# Menchu v. Multnomah County Health Department

> District Court, D. Oregon · August 16, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765692

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** August 16, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765692

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that employer’s scolding and threatening of plaintiff’s job was not an adverse employment action in retaliation context
- holding that intervening event negated any inference that plaintiff’s protected activity caused the subsequent adverse action

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

JERRY ALEXANDER MENCHU, Ca se No. 3:20-cv-00559-AR

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION
v.

MULTNOMAH COUNTY HEALTH
DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.
_____________________________________

ARMISTEAD, Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Jerry Menchu, representing himself, brings this lawsuit against his employer, the
Multnomah County Health Department. Menchu is Mayan, Guatemalan, and of Hispanic
ethnicity. His first language is Spanish, and he speaks English with a Spanish accent. (First Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 12-13, ECF No. 20.)
Menchu began working as an on-call Spanish interpreter for the Department in 2013. He
remains on-call as an interpreter, although he has not performed any work for the Department

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since 2020. Menchu alleges that, during his employment, the Department discriminated against
him based on his race and national origin by classifying him as a temporary on-call employee
and treating him differently from regular, fulltime employees: he brings claims for disparate
treatment based on race or national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.), Oregon’s statutory parallel (ORS §§ 659A.001, et seq.), and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981) (Claim 1). Menchu also alleges that
the Department retaliated against him for complaints he made in 2018 and 2019, in violation of
federal law—specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII (Claim 2), and in violation of Oregon
Revised Statutes §§ 659A.030(1)(f), 659A.199, and 659A.203 (Claim 3). Finally, Menchu

alleges that the Department violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d)
by using federal funds for a discriminatory purpose (Claim 4). (Compl. ¶¶ 49-78.)
The Department moves for summary judgment on each of Menchu’s claims. It argues
that Menchu’s claims are untimely, that the conduct Menchu alleges does not constitute adverse
employment actions, that there is no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent, and that the
Department had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions it took. (Def.’s Mot. at 2,
ECF No. 80.)
The court agrees that Menchu cannot show that discriminatory or retaliatory intent
motivated any adverse employment actions against him. Accordingly, the Department’s motion

for summary judgment should be granted.
\ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \
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BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed. The Multnomah County Health Department
employed Menchu as an on-call interpreter from 2013 through 20201 to interpret between
Spanish and English for clinic patients. The Department has seven clinics throughout Multnomah
County. (Mora Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 82.) As an on-call interpreter, Menchu was not an employee
of any specific clinic. Instead, he worked across multiple clinics, and could be scheduled to
interpret at more than one clinic in a single day. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 16; Menchu Dep. at 60:15-20, ECF
No. 89-1 at 1282-1344.) As an on-call employee, Menchu did not have a set schedule and his
hours and number of assignments varied from day to day and week to week. (Mora Decl. ¶ 12;

Hazeem Dep. at 11:19–13:11, ECF No. 100 at 66-74; see also Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 1, ECF
No. 81.) Typically, on-call employees at the Department are expected to work no more than 20
hours per week. (Mora Decl. ¶ 13; Menchu Dep. at 231:20–232:22; D’Agostini Dep. at 30:14-18,
ECF No. 100 at 77-88.) But Menchu consistently worked more than 20 hours per week, often
exceeding 40 hours per week, between 2016 and early 2020. (See Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 1.)
On-call interpreters’ appointments were scheduled through Language Services. Language
Services would receive a notification when a patient requested an interpreter. Sometimes, a
patient indicated a preferred interpreter, in which case Language Services would schedule that
interpreter for the appointment, if available. (Hazeem Dep. at 8:06-17, 21:22-25.) Interpreters

could also pick up appointments if they were present in a clinic when the clinic needed an

1 Menchu remains an on-call interpreter for the Department, but has not been scheduled to
work any hours since April 2020, when the Department switched to using outside vendors to
provide interpreters. (Mora Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9; Menchu Dep. 242:23-243:20.) Menchu does not allege
that the Department either discriminated or retaliated against him by switching to vendors in
April 2020. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12-48.)

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interpreter. (Mora Decl. ¶ 13; see also Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 5 at 72.) Employees of the
individual clinics did not know in advance when a given interpreter would be present in a clinic.
(Mora Decl. ¶ 17.) On-call interpreters did not have badge access in the clinics where they
worked. Instead, they had to check in with the clinic’s front desk when they arrived at each
clinic, and were then allowed into non-public areas of the clinic. (Id. ¶ 16; Menchu Dep. at
79:02–80:03.)
Each clinic has its own budget that is billed when it uses on-call interpreters. (Mora Decl.
¶ 8.) From 2013 to 2020, the Department used both on-call employee interpreters (like Menchu)
and outside vendors to interpret in the clinics. (Id. ¶ 6.) In April 2020, because of the COVID-19

pandemic, the Department stopped in-person interpretation and began exclusively scheduling
vendors, who were already interpreting over the phone. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Department continues to
use vendors exclusively. (Id. ¶ 10.) Using vendors makes scheduling easier because the vendors
manage requests and ensure available interpreters. The Department also uses Oregon Health Plan
(OHP) preferred vendors, which ensures that the Department does not have to pay for
interpretation for OHP-insured patients. (Id. ¶ 8.)
A. Menchu’s Complaints and Responses
In August 2015, Menchu filed a report with Multnomah County’s Office of Equity and
Inclusion, asserting that clinic staff had not allowed a different interpreter into the back office to

fax her timesheet, telling both Menchu and the other interpreter that they could not come into the
non-public areas of the clinic without an escort. (Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 3 at 3-5.) Menchu
complained that the conduct was discriminatory. (See id.) The next month, a supervisor emailed
clinic staff that they should let on-call interpreters into the back office to fax their timesheets,

