# Gilcher v. Smith

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · December 13, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10760817

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 13, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10760817

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, in an Eighth Amendment case, that de minimis injury does not require “automatic dismissal of an excessive force claim”
- stating that 15 under the Eighth Amendment, whether a prison guard has used excessive force depends on several factors

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00192-MR

PATRICK ALAN GILCHER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
RYAN SMITH, in his individual and )
official capacities; BILLY OLVERA, in )
his individual and official capacities; ) ORDER
BRENT HOLBROOKS, in his official )
capacity as Sheriff of Macon County; )
ROBERT HOLLAND, in his official )
capacity as former Sheriff of Macon )
County; and WESTERN SURETY )
COMPANY, as surety for the Sheriff )
of Macon County, )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. [Doc. 16].
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 1, 2023, the Plaintiff Patrick Alan Gilcher (the “Plaintiff”)1
filed a Complaint against the Defendants Brent Holbrooks, in his official

1Taryn Gilcher, the Plaintiff’s wife, was also named as a party plaintiff [Doc. 1 at 1] but
was subsequently dismissed voluntarily [Doc. 11].
capacity as the current Sheriff of Macon County; Robert Holland, in his
official capacity as the former Sheriff of Macon County; Ryan Smith, in his

individual and official capacity; Billy Olvera, in his individual and official
capacity; and Western Surety Company, as surety for the Sheriff of Macon
County (collectively, the “Defendants”). [Doc. 1 at 1].

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Defendants Olvera and Smith for excessive force, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and for cruel and unusual punishment, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, and against Defendants Holland and Holbrooks

for failure to train, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 12–15].
The Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of common law battery against
Defendants Olvera and Smith, and an action on the Macon County Sheriff’s

bond with respect to Defendants Holland, Smith, and Olvera. [Id. at 15–19].
On October 2, 2023, the Defendants filed an Answer. [Doc. 5].
On September 16, 2024, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment regarding all of the Plaintiff’s claims. [Doc. 16 at 2]. On October

8, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. [Doc. 23]. On October 22, 2024, the Defendants
filed a Reply to the Plaintiff’s Response. [Doc. 27]. This matter is now ripe

for disposition.
2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Id.
The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not
rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a summary judgment motion with citation to “depositions,
3
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in the

record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Namely, the nonmoving party must
present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To that end, a

court may only consider material that can be reduced to admissible evidence.
Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F. App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir.
2008) (citing Md. Highways Contractors Ass’n v. Maryland, 933 F.2d 1246,
1251 (4th Cir. 1991)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (“A party may object

that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence.”).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a
‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
when the moving party has carried its burden
under Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than
simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts. Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
4
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for
trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment; the requirement is that there
be no genuine issue of material fact. When opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling
on a motion for summary judgment.

Id. (citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewing the forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the following is a recitation of the relevant facts.
On September 4, 2021, Trey Chastain (“Officer Chastain”), then a
police officer for Franklin, North Carolina, responded to a disturbance call
from an RV park in Franklin. [Doc. 16-1: Chastain Decl. at ¶¶ 4–5]. Prior to
Officer Chastain’s arrival, the RV park manager had choked the Plaintiff and
thrown him to the ground. [Doc. 24-3: Plaintiff Dep. at 15]. After interviewing
witnesses on the scene, Officer Chastain arrested the Plaintiff, who
appeared to be intoxicated. [Doc. 16-1: Chastain Decl. at ¶ 5; Doc. 17-2:
Chastain Dep. at 4]. Officer Chastain then transported the Plaintiff to the
Macon County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). [Doc. 17-2:
Chastain Dep. at 2; Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 5].
5
Defendants Olvera and Smith were working at the Detention Center as
detention officers when the Plaintiff arrived at about 4:30 a.m. [Doc. 18:

