# State of Ohio, ex rel Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost v. Jones

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · December 17, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10761671

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** December 17, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

STATE OF OHIO, ex rel OHIO ATTORNEY
GENERAL DAVE YOST,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:22-cv-2700
Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

AARON MICHAEL JONES, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Doc.
112) and Defendants Bridge and Cox’s Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 115). For the following
reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 115) is DENIED. The parties are
ORDERED to confer in the next fourteen (14) days on the outstanding discovery requests. They
are then ORDERED to file a joint status report, on or before January 3, 2025, outlining what
discovery disputes, if any, remain.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is about robocalls. Plaintiff, the State of Ohio, ex rel. Attorney General Dave
Yost, alleges that Defendants “acting individually and collectively through a common enterprise,
have participated in an unlawful robocall operation that bombarded American consumers with
billions of robocalls.” (Doc. 1 at 4 (emphasis in original); see id. at ¶¶ 11–32 (naming fourteen
corporate Defendants and eight individual Defendants)). Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227(g); the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (“Telemarketing Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 6103(a), for
Defendants’ violations of Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Telemarketing Sales Rule
(“TSR”), 16 C.F.R. Part 310; the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“Ohio CSPA”), Ohio Rev.
Code § 1345.07; and the Ohio Telephone Solicitation Sales Act (“Ohio TSSA”), Ohio Rev. Code
§ 4719.12. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 157–200).
Relevant here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Roy Melvin Cox, Jr. is an actual or de facto
owner, officer, or member of the corporate Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 26). And Defendant Julie K.
Bridge is an officer and member of four corporate Defendants: Technologic USA, Inc., Virtual
Telecom Inc., Davis Telecom, Inc., and Mobi Telecom, LLC. (Id. at ¶ 28). Several Defendants,
including Andrea Baloghne Horvath; Livia Szuromi; Davis Telecom, Inc.; Sumco Panama S.A.;
and Technologic Inc. have yet to be served. (See, e.g., Docs. 100, 110, 116).
On October 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendants Bridge and Cox to
respond to Plaintiff’s first set of requests for production of documents.1 (Doc. 112). It represented
that despite counsel agreeing to several extensions and Defendants’ numerous promises that the
responses would be forthcoming, Plaintiff’s requests remained largely unfulfilled months after
being served. (See generally id.). The Court stayed briefing, so the parties could confer and file
a joint status report. (Doc. 113). The parties filed that status report, which represented that the
two Defendants were preparing to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 114). That
same day, and more than two years after filings their answers to the Complaint, (see Docs. 29, 30),
Defendants Bridge and Cox filed a consolidated Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Stay
of Discovery. (Doc. 115). The Court then set simultaneous briefing for both motions. (Doc. 117).
These matters are ripe for review. (Docs. 112, 115, 119, 121, 122, 123).
II. STANDARD
In considering a motion to stay discovery, the “district court has the inherent power to stay
proceedings based on its authority to manage its docket efficiently.” Ohio Valley Bank Co. v.
MetaBank, No. 2:19-cv-191, 2019 WL 2170681, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 20, 2019) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). And parties routinely file motions to stay discovery while a motion to

