# GADDY v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · December 3, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753902

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 3, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753902

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TAMMY GADDY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 23-CV-938
)
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA )
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Tammy Gaddy, a former employee of Defendant
University of North Carolina Health Care System (“UNC Health”),
alleges employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Before the
court are UNC Health’s motion to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 8),
and Gaddy’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint (Doc.
12). For the reasons set forth below, Gaddy’s motion for leave to
file an amended complaint will be granted, and Defendant’s motion
to dismiss will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts are based on the well-pleaded allegations of the
complaints, which are accepted as true for purposes of the pending
motions and viewed in the light most favorable to Gaddy.
Gaddy is an African American female. (Doc. 1 ¶ 5.) She was
employed as a Patient Accounts Manager for the Financial Counseling
team at UNC Health from January 2, 2008, until April 26, 2022.
(Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Throughout her employment with UNC Health, Gaddy
was consistently evaluated as exceeding expectations in her annual
performance reviews. (Id. ¶ 7.)
On April 8, 2022, Gaddy attended an ice cream social with her
co-workers and made a joke about “who had the better team.” (Id.

¶ 9.) No one at the event expressed any offense by the joke. (Id.
¶ 10). On April 11, 2022, Gaddy was contacted by Jennifer Headen1
at UNC Health, who told her not to report to work the following
day. (Id. ¶ 11.) Gaddy discovered that access to her work account
had been blocked and that her supervisors had been contacted by
Headen about “writ[ing] statements against her.” (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.)
On April 12, Gaddy was notified that she was placed on
investigatory paid leave so that UNC Health could investigate a
complaint made against her for her conduct during the ice cream
social. (Id. ¶ 15.) Later that week, Gaddy attended a phone
conference where Headen explained that Gaddy’s actions “were not

aligned with [the] ‘One Great Team’” philosophy. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.)
Headen requested that Gaddy respond to the allegations in writing,
and Gaddy did so, explaining that “she did not recall making any
comments that would warrant [being placed] on investigatory

1 Gaddy’s original complaint refers to “Jennifer Header.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 11.)
UNC Health’s briefing explains that the individual is understood to be
“Jennifer Headen.” (Doc. 9 at 6 n.1.) Because Gaddy’s response brief
adopts this name (Doc. 11 at 8), the court will, too.
leave.” (Id. ¶¶ 20-27.) Gaddy also noted in her response that
after her joke at the social event, she had stated, “[A]ll jokes
aside, we are one great team. Regardless of who you report to, we
are all here to help you.” (Id. ¶ 28.)
On April 26, 2022, Headen told Gaddy that she was being
terminated immediately “without cause.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Gaddy asked

Headen if she had considered the investigation into the social
event in making her decision to terminate Gaddy, and Headen
indicated that she had. (Id. ¶ 30.) Headen did not allow Gaddy
to see a copy of the documentation from the investigation. (Id.
¶ 31.)
Gaddy filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which dismissed the
charge and issued a right to sue notice on August 1, 2023. (Id.
at 9.) Gaddy filed her complaint alleging discrimination under
Title VII on October 31, 2023.
Gaddy alleges disparate treatment on the basis of race and

alleges four comparators. The first is an employee who “was hired
with the job posting [requiring him] to be certified within six
(6) months of hire or be terminated.” (Id. ¶ 35.) This employee
did not get certified yet kept his job. (Id.) In her proposed
amended complaint, she adds that this employee is white. (Doc.
12-1 ¶ 38.) The second comparator is a white female employee at
UNC Health, who was accused of racial discrimination by an African
American employee. (Doc. 1 ¶ 36.) The white employee was promoted
to Associate Vice President after this complaint was lodged. (Id.
¶ 37.) In her proposed amended complaint, Gaddy adds that this
employee was later promoted to Vice President of Operations. (Doc.
12-1 ¶ 42.) The third comparator is a white female employee, who
was accused of poisoning other employees and was not terminated.

(Doc. 1 ¶ 38.) In Gaddy’s proposed amended complaint, she changes
this allegation, explaining that the third comparator is a Human
Resources Consultant who made “racist comments about lynchings,
immigrants, and poisoning” rather than being accused of poisoning
other employees. (Doc. 12-1 ¶ 43.) Gaddy alleges that UNC Health
determined that this employee had, in fact, made such comments but
did not discipline or terminate her. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 47.) The final
comparator is a white female employee who made offensive remarks
regarding individuals who are LGBTQ and African American. (Doc.
1 ¶ 39.) This employee was neither disciplined nor terminated.
(Id. ¶ 40.) The proposed amended complaint adds that this employee

worked in the Financial Navigation Department and reported to
Jennifer Headen and that her offensive comments were reported to
Headen. (Doc. 12-1 ¶¶ 48-51.)
UNC Health responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of service and failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. (Doc. 8.) Gaddy responded in
opposition (Doc. 11) and moved for leave to file an amended
complaint (Doc. 12), attaching her proposed amended pleading (Doc.
12-1). UNC Health filed a reply as to its motion to dismiss (Doc.
14) and an opposition to Gaddy’s motion for leave to file an
amended complaint (Doc. 15).
In her proposed amended complaint, Gaddy supplements and
modifies certain factual allegations, particularly with respect to