Olvera Decl. at ¶ 5; Doc. 16-2: Smith Decl. at ¶ 7].2 The Plaintiff appeared
to be intoxicated when he entered the Detention Center. [Doc. 18: Olvera
Decl. at ¶ 6]. The Plaintiff was physically cooperative but verbally

uncooperative with Defendants Olvera and Smith. [Doc. 24-6: Smith Dep. at
9]. Defendant Smith thought the Plaintiff was being “annoying,” but the
Plaintiff never threatened anyone. [Id. at 9–11].
At about 4:38 a.m., Defendants Olvera and Smith placed the Plaintiff

into cell 239, and immediately upon entering the cell, the Plaintiff struck the
cell door. [Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 6; Video One at 4:01–4:04; Doc. 24-3:
Plaintiff Dep. at 5–6].3 Immediately after the Plaintiff struck the door, about

three seconds after the Plaintiff entered cell 239, Defendant Smith opened
the cell door, aimed his taser at the Plaintiff, ordered the Plaintiff to get on

2Detention Center cameras recorded portions of the Plaintiff’s time at the Detention
Center. The recordings are on two videos: one displaying the Detention Center’s booking
area (“Video One”) and one displaying the inside of cell 238, the Plaintiff’s second cell
location (“Video Two”). There appears to be about a six-minute disparity between the
time stamps in Video One and Video Two. This disparity, however, is immaterial.

3The number ranges within the video citations indicate the location of the relevant portion
of the video, not the standard time in North Carolina on September 4, 2021. For example,
the “4:01” mark of Video One is the first second of the fourth minute of Video One, which
shows footage of the Detention Center at 4:38 a.m. on September 4, 2021.
6
the ground, and handcuffed the Plaintiff’s hands behind his back. [Doc. 17-
6: Smith Dep. at 2; Video One at 4:04–5:37]. Defendant Smith testified that

he had warned the Plaintiff against hitting the door, but Defendant Smith did
not include any such warning in his written incident report. [Doc. 24-6: Smith
Dep. at 12].

After handcuffing the Plaintiff, Defendant Smith checked to see if the
Plaintiff’s handcuffs were too tight. [Doc. 17-6: Smith Dep. at 2; Doc. 18:
Olvera Decl. at ¶ 6]. Defendants Olvera and Smith then placed the Plaintiff
in a “restraint chair,” a chair with straps that prevent the occupant from

moving. [Doc. 17-6: Smith Dep. at 3; Video One at 5:46]. The officers placed
the Plaintiff in the restraint chair for his own safety, as well as the safety of
others. [Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 6; Doc. 24-5: Olvera Dep. at 16].

Defendant Olvera stated that putting the Plaintiff into the restraint chair was
necessary because “hitting [the door] repeatedly could result in injury.” [Doc.
24-5: Olvera Dep. at 16]. Defendants Olvera and Smith then put the Plaintiff,
who remained in the restraint chair, into cell 238. [Doc. 17-6: Smith Dep. at

3; Video One at 8:21].
The Plaintiff testified that he did not remember anyone checking on his
“well-being” while he was in the restraint chair. [Doc. 24-3: Plaintiff Dep. at

25–26]. According to the Plaintiff, while he was in the restraint chair, he
7
pleaded for medical help and for the detention officers to loosen his
handcuffs, but the detention officers verbally antagonized him, rather than

helping him. [Id.]. The Plaintiff testified that the detention officers told him to
“quit being a baby,” and that his time in the restraint chair would restart every
time he “whimper[ed].” [Id.]. Defendant Smith testified, on the other hand,

that during his shift, the Plaintiff was continuously monitored during pursuant
to Detention Center policy. [Doc. 16-2: Smith Decl. at ¶ 8]. According to
Defendant Smith, this monitoring included allowing the Plaintiff to stand,
checking the Plaintiff’s handcuffs to ensure they were not too tight, and

asking the Plaintiff if he wanted water. [Id.].
The video evidence shows that at around 5:14 a.m., Defendants
Olvera and Smith removed the Plaintiff from cell 238. [Video Two at 23:03–

23:21]. Defendants Smith testified that he and Defendant Olvera then
checked the Plaintiff’s restraint straps and handcuffs to ensure they were not
too tight before returning him to his cell.4 [Doc. 17-6: Smith Dep. at 3]. At
about 5:54 a.m., an unidentified male detention officer and an unidentified

man in plain clothes entered cell 238. [Video Two at 48:04]. The two men

4The video evidence shows that the Plaintiff was removed from cell 238, but the video
evidence does not show whether Defendants Olvera and Smith checked the Plaintiff’s
restraint straps or handcuffs. [Video Two at 23:03–23:21].
8
spoke to the Plaintiff for about three minutes, and the man in plain clothes
took notes. [Id. at 48:04–50:49].

