# Kennedy v. Richland Parish

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · August 8, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765410

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 8, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765410

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of a 2241 petition as “not cognizable” because it related to the petitioner’s “medical needs, and a determination in his favor would not result in his accelerated release.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

DAVID M. KENNEDY, JR. CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-0769

SECTION P
VS.
JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

RICHLAND PARISH DISTRICT MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, ET AL.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner David M. Kennedy, Jr., a pre-trial detainee at Richland Parish Detention Center
(“RPDC”), filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, on
approximately June 5, 2024. Petitioner seeks release from incarceration and the dismissal of his
pending charges.1 For reasons below, the Court should dismiss Petitioner’s claims.
Background
Petitioner states that Officer McKinney arrested him on November 19, 2021, while
Petitioner was having a mental health crisis. [doc. # 7-1, p. 15]. He was later released on bond.
Id. at 18. On October 15, 2023, he was admitted to Longleaf Hospital/Longleaf Behavioral
Center for mental health treatment. [doc. #s 7, p. 2; 7-1, p. 19; 7-2, p. 32].
Petitioner first claims that he was falsely arrested, under a warrant, at Longleaf Hospital
and charged with “jumping bail.” [doc. # 7, p. 2]. He appears to claim that the arrest interrupted
his mental health treatment. Id. at 2, 6. He was transported to RPDC. Id. at 6. He was
thereafter charged with several other crimes, including aggravated flight from an officer where

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under
28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.
human life is endangered, resisting an officer with force or violence, aggravated assault with a
motor vehicle upon a peace officer, battery of a police officer resulting in medical attention, and
aggravated criminal damage to property. [doc. # 7-2, pp. 43-48].
Petitioner claims that he was confined under unconstitutional conditions of confinement

at RPDC. [doc. # 7, p. 6]. He was forced to strip, and he was assigned to solitary confinement
for three days. Id. There, a nurse allegedly asked him if he wanted to “die for real yet.” Id.
Petitioner claims that Attorneys Salomon and Ellis rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel. [doc. # 7, p. 6]. He alleges that Salomon failed to investigate, have him evaluated,
obtain bail, obtain medical records, remain informed about Petitioner’s case, refrain from
taunting him, and remain enrolled as counsel. Id. He alleges that Ellis “hollers or laughs” at him
and once grabbed and pushed him. Id.
Petitioner claims that he is being denied a speedy trial. [doc. # 7, p. 6]. He was
incarcerated for 97 days in 2021-2022, and he has currently been incarcerated for approximately
253 days. Id.

Petitioner claims that District Attorney Wheeler has engaged in, and continues to engage
in, prosecutorial misconduct. [doc. # 7, p. 7].
As above, Petitioner seeks release from incarceration and the dismissal of his pending
charges.
Law and Analysis

1. Speedy Trial
Petitioner’s charges are pending before the Fifth Judicial District Court, Richland Parish.
He was incarcerated for 97 days in 2021-2022, and he has currently been incarcerated for
approximately 253 days. Id.
A petitioner seeking federal habeas corpus relief must first exhaust all available state
remedies.2 See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Minor v. Lucas, 697 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.
1983). If the record, or the face of the federal habeas corpus petition, reveals that the petitioner
has not complied with the exhaustion requirement, courts are expressly authorized to dismiss the

petition. See Resendez v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 1984); Shute v. State of Tex.,
117 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1997).
Here, of import, Petitioner does not ask this Court to order the State or the state trial court
to bring him promptly to trial; rather, Petitioner seeks release from incarceration and dismissal of
his charges. In other words, Petitioner does not seek to enforce the State’s obligation to provide
him with a state court forum, he seeks to forestall the state prosecution. See Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
There is “an important distinction between a petitioner who seeks to abort a state
proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state judicial processes by litigating a speedy
trial defense to a prosecution prior to trial, and one who seeks only to enforce the state’s

obligation to bring him promptly to trial. This distinction apparently turns upon the type of relief
sought: an attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution is of the first
type, while an attempt to force the state to go to trial is of the second. While the former objective
is normally not attainable through federal habeas corpus, the latter is, although the requirement
of exhaustion of state remedies still must be met.” Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th
Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks and quoted sources omitted).

