# Strausbaugh v. Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex Sheriff's Office

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · August 13, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765736

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 13, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765736

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that magistrate judge must secure consent of all parties before acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

FARON TIMOTHY STRAUSBAUGH CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-1213

TERREBONNE PARISH CRIMINAL SECTION: “R”(3)
JUSTICE COMPLEX/SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, ET AL.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Faron Timothy Strausbaugh, a pretrial detainee, filed an ex parte
motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Rec. Doc. 6. The
motion and underlying matter were referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to
conduct a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit
proposed findings and recommendations for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915e(2), and § 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c)(1) and(2).1 Upon review of the record, the Court has determined that this
matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing and without need for a
response from defendants.2

1 Without consent of the parties, a magistrate judge is without jurisdiction to
issue a dispositive order on a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Ritter v. Cook, 45 F. App’x 325, 2002 WL 1899582, at *2 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing Withrow v. Roell, 288 F.3d 199, 204-05 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that magistrate
judge must secure consent of all parties before acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c))).

2 Summonses have issued for the identified defendants, but they have not yet
been served by the United States Marshal As defendants have not yet been properly
served, they have no notice of this motion and have thus not had an opportunity to
respond.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed this pro se and in forma pauperis civil action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. He named as defendants Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex/Sheriff’s

Office, Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, Terrebonne Parish Criminal
Justice Complex Medical Department, Nurse Tina, Rhonda Ledet, S. Bergeron,
Captain Martin, and Leland Autemeaux. In the complaint, plaintiff, who was
arrested on April 2, 2024, claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs relating to his Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome3 which culminated in
him being injured and hospitalized after he fainted and fell down a flight of stairs on

April 29, 2024.
Plaintiff specifically alleges that he complained of chest pains upon his arrest
on April 4, 2024, and was placed in the medical department for observation. Rec. Doc.
3 at 4. He claims he had seizures on April 6, 2024, and was taken to Chabert Medical
Center where he was treated. Id. at 4, 6. Upon his return, he was placed in medical
observation. Id. at 6. He was moved from medical to a dormitory on April 12, 2024,
but claimed he had chest pains on April 15, 2024. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was

taken to the medical department and placed in a restraint chair, but that “Nurse
Tina” refused to check his blood pressure. Id. At his request, he was returned to his
dorm. Id. at 7.

3 Wolff-Parkinson-White (WPW) syndrome is a congenital heart defect in which an
extra electrical pathway exists between the heart’s upper and lower chambers
resulting in a fast heartbeat. See https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/wolff-parkinson-white-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20354626.
2
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered chest pains again on April 26, 27 and 28, 2024,
and had blood pressure checks. Id. at 7. On April 29, 2024, when he suffered chest
pains, an inmate told him to sit down so plaintiff sat at the top of the stairs. Id. at 7.

Plaintiff alleges that he blacked out and toppled down the stairs. Id. at 7-8. He was
transported first to Chabert Medical and later t to Oschner Medical Center in New
Orleans, where he was treated. Id. at 8. According to plaintiff, he was told he was
suffering from complications of Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome and an ablation
procedure was recommended. Id. at 8. Since his return to the jail, he has been housed
in a medical cell. Id. at 10. As a result of the alleged medical indifference, plaintiff

seeks compensatory damages for his medical expenses and for pain and suffering. Id.
at 10. He also seeks to be released or moved to a different facility. Id.
II. Analysis
A. Request for a Temporary Restraining Order

In connection with his complaint, plaintiff has filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Rec. Docs. 6. Plaintiff claims that he
was taken out of the general population dorm and placed in a four-person medical
cell where he now has less privileges relating to showering and phone calls. He also
claims that he was placed on a commissary restriction for two weeks and denied
hygiene items and stationery for kicking a door. He alleges that his mental health is
being neglected. Specifically, he claims that he has been unable to see a doctor about
his depression and has been denied his psychiatric medications. He claims that he is
housed in a medical cell with two violent offender and is being denied recreation.