Both Defendant Olvera’s and Smith’s shifts ended at 6:00 a.m. [Doc.
18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 7; Doc. 16-2: Smith Decl. at ¶ 9]. At the end of their
shifts, both Defendants Olvera and Smith left the Detention Center, and the

Plaintiff remained in the restraint chair in cell 238. [Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at
¶ 7; Doc. 16-2: Smith Decl. at ¶ 9]. At about 6:07 a.m., an unidentified male
detention officer entered cell 238 and spoke to the Plaintiff for about one
minute. [Video Two at 1:00:52–1:01:51]. At about 6:12 a.m., detention

officers removed the Plaintiff from cell 238 and returned him to cell 238 about
two minutes later. [Id. at 1:05:10].5 At about 6:21 a.m., an unidentified female
detention officer entered cell 238 and spoke to the Plaintiff for about thirty

seconds. [Id. at 1:11:42–1:12:09]. At about 6:31 a.m., an unidentified male
detention officer and an unidentified female detention officer entered cell 238
and spoke with the Plaintiff for about twenty seconds. [Id. at 1:20:49–
1:21:07].

5There appears to be a “jump” in the time stamp between the time that the Plaintiff was
removed from the cell and when he was returned. The time stamp, which shows the
standard time in North Carolina on September 4, 2021, reads “6:12:46” when the Plaintiff
is removed, and it reads “6:14:41” when he is returned. [Id. at 1:05:10–1:05:16]. The
time that elapses from the recording during this period, however, is only about six
seconds. [Id.]. If there is any relevance to this, neither party has addressed it.
9
At about 7:34 a.m., detention officers removed the Plaintiff from the
restraint chair and removed his handcuffs. [Id. at 2:00:39]. Detention officers

then moved the Plaintiff into another cell until his grandfather picked him up
on September 6, 2021. [Doc. 17-7: Plaintiff Dep. at 4–8]. That same day,
the Plaintiff went to Angel Medical Center (the “Hospital”). [Id.; Doc. 17-8].

The Hospital recorded the Plaintiff’s visit on a registration form (the “Form”).
[Docs. 17-8, 24-18]. The Form states that the Plaintiff complained of “neck
pain with low back pain, right wrist and hand pain/tingling and a small lump
over [a] previous surgical site that occurred after an alleged assault.” [Doc.

24-18 at 4]. The Form states that the Plaintiff “was picked up and body
slammed on Friday night.” [Id.]. The Form does not include any complaint
by the Plaintiff that he was harmed by handcuffs or other restraints at the

Detention Center. [Id.]. The Plaintiff testified, however, that he told a Hospital
employee that he had been handcuffed “very tightly for several hours at the
[Detention Center].” [Doc. 24-20: Plaintiff Decl. at 3].
Under the Plaintiff’s “Diagnosis/Disposition,” the Form lists the

following: “1. Abdominal wall lump 2. Acute low back pain 3. Right wrist sprain
4. Sprain of right hand 5. Acute strain of neck muscle.” [Id. at 5]. Under
“Patient Instructions,” the Form indicates that the Plaintiff was instructed to

take “Tylenol and ibuprofen as needed for pain. Follow up with your surgeon
10
to address your potential abdominal wall hernia. Return to the emergency
room if your symptoms change or worsen. Follow-up with primary care in 2

to 3 days for recheck.” [Id.].
On September 16, 2021, the Plaintiff photographed his right hand and
right wrist. [Doc. 24-21]. The photographs appear to show some minimal

bruises and abrasions. [Id.]. About eighteen months later, on March 15,
2023 and May 31, 2023, Doctor Allen R. Blackburn, II saw the Plaintiff as a
clinical patient. [Doc. 24-14: Blackburn Decl. at 3]. Doctor Blackburn is “a
board-certified orthopedic hand, wrist, and elbow surgeon and fellowship-

trained hand and upper extremity specialist.” [Id. at 2]. Doctor Blackburn
opined that the Plaintiff has “persistent neurological symptoms in his right
wrist and hand, and that these symptoms represent a permanent

impairment.” [Id. at 4]. According to Doctor Blackburn, the Plaintiff has “a
sensory deficit of 50% secondary to persistent pain and sensory deficit in the
superficial terminal branches of the radial nerve.” [Id. at 3]. Moreover, Doctor
Blackburn opined “that a causal relationship existed between the use of

metal handcuffs as a restraint on September 4, 2021, and [the Plaintiff’s]
persistent neurological symptoms, and that some degree of persistent
sensory deficit is expected indefinitely consistent with permanent injury.”

