant.
___________________________________/

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint (“Motion”), which was referred to the undersigned by United States
District Judge Melissa Damian. (DE 85, DE 86). For the reasons set forth below, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion be GRANTED and that the Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. OVERVIEW
This is a civil rights case brought by the personal representative of the Estate of Cedric
Levon Williams (the “Estate”), arising from Williams’ death while incarcerated as an inmate in
the Florida prison system. The current complaint (DE 82) represents the Estate’s third effort to
plead viable claims in this case. By previous orders, the District Judge1 dismissed two earlier

1 United States District Judge Aileen M. Cannon was the presiding District Judge at the time the
initial complaint was dismissed. This case has since been reassigned to United States District
Judge Melissa Damian. (DE 43).
versions of the complaint, each time allowing leave to amend to cure pleading deficiencies. (DE
40, DE 68). All the while, the Estate’s counsel reported that he was gathering documents via
discovery in an effort to plead the facts necessary to survive dismissal. (DE 26 at 3-4, DE 47 at
7-8). In the most recent order of dismissal, the District Judge warned that no further

amendments would be allowed. (DE 68 at 3).
II. FACTS
The Court accepts the following facts as true, taken from the SAC. Prior to his death,
Williams was serving a term of incarceration at the South Bay Corrections Center. (DE 82 ¶ 7).
The Geo Group, Inc. (“GEO”), a private facility, operates the South Bay Corrections Center
pursuant to a contract with the State of Florida. (DE 82 ¶ 7). During his time of incarceration,
Williams suffered from high blood pressure and diabetes. (DE 82 ¶ 13). On April 12, 2022,
Williams complained of “shortness of breath with severe productive cough,” as well as “chest
pain with abdominal discomfort.” (DE 82 ¶ 17). He also expressed “concern that his condition
was getting worse not better.” (DE 82 ¶ 17). According to the SAC, Williams was “ignored

despite the emergency situation.” (DE 82 ¶ 17).
Sixteen days later, on April 28, 2022, “it was reported that [Williams’] medical condition
worsened.” (DE 82 ¶ 19). The SAC does not specify who made this report or to whom it was
made. According to the SAC, Williams “suffered shortness of breath on exertion and feeling
tired progressively.” (DE 82 ¶ 19). The same day, prison officials transported Williams to
Palms West Hospital. (DE 82 ¶ 19). At the hospital, Williams exhibited “shortness of breath
that rapidly progressed to a significant functional limitation,” as well as “orthopnea.” (DE 82 ¶
19).

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Ten days later, on May 7, 2022, Williams was transferred from Palms West Hospital to
JFK Medical Center. (DE 82 ¶ 20). The SAC does not explain the reasons for the transfer.
Eight days later, on May 15, 2022, Williams passed away at JFK Medical Center from a
myocardial infarction (a heart attack). (DE 82 ¶ 20).

Based on the above events, the Estate alleges a claim against GEO for deliberate
indifference to Williams’ serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Estate alleges that “[h]ad Mr. Williams been taken to
the hospital promptly when he complained [on April 12, 2022], his life would have been saved.”
(DE 82 ¶ 19).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
By way of this Motion, GEO seeks dismissal of the SAC with prejudice pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (DE 85). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, the Court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” a mere “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Instead, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

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IV. DISCUSSION
The SAC alleges a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy against
“every person” who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. (DE 82 ¶¶ 13-21). When a private company like

GEO contracts with the state to perform a function traditionally performed by the state, the
private company acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. See Brown v. GEO
Group, No. 18-80026-CV, 2019 WL 13410738, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2019), R. & R.
adopted, 2019 WL 13410737 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2019) (“The law is well established that prisoners
in privately run prisons can bring § 1983 actions against the prison companies and their
employees.”) (cleaned up).
Here, the SAC alleges that GEO violated Williams’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by failing to provide him with timely medical care, thereby causing his death. (DE 82 ¶¶
13-21). Because the Estate has chosen to sue GEO itself rather than the individual agents or
employees of GEO, the Estate must satisfy the standard for entity-level § 1983 liability set forth

in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This requires the Estate to
plead facts to show (1) that an underlying Eighth Amendment violation took place, and (2) that
GEO can be held responsible for the violation under the standards set forth in Monell.
GEO argues that the SAC fails to allege sufficient facts to satisfy either prong. As set
forth below, the Court agrees.
A. The Underlying Eighth Amendment Violation
To establish a § 1983 claim in an Eighth Amendment medical-needs case, a plaintiff must
allege facts to show (1) a serious medical need, (2) the defendant’s deliberate indifference to that