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and that interpreters did not need escorts. The email also instructed that interpreters “should not
linger or visit with staff.” (ECF No. 89-1 at 324.) After that, Menchu did not have any issues
accessing the fax machine. (Menchu Dep. at 128:20-24.)
In May 2016, Menchu filed a report with the County, noting that he had been asked to
make reminder calls to patients on his personal phone after he was clocked out. Menchu reported
that he believed the practice violated HIPAA. In September, a County attorney responded that
Menchu and other interpreters would be asked only to make calls during work hours and from a
County office. (Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 4 at 1.)
In April 2017, Menchu and other interpreters filed a complaint with the Oregon Health

Authority (OHA), alleging that the Department was violating Title VI, state law, and Section
1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act by using multilingual staff to interpret
for patients. Soon after, Menchu filed a substantially similar complaint with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. (Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 5 at 1-5, 14-16; Pl.’s
Resp. at 54, ECF No. 89; ECF No. 89-1 at 1035.) The on-call interpreters pointed out that they
were required to be qualified, and had obtained the necessary credentials to become qualified.
(Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 5 at 20.) In contrast, they said, multilingual staff were not qualified
and should not be interpreting for patients. (Id. at 4-5.) Menchu sent another complaint to HHS
in October 2019, and to the County and OHA in November 2019, about the use of multilingual

staff. (See Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 12 at 1; ECF No. 89-1 at 1090-94.) HHS investigated the
matter and eventually determined that the Department was in compliance with Title VI and
Section 1557. (Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 12 at 2.)
In July 2018, Menchu began emailing Multnomah County’s Human Resources (HR)

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office about why he did not receive cost of living adjustments (COLAs) and other benefits,
despite working a fulltime schedule. (ECF No. 89-1 at 936-37; Bannon Moore Decl. Ex 6 at 1.)
Two HR employees met with Menchu that month and again in August. (ECF No. 89-1 at 837-
38.) As a result of those meetings, HR requested the creation of a new classification for
interpreters, which was approved in September 2018. (Murphy Decl. Ex. 1 at 4, ECF No. 83.)
Effective October 3, 2018, all interpreters were moved to the new classification, which provided
a pay raise from $18.04 to $20.48 per hour and eligibility for yearly COLAs. (Id. at 4-5.) The
new classification allowed interpreters to be hired as fulltime regular employees, if any clinic
had the need and budget for a fulltime interpreter. (Id. ¶ 5.) Based on the HR employees’

statements to him during the August and September meetings, Menchu believed that he would
soon be moved into a fulltime position with full benefits. (See ECF No. 89-1 at 946, 960.) But no
clinic ever hired a fulltime interpreter and Menchu never received a fulltime position. (Murphy
Decl. ¶ 5.)
In November 2018, Menchu filed an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) complaint with the
Oregon Employment Relations Board, asserting that the Department was discriminating against
him by continuing to classify him as an on-call employee. (Bannon Moore Decl. Ex. 7 at 1, 16-
17.) He argued that he should be classified as, and receive the benefits of, a regular fulltime
employee. (Id. at 11-12.) Menchu withdrew his ULP complaint in August 2019. (Bannon Moore

Decl. Ex. 11 at 1-2.)
In February 2019, Menchu filed a complaint with Oregon’s Bureau of Labor and
Industries (BOLI), alleging discrimination on the basis of age, race, and national origin. (Bannon
Moore Decl. Ex. 8 at 1.) After obtaining counsel in April (id. at 8), he amended his BOLI

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complaint in July to add claims for retaliation. (Id. at 4.) In April 2020, Menchu filed this
lawsuit.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A party
seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party demonstrates no
issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify
facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. A party cannot defeat a summary judgment

motion by relying on the allegations set forth in the complaint, on unsupported conjecture, or on
conclusory statements. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003).
Summary judgment thus should be entered against “a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629,
631 (9th Cir. 2014); Hernandez, 343 F.3d at 1112. All reasonable doubt as to the existence of a
genuine issue of fact should be resolved against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d

429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976). But deference to the nonmoving party has limits. The nonmoving party
must set forth “specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). The “mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position [is] insufficient.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Chong v. STL Int’l, Inc., 152 F. Supp.

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3d 1305, 1309 (D. Or. 2016). Therefore, where “the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quotation
marks omitted).
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Before addressing the substance of Menchu’s claims, the court resolves two preliminary
arguments raised by the Department: that (1) much of Menchu’s evidence must be excluded and
(2) Menchu’s claims are untimely as to most of the conduct alleged.
A. Evidentiary Objections

The court first addresses the Department’s objections to Menchu’s evidence. Menchu
attached one document, containing 100 exhibits, to his Response to the Department’s Motion.
(ECF No. 89-1.) The Department objects to some of those exhibits, or portions of them, on the
bases that those exhibits are irrelevant, are inadmissible, lack foundation, or reference events
outside the statute of limitations. It also objects to any portions of the exhibits not cited in
Menchu’s briefs. (Def.’s Reply at 3, ECF No. 95.)
The Department’s relevance objections are moot in the summary judgment context
because they are “duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.” Sandoval v. County of
San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F.

Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006)). “[I]f evidence submitted on summary judgment could
create a genuine dispute of material fact, it is, by definition, ‘of consequence in determining the
action,’ and therefore relevant.” Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 665. As the Ninth Circuit has instructed,
“parties briefing summary judgment motions would be better served to simply argue the import

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of facts reflected in the evidence rather than expending time and resources compiling laundry
lists of relevance objections.” Id.
The Department’s objections that exhibits are “Outside SOL” (ECF No. 96 at 3-20),
which the court understands to mean outside the statute of limitations, are unavailing. First, as
explained below, the court disagrees with some of the Department’s assessment of the timeliness
of Menchu’s claims. Second, even if Menchu’s evidence relates to conduct that occurred outside
the statute of limitations (and thus cannot be used to extend liability) that evidence can still be
used to show the Department’s discriminatory intent. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1110
(9th Cir. 2002). Finally, the Department’s “Outside SOL” objections boil down to relevance

objections. (See Def.’s Reply at 7 (“[M]ost of the evidence provided is irrelevant as it occurred
outside the statute of limitations.”) id. at 8 (“Again, the evidence provided by [Menchu] is
irrelevant as it occurred outside the statute of limitations.”).) As noted above, relevance
objections are moot in the summary judgment context.
Regarding the Department’s objection to any portion of the materials not cited in
Menchu’s Response, the court has discretion to consider portions of the record not cited in the
briefs. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.”). The court declines to summarily strike all portions of
Menchu’s exhibits not cited in his brief.

Finally, the Department argues that many of Menchu’s exhibits are inadmissible or lack
foundation. Those objections are also denied as moot because consideration of the materials
objected to does not alter the outcome on the Department’s motion for summary judgment. See,
e.g., Pullom v. U.S. Bakery, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1109 (D. Or. 2007) (denying defendant’s

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motion to strike because “the court’s consideration of material that [was] the subject of
defendant’s motion was not outcome determinative”); Bona Fide Conglomerate, Inc. v.
SourceAmerica, Case No. 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS, 2017 WL 3149578, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July
24, 2017) (stating that the court would address “only the salient objections” regarding party’s
evidence on motion for summary judgment).
B. Timeliness of Menchu’s Claims
The court next addresses the Department’s argument that the majority of Menchu’s
claims are untimely. The Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS §§ 30.260 et seq., provides both notice
requirements and statutes of limitations for parties seeking to file tort claims against Oregon

public bodies. ORS § 30.275(2)(b) requires an injured party to give notice of any claim against
an Oregon public body within 180 days of the alleged loss or injury. Accordingly, the
Department argues, any claim for conduct occurring more than 180 days before the Department
received Menchu’s initial lawsuit on May 18, 2020, is time-barred. (Def.’s Mot. at 9.)
Menchu argues that there is an exception to the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA) for
discrimination claims. He points out that, under ORS § 659A.875(6)(c), an employment
discrimination lawsuit again a public body must be commenced within five years of the alleged
loss or injury. (Pl.’s Statement of Facts at 2, ECF No. 88.) That statute provides an exception to
the statute of limitations described in ORS § 30.275(9), which ordinarily requires that actions

against public bodies be filed within two years of the alleged loss or injury.
The Department’s argument, however, is based in the OTCA’s notice requirement, not its
statute of limitations. Menchu’s Oregon statutory claims are subject to both the notice
requirement and the applicable statute of limitations. ORS § 30.275; ORS § 659.875; see also

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Shepard v. City of Portland, 829 F. Supp. 2d 940, 957 (D. Or. 2011) (explaining that both the
OTCA’s notice requirement and the statute of limitations provided by ORS § 659A.875 applied
to plaintiff’s state-law discrimination and retaliation claims, concluding that “the OTCA notice
provision acts as the ultimate time-bar with respect to plaintiff’s claims”).
Accordingly, to the extent that Menchu’s Oregon statutory claims are based on discrete
acts that occurred more than 180 days before May 18, 2020,2 those claims are time-barred.
Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1105-08.
But the OTCA’s notice requirements do not apply to Menchu’s federal claims. “Unlike
the lack of statutes of limitations in the federal civil rights laws, the absence of any notice-of-

claim provision is not a deficiency requiring the importation of such statutes into the federal civil
rights scheme.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 134, 140 (1988) (holding that similar notice
requirement in Wisconsin statute did not apply to § 1983 claim because it was “pre-empted as
inconsistent with federal law”); see also Baumgarner v. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1091-95 (D. Or. 2014) (declining to apply notice provisions of the OTCA to plaintiff’s Title VII
claims, noting “the absence of any authority requiring individuals to comply with the notice
provisions of the OTCA before bringing claims for violation of Title VII”); Rogers v. Saylor,
306 Or. 267, 278, 285 (1988) (holding that certain of OTCA’s provisions did not apply to
plaintiff’s federal § 1983 claim). Menchu’s federal claims are not time barred.