[Id.].
11
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Cognizable Parties

As an initial matter, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against Defendant Holland, the former Sheriff of Macon
County, should be dismissed. [Doc. 17 at 7]. Official capacity claims

“generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66
(1985) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
n.55 (1978)). In official capacity claims, “the real party in interest is the

entity,” id. at 166, and the current office holder is the proper party, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 25(d).
By naming Defendants Holland and Holbrooks as defendants in their

official capacities, the Plaintiff initiated “a suit against the entity,” the Macon
County Sheriff’s Office. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Defendant
Holbrooks, the current Sheriff, is the proper party for this suit; Defendant
Holland, the former Sheriff, is not. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Therefore, the

Court dismisses the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Holland. Because
Defendant Holbrooks is the proper party, even though this case concerns
events that occurred during Defendant Holland’s tenure, the Court will

designate claims against Defendants Holbrooks simply as claims against the
12
“Macon County Sheriff.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(d) (stating that a “public
officer who sues or is sued in an official capacity may be designated by

official title rather than by name”).
The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Olvera and Smith in their official capacities should be dismissed

because those claims are duplicative of the Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
against the Macon County Sheriff. [Doc. 17 at 11–12]. As detailed above,
official capacity claims against county officers are claims against the sheriff
as the municipal entity, see Graham, 473 U.S. at 165–66, and courts can

dismiss official capacity claims against county officers as redundant when
the plaintiff also sues the sheriff, see Hogan v. Cherokee County, 519 F.
Supp. 3d 263, 283 (W.D.N.C. 2021). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Olvera and Smith in their official
capacities. See id.
B. Section 1983
The Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against Defendants Olvera and

Smith for cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, and for excessive force, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 12–14]. The Plaintiff also asserts a § 1983 claim

against the Macon County Sheriff for failure to train, in violation of the
13
Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 14–15]. Section 1983 provides in relevant
part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail under § 1983, “the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed
under color of state law.” Hogan, 519 F. Supp. 3d at 276 (citing Austin v.
Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727 (4th Cir. 1999)).
1. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from inflicting “cruel
and unusual punishments,” U.S. Const. amend. VIII, but the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d
863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). It is undisputed that the Plaintiff was a pretrial
detainee on September 4, 2021. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment is
inapplicable here, and the Court grants the Defendants summary judgment
on the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
14
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Constitution has multiple provisions that prohibit the government

from using excessive force. See U.S. Const. amends. IV, VIII, XIV. The
applicable constitutional provision depends on the plaintiff’s status in relation
to the government. The Fourth Amendment applies to excessive force

claims regarding persons who are arrested or otherwise “seized,” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989), the Eighth Amendment applies to
excessive force claims regarding convicted criminals, Martin, 849 F.2d at
870, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies to excessive force claims

regarding pretrial detainees, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97
(2015). The Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee on September 4, 2021, so the
Fourteenth Amendment applies here. See id.

Excessive force analyses are similar, regardless of the applicable
constitutional provision. See Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6
(2021) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (stating that under the Fourth
Amendment, “whether an officer has used excessive force depends on ‘the

facts and circumstances of each particular case’”); Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (stating that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, excessive force turns on the “facts and circumstances of each

particular case”); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (stating that
15
under the Eighth Amendment, whether a prison guard has used excessive
force depends on several factors).6 Indeed, the excessive force inquiry

under the Fourth Amendment is identical to the excessive force inquiry under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 141 S. Ct. 2239,
2241 n.2 (2021) (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).