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need, and (3) causation between the indifference and the plaintiff’s injury. Rutledge v. Alabama,
724 F. App'x 731, 735 (11th Cir. 2018). A “serious medical need” is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,

1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). “Deliberate indifference” requires a plaintiff to allege facts
that show prison officials had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, that they
disregarded that risk, and that they acted with more than gross negligence. Hoffer v. Sec’y,
Florida Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020).
When a plaintiff attempts to bring an Eighth Amendment claim based on delay in
receiving medical treatment, the plaintiff must show that the delay exacerbated the injury or
unnecessarily prolonged the plaintiff’s pain. See Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592 F.3d
1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010). In evaluating a delay claim, courts look to several factors including
the nature of the medical need, the reason for the delay, and the effect of the delay on the
prisoner’s medical condition. See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007).

The delay must amount to more than mere negligence, as “a complaint that a physician has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976).
Turning to the allegations here, the Court finds the Estate once again fails to plead facts
that show plausible Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violations. Most notably, the SAC makes
clear that Williams spent the last eighteen days of his life under hospital care, first at Palms West
Hospital and then at JFK Medical Center. (DE 82 ¶ 20). In the Court’s view, the SAC fails to
“connect the dots” between Williams’ death (after eighteen days in the hospital) and any action

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or inaction by GEO. Indeed, the SAC offers only a single sentence to support causation, alleging
that “[h]ad Mr. Williams been taken to the hospital promptly when he complained [on April 12,
2022], his life would have been saved.” (DE 82 ¶ 19). But the SAC offers no additional facts or
circumstances to make this allegation plausible. A complaint must do more than make

conclusory, boilerplate allegations; it must allege sufficient factual matter to state a claim of
relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Here, the SAC’s allegations leave more questions than answers as to the nature of
Williams’ medical needs, GEO’s alleged deliberate indifference towards them, and the reasons
for Williams’ death. Among other problems:
• The SAC alleges that Williams suffered from diabetes and high blood pressure,
(DE 82 ¶ 13), but it remains unclear if, how, or why these conditions contributed
to his death.
• The SAC alleges that Williams complained about his medical condition on April

12, 2022 (DE 82 ¶ 17), but it remains unclear who received this complaint or
whether Williams made additional complaints after April 12, 2022.
• In fact, the SAC is completely silent as to what happened between April 12, 2022
and April 28, 2022.2

2 GEO has moved for sanctions against the Estate, arguing that the SAC’s silence concerning this
time period warrants the imposition of sanctions. (DE 91). Specifically, GEO claims it has
produced records to the Estate showing that, from April 12, 2022 to April 28, 2022, Williams
received medical care from GEO eleven times, including an X-ray, lab work, and multiple visits
with doctors and nurses. (DE 91 at 2-6). In deciding the instant Motion, the Court has restricted
its analysis solely to the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the SAC. The Court has not
considered the arguments set forth in GEO’s sanctions motion or the truth or falsity of the claims
made there.
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• On April 28, 2022, the SAC alleges that, “it was reported that [Williams’] medical
condition worsened.” (DE 82 ¶ 19). It remains unclear who made this report,
who received this report, and exactly how Williams’ medical condition had
worsened.

• The SAC further alleges that Williams was transported to Palms West Hospital on
April 28, 2022, but it remains unclear why the transport decision was made, apart
from an allegation that Williams had “shortness of breath on exertion and feeling
tired progressively.” (DE 82 ¶ 19).
• Nine days later, on May 7, 2022, Williams was transferred from Palms West
Hospital to JFK Medical Center. (DE 82 ¶ 20). Again, the SAC does not explain
the reasons for the transfer.
• Eight days later, on May 15, 2022, Williams passed away at JFK Medical Center
from a myocardial infarction (a heart attack). (DE 82 ¶ 20). Again, the SAC does

not explain the reasons for the heart attack, nor does it contain facts to show a
plausible causal link between the heart attack and any action or inaction of GEO.
In an Eighth Amendment medical-needs case, a § 1983 plaintiff must do more than allege
facts showing subpar medical care. Greene v. Dixon, No. 3:22-CV-799-BJD-PDB, 2022 WL
4384173, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2022). Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts to show a
“serious medical need,” a “deliberate indifference” to that need, and causation between the
indifference and the injury. Rutledge, 724 F. App’x at 735. The SAC here, like the prior
complaints before it, does not meet this standard. As such, the SAC must be dismissed.