Having resolved those preliminary matters, the court turns to the Department’s motion

2 The Department contends that it did not receive notice under ORS § 30.275 until May 18,
2020, when it received Menchu’s initial lawsuit. (Def.’s Mot. at 9.) Menchu does not dispute that
May 18, 2020 is the date that the Department received notice under ORS § 30.275. (See Pl.’s
Statement of Facts; Pl.’s Resp.)

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for summary judgment on Menchu’s disparate treatment and retaliation claims.
DISCUSSION
A. Claims 1, 2, and 3: Disparate Treatment and Retaliation
Menchu alleges numerous and overlapping factual bases for each of his claims. As to his
disparate treatment claim (Claim 1), he alleges that the Department discriminated against him by
denying him access to non-public clinic areas, excluding him from meetings, trainings, and
social gatherings, assigning him extra duties and cancelling his appointments, publicly
reprimanding him, classifying him as a temporary on-call employee, reducing his hours in 2017,
and failing to hire him into a Health Assistant 1 position. (See Compl.; Pl.’s Resp.)

As to his retaliation claims (Claims 2 and 3), Menchu points to the Department failing to
hire him into the Health Assistant 1 position, auditing his paycheck, reducing his hours in 2019,
removing his name from appointments, denying him sick leave, and failing to hire him into a
fulltime position. (See Compl.; Pl.’s Resp.)
To survive a motion for summary judgment on a disparate treatment or retaliation claim
under Title VII, ORS § 659A.030, or § 1981, or a retaliation claim under ORS §§ 659A.199 or
659A.203, “a plaintiff must offer evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination, either through the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green or
with direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.” Freyd v. Univ. of Or., 990 F.3d

1211, 1228 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted) (disparate treatment under Title VII);
Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (same legal framework applies to
claims under Title VII and ORS § 659A.030); Surrell v. Cal. Water Svc. Co., 518 F.3d 1097,
105-06 (9th Cir. 2008) (same legal framework applies to disparate treatment and retaliation

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claims under Title VII and § 1981); Larmanger v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Nw., 895 F.
Supp. 2d 1033, 1049 (D. Or. 2012) (same legal framework applies to retaliation claims under
Title VII and ORS §§ 659A.199 and 659A.203). Accordingly, the court analyzes all of Menchu’s
disparate treatment and retaliation claims (Claims 1, 2, and 3) together.
“Under either approach, staving off a motion for summary judgment . . . entails three
steps.” Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2023). First, the plaintiff must establish his
prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory
conduct. “The plaintiff may then offer evidence that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is

merely a pretext for discrimination.” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1105-06; Opara, 57 F.4th at 721-24.
1. Prima Facie Case
In the disparate treatment context, a plaintiff can raise an inference of discriminatory
intent by showing (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position and
performing his job satisfactorily; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and
(4) similarly situated individuals outside his class were treated more favorably, or other
circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of
discrimination. Opara, 57 F.4th at 722; Hawn v. Exec. Jet. Mgmt., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir.
2010). Alternatively, a plaintiff can simply produce “direct or circumstantial evidence of

discriminatory motive to establish [his] prima facie case.” Opara, 57 F.4th at 722 (italics added);
Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1105.

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In the retaliation context, a plaintiff makes his prima facie case by showing that (1) he
engaged in a protected activity; (2) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (3)
there was a causal connection between the two. Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1108.
Common to both discrimination and retaliation claims is the requirement that the plaintiff
allege that he was subject to an adverse employment action. “The Ninth Circuit defines adverse
employment actions broadly.” Shepard v. City of Portland, 829 F. Supp. 2d 940, 960 (D. Or.
2011). In the disparate treatment context, “an adverse employment action is one that materially
affects the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Team Elec.
Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (simplified). That is, the employer’s conduct must have

an “adverse effect on the employee’s work or status” to constitute an adverse employment
action. Schlosser v. Potter, 248 F. App’x 812, 817 (9th Cir. 2007). In the retaliation context, the
definition of adverse employment action is broader: it includes any action that is “reasonably
likely to deter [an employee] from engaging in protected activity.” Coszalter v. City of Salem,
320 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2002).
A variety of conduct has met these definitions, including: a lateral transfer,
or refusing a lateral transfer; undeserved negative performance evaluations or job
references if motivated by retaliatory animus and not promptly corrected; being
excluded from meetings, seminars, and positions that would have made the
employee more eligible for salary increases; being denied secretarial support;
eliminating job responsibilities; and receiving a more burdensome work schedule.
Shepard, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 960 (collecting cases). In contrast, mere ostracism or
offensive utterance by co-workers does not qualify as an adverse employment
action.

Retherford v. Portland Pub. Schs., Case No. 3:18-cv-00401-JR, 2019 WL 7879880, at
*14 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2019).