3
Plaintiff alleges that he fears for his life and requests that he be transferred to a
medical facility.
Despite plaintiff’s request, in part, for a temporary restraining order, his

motion must be construed solely as one for a preliminary injunction because the relief
he seeks would extend beyond the ten-day limit of a temporary restraining order.
Neal v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 76 F. App’x 543, 545 (5th Cir. 2003). The
remaining issue for purposes of this Report and Recommendation is the request for a
preliminary injunction.
B. Request for a Preliminary Injunction

“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (emphasis added); accord Louisiana ex rel.
Murrill v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No. 24-30399, 2024 WL 3452877, at *2 (5th
Cir. July 17, 2024) (“the historical purpose of a preliminary injunction … is to
maintain the status quo pending litigation.”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must make a clear showing that his case satisfies four criteria: (1) a

substantial likelihood exists that he will succeed on the merits of his claim; (2) a
substantial threat of imminent and irreparable harm exists if the injunction is not
granted; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any harm to defendants if the injunction
is granted; and (4) the injunction will not undermine the public interest. See Valley
v. Rapides Par. School Board, 118 F.3d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
Ingebresten v. Jackson Pub. School District, 88 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1996); Doe v.

4
Duncanville Indep. Sch. District, 994 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1993); Holland Am.
Insurance Co.. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985). A preliminary
injunction is therefore an “extraordinary remedy” which should be granted only if the

movant has carried the burden of persuasion on all four of the above prerequisites; a
failure to satisfy even one of the four factors requires denial of the preliminary
injunction. Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621
(5th Cir. 1985). As a result, “[t]he decision to grant a preliminary injunction is to be
treated as the exception rather than the rule.” Id.
Furthermore, in the prison setting, requests for a preliminary injunction are

“viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in
dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.’ ” Goff
v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211,
1214 (8th Cir.1982)). “Except in extreme circumstances,” the “federal courts are
reluctant to interfere” with matters of prison administration and management,
including prison discipline and classification of inmates. Young v. Wainwright, 449
F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir.1971) (affirming denial of injunction to obtain release from

administrative segregation). For the reasons below, plaintiff has not established that
the exceptional remedy of a preliminary injunction is warranted in this case.
First, the allegations in plaintiff’s motion are that jail officials are failing to
treat his psychological condition and are violating his rights in other ways, including
restricting his recreation and hygiene, access to commissary, ability to make
telephone calls, and potentially access to the courts. Yet this lawsuit concerns his

5
medical care related to his Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome and the injuries
resulting from a fall on April 29, 2024. Therefore, the requests in plaintiff’s motion
are not appropriate in the context of this lawsuit. Rather, as the U.S. Court of appeals

for the Eighth Circuit has explained:
A court issues a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit to preserve the
status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court has an
opportunity to rule on the lawsuit’s merits. See Dataphase Sys., Inc., v.
C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 & n. 5 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Thus,
a party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a
relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the
conduct asserted in the complaint. See Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528
F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1975). It is self-evident that [plaintiff]’s
motion for temporary relief has nothing to do with preserving the
district court’s decision-making power over the merits of [plaintiff]’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. To the contrary, [plaintiff]’s motion is based on
new assertions of mistreatment that are entirely different from the
claim raised and the relief requested in his inadequate medical
treatment lawsuit. Although these new assertions might support
additional claims against the same prison officials, they cannot provide
the basis for a preliminary injunction in this lawsuit. See Stewart v.
United States I.N.S., 762 F.2d 193, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1985).

Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). See also
Power v. Starks, No. 4:16-CV-00045, 2017 WL 2062940, at *1 (N.D. Miss. May 12,
2017) (“Because a preliminary injunction depends on the prisoner’s likelihood of
success on the merits, a district court should not issue an injunction when the
injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying
wholly outside the issues in the suit. Accordingly, courts have routinely declined to
grant a prisoner injunctive relief related to conduct unrelated to the underlying
claims of his lawsuit.” (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)); Lando &
Anastasi, LLP v. Innovention Toys, L.L.C., Civ. Action No. 15-154, 2015 WL
6
12564201, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2015) (“[W]hile a preliminary injunction is
appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be
granted finally, a district court should not issue an injunction when the injunction in

question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside
the issues in the suit.” (quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Schwartz v. United
States Department of Justice, Civ. Action No. 06-5581, 2007 WL 2916465, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2007) (“A preliminary injunction grants intermediate relief of the same
character as that which may be granted finally. When the movant seeks intermediate
relief beyond the claims in the complaint, the court is powerless to enter a preliminary

injunction.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Here, plaintiff is requesting immediate court intervention with respect to his
allegations that defendants are now retaliating against him. Yet he does not explain
how his instant request is in any way aimed at preserving the status quo with respect
to the claims in this lawsuit, which concern the medical treatment of his Wolff-
Parkinson-White syndrome, which made him faint and fall. As a result, he has not
established that the immediate relief he seeks is appropriate and necessary.4

If plaintiff believes that other of his constitutional rights are being violated,
his recourse, after exhausting his administrative remedies as required by 28 U.S.C.

4 The Court notes that, while plaintiff claims that he is being denied treatment
and medication for his psychiatric condition, records show that no psychiatric
medication prescriptions were on file at his pharmacy. Rec. Doc. 15-1 at 249.
Additionally, plaintiff, at his request, was referred to see Dr. Lo about his depression
on June 4, 2024, but plaintiff twice refused to see the doctor. Rec. Doc. 15-2 at 13.
Nonetheless, the medical staff indicated that they would “try again.” Id.
7
§ 1997e(a), is to file a separate lawsuit asserting those claims against the individuals
allegedly violating that right and, if appropriate, then to seek the injunctive relief he
desires in that lawsuit.

Even if the Court broadly construes plaintiff’s motion to be based on
defendants’ treatment of his Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome and the injuries
resulting from his fall on April 29, 2024, he is still not entitled to relief. At this stage
of the litigation, plaintiff has failed to establish the first element, a likelihood of
success on the merits of his deliberate indifference claim.
After reviewing the allegations in the lawsuit, the undersigned held a status

conference on June 3, 2024 and ordered jail officials to provide both this Court and
plaintiff with certified copies of his medical records. Rec. Doc. 11. Those records were
produced and provided to plaintiff for his use in this case and were filed into this
federal record under seal. See Rec. Docs. 15-1 and 15-2. The records show that
plaintiff has consistently received medical treatment since his arrest on April 4, 2024.
• Plaintiff was treated by emergency medical personnel prior to being
brought to the facility on April 4, 2024. Rec. Doc. 15-1 at 299. The next
day, April 5, 2024, plaintiff fainted in the jail medical department. Id.
at 295. He complained of chest pains and was placed in a restraint chair.
Id. His blood pressure and pulse were monitored, and he remained in
the chair for observation. Id.

• On April 6, 2024, plaintiff’s medical examination at the jail was
completed. Id. at 296-97. Plaintiff reported that he took mental health
medications and further reported that he had prescriptions at
Walmart’s pharmacy—a claim that ultimately could not be verified. Id.
at 297.5

5 On April 15, 2024, Walmart Pharmacy, the pharmacy provided by plaintiff, was
called to verify plaintiff’s prescription medications. Rec. Doc. 15-1 at 249; see id. at
296. No prescriptions for psychiatric medications were on file. Id.
8
• Later that day, plaintiff was brought to Chabert Medical Center due to
an inability to urinate. Id. at 268-81, 291-94. The transporting officer
reported that plaintiff had a vomiting and “shaking episode” en route.
Id. at 268, 272. Plaintiff had a seizure-like episode as well as an episode
of vomiting in the emergency department. Id. at 266. Plaintiff reported
that he had recently ingested an unknown substance believing it to be
methamphetamine. Id. at 268, 272. The examining physician opined
that it was a possible seizure but also possible secondary gain from
seizure. Id. at 272. A head CT was normal. Id. at 271. Plaintiff was
treated for urinary retention. Id. at 273. His condition was stable upon
release, and he was referred to a neurologist and urologist. Id. at 273,
279-80.6

