# (PS) Stratton v. PHH Mortgage Corp.

> District Court, E.D. California · December 11, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10762090

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** December 11, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 VICTORY STRATTON, No. 2:24-cv-3406 TLN AC PS
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER and
14 PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
15 Defendant.
16
17 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the
18 undersigned by E.D. Cal. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff filed a request for leave to proceed in forma
19 pauperis (“IFP”) and has submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 28 U.S.C.
20 § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) will therefore be granted.
21 I. Screening
22 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally
23 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks
24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A
25 claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v.
26 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will
27 (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly
28 baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
1 (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton
2 Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S.
3 1037 (2011).
4 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint
5 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court
6 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must
7 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a
8 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
9 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable
10 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,
11 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice
12 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
13 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
14 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to
15 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
16 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
17 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
18 678.  A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity
19 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v.
20 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in
21 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000)) (en banc).
22 A. The Complaint
23 Plaintiff is suing PHH Mortgage Corporation for violations of the Real Estate Settlement
24 Procedures Act (“RESPA”), Declaratory Relief, violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),
25 and Fraud in the Concealment related to the real property located at 7041 McGill Court, Elk
26 Grove, California (“the subject property”). ECF No. 1 at 2-35. Plaintiff alleges that on July 21,
27 2021, she obtained a Forensic Chain of Title Securitization Analysis, Mortgage Audit Report that
28 showed that the Note and the Mortgage on the subject property are irreparably separated. ECF
1 No. 1 at 8.
2 Plaintiff initiated another action in this court, Victory Stratton v. Premier Trust Deed
3 Services, et al., 2:23-cv-2004 DAD SCR (“Stratton I”), that is ongoing. Stratton I was removed
4 to this court from state court on September 15, 2023. Though plaintiff did not name PHH
5 Mortgage Corporation as a defendant in her initial complaint in Stratton I (ECF No. 1-2), there is
6 a pending Second Amended Complaint naming PHH Mortgage Corporation as a defendant.
7 Stratton I at ECF No. 31. Stratton I and the instant case arise from an identical factual basis: in
8 both cases plaintiff seeks to assert a superior claim of title to the property located at 7014 McGill
9 Court, Elk Grove, California based on the July 21, 2021 Forensic Chain of Title report. ECF No.
10 1; Stratton I at ECF No. 1-2 at 3.
11 B. Analysis
12 This complaint must be dismissed because it is duplicative of another ongoing case in this
13 district. The district court has the power to control its docket, including the power to dismiss
14 claims that are duplicative of claims presented in other cases. M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681
15 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s dismissal of claim presented in a
16 separate case). “To determine whether a suit is duplicative, we borrow from the test for claim
17 preclusion. As the Supreme Court stated in The Haytian Republic, “the true test of the
18 sufficiency of a plea of ‘other suit pending’ in another forum [i]s the legal efficacy of the first
19 suit, when finally disposed of, as ‘the thing adjudged,’ regarding the matters at issue in the second
20 suit.” 154 U.S. 118, 124 (1894).” Adams v. California Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684,
21 688–89 (9th Cir. 2007) (overruled on other grounds Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)).
22 The Ninth Circuit clarified in Adams that “in assessing whether the second action is
23 duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the
24 parties or privies to the action, are the same.” Id. “A suit is deemed duplicative if the claims,
25 parties and available relief do not vary significantly between the two actions.” Shappell v. Sun
26 Life Assur. Co., No. 2:10-CV-03020-MCE, 2011 WL 2070405, at *2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27 55644 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2011). To assess whether successive causes of action are the same,
28 courts utilize the “transaction test, ” which requires consideration of four criteria: 1) whether the
1 rights or interests established in the initial action would be impaired by prosecution of a second
2 suit; 2) whether substantially the same evidence would be presented in both actions; 3) whether
3 both suits involve infringement of the same right; and 4) whether both suits arise out of the same
4 transactional nucleus of facts. Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 (9th
5 Cir.1982). The last factor has been deemed the most important. Id. at 1202.
6 Here, all elements are met. As a preliminary matter, it is clear that plaintiff intends to
7 name PHH Mortgage as a defendant in both suits, as discussed above. Plaintiff’s inclusion of
8 other defendants in Stratton I does not substantially distinguish that case from this case because
9 plaintiff’s underlying claim is the same; plaintiff is seeking to assert her title to the same subject
10 property. Because Stratton I is an ongoing case, even if plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is
11 ultimately rejected, plaintiff could make a motion in that case to include PHH as a defendant; the
12 desire to add PHH Mortgage as a defendant in Stratton I does not support the filing of a
13 duplicative case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
14 Most importantly, Stratton I and this case arise out of the same incident. Both cases seek
15 to clear plaintiff’s title to the McGill Court property. ECF No. 1 at 2; Stratton I, ECF No. 1-2 at
16 3. Indeed, the complaints in both cases are substantively identical. Compare ECF No. 1 and
17 Stratton I, ECF No. 1-2. Because both cases arise out of the same incident and involve
18 substantially the same allegations, the cases arise from the same transactional nucleus of fact.
19 Costantini, 681 F.2d at 1201–02 (9th Cir.1982). With two separate lawsuits based on the same
20 incident and involving substantially the same parties, it is axiomatic that the cases will involves
21 substantially the same evidence and that a decision in one case would impair the prosecution of
22 the other. Thus, the elements of the transaction test are satisfied. Id.
23 “It is well established that a district court has broad discretion to control its own docket,
24 and that includes the power to dismiss duplicative claims.” M.M., 681 F.3d at 1091 (9th Cir.
25 2012). This case is duplicative of the case pending at 2:23-cv-2004-DAD-SCR. In the interest of
26 the competent administration of justice and judicial economy, it must be dismissed in favor of the
27 prosecution of the earlier filed lawsuit.
28 ////
] I. Leave to Amend is Not Appropriate
2 Leave to amend is not appropriate in this case because it is duplicative of an earlier filed,
3 || ongoing lawsuit. If plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended complaint, she should do so in her
4 | initially filed case.
5 Ill. Pro Se Plaintiff?s Summary
6 Your request to proceed in forma pauperis is being granted and you do not need to pay the
7 || filing fee. However, the Magistrate Judge is recommending that this case be dismissed because it
8 | is acopy of the same as a case you filed earlier, Stratton v. Premier Trust Deed Services, et al.,
9 || 23-cv-2004 DAD SCR. Both your original case and this case are about your rights to the same
10 || property and the cases involve all the same facts. If you want to add PHH Mortgage as a
11 || defendant or change your claims, you must do so by making a motion in the ongoing case; you
12 | cannot file a second case. You have 21 days to object to this recommendation if you wish to do
13 || so. The District Judge will make the final decision about dismissing this case.
14 IV. Conclusion
15 Accordingly, the undersigned orders that plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis
16 || (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED but recommends that the complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED
17 || because it is duplicative of another case pending in this district.
18 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
19 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days
20 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections
21 | with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a document
22 || should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure
23 || to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s
24 || order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153,
25 | 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
26 | DATED: December 10, 2024 A /, ~

27 ALLISON CLAIRE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10762090. Public record. Not legal advice.