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“Whether a particular [action] is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of
the particular case, and should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of
showing how a reasonable employee would have found each of the challenged actions materially
adverse. Id. at 68.
2. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
“Once a prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. This burden is one of

production, not persuasion and involves no credibility assessment.” Opara, 57 F.4th at 723
(simplified).
3. Pretext
At the third step, a plaintiff can prove that the employer’s proffered explanation is pretext
either “(1) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely than not motivated the
employers; [or] (2) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable; or via a combination
of these two kinds of evidence.” Opara, 57 F.4th at 723 (simplified). Although “very little
evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer’s motive,” McGinest

v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) (simplified), when an employer
provides “abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence” to suggest discrimination did not
occur, a “plaintiff’s creation of only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was
untrue will not suffice.” Opara, 57 F.4th at 724 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,

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Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)). The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion that “an
employer’s contested action was ‘due in part or [in] whole to discriminatory intent.’” Opara, 57
F.4th at 724 (quoting McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1123).
B. Analysis of Discriminatory Motive
Applying the above standards, Menchu’s discrimination and retaliation claims fail.
Menchu does not provide any direct evidence of discriminatory motive, nor does he create an
inference of discriminatory motive under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
1. Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Motive
The court first considers whether Menchu has provided any direct evidence of

discrimination. “Direct evidence [of discrimination] is evidence which, if believed, proves the
fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.” Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co.,
413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). “Direct evidence
typically consists of clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the
employer.” Id.
In his Response, Menchu argues that he suffered “direct discrimination” when he was
told not to linger or visit with staff, when he was required to become certified to work as an
interpreter, when the Department allowed its bilingual staff to perform interpreter duties, and
when the Department failed to hire him as a fulltime employee. (Pl.’s Resp. at 16-41.) He also

points out that his supervisor, Gabriela Mora, testified in deposition that she rarely interacted
with Menchu, and that, as an on-call employee, Menchu was at the lowest level of the County’s
employees. (Pl.’s Resp. at 18 (citing Mora Dep. at 15:25-17:04, ECF No. 100 at 53-63).) None of
those statements or actions, accepted as true, concern on their face anything to do with Menchu’s

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national origin, race, or ethnicity. Menchu’s proffered direct evidence does not prove the fact of
discriminatory animus.
2. McDonnell Douglas Framework
Because there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the court assesses whether
Menchu creates an inference of discriminatory motive under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
The Department does not dispute that Menchu is a member of a protected class, is
qualified for his position, or has performed his job satisfactorily. But the Department contends
that Menchu fails to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework for his disparate treatment or
retaliation claims, for four reasons. First, it argues that some of the alleged adverse employment

actions never happened. (Def.’s Mot. at 12-15, 17.) Second, it says that other contested actions
do not qualify as “adverse employment actions.” (Id. at 12-17.) Third, it points out that Menchu
was treated the same as all similarly situated employees. (Id. at 13-19.) Finally, even if Menchu
can make a prima facie case, the Department offers nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory reasons for
actions that it took. (Id. at 12-15, 17.) The court considers each alleged adverse employment
action in turn.
Access to Non-Public Clinic Areas (Claim 1). Menchu contends that the Department
discriminated against him by denying him privileges enjoyed by clinic employees. Menchu, as
an on-call interpreter, did not have badge access to non-public areas in the clinics, such as break

areas and patient rooms. (Compl. ¶ 18; Menchu Dep. at 78:17-80:15, 103:22-105:06; Mora Decl.
¶ 16.) When necessary to perform his job, Menchu was escorted to patient rooms or other non-
public areas by clinic employees. (Menchu Dep. at 79:25-80:03; Mora Decl. ¶ 16; Pl.’s Resp. at
16-18.)

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Assuming that the lack of badge access was an adverse employment action, Menchu fails
to make a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas because he provides no evidence that
similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were granted access that he was not. It is
undisputed that no interpreter, regardless of race or national origin, had badge access to the
locked areas of the clinics. (Mora Decl. ¶ 16; Pl.’s Resp. at 18.) Further, there is no evidence that
any employee who worked across multiple clinics had badge access to each clinic where they
worked. Menchu asserts “Other people who did not work for [the Department], including a
Caucasian CareOregon employee (not a County employee), had free access to the back office
and fax.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 19.) Menchu supports that assertion by citing to Exhibit 31 to his

Response. That exhibit includes a complaint that Menchu filed with Multnomah County, where
he likewise asserted that there was a white CareOregon employee who had access to the back
area of the clinic. (ECF No. 89-1 at 316.) But that Exhibit also indicates that, unlike Menchu,
who worked across at least five clinics (Menchu Dep. at 82:5-10, 111:13-112:02), the
CareOregon employee’s primary work location was the clinic where she had badge access. (Id. at
323.) Menchu does not contend that the white CareOregon employee worked across multiple
clinics or that she had badge access in other clinics. (See Pl.’s Resp.) The woman therefore does
not provide a useful comparator. See Ballou v. McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 423 (9th Cir. 2022) (“To
establish similarity under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the individuals being

compared [must be] similar in all material respects.”); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349
F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]ndividuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs
and display similar conduct.”).

