# Cortes v. Springfield Public Schools

> District Court, D. Oregon · September 24, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767175

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** September 24, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767175

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case, the court must dismiss the complaint, even sua sponte if necessary

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

MARIA CORTES, an Individual; YASMIN
STAUNAU, an individual; ALYSSA KENT, Case No. 6:23-cv-00680-MK
an individual; ARIN VANDERHOFF, an
individual; DENISE CLARK, an individual; FINDINGS AND
CHEMEN CLEARWATERS, an individual; RECOMMENDATION
KIRSTEN LaSHOT, an individual; LORI
UMENHOFER, an individual; SHELLEY
TONCRAY, an individual; SKYLAR NESTA,
an individual; STEPHANIE WEBSTER, an
individual; YESENIA SILVA, an individual;
WENDY WRAY-WILLIAMS, an individual;
CAROLINE McGILVARY, an individual; and
JULIE BUSTER, an individual,

Plaintiffs,
v.
SPRINGFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS, a
public body; SPRINGFIELD EDUCATORS
ASSOCIATION, a labor union; OREGON
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, a
labor union,
Defendants.

KASUBHAI, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiffs Maria Cortes, Yasmin Staunau, Alyssa Kent, Arin Vanderhoff, Denise Clark,
Chemen Clearwaters, Kirstin LaShot, Lori Umenhofer, Shelley Toncray, Skylar Nesta, Stephanie
Webster, Yesenia Silva, Wendy Wray-Williams, Caroline McGilvary, and Julie Buster,
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued their former employer Springfield Public Schools (“SPS”) and
two labor unions, Springfield Educator’s Association (“SEA”) and Oregon School Employees
Association (“OSEA”) alleging federal and state claims of employment and religious
discrimination. Before the Court is Defendant OSEA’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 67, pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to
OSEA’s motion. For the reasons below, Defendant’s motion should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are fifteen current and former employees of Defendant SPS who applied for
religious exemptions from their employer’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate but were placed on
indefinite unpaid administrative leave. Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 58. In August 2021, the
Oregon Health Authority mandated that employees in public school facilities be vaccinated
against COVID-19. Id. ¶ 53. Employees could seek religious exemptions to the mandate. Id. ¶
54. Plaintiffs allege that, when they sought religious exemptions, SPS “did not engage in a good-
faith, interactive exploration of potential accommodations,” but instead uniformly placed

exempted employees on indefinite administrative leave. Id. ¶¶ 62-64. Plaintiffs allege state and
federal religious discrimination claims and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment claim against
SPS, and a state law claim against Defendants OSEA and SEA for aiding and abetting religious
discrimination in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § (“ORS”) 659.030(1)(g).
As relevant to this motion, Defendant OSEA was the exclusive collective bargaining
representative for Plaintiffs Kent, Clark, Umenhofer, Toncray, Webster, Silva, and Buster, and
Defendant SEA was the exclusive bargaining representative for Plaintiffs Cortes, Staunau,
Vanderhoff, Clearwaters, LaShot, Nesta, Wray-Williams, and McGilvary. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants OSEA and SEA aided and abetted SPS’ religious discrimination in
violation of state law “by agreeing to allow [SPS] to place Plaintiffs on indefinite unpaid leave as
a so-called ‘accommodation.’” Id. ¶ 67. As the factual basis for this claim, Plaintiffs rely on
memorandums of agreement (MOAs) entered into by Defendants OSEA and SEA with
Defendant SPS related to the COVID-19 vaccine mandate. Id. ¶¶ 119-120, Exs. F, G.
STANDARDS1

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256
(2013) (quotation marks omitted). As such, courts must presume “that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations
omitted); see also Advanced Integrative Med. Sci. Institute, PLLC v. Garland, 24 F.4th 1249,
1256 (2022). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of
“subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be
forfeited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). An objection that a
particular court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by any party, or by the court on its

own initiative, at any time. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be either
“facial” or “factual.” See Edison v. U.S., 822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016). A facial attack on
subject matter jurisdiction is based on the assertion that the allegations contained in the
complaint are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. “A jurisdictional challenge is factual
where the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise

1 Although Defendant OSEA also moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), that standard is omitted
here because Defendant OSEA’s arguments under Rule 12(b)(1) are dispositive.
invoke federal jurisdiction.” Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013). A factual
attack on the plaintiff’s assertion of jurisdiction “contests the truth of the plaintiff's factual
allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside the pleadings.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig,
LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 614. See also Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1131