In order to prove excessive force, a pretrial detainee must show that
the force “used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576
U.S. at 396–97. Objective reasonableness “turns on the ‘facts and
circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. at 397 (quoting Graham, 490

U.S. at 396). Courts must “account for the legitimate interests that stem from
[the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is
detained, appropriately deferring to policies and practices that in th[e]

judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline
and to maintain institutional security.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979)). In doing so, courts
should consider:

6An Eighth Amendment excessive force claim differs because it “involves both an
objective and a subjective component.” Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir.
2019). Nonetheless, the objective component of an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim, like an excessive force claim under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment, depends
on the facts and circumstances of each case. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
16
the relationship between the need for the use of force
and the amount of force used; the extent of the
plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to
temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of
the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably
perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was
actively resisting.

Id. De minimis injuries are not automatically dispositive of an excessive force
claim. See id.; see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39–40 (2010)
(holding, in an Eighth Amendment case, that de minimis injury does not
require “automatic dismissal of an excessive force claim”). Nevertheless,
injury and force are correlated, and de minimis injuries can “provide some
indication of the amount of force applied.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37.
Handcuffing is “a standard procedure” in law enforcement, Brown v.
Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 369 (4th Cir. 2002), that “inevitably involves some
use of force,” Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2006). Thus,
handcuffing, in and of itself, “rarely constitute[s] excessive force where the
officers were justified” in applying the handcuffs. Brown, 278 F.3d at 369.
“Unduly tight handcuffing,” however, can constitute excessive force if the

plaintiff is injured from the handcuffing, and the defendant ignored the
plaintiff’s complaints about the handcuffs. Karn v. PTS of Am., LLC, 590 F.
Supp. 3d 780, 819–20 (D. Md. 2022) (denying summary judgment regarding

the plaintiff’s excessive force claim for overly tight handcuffs). Like
17
handcuffing, “placement in a restraint chair ‘does not in and of itself constitute
an excessive use of force, as the use of devices such as restraint chairs . . .

have repeatedly been found to be constitutional when used appropriately.’”
Pugh v. Evans, No. 5:11-CT-3239-D, 2012 WL 6892816, at *3 (E.D.N.C.
June 20, 2012) (quoting Rodriguez v. Taylor, No. 9:08–01027–RBH, 2008

WL 5244480, at *8 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2008)), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 934 (4th Cir.
2012).
Considering the need to preserve order in the Detention Center, it was
not objectively unreasonable for Defendants Olvera and Smith to handcuff

the Plaintiff and place him in a restraint chair for striking a cell door. See
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97; Pugh, 2012 WL 6892816, at *3; Brown, 278
F.3d at 369. Therefore, Defendants Olvera and Smith did not use excessive

force when they did so.
The Plaintiff claims that the handcuffs were too tight and that while he
was in the restraint chair, he pleaded for medical help and for the detention
officers to loosen his handcuffs, but the detention officers verbally

antagonized him, rather than helping him.7 [Doc. 24-3: Plaintiff Dep. at 25–

7 The Plaintiff also testified that he did not remember anyone checking on his “well-being”
while he was in the restraint chair. [Doc. 24-3: Plaintiff Dep. at 25–26]. The video
evidence plainly shows multiple detention officers entering cell 238 and speaking with the
Plaintiff while he was in the restraint chair. As such, the Court need not accept this portion
18
26]. The Plaintiff further testified that the detention officers told him to “quit
being a baby,” and that his time in the restraint chair would restart every time

he “whimper[ed].” [Id.]. Standing alone, antagonizing comments by the
detention officers do not create a constitutional claim. Morrison v. Martin,
755 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (quoting Coyle v. Hughs, 436 F.

Supp. 591, 593 (W.D. Okla. 1977)) (“The law is clear that ‘[m]ere threatening
language and gestures of a custodial officer do not, even if true, amount to
constitutional violations.’”), aff’d, 917 F.2d 1302 (4th Cir. 1990).
Moreover, “[i]n a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must prove that the

defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of a claimed injury.” Dillard v.
Smith, 558 F. Supp. 3d 308, 311 (W.D. Va. 2021) (citing Kane v. Lewis, 604
F. App’x 229, 234 (4th Cir. 2015)). “It is well-settled that expert testimony is

‘not always necessary to establish causation’ in cases involving the alleged
use of excessive force.” Id. at 312 (quoting Zartner v. Miller, 760 F. App’x
558, 563 (10th Cir. 2019)). Nonetheless, “when an injury lacks an obvious
origin and multiple causes are possible, expert medical testimony is

of the Plaintiff’s testimony because it “is blatantly contradicted by the record.” See Scott,
550 U.S. at 380.