Page 18 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Exclusion from Meetings, Trainings, and Social Gatherings (Claim 1). Menchu asserts
that the Department discriminated against him by excluding him from meetings, trainings, and
social gatherings. The only specific training or meeting that Menchu alleges he was excluded
from was a COVID-19 training in March 2020. (Compl. ¶ 43; Pl.’s Resp. at 56.) To support that
contention, Menchu points to an email showing he did receive an invitation to a March 2020
COVID-19 meeting before it happened. (Pl.’s Resp. at 56 (citing ECF No. 89-1 at 1226).) That
email does not create a genuine issue of fact that Menchu was ever excluded from a COVID-19
meeting or training.
More broadly, Menchu contends that the clinics had many meetings, and that the clinics

discriminated against him by failing to invite him to those meetings. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 13;
Menchu Dep. at 82:19-83:03.) But exclusion from meetings or trainings is only an adverse
employment action when those meetings or trainings are relevant to the employee’s job,
particularly where attendance would likely affect the employee’s professional advancement.
Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996). Menchu neither
provides a description of the many meetings or trainings that he alleges he was excluded from,
nor how his exclusion from those meetings and trainings affected the terms of his employment.
Accordingly, he has not provided evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
exclusion from meetings and trainings constituted adverse employment actions.

Menchu also alleges that he was discriminated against when he was not invited to social
gatherings, such as baby showers and birthday parties, held at the individual clinics. (Compl.
¶ 18; Pl.’s Resp. at 13.) But Menchu has provided no evidence suggesting that attendance at
clinic social gatherings might have improved his employment status or chances of promotion.

Page 19 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Absent any such evidence, Menchu cannot show that his exclusion from social gatherings was an
adverse employment action. Strother, 79 F.3d at 869 (“Mere ostracism in the workplace is not
enough to show an adverse employment [action].”); see also Blount v. Morgan Stanley Smith
Barney LLC, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that supervisor’s failure to
invite plaintiff to lunches with other employees was not an adverse employment action absent
evidence that plaintiff’s “compensation or business acumen would have improved as a result of
attending the[] lunches”).
Extra Duties and Cancelled Appointment (Claim 1). According to Menchu, the
Department discriminated by requiring him to perform extra duties, such as making reminder

calls to patients, and by cancelling appointments and refusing to pay Menchu for the cancelled
appointments. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Menchu does not make out a prima facie case as to those
actions under McDonnell Douglas because he does not contend, or provide evidence suggesting,
that the Department treated any similarly situated individual more favorably.
Public Reprimands (Claim 1). Menchu alleges that the Department discriminated against
him when Department employees publicly reprimanded him for failing to notify the clinic of a
patient’s presence, despite that Menchu had no responsibility for doing so. (Compl. ¶ 20; see
also Pl.’s Resp. at 15.) “A verbal reprimand that has no effect on a plaintiff’s job duties and was
not placed in plaintiff’s personnel file does not rise to the level of an adverse employment

action.” Mendoza v. DeJoy, Case No. 21-cv-00991-H-JLB, 2022 WL 18832234, at *7 (S.D. Cal.
Dec. 20, 2022) (citing Hardage v. CBS Broad., Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2005) (Snide
remarks are insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action.) and Bollinger v. Thawley,
304 F. App’x 612, 614 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Mere harsh words or threats are insufficient to

Page 20 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
constitute an actionable adverse employment action” in the retaliation context.)); accord. Nunez
v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 875 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that employer’s scolding and
threatening of plaintiff’s job was not an adverse employment action in retaliation context).
Menchu provides no evidence suggesting that reprimands by clinic employees affected his
employment status or were reflected in his personnel file. Because the reprimands did not alter
Menchu’s conditions of employment, they are not adverse employment actions in the
discrimination context.
Job Classification (Claim 1). According to Menchu, the Department discriminated
against him by hiring him into, and keeping him in, a position that was classified as a “temporary

outside worker on-call.” (Compl. ¶¶ 28, 33-34; Pl.’s Resp. at 26.) As a result of that
classification, he received lower pay than “regular fulltime” employees and was not entitled to
COLAs, merit raises, paid leave, or insurance coverage. (Pl.’s Resp. at 26, 29-30.) Menchu does
not allege a prima facie case as to his classification because he does not demonstrate that the
Department treated similarly situated individuals outside his protected class more favorably. It is
undisputed that Department employees who are part of the union receive benefits that on-call
interpreters do not. (Pl.’s Resp. at 26-27; ECF No. 89-1 at 675, 684-85.) Menchu acknowledges,
however, that all interpreters were classified the same way, and denied the same benefits,
regardless of their race, ethnicity, or national origin. (Pl.’s Resp. at 25-30.) Because Menchu

does not provide evidence of similarly situated employees outside his protected class who were
treated more favorably (see Pl.’s Resp. at 25-41), he has not made out a prima facie case of
discrimination as to his job classification.

Page 21 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
2017 Reduction in Hours (Claim 1). Menchu alleges that the Department discriminated
against him when, in March 2017, “Menchu’s hours were reduced, and defendant began utilizing
its uncertified bilingual staff to interpret for non-English-speaking patients in violation of federal
regulations.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) The Department disputes that Menchu’s hours were reduced in
2017. (Def.’s Mot. at 12.) Even if Menchu’s hours were reduced in March 2017, Menchu does
not contend that the staff members who took his hours (that is, were treated more favorably)
were outside of his protected class. Instead, he testified in his deposition that the Department’s
bilingual staff were Hispanic, that he didn’t know their national origins but that they had
“different national origin[s]” besides the United States, and that they were of “different race[s]”