2 “[I]t has long been settled that a Section 2241 petitioner must exhaust available state court
remedies before a federal court will entertain a challenge to state detention.” Montano v. Texas,
867 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 2017).
“[P]re-trial habeas relief is generally not available to consider a petitioner's claim that a
state is barred from trying him because it has violated his sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial.” Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987). “[F]ederal habeas corpus
does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances,’ to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to
a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.”3 Braden, 410 U.S. at

489; see also Easterly v. Smith, 30 F.3d 1491 (5th Cir. 1994).
Here, Petitioner has yet to have a trial, and he does not identify any “special
circumstances” which would require the Court to except him from this exhaustion requirement.
See Easterly, 30 F.3d at 1491. The constitutional right to a speedy trial does not qualify as “a per
se ‘special circumstance’ which would obviate the exhaustion requirement.” Id.; Dickerson, 816
F.3d at 227 (declining to accept the argument “that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is
a per se ‘special circumstance’ because to do so would eliminate the careful distinction . . .
between a defendant disrupting the orderly functioning of a state’s judicial processes as opposed
to enforcing his right to have the state bring him promptly to trial.”).

3 The Fifth Circuit “has not clarified what ‘special circumstances’ might warrant an exception
from this rule.” Hartfield v. Osborne, 808 F.3d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 2015). That said, in
Dickerson, the court noted: “In his dissent in Braden, Justice Rehnquist suggests that pre-trial
habeas which interferes with state criminal processes is justified when there is a ‘lack of
jurisdiction, under the Supremacy Clause, for the state to bring any criminal charges against the
petitioner.’ We need not decide in this case whether this might be the only situation in which pre-
trial habeas is available.” Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226 (internal citation omitted). In another
case, the Fifth Circuit opined: “In the somewhat analogous area of abstention a pending state
criminal prosecution will not be enjoined absent ‘very unusual situations, . . . necessary to
prevent immediate irreparable injury.’ Irreparable injury will not ordinarily be deemed to be
present where the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights can be eliminated by the
defense of a single criminal prosecution. Furthermore, special circumstances are not necessarily
established by the alleged infallibility of the federal claim. Indeed, without reaching the merits
of appellant's constitutional argument we take note of the fact that if her position is as clearly
correct as she suggests, the Florida courts are surely capable of recognizing and vindicating her
position.” Tooten v. Shevin, 493 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1974) (internal footnotes omitted).
Because Petitioner has yet to have a trial, his claim is unexhausted.4 Accordingly, the
Court should abstain from interfering in Petitioner’s state-court proceeding and should,
consequently, dismiss this claim.5
2. Conditions of Confinement

Petitioner claims that he was incarcerated under unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at RPDC. [doc. # 7, p. 6]. He was forced to strip, and he was assigned to solitary
confinement for three days. Id. There, a nurse allegedly asked him if he wanted to “die for real
yet.” Id.
“Simply stated, habeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of
detention. Its sole function is to grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it
cannot be used properly for any other purpose. While it is correctly alluded to as the Great Writ,
it cannot be utilized as . . . a springboard to adjudicate matters foreign to the question of the
legality of custody.” Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir. 1976). “[T]he
Great Writ does not, in this circuit, afford release for prisoners held in state custody due to

adverse conditions of confinement.” Rice v. Gonzalez, 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021).
“Allegations that challenge the fact or duration of confinement are properly brought in
habeas petitions, while allegations that challenge rules, customs, and procedures affecting

4 Petitioner maintains that he filed a writ of habeas corpus before the trial court. [doc. # 7, p. 3].
The trial judge denied his request. Id. Petitioner thus implies that exhaustion is futile. That said,
Petitioner does not indicate that he petitioned—or asked his counsel to petition—either the trial
or appellate court to bring him promptly to trial, and, more importantly, he does not ask this
Court to bring him to trial.