1 Defendants Bridge and Cox are represented by the same counsel. (See Docs. 4, 5, 12, 13).
dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings is pending. See, e.g., Shanks v. Honda of Am.
Mfg., No. 2:08-cv-1059, 2009 WL 2132621, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 2009) (noting that, “[t]his
Court has had many occasions, over the years, to address the question of whether a stay of
discovery should be imposed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss”). But “the fact that a
party has filed a case-dispositive motion is usually deemed insufficient to support a stay of
discovery.” Bowens v. Columbus Metro. Libr. Bd. of Trs., No. 2:10-cv-00219, 2010 WL 3719245,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2010); see also Ohio Valley Bank, 2019 WL 2170681, at *2.
In “special circumstances,” however, a court may find that a discovery stay is appropriate.
Shanks, 2009 WL 2132621, at *1. A discovery stay may serve the interests of judicial economy,
for example, where “the defendant has raised a defense, such as absolute or qualified immunity,
which must, as a matter of law, be addressed before discovery proceeds” or where “it appears that
the complaint will almost certainly be dismissed.” Id. (citations omitted). Further, in considering
a motion to stay discovery, “‘a court weighs the burden of proceeding with discovery upon the
party from whom discovery is sought against the hardship which would be worked by a denial of
discovery.’” Ohio Valley Bank, 2019 WL 2170681, at *2 (quoting Bowens, 2010 WL 3719245, at
*1); see also Fisher v. City of Columbus, No. 2:24-cv-150, 2024 WL 413484, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 10, 2024) (“[C]ourts commonly consider the following factors: (1) the stage of litigation; (2)
whether the non-moving party will be unduly prejudiced or tactically disadvantaged; (3) whether
a stay simplifies the issues; and (4) whether the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court
is reduced.” (citation omitted)). In the end, “[t]he Court . . . must tread carefully in granting a stay
of proceedings since a party has a right to a determination of its rights and liabilities without undue
delay.” Ohio Valley Bank, 2019 WL 2170681, at *2 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Next, two federal rules govern a motion to compel. Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 37, for its part, allows for a motion to compel discovery when a party fails
to answer interrogatories submitted under Rule 33 or to provide proper responses to requests for
production of documents under Rule 34. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1), (3). “The proponent of a
motion to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving that the information sought is
relevant.” Gruenbaum v. Werner Enters., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 298, 302 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (citation
omitted). If the movant meets that burden, “the party resisting production has the burden of
establishing that the information either is not relevant” or that the information’s relevance “is
outweighed by the potential for undue burden[.]” O’Malley v. NaphCare Inc., 311 F.R.D. 461,
462 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2015).
“While relevancy is broad, ‘district courts have discretion to limit the scope of discovery
[when] the information sought is overly broad or would prove unduly burdensome to produce.’”
Plain Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. DeWine, 335 F.R.D. 115, 119 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (alteration
in original) (quoting Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir.
2007)). At base, “the scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Stumph
v. Spring View Physician Practices, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-00053-LLK, 2020 WL 68587, at *2 (W.D.
Ky. Jan. 7, 2020) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court first considers Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery before turning to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.
A. Motion to Stay Discovery
Defendants Bride and Cox request a discovery stay pending the Court’s resolution of their
Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. As relevant to that Motion, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff’s Complaint is required to, but fails to, allege a plausible factual basis for piercing
the corporate veil of the named corporate Defendants. (Doc. 115 at 6–8). They further argue that
the Complaint fails to plausibly allege liability for either Bridge or Cox and ask that the Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s state law claims. (Id. at 8–12; see also
Doc. 123 at 1–4). Plaintiff counters that its Complaint meets all the contested pleading
requirements. (See generally Doc. 121).
Defendants’ arguments in favor of a discovery stay relies on their confidence that the Court
will grant their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 115 at 14). Indeed, the bulk of
Defendants’ argument rehashes their contention that Plaintiff’s Complaint offers mere labels and
conclusions as to their involvement in the alleged wrongs or formulaic recitations of the elements
of the alleged claims. (Id. at 14–15; see also Doc. 123 at 6). Yet this Court has been clear that a
pending dispositive motion is not enough by itself to justify staying discovery. See, e.g., Bowens,
2010 WL 3719245, at *2; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-cv-00831, 2010
WL 3910352, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2010) (“Although Federal’s current Motion for Summary
Judgment may ultimately succeed, a pending case-dispositive motion is generally not enough to
stay discovery.”); Williams v. New Day Farms, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-0394, 2010 WL 3522397, at
*3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2010) (“[T]he primary basis for the requested stay, the pendency of a
potentially dispositive motion as to which the parties have presented substantial arguments on both
sides, is simply not sufficient to warrant a complete stay of discovery.”). Notably, Defendants’
Rule 12(c) Motion does not present a “special circumstance” like raising “a defense, such as
absolute or qualified immunity, which must, as matter of law, be addressed before discovery
proceeds.” Shanks, 2009 WL 2132621, at *1; Wilson v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp., No. 2:20-
CV-2138, 2022 WL 1618447, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2022) (commenting that a challenge of the
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction could also justify a discovery stay).
What’s more “it is unpersuasive for a party to rely on the strength of its dispositive motion
in moving to stay, unless the complaint is clearly frivolous.” dlhBOWLES, Inc. v. Jiangsu Riying
Elecs. Co., No. 5:21-cv-170, 2021 WL 6335001, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2021) (citing Tarazi
v. Oshry, No. 2:10-cv-793, 2011 WL 1437052, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2011)). While the
Undersigned expresses no opinion on the underlying merits of the Rule 12(c) Motion, it is not
“patent that the case lacks merit” or that the Complaint is so frivolous that it “will almost certainly