besides white or Caucasian. (Menchu Dep. at 143:19-144:17, 149:10-15; see also ECF No. 89-1
at 520.) Menchu therefore fails to make a prima facie case of discrimination as to this action.
Health Assistant 1 Position (Claims 1, 2, and 3). In his Complaint, Menchu alleges that
the Department either discriminated against him or retaliated against him by hiring someone else
into the “Health Assistant 1” position in March 2018. (Compl. ¶ 27.) Menchu did not apply for
that position (Menchu Dep. at 188:19-189:01), and he fails to identify the person who was hired,
besides asserting that the person was unqualified. (Pl.’s Resp. at 25; ECF No. 89-1 at 573, 1169-
71.) Accordingly, he fails to make a prima facie case that this action was based on racial or
national origin discrimination. He also fails to make a prima face case of retaliation, because he

does not allege that any of his protected activities led to the action. (See Compl. ¶ 27; Pl.’s Resp.
at 25.) Instead, Menchu argues in his Response that the position itself was problematic because it
did not require interpreter certification, despite that the role involved interpreting, among other
duties. (Pl.’s Resp. at 25.)

Page 22 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Paycheck Audit (Claims 1, 2, and 3). Menchu contends that the County retaliated against
him (and possibly discriminated against him) by auditing his paychecks and requiring him to
refund overpayments in April 2019. (Compl. ¶ 39.) Assuming Menchu makes out a prima facie
case of both retaliation and discrimination, Menchu’s claims related to the paycheck audit fail
because he does not show that the Department’s proffered reason is pretextual. The County
switched to a new payroll system in January 2019. (Murphy Decl. ¶ 6; Mora Dep. at 31:15-18.)
After the switch, Menchu incorrectly coded his time as “Double Time” instead of “Overtime” on
a number of occasions. (Murphy Decl. ¶ 7.) The incorrect time entries created a flag in the
payroll system because on-call employees do not earn double time. (Smith Dep. 23:3-12, ECF

No. 100 at 14-20; Murphy Decl. ¶ 7.) As a result, Menchu’s paychecks were audited, and
Department employees Brieshon D’Agostini and Debi Smith met with him in either April or
May 2019 to explain the errors, and that he had been overpaid as a result. (Smith Dep. at 23:3-
24.) Menchu makes no argument that the Department’s asserted reason for the meeting and
paycheck audit is untrue. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 48-53.)
June 2019 Reduction in Hours (Claims 2 and 3). Menchu alleges that the Department
reduced his hours in June 2019 in retaliation for his filing an unfair labor complaint in November
2018, filing a BOLI complaint in March 2019, and obtaining counsel in April 2019. (Compl.
¶¶ 38, 40; Menchu Dep. at 225:14-227:12.) He points out that, in the April or May 2019 meeting,

D’Agostini told him that he had been inputting his time incorrectly and had been overpaid.
(Menchu Dep. at 225:03-08; Smith Dep. at 23:18-22, 25:13-15; D’Agostini Dep. at 38:7-40:15.)
At the meeting, Menchu was also told that he was working excessive hours for an on-call
employee. (D’Agostini Dep. at 36:06-22; Pl.’s Resp. at 51.)

Page 23 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
The Department does not contest that Menchu engaged in protected activities in
November 2018, February 2019, and April 2019. The Department does, however, disagree that
there was any reduction in Menchu’s hours, pointing out that Menchu “worked well over the
recommended 20 hours per week maximum for on-call employees.” (Def.’s Mot. at 12.)
Although it is undisputed that Menchu worked more than 20 hours per week throughout 2019,
that fact is consistent with Menchu’s contention that his hours and assignments were reduced
sometime in 2019. Indeed, Menchu’s paystubs show that Menchu worked fewer hours and
received lower pay in June 2019 than he had in the preceding five months. (See Bannon Moore
Decl. Ex. 5 at 6-7, ECF No. 81.) Further, an employee of Language Services, who was tasked

with scheduling interpreter appointments at the time, testified that she was instructed to reduce
Menchu’s hours around June 2019. (Hazeem Dep. at 17:16-18; Pl’s Resp. at 49.) Menchu has
provided sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that his hours were
reduced in June 2019. Even a small reduction in hours (and a corresponding reduction in pay) is
an adverse employment action in the retaliation context because it is “reasonably likely to deter
[employees] from engaging in protected activities.” Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242-43 (holding that
reduction in workload and pay were adverse employment actions).
To meet the third element of his prima facie case, Menchu must provide evidence that the
adverse employment actions would not have occurred but for his protected activities. Univ. of

Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). Menchu relies on timing to show that
his protected activities were a but-for cause of his reduction in hours. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 51.)
“Causation can be inferred from timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on

Page 24 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
the heels of protected activity.” Villarimo v. Aloha Is. Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir.
2002).
But the record here undermines Menchu’s use of timing to show that the reduction in
hours resulted from his protected activities. Long before Menchu had filed the complaints
alleged to have caused the retaliation, the Department had informed all interpreters that, because
of budget constraints, they would be scheduled to only four assignments per day. (ECF No. 89-1
at 458.) After Menchu’s protected activities and before his hours were reduced, the Department
audited Menchu’s paychecks because of his mistaken timekeeping entries. As a result, the
payroll department reviewed Menchu’s invoices, which showed his appointments and that his

hours far exceeded 20 hours per week. (Mora Dep. at 28:16-29:08; Mora Decl. ¶ 13.) Given the
undisputed evidence that Menchu’s paychecks and invoices were reviewed shortly before the
adverse employment action for reasons independent of Menchu’s protected activities, together
with Language Service’s previously announced policy of limiting appointments for on-call
interpreters, timing alone does not create an inference of causation here. See, e.g., Lee v. Eden
Med. Ctr., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that intervening event negated
any inference that plaintiff’s protected activity caused the subsequent adverse action); Zsenyuk v.
City of Carson, 99 F. App’x 794, 796 (9th Cir. 2004) (temporal proximity argument undermined
where alleged retaliatory conduct stemmed from investigation of conduct that occurred before

protected activity).
September 2019 removal from appointments (Claims 2 and 3). Menchu alleges that, by
September 2019, the Department was reassigning Menchu’s appointments to others. (Compl.
¶ 40.) But Menchu provides no evidence of his name being removed from appointments (see