• On April 7,2024, plaintiff was brought to the medical department after
he fell in his cell. Id. at 283. He was observed having random movements
lasting about thirty seconds. Id. He then held his breath and spit all
over. Id. Minutes later, he spoke clearly and asked to return to his cell.
Id.

• On April 8, 2024, plaintiff was brought to the medical department for
vomiting. Id. at 282. His vitals were normal and his speech clear. Id. He
was given an anti-nausea medication and returned to his cell. Id. On
April 11, 2024, plaintiff was removed from medical observation as his
condition was stable and he was moved into general population. Id. at
250.

• The records reflect that plaintiff was injured when he fell down a flight
of stairs on April 29, 2024. Id. at 236-39, 242-43. He was taken to
Chabert Medical Center, where he was examined and underwent
imaging and other testing. Id. at 202-19. The examining physician
opined that a seizure was unlikely and diagnosed plaintiff with syncope
and collapse. Id. at 217-18.

• Plaintiff was transferred to Ochsner Medical Center in New Orleans for
a neurology and cardiology consult. Id. at 217, 219, 222-34, 251-67. An
MRI of his spine showed no evidence of traumatic malalignment or acute
fracture. Id. at 222. Examination revealed some decreased sensation in

6 The records indicate that plaintiff was seen by the medical department for
complaints of tooth pain and difficulty urinating on April 21 and 23, 2024. Rec. Doc.
15-1 at 241, 248. Those records do not indicate that plaintiff complained of chest pain.
Id. at 240-41, 248.

9
upper and lower extremities and diffuse weakness, possibly effort
dependent Id. at 230, 233-34. EEG was normal. Id. at 227-28. The
examining physician opined that the episode was cardiac syncope rather
than seizure-like activity. Id. at 230, 234. An outpatient ablation was
recommended. Id. at 225. Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on
May 1, 2024. Id. at 193-201.

• On May 18, 2024, plaintiff requested to be seen for complaints of
palpitations and chest pains. Id. at 473. On May 19, 2024, plaintiff
complained of severe pain in his back, hips and neck and a headache. Id.
at 477. He was examined that same day and no distress was noted. He
was told he could request over the counter medication for pain. Id. at
473, 477. He was examined on May 21, 2024 due to a complaint of tooth
pain. Id. at 476. No abscess was found and there was no need for
antibiotics. Id.

• On May 22, 2204, he again complained of tooth pain but declined to be
seen when he was called. Id. at 475. He was placed on the medical call
list again at his request, but later refused to see Dr. Lo. Id. Plaintiff
complained of difficulty urinating on May 24 and 27, 2024 and was
examined and treated. Id. at 472, 474.

• On May 31, 2024, plaintiff attended an outside cardiology appointment.
Id. at 465-70. He had complied with medications as prescribed. Id. at
465. The nurse practitioner noted that plaintiff previously underwent
an ablation in February 2018 but had recurrence of pre-excitation. Id.
An electrophysiology study showed low risk pathway. Id. A follow-up
appointment is scheduled for September 3, 2024. Rec. Doc. 15-2 at 2.

• The most recent records show that plaintiff was place on a dental list
and started on an antibiotic and pain medication due to an abscess in
his mouth on June 2, 2024. Id. at 14-15. On June 4, 2024, he requested
to see Dr. Lo about his depression and was referred, but twice refused
to see the doctor. Id. at 13. On June 6, 2024, plaintiff complained of back,
leg and tailbone pain. Id. at 12. He was to continue on Naproxen with a
plan to re-evaluate upon completion of the prescription. Id. He continued
to complain of pain on June 7, 2024. Id. at 10. He was already taking a
pain medication, but was prescribed hot showers, massage therapy and
mild exercises. Id. He was later observed to have no difficulty changing
positions from laying to sitting and had no complaints. Id. at 11. He had
no complaints when the nurse saw him later that day. Id.