19
necessary to prove causation between a use of force and an injury.” Id.
(quoting Zartner, 760 F. App’x at 563–64).

The Plaintiff asserts that he was injured by how tightly the handcuffs
were applied. The Plaintiff’s evidence from his visit to Angel Hospital on
September 6th was that he had sprained his wrist and hand (among other

serious complaints). The medical record, however, says nothing of any
compression injury to the Plaintiff’s wrist. Moreover, prior to his arrest the
Plaintiff was in a physical altercation with the RV park manager, who choked
the Plaintiff and threw him to the ground. The Plaintiff’s complaints at the

hospital correlate with injuries stemming from that altercation, but not with
any injury caused by tight handcuffs.8 As such, no reasonable jury could
conclude from this evidence that the Defendants’ application of the handcuffs

caused such injury.
The only other piece of evidence the Plaintiff relies on is the declaration
of a physician who treated the Plaintiff many months later, Doctor Blackburn.
The doctor’s causation opinion, however, lacks a sound medical or scientific

methodology. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. His declaration does not describe the

8 In this respect, the present case is distinguishable from Karn v. PTS of America, 509
F.Supp.3d 780 (D. Md. 2022). In Karn, the plaintiff presented evidence of a clear physical
manifestation of the excessively tight handcuffs for a much longer period of time than is
found here.
20
“principles and methods” that he used to decide that the Plaintiff’s injuries
were caused by handcuffs, which were applied for approximately three

hours, more than eighteen months prior to Doctor Blackburn examining the
Plaintiff. See id. Rather, Doctor Blackburn infers that the Plaintiff’s injuries
were caused by handcuffs, as opposed to, for example, being body slammed

at the RV park. [Doc. 17-8 at 2]. Because Doctor Blackburn fails to explain
how he derived this inference by “using scientific or other valid methods,” his
causation opinion is based merely “on belief or speculation.” See Nease v.
Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 229 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Oglesby v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 190 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, this causation
opinion would be inadmissible at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Without an admissible

expert opinion, the Plaintiff cannot prove causation between the Defendants’
use of force and his injury. See Dillard, 558 F. Supp. 3d at 312.
The Court is mindful that it must view the forecast of evidence and
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, but the Court

is also mindful of the ultimate question at this stage: whether “a reasonable
jury could return a verdict” for the Plaintiff. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Given that handcuffs and restraint chairs are standard law enforcement

tools, see Brown, 278 F.3d at 369; Pugh, 2012 WL 6892816, at *3, and that
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the Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence establishes, at most, minimal injuries,
without any admissible expert evidence to forecast how and when the injuries

occurred, see Dillard, 558 F. Supp. 3d at 312, no reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the Plaintiff regarding his excessive force claim. Accordingly,
the Court grants the Defendants summary judgment as to the Plaintiff’s §

1983 claim against Defendants Olvera and Smith for using excessive force.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A sheriff, as the final decision-maker for the county, can be held liable
under § 1983 for failure to train, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

387 (1989), but a sheriff cannot be held liable for failure to train “absent a
finding of a constitutional violation on the part of the person being
supervised,” Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 724 (4th Cir.

1991) (quoting Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir.1990)). As the
Court has concluded that the Plaintiff was not subjected to excessive force
by Defendants Olvera and Smith, there can be no liability on the part of the
Macon County Sheriff. See id. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants

summary judgment regarding the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the Macon
County Sheriff for failure to train. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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C. State Law Claims
In a civil action over which a district court has original jurisdiction, a

district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within [its] original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A

district court may also “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” when it
“has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. §
1367(c)(3). Indeed, “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the

pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7

(1988). Because the Court dismisses all of the Plaintiff’s federal claims, it
declines “to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” See
id.
ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 16] is GRANTED IN PART, and the Plaintiff’s
federal claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs state law claims, which are
hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this civil case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: December 13, 2024

Martifi Reidinger ee
Chief United States District Judge “AES

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10760817. Public record. Not legal advice.