(9th Cir. 2012). A factual challenge “can attack the substance of a complaint’s jurisdictional
allegations despite their formal sufficiency.” Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.
1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Defendant OSEA argues (1) that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief against it
and (2) that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Court does not reach the first
argument because it agrees that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against
Defendant OSEA.
The sole claim asserted against OSEA is a state law claim for aiding and abetting
religious discrimination under ORS 659.030(1)(g). Under Section 659A.030(1)(g), it is an

unlawful employment practice “[f]or any person, whether an employer or employee, to aid, abet,
incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to
do so.” Plaintiffs allege that OSEA’s act of signing the MOA is the basis for their aiding and
abetting religious discrimination claim. Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim because Plaintiffs’ Complaint on its face establishes this
Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, it argues that, because the claim against
it is based on its duty of fair representation, the claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction on the
Employment Relations Board (“ERB”). Plaintiffs failed to file a response in opposition to
Defendant’s motion.
Under Oregon law, the duty of fair representation is one “created by statute and…a
breach of that duty constitutes an unfair labor practice.” Coleman v. Children's Servs. Div. of
Dep't of Hum. Res., 71 Or. App. 687, 690, 694 P.2d 555, 557 (1985). ERB has “exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all unfair labor practice complaints concerning public employers.” Id. at

692 (citation omitted); see also ORS 243.676 (providing that “[w]henever a written complaint is
filed alleging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice,” ERB
must investigate and make factual and legal findings); Ahern v. Oregon Pub. Emps. Union, 329
Or. 428, 435, 988 P.2d 364, 367 (1999) (ERB has “exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether
an unfair labor practice has been committed”).
Based on Plaintiffs’ allegations and analogous case law, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs’
claim as alleged is based on unfair labor practices which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
ERB. The basis for Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendant OSEA is its entry into an MOA with the
District. It is not based on any affirmative conduct of Defendant OSEA with respect to Plaintiffs
specifically, but rather:

Making matters worse is that the Unions – the SEA in the case of the Teachers’
Union Members, the OSEA in the case of the OSEA Members – as the exclusive
collective bargaining representatives for their respective groups of Plaintiffs, owed
Plaintiffs a duty of fair representation that required the Unions to act in their
members’ best interests. The Unions did no such thing: Instead, they actively aided
and abetted SPS’ discrimination against Plaintiffs by agreeing to allow the District
to place Plaintiffs on indefinite unpaid leave as a so-called “accommodation[.]”
Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 67 (emphasis added).
In Plaintiffs’ own words, their claim is one for breach of Defendant OSEA’s duty of fair
representation relative to its entry into the MOA with SPS, which is a complaint about unfair
labor practices. See Coleman, 71 Or. App. at 691 (“ERB’s determination that a violation of the
union’s duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice[] under ORS 243.672 is
reasonable…”). This also aligns with other cases which have explained that claims which are
premised on a violation of a union representative’s duty of fair representation implicate the
statute which imposes that duty, even if couched as other types of claims. See, e.g., Ahern, 329
Or. at 433 (a plaintiff cannot avoid ERB’s jurisdiction by alleging an unfair labor practice as an
element of another type of claim); Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 2008) (Where

state law claims are “inextricably linked to [a defendant’s] performance of duties owed in their
capacity as union representatives,” such claims are governed by labor law because the claims
depended on whether the defendant union violated its duty of fair representation).2
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claim on its face is based on
Defendant OSEA’s duty of fair representation related to its entry into an MOA, their claim is one
for unfair labor practices which is in the exclusive jurisdiction of ERB and this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, because the claims against Defendant SEA rest on the
same facts regarding its fair representation of Plaintiffs, see Fifth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67, 119, the
Court likewise lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. The Court must dismiss any case
over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Pistor v. Garcia,

791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
meaning it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case, the court must dismiss
the complaint, even sua sponte if necessary). Accordingly, the claim against SEA for aiding and
abetting should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the same
reasons.

2 Although the issue in this latter case was the preemption of state law claims by federal law—
which is not the question before the Court here—the analysis about the nature of claims based on
a duty of fair representation but pled as a different type of claim is equally applicable to this
case.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, Defendant OSEA’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 67) should be
GRANTED and the claims against it should be DISMISSED with prejudice. Further, the claims
against Defendant SEA should be DISMISSED with prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)
should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment or appealable order. The Findings
and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and
Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today’s date. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district
court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED this 24th day of September 2024.

s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him)
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10767175. Public record. Not legal advice.