10
Along with the recitation set forth above based on the medical records, plaintiff
stated at the status conference on June 3, 2024, that he is taking his heart medication
and wearing a heart monitor. See Rec. Doc. 11. Defense counsel confirmed that

plaintiff is housed in a medical cell immediately outside the medical department and
that plaintiff has additional appointments scheduled outside the jail. See id.
For these reasons, there is not a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will
ultimately succeed on the merits of his inadequate medical care claim. On the
contrary, such claims rarely succeed, mainly because a prisoner’s federal
constitutional right to medical care is extremely limited.

“The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right not to have
their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the
confining officials.”7 Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
marks omitted)). “A serious medical need is one for which treatment has been
recommended or for which the need is so apparent that even laymen would recognize
that care is required.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006).
As to the “deliberate indifference” requirement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit has explained:
Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. It is
indisputable that an incorrect diagnosis by prison medical personnel
does not suffice to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Rather, the
plaintiff must show that officials refused to treat him, ignored his
complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any

7 In the discussion of this medical claim, the Court cites to cases decided under both
the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment because the duty involved is identical
regardless of whether the claim is asserted by a pretrial detainee or a convicted
prisoner. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019).
11
similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any
serious medical needs. Furthermore, the decision whether to provide
additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical
judgment. And, the failure to alleviate a significant risk that the official
should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to show deliberate
indifference.

Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). “Deliberate indifference encompasses only
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Stewart v.
Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999).
“Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do
not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does an inmate’s disagreement with his
medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. For
example, “the question of whether ... additional ... forms of treatment [are] indicated
is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 107 (1976). Generally, such matters of professional medical judgment are better
left to the medical expertise of physicians rather than to the legal expertise of judges.
Henry v. Higgins, No. Civ. A. 12-1886, 2013 WL 1694864, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Apr. 18,
2013).
To succeed on a deliberate-indifference claim, plaintiff must show (1)
defendants were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and (2) the defendants drew that inference.
Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)); Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003). Thus,
12
here, plaintiff must show defendants “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
clearly evidence a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Brewster v.

Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756).
It is doubtful that plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference. Here, the
records show that plaintiff has received extensive and ongoing medical treatment,
including emergency care at outside hospitals several times since his arrest on April
4, 2024. “[M]edical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnosis, and medications
may rebut an inmate’s allegations of deliberate indifference.” Banuelos v. McFarland,

41F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995). While plaintiff may believe that his medical
treatment by defendants has been subpar, the fact that a prisoner’s medical care
“may not have been the best money could buy” is insufficient to establish a federal
violation. Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.1992); see also Gobert, 463 F.3d at
349 (“[D]eliberate indifference exists wholly independent of an optimal standard of
care.”); McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.1978). Moreover, if an inmate
has in fact received medical treatment, federal constitutional protections are not

violated just because that treatment failed or because pain persisted despite the
treatment. Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; Williams v. Chief of Medical Operations, Tarrant
County Jail, No. 94-10115, 1994 WL 733493, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 1994); Kron v.
Tanner, Civ. Action No. 10-518, 2010 WL 3199854, at *7 (E.D. La. May 19, 2010),
adopted, 2010 WL 3171040 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2010). Further, the U.S. Constitution
does not require even that an inmate’s medical care be free from negligence or medical

13
malpractice. Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693, 697–98 (5th Cir.1999); see also Kelly v.
Gusman, Civ. Action No. 07-611, 2007 WL 2007992, at *4 (E.D. La. July 5, 2007);
Cerna v. Texas Tech Medical Staff, No. 2:03-CV-0322, 2004 WL 42602, at *2 (N.D.