be dismissed” as to Defendants Bridge and Cox. Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:14-CV-1132,
2015 WL 2128156, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 6, 2015) (quoting Wilson v. Gillespie, No. 2:13-CV-139,
2014 WL 3460042, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 2014)). And it would be inappropriate for the
Undersigned to “weigh in on the strength of either party’s position in the briefing” of the Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings at this juncture. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 2010 WL 3910352, at
*2 n.5.
Against the backdrop that the arguments in their Rule 12(c) Motion present an
“independent basis” to stay discovery, Defendants also say that no harm would result from a stay.
(Doc. 115 at 14). They contend that “the State’s case is stuck in ‘park.’ There’s no reason to
believe that will change any time soon.” (Id.). It is not immediately clear why Defendants think
this to be the case. Though it is true this case is more than two years old and some Defendants
have yet to be served, there is an active case schedule in place that requires discovery completed
and dispositive motions filed by July of next year. If anything, the age of this case weighs in favor
of allowing discovery to proceed. Indeed, Plaintiff’s response details specific measures being
undertaken to move the case forward. (See Doc. 121 at 31–35 (discussing that Plaintiff issued
over fifty subpoenas; responded to Defendants’ discovery requests and are preparing to
supplement them; are arranging depositions of third parties; and will move for summary judgment
after deposing Defendants)). Notably, these measures require obtaining discovery from
Defendants Bridge and Cox. (Id.).
Relatedly, Plaintiff argues it would be harmed should discovery be stayed precisely
because this planned discovery would be put off. (Id. at 31, 34 (noting that a stay would postpone
depositions and tactically disadvantage Plaintiff)). In contrast, Defendants merely cite to “grossly
over-broad discovery requests” and “financial burden” as harms they would face should discovery
proceed. But “conclusory contentions regarding the expense and burden of discovery are
insufficient to outweigh the potential prejudice to Plaintiff from delay of this case.” Ohio Valley
Bank Co., 2019 WL 2170681, at *2 ; see also Ray v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Health, No. 2:18-CV-
272, 2018 WL 4907080 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2018); cf. City of Lancaster v. Flagstar Bank, FSB,
No. 2:10-CV-01041, 2011 WL 1326280 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2011) (“Yet, the City makes no effort
to detail the specific burdens it will face from discovery in this case; nor does it explain how the
prejudice it would face is different from any other party that files a potentially case-dispositive
motion before the Court.”). For these reasons, both the stage of this litigation and the harm a stay
potentially poses to Plaintiff weigh in favor of allowing discovery to continue.
Finally, Defendants maintain that a discovery stay pending the outcome of their motion
would simplify this action “because the issues will be narrowed.” (Doc. 115 at 14). But again,
Defendants rest this argument on their assertion that the Complaint merely “lump[s them] in as
‘defendants’ and ‘Individual Defendants.’” (Id.). This a not a case where Defendants raised
threshold issues in their Rule 12(c) Motion that would so simplify the issues or reduce the burden
of litigation as to justify staying discovery. Cf. Waldron v. Brown, No. 2:22-CV-3556, 2023 WL
4182150, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2023) (extending a temporary discovery stay during the
pendency of a motion to dismiss that raised questions of necessary parties and proper venue). And
even if certain aspects of this case or discovery were simplified, that fact alone does not tilt the
scale in a different direction when the other factors weigh in favor of allowing discovery to
proceed.
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 115) is DENIED. The
Undersigned expresses no opinion on the underlying merits of Defendants’ Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings.
B. Motion to Compel
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. (Doc. 112). Plaintiff asks, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, the Court to order both Defendants to produce responses to its
discovery requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3).
Plaintiff served Defendant Bridge with requests for the production of documents on May
9, 2024. (Doc. 112 at 3; see Doc. 112-2). Defendant Bridge’s response deadline was originally
June 10. (Doc. 112 at 3). Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to extend this deadline at least six times. (Id.;
see Doc. 112-4). Similarly, Plaintiff served Defendant Cox with requests for documents on
September 5, with responses due on October 7. (Doc. 112 at 3; see also Doc. 112-3). Counsel
agreed to two extensions to that deadline. (Doc. 112-4). In the end, and despite assurances from
Defendants’ counsel that responses would be forthcoming, Plaintiff received “no written
responses, no objections, and no documents have been produced, aside from one limited
production from Defendant Bridge that was largely non-responsive.” (Doc. 112 at 3; Doc. 112-4;
see also Doc. 112 at 8 (“Defendant Cox has produced nothing.”)).
Defendants largely chalk their non-responsiveness up to the other pending motions. (See
Doc. 114 (“Defendants believe that all claims should be dismissed against them, and that a stay of
outstanding discovery is warranted.”); Doc. 119 at 3–6 (arguing the Court should stay discovery)).
They also argue that Plaintiff’s requests are not relevant and are overbroad, again relying heavily
on their assertion that they are wrongly part of this case. (Doc. 119 at 7–11). But at this point,
Defendants are still parties in this case who cannot shirk their discovery obligations. See also
Sinomax USA, Inc. v. Am. Signature Inc., No. 2:21-CV-3925, 2022 WL 1301683, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
May 2, 2022) (citation omitted) (noting that scope of discovery permitted by case law and the
Federal Rules is extremely broad).
The Court concludes that the parties still have more work to do. Now that the Court has
denied Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery, the parties must work together to resolve the
disputes outlined in Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. Accordingly, the parties are ORDERED to
confer, either in person or on the phone, in the next fourteen (14) days on the outstanding
discovery. They are then ORDERED to file a joint status report on or before January 3, 2025,
outlining any discovery disputes that remain.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc.
115). The parties are ORDERED to confer in the next fourteen (14) days on the outstanding
discovery requests. They are then ORDERED to file a joint status report, on or before January 3,
2025, outlining any discovery disputes that remain.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 17, 2024 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10761671. Public record. Not legal advice.