Page 25 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Pl.’s Resp. at 48-56), and thus has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact that this action
occurred.
December 2019 Reduction in Assignments (Claims 2 and 3). Menchu alleges that the
Department began reducing his assignments effective December 10, 2019, after learning about
his whistleblower complaint around December 5. (Id. at 56.) He directs the court to his Exhibit
73, which shows that, as of December 9, Menchu was only scheduled for two appointments on
December 10. As the court has noted, it is undisputed that Menchu’s hours and number of
appointments varied from day to day and week to week. Although two appointments is fewer
than Menchu usually had in a day, that Menchu was scheduled for fewer appointments than usual

on a single day, without more, does not create a genuine dispute of material fact that Menchu’s
assignments were intentionally reduced in December 2019.
Sick Leave (Claims 2 and 3). Menchu alleges that the Department retaliated against him
by denying him sick leave to which he was entitled. (Compl. ¶ 44.) Yet Menchu provides no
other information about when he was denied sick leave or the circumstances of that denial. (See
id; Pl.’s Resp.) Without more information, Menchu fails to make a prima facie case that any
denial of sick leave was retaliatory.
Failure to Hire into Fulltime Position (Claims 2 and 3). Menchu alleges that the
Department retaliated against him by failing to hire him into a fulltime position. (Compl. ¶¶ 35-

37; Pl.’s Resp. at 48-51.) Following Menchu’s complaints, the Department created the
classification for a fulltime interpreter position. Once the classification was created, any clinic
could hire a fulltime, “regular status” interpreter if it had the budget and need for the position.
(Murphy Decl. ¶ 5.) However, no clinic has done so. (Def.’s Mot. at 7-8; Murphy Decl. ¶ 5.) The

Page 26 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Department contends that the clinics prefer to use vendors for interpretation, because doing so is
easier and ensures that the Oregon Health Plan will cover interpretation for its patients. (Mora
Decl. ¶¶ 8-10.) Menchu provides no argument or evidence to show that the Department’s
proffered reason is pretext for retaliation, and his based on this action therefore fails.
In sum, Menchu has failed to provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder
to conclude that he experienced any adverse employment actions due in whole or in part to his
race, national origin, or protected activities. Indeed, “abundant and uncontroverted independent
evidence” suggests that no discrimination or retaliation occurred. Opara, 57 F.4th at 724.
Accordingly, the Department’s motion for summary judgment on Claims 1, 2, and 3 should be

granted.
C. Claim 4: Race Discrimination under Title VI
Menchu also alleges that the Department violated Title VI by using federal funds for a
discriminatory purpose. In relevant part, Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial aid.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To state a race discrimination claim under Title VI, “a
plaintiff must allege that (1) the entity involved is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the
entity involved is receiving federal financial assistance.” Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp.,

29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled in part not relevant here by Daviton v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001). “Private parties seeking
judicial enforcement of Title VI’s nondiscrimination protections must prove intentional

Page 27 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
discrimination.” Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 15 F.4th 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001)).
As explained in the analysis of Menchu’s disparate treatment claim, Menchu has not
provided evidence giving rise to an inference of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or
national origin. And to the extent that Menchu argues in his Response that he is asserting a Title
VI disparate treatment claim on behalf of the Department’s patients (see Resp. at 8), who are
intended beneficiaries under Title VI, Menchu lacks standing to make that claim. See Fobbs, 29
F.3d at 1448 (rejecting third-party standing argument on Title VI claim where plaintiff-doctor
did not explain why he, rather than his patients, should receive money damages for injury

inflicted on patients). The Department’s motion for summary judgment on Claim 4 should be
granted.
D. New Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
In his Response, Menchu asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). (Pl.’s Resp. at 66.)
Menchu did not bring that claim, or factual allegations that would support the claim, in his
amended complaint. “A response to summary judgment is not the time to amend pleadings or
raise new claims.” Unigestion Holdings, S.A. v. UPM Tech., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 3d 932, 957 n.19
(D. Or. 2022). Menchu’s § 1985 claim is not properly before the court, and the court therefore
declines to address it. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir.

2008) (“[O]ur precedents make clear that where, as here, the complaint does not include the
necessary factual allegations to state a claim, raising such a claim in a summary judgment motion
is insufficient to present the claim to the district court.”).
\ \ \ \ \

Page 28 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 80) should
be GRANTED.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any,
are due within 14 days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go
under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within 14 days. When the
response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go
under advisement.
DATED: August 16, 2024

United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765692. Public record. Not legal advice.