the four comparators, as explained above. (Doc. 12-1 ¶¶ 38-52.)
She also explains Jennifer Headen’s position at UNC Health (id.
¶ 11) and adds a state law claim for wrongful termination in
violation of North Carolina public policy (id. at 8-9).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Service of Process
1. Service Directed to Process Agent
UNC Health first argues that Gaddy’s complaint should be
dismissed for insufficient service of process because the summons
was not directed to UNC Health’s agent for service of process.
UNC Health contends that under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Gaddy was required to serve its appointed process agent,
Thomas Shanahan. (Doc. 9 at 9-10.) Instead, the summons was
directed to B. Glenn George. (Id. at 10.) UNC Health argues that
this is “not a minor technical defect, but a fatal error” and that
“[t]his [c]ourt has repeatedly found service deficient where the
summons and complaint were not properly served on the agency’s
designated process agent.” (Id.)
Gaddy responds that she was unaware that B. Glenn George, who
was formerly the registered agent for UNC Health, had retired and
been replaced by Thomas Shanahan. (Doc. 11 at 5.) Gaddy contends
that while she technically violated the rules for service, UNC
Health received actual notice and so “the rules for service should
be given ‘a liberal construction.’” (Id. (quoting Armco, Inc. v.

Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir.
1984)).)
UNC Health is a state agency. Singh v. Univ. of N. Carolina
at Chapel Hill, 659 F. Supp. 3d 659, 669-72 (M.D.N.C. 2023). Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are two ways to serve
process on a state agency: (1) “delivering a copy of the summons
and of the complaint to its chief executive officer” or (2)
“serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by the state’s
law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). North Carolina law instructs that an
agency of the state must be served by directing the summons and

complaint to its process agent. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(4) (providing
that service of process must be effected “by personally delivering
a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the process agent,”
“by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint . . .
addressed to said process agent,” or “by depositing with a
designated delivery service . . . a copy of the summons and
complaint[] addressed to the process agent”). When service is
ineffective, “the [c]ourt has discretion to dismiss the action or
to quash service and allow the plaintiff more time to serve
process.” Walston v. Cintron, No. 1:18-CV-517, 2018 WL 6624198,
at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2018) (citing Thomas v. Nelms, No. 1:09-
CV-491, 2013 WL 593419, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 2013) (collecting
cases)). In exercising their discretion, courts have considered

whether the defendant received actual notice or was prejudiced by
the defect in service. See McCreary v. Vaughan-Basset Furniture
Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537-39 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (denying motion
to dismiss for insufficient service of process because defendant
corporation had actual notice, even though plaintiff directed U.S.
Marshal Service to serve complaint and summons at defendant’s
physical address but service was made on its post office box and
no registered agent was identified).
It is undisputed that Gaddy did not properly serve UNC
Health’s process agent, but rather served UNC Health at its address
“c/o” B. Glenn George, its prior chief legal officer who was the

process agent. If the court were to dismiss this action, Gaddy
would be unable to pursue her claim, as the statute of limitations
has expired. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (requiring plaintiffs to
file a complaint within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC); (Doc. 1 at 9) (showing the right-to-sue
letter was issued on August 1, 2023, and the complaint was filed
ninety days later on October 31, 2023). Furthermore, UNC Health
received actual notice of this action (which is not surprising as
UNC Health apparently recognized the materials to be intended for
the chief legal counsel who also serves as its process agent) and
would not be prejudiced by quashing service. See McCreary, 412 F.
Supp. 2d at 537, 539. Therefore, the court declines to quash
service and dismiss the complaint based on insufficiency of

service.
2. Timeliness
UNC next argues that service of process was untimely. Under
Federal Rule of Civil procedure 4(m), the defendant must be “served
within 90 days after the complaint is filed.” However, “if the
plaintiff shows good cause for the failure [to serve the defendant
within that time], the court must extend the time for service for
an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). UNC Health contends
that Gaddy served process more than ninety days after filing the
complaint, pointing out that she only requested a summons after
the court notified her of her failure to serve process within

ninety days. (Doc. 9 at 12.) UNC Health also argues that Gaddy
cannot show good cause. (Id.) It asserts that neither
inadvertence nor counsel’s personal health problems amounts to
good cause. (Doc. 14 at 8.) UNC Health also argues that if
Gaddy’s counsel was unable to personally ensure process was served
during the ninety-day window due to a medical issue, he could have
had another attorney at his firm take responsibility for doing so.
(Id. at 9.) In fact, UNC Health argues, Gaddy’s counsel did just
this in another case, Banks v. Alamance-Burlington Board of
Education, pending before this court during the ninety-day window
in this case. (Id.)
Gaddy responds that service was timely because the summons
was issued within the time set by the court in its Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(m) notice (Doc. 2) and that if not, she can show
good cause. (Doc. 11 at 2.) Gaddy acknowledges that process must
be served within ninety days of filing the complaint but explains
that under Rule 4, if the plaintiff fails to do so, the court has
the option to dismiss the action or provide that service must be
effected within a specified time. (Id.) She argues that she
served process before the court “issu[ed] an [o]rder for service
to be effectuated within a specified period of time,” effectively
mooting the issue. (Id.) She also suggests that service was
timely because when the court issued the notice regarding her
failure to serve UNC Health within the ninety-day period (Doc. 2),