Tex. Jan. 7, 2004). Claims of negligence or malpractice present issues of state law for
state courts, not federal constitutional issues for a federal court. See Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Cerna, 2004 WL 42602, at *2
That plaintiff opines that more could have been done for him and with greater
alacrity is of little moment. Absent exceptional circumstances, a prisoner’s
disagreement with his medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference.

Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. For example, “the question of whether ... additional ... forms
of treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment,”
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107, and federal courts are therefore generally loath to second-
guess such medical decisions in federal civil rights actions. Westlake v. Lucas, 537
F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir.1976) (“Where a prisoner has received some medical
attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims

which sound in state tort law.”); Castro v. Louisiana, Civ. Action No. 08-4248, 2008
WL 5169401, at *4 (E.D .La. Dec. 8, 2008) (“[M]edical judgments are not to be lightly
second-guessed in a federal civil rights action.”).
At this early stage of the proceedings, such second-guessing is inappropriate,
especially when, as here, the records presented demonstrate that plaintiff has
consistently received medical treatment since his arrest on April 4, 2024. Therefore,

14
it is recommended that plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction be denied and
that any decision on the constitutionality of his medical care should instead be
resolved on dispositive motions or, if necessary, at trial. See, e.g., Zuniga v. University

Health Sys., 71 F. App’x 293 (5th Cir.2003) (conclusional allegations of irreparable
harm are insufficient to warrant immediate injunctive relief); Taylor v. Berry, Civ.
Action No. 2:05CV381, 2007 WL 1536796 (S.D. Miss. May 23, 2007) (denying a motion
for a preliminary injunction because “[i]f plaintiff’s claims regarding his medical
treatment are meritorious, appropriate relief may be awarded or obtained at trial”).
If this recommendation is accepted, this matter will remain referred to the

undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge and plaintiff’s underlying claims will be further
considered once defendants have been served and responded to the complaint.
C. Request for Transfer
Finally, plaintiff requests to be released or transferred to another facility. But
there is no constitutional right to be housed in any particular facility or to be
transferred from one facility to another, even if medical treatment in one prison may
be preferable to that in another. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 245-46 (1983);

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-225 (1976); Fuselier v. Mancuso, 354 F. App’x
49, 49 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Olim, 461 U.S. at 245); Biliski v. Harborth, 55 F.3d 160,
162 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, plaintiff’s transfer request lacks support. Jones v.
LeBlanc, Civ. Action No. 10-0346, 2013 WL 3148634, at *9 (W.D. La. June 19, 2013);
Hymel v. Champagne, Civ. Action No. 07-450, 2007 WL 1030207, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar.
28, 2007).

15
Beyond the doubts outlined above concerning plaintiff’s likelihood of success
on the merits, none of the other three bases for a preliminary injunction have been
demonstrated on this record. There is no substantial threat of irreparable injury if

plaintiff is not transferred. The record shows that plaintiff is receiving medical care
both at the jail and outside. He has a follow-up appointment with an outside medical
professional scheduled for September 3, 2024. Rec. Doc. 15-2 at 2. Should the Court
ultimately determine that the named defendants were intentionally indifferent to a
serious medical need, plaintiff’s pain can be redressed with monetary compensation.
“The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be

available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against
a claim of irreparable harm.” Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1975).
It also has not been shown that plaintiff’s risk of injury outweighs the potential
harm to legitimate prison administrative functions that would result from the kind
of intrusive court intervention in prison affairs requested by plaintiff. This is true
especially given courts’ “reluctan[ce] to interfere” with matters of prison
administration. Accord Young, 449 F.2d at 339. Thus, consistent with the fourth

factor, courts have a long tradition of avoiding a disservice to the common interest.
In this case, that common interest reflects the prison official’s discretion to manage
their facilities and services provided that they do so within constitutional bounds.
Thus, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden and his motion should be denied.

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RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiffs motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, Rec. Doc. 6, be DENIED.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party
has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 14380 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13 day of August, 2024.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765736. Public record. Not legal advice.