5 The Dickerson court concluded that the petitioner failed to exhaust his claims. That said,
exhaustion is a form of judicial abstention: “The exhaustion doctrine . . . was judicially crafted
on federalism grounds in order to protect the state courts’ opportunity to confront and resolve
initially any constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions as well as to limit federal
interference in the state adjudicatory process.” Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225.
conditions of confinement are properly brought in civil rights actions.” Schipke v. Van Buren,
239 F. App'x 85, 85–86 (5th Cir. 2007). “A § 2241 habeas petition is the proper procedural
vehicle for challenging an action that ‘directly implicates the duration of’ a prisoner’s
confinement. Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1998). It is not, however, the

proper procedural vehicle for claims . . . regarding the conditions of confinement.” Boyle v.
Wilson, 814 F. App'x 881, 882 (5th Cir. 2020).6
In Moore v. King, No. 08-60164, 2009 WL 122555, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 20, 2009), for
instance, the petitioner sought habeas relief, challenging the conditions of his confinement. The
court affirmed the dismissal of his claim, citing Pierre for the rule that habeas is simply not
available.
Here, the Court should dismiss Petitioner’s conditions-of-confinement claim because it is
unrelated to the cause of his detention.
3. Medical Care
Petitioner suggestively claims that he has not received adequate medical care while in

pre-trial detention. He also suggests that respondents deprived him of medical care when they
removed him from an inpatient mental healthcare facility.
Habeas corpus relief is, however, unavailable for Petitioner’s medical care claims. A suit
“challenging the adequacy of a prison’s medical care [] does not go to the validity of a
conviction or sentence, and thus falls outside habeas’s core.” Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 168

6 See Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A] habeas petition ‘is the proper
vehicle to seek release from custody,’ while a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a
state prisoner or under Bivens for a federal prisoner is ‘the proper vehicle to attack
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures.’”) (quoting Carson v.
Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997)).
(2022); see Mora v. Warden, Fed. Corr. Complex, Yazoo City Medium, 480 F. App'x 779, 780
(5th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of a 2241 petition as “not cognizable” because it related to
the petitioner’s “medical needs, and a determination in his favor would not result in his
accelerated release.”); Figueroa v. Chapman, 347 F. App'x 48, 50 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he district

court found it could not grant her relief pursuant to Section 2241 because her application was
‘not in reference to the imposed sentence—but for medical needs.’ We agree.”); McBarron v.
Jeter, 243 F. App'x 857, 857 (5th Cir. 2007); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.
1977).
Because Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief, the Court should dismiss these
claims.
4. Prosecutorial Misconduct, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, False Arrest, and
Unreasonable Seizure

Petitioner claims that Attorneys Salomon and Ellis rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel. [doc. # 7, p. 6]. He alleges that Salomon failed to: investigate, have him evaluated,
obtain bail, obtain medical records, remain informed about Petitioner’s case, refrain from
taunting him, and remain enrolled as counsel. Id. He alleges that Ellis “hollers or laughs” at him
and once grabbed and pushed him. Id.
Petitioner claims that District Attorney Wheeler has engaged in, and continues to engage
in, prosecutorial misconduct. [doc. # 7, p. 7].
Petitioner also claims that he was falsely arrested, under a warrant, at Longleaf Hospital
and charged with “jumping bail.” [doc. # 7, p. 2]. Likewise, he suggests that he was subjected
to an unreasonable seizure when he was arrested and removed from the inpatient healthcare
facility.
The Court should abstain. Federal courts should abstain “if the issues raised in the
petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other state
procedures available to the petitioner.” Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225.

While the thrust of the court’s opinion in Dickerson concerned a Sixth Amendment
speedy trial claim, the petitioner there also argued that his pre-indictment delay violated his “due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment . . . .” Id. at 223. The court opined:
The fact that the due process clause plays some role in protecting against the
prejudice of preindictment delay, however, does not mean that a petition for
habeas corpus relief filed before commencement of the defendant’s trial is the
proper vehicle to protect this right. We believe that the same federalism reasons
that prevent a defendant’s sixth amendment claims from “derailing” a pending
state proceeding unless “special circumstances” exist also renders pretrial
habeas corpus relief an inappropriate vehicle to consider the merits of
Dickerson’s due process claim. Dickerson can present both his fourteenth
amendment due process claim as well as his sixth amendment speedy trial claim
in the state court at trial where they can be considered.