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B. Monell Liability
In addition, because the Estate has chosen to sue GEO itself, the Estate must do more
than show an underlying Eighth Amendment violation. The Estate must also allege facts
sufficient to meet the demanding standard for municipal liability set forth in Monell, 436 U.S. at

658. See Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying Monell to a private
company that operated as the “functional equivalent of a municipality”). In Monell, the Supreme
Court recognized that municipalities qualify as “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. 436 U.S.
at 658. To demonstrate liability against a municipality, however, a plaintiff must do more than
show that the municipality employed a person who committed a constitutional violation, as the
doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions. Id. at 691. “[A] city is not
vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it
can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex.,
503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992).
The Supreme Court has defined three very narrow circumstances under which a

municipality can be held liable under § 1983. First, Monell recognizes § 1983 liability when the
municipality itself adopts a formal policy, rule, or regulation that causes constitutional violations.
436 U.S. at 658. Second, Monell recognizes that municipalities may follow informal customs or
practices that cause constitutional violations even though such customs or practices have “not
received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id. at 690-91
(cleaned up). To prove a custom or practice, a plaintiff must establish a widespread pattern of
conduct “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of
law.” Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991) (cleaned up).

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Third, the Supreme Court recognizes “limited circumstances” under which “failure to train” can
give rise to § 1983 liability. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). Specifically,
inadequate training “may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

contact.” Id. at 388.
In this case, the SAC attempts to proceed under the “informal custom or practice” theory.
The Estate alleges that, in 2018, the “Correctional Medical Authority” performed a records
review of the South Bay Corrections Center and concluded that eight of the sixteen records
reviewed showed that inmates “were not seen according to their medical grade status.” (DE 82 ¶
15). The Estate alleges this demonstrates an informal custom or practice of providing
“lackadaisical treatment of inmates with serious medical needs by permitting and tolerating
situations of such to exist.” (DE 82 ¶ 15). The Estate further alleges that this informal custom or
practice caused the Eighth Amendment violation at issue in this case, resulting in Williams’
death. (DE 82 ¶ 16).

The Court has reviewed the allegations of the SAC and finds them insufficient to
demonstrate Monell liability for at least three reasons. First, the Estate does not explain the role
of the “Correctional Medical Authority” or the meaning of the term “medical grade status.” It
remains unclear how these concepts relate to potential Eighth Amendment violations.
Next, even assuming these allegations could be interpreted to mean that GEO has a
custom or practice of delivering subpar medical care, this would be insufficient to show an
Eighth Amendment violation. As previously noted, mere delivery of subpar medical care does
not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1270 (noting that deliberate

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indifference requires a plaintiff to allege facts that show prison officials “acted with more than
gross negligence”).
Third and finally, the SAC fails to allege facts to connect Williams’ death to GEO’s
alleged custom or practice of failing to see inmates according to their medical grade status. For

instance, the SAC does not identify Williams’ medical grade status or explain the type of care he
should have received based on that status. Most importantly, the SAC does not explain – with
sufficient, plausible detail – how Williams’ death would have been prevented if he had been seen
according to his medical grade status. In short, the SAC does not meet the demanding standard
for entity-level liability set forth in Monell.
V. RECOMMENDATION & NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion (DE 85)
be GRANTED. Given that Plaintiff was afforded leave to amend on two other occasions, the
undersigned further RECOMMENDS dismissal WITH PREJUDICE of the Second Amended
Complaint.

The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with United
States District Judge Melissa Damian. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from
a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and
Recommendation and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
11th Cir. R. 3-1.

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IF A PARTY DOES NOT INTEND TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION, THE PARTY SHALL FILE A NOTICE TO THAT EFFECT
WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers at West Palm Beach in the Southern
District of Florida, this 10th day of September 2024.
□□ ye ie ee oe
Ue
RYON M. MCCABE
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767254. Public record. Not legal advice.