Id.

Here, it is manifest that Petitioner seeks to ‘disrupt the orderly functioning of state
judicial processes’ or to otherwise ‘derail’ or ‘abort’ his pending state-court proceeding. Pre-trial
habeas corpus is an inappropriate vehicle in which to consider the merits of the instant claims.7

7 Even assuming Dickerson and Braden only apply to affirmative defenses—for instance, cases
in which petitioners seek to abort state court trials due to alleged speedy-trial or double-jeopardy
violations—the undersigned would recommend that the Court abstain under Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), which is not limited to proceedings in which plaintiffs/petitioners seek relief
grounded in affirmative defenses. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 489 (“[F]ederal habeas corpus does
not lie, absent ‘special circumstances,’ to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a
state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.”) (emphasis supplied).
Abstention/exhaustion under Braden and Dickerson and abstention under Younger are entwined.
In Braden and Younger, the scenarios in which the Supreme Court directed courts to abstain, as
well as the tests/analyses the Supreme Court directed courts to apply (i.e., ‘special
circumstances’ versus ‘extraordinary circumstances’) overlap and are largely indistinguishable.
Moreover, while federal habeas relief may be available prior to trial or conviction if
“special circumstances” exist, Petitioner’s filings do not reveal any special circumstances.
“Federal habeas corpus should not be used as a ‘pretrial motion forum for state prisoners.’”
Tooten v. Shevin, 493 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 508).

Petitioner can present his claims before the state trial court and, if necessary, he can seek
relief thereafter before the appropriate state appellate court, before the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, and via post-conviction review in the state courts. A habeas corpus remedy remains
available to Petitioner “after the conclusion of the state proceedings against him, if he is in
custody pursuant to conviction and has exhausted his state remedies.” See Dickerson, 816 F.2d
at n.16.
Accordingly, the Court should abstain and, consequently, dismiss these claims without

As noted, the Fifth Circuit has defined the ‘special circumstances’ language in Braden using
language from Younger: “In the somewhat analogous area of abstention a pending state criminal
prosecution will not be enjoined absent ‘very unusual situations, . . . necessary to prevent
immediate irreparable injury.’ Irreparable injury will not ordinarily be deemed to be present
where the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights can be eliminated by the defense of a
single criminal prosecution.” Tooten, 493 F.2d at 177. In Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 882
(5th Cir. 2018), the court declined a plaintiff’s request to enjoin his prosecution under state and
federal speedy-trial laws. For support, the court cited Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 903 (9th
Cir. 2012), which in turn relied on Younger. However, the court also cited Brown v. Estelle, 530
F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976), for support, which did not mention Younger but instead relied
solely on Braden.

Also of note, the undersigned would recommend applying Younger even though Petitioner seeks
dismissal of his charges or release from confinement rather than the precise injunction the
plaintiff sought in Younger. In Kolski v. Watkins, 544 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1977), the court
opined: “We do not believe that the mere fact that the relief sought by Petitioner here federal
habeas relief prior to a pending state criminal trial is different from the type of relief sought in
Younger makes the requirements announced in Younger any less applicable to this case. There is
no practical difference between granting federal habeas relief from a pending state criminal trial
and enjoining the same trial. The principles of federalism and comity which underlie Younger
are present in both. Thus, we conclude that Petitioner must satisfy the Younger abstention
hurdles before we may give federal habeas relief.”
prejudice.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner David M. Kennedy,
Jr.’s claims for habeas corpus concerning his conditions of confinement and medical care be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s remaining claims be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by
this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation
to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another
party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or
response to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the
proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen
(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the
legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See
Douglass vy. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5" Cir. 1996).
In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 8th day of August, 2024.

Hel li
Kayla Dye MeCtasky
United States Magistrate Judge

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10765410. Public record. Not legal advice.