it gave her fourteen days to respond to the notice, and she issued
the summons within those fourteen days. (Doc. 11 at 2.) Gaddy
continues that if service was untimely, her counsel’s medical
issues during the ninety-day window constitute good cause.2 (Id.

2 Gaddy’s counsel was diagnosed with serious heart issues in mid-November
2023. (Id. at 2.) After further testing, counsel underwent quadruple
bypass surgery on December 18, 2023, and was released from the hospital
several days later. (Id. at 3.)
at 2-5.) Gaddy further argues that the delay in service was minor,
only twenty-six days, and did not prejudice UNC Health. (Id. at
4-5.) Finally, she argues that dismissing this action would
“create a statute of limitations issue.” (Id. at 5.)
Rule 4(m) provides that if a defendant is not served within
ninety days of the filing of the complaint, the court on motion or

on its own after providing notice to the plaintiff “must dismiss
the action without prejudice against the defendant or order that
service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
However, if the plaintiff can show good cause for the failure,
“the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate
period.” Id. “Generally, for purposes of Rule 4(m), ‘good cause’
requires some showing of diligence on the part of the plaintiffs.”
Attkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 627 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended
(June 10, 2019). If the plaintiff cannot show good cause, the
court has the discretion to extend time to serve the defendant.
See Gelin v. Shuman, 35 F.4th 212, 219-20 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[A]

district court possesses discretion to grant the plaintiff an
extension of time to serve a defendant with the complaint and
summons even absent a showing of good cause . . . .”). “The
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that service of process
has been accomplished in a manner that complies with Rule 4.”
Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Ciba Seeds, 933 F. Supp. 519, 526
(M.D.N.C. 1996).
Gaddy’s response demonstrates a misunderstanding of Rule 4.
The deadline for service of the summons and complaint is ninety
days from the filing of the complaint; it is not any time before
the court “issu[es] an [o]rder for service to be effectuated within
a specified period of time.” (See Doc. 11 at 2.) And the court’s
notice to counsel that the ninety-day period has passed (see Doc.

2) is not an extension. Here, Gaddy filed her complaint on October
31, 2023 (Doc. 1), and thus had until January 29, 2024, to serve
UNC Health. The parties agree that Gaddy does not claim to have
served UNC Health until after this date.3
Gaddy’s counsel’s medical condition during the ninety-day
window for service in this case was undoubtedly serious. However,
courts often find that the medical condition of plaintiff’s
counsel, even when serious, is insufficient to show good cause.
See, e.g., Chihota v. Fulton, Friedman & Gullace, LLP, No. RDB-
11-01273, 2012 WL 1319816, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 16, 2012) (finding
that good cause was not shown when counsel had had a medical

procedure performed on both eyes); Knott v. Atlantic Bingo Supply,
Inc., No. JFM-05-1747, 2005 WL 3593743, at *1-2 (D. Md. Dec. 22,
2005) (finding that good cause was not shown despite counsel being
incapacitated by sarcoidosis in part because other attorneys at

3 A summons was not issued until February 22, 2024. (Doc 4.) Gaddy
contends that process was served on February 26, 2024. (Doc. 11 at 5.)
UNC Health asserts that it received a copy of the summons and complaint
by certified mail on or about March 5, 2024. (Doc. 9 at 6.)
counsel’s firm “could have taken over responsibility for seeing
process served”). Nevertheless, the court retains the discretion
to extend the time for Gaddy to serve UNC Health in this case.
As a practical matter, if the court were to quash service and
dismiss the action, Gaddy would be time-barred in bringing her
claim, the delay of which is attributable to counsel. Cf. Harris

v. S. Charlotte Pre-Owned Auto Warehouse, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-00307-
MOC-DCK, 2015 WL 1893839, at *5-6 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)
(reopening and enlarging the time for service because mistakes
that led to a failure to serve process were “clearly attributable
to [plaintiff’s] attorney” despite not finding good cause).
Alternatively, if the court were to “order that service be made
within a specified time” under Rule 4(m), it would be a largely
pointless act as UNC Health concedes it received actual notice.
Where, as here, the defect in service involved naming the proper
Defendant but designating the predecessor chief legal counsel (who
was the process agent) as process agent, the court will exercise

its discretion under Rule 4(m) and extend the time for serving the
summons and complaint to the date UNC Health concedes it was served
by certified mail in this case. The motion to quash service will
therefore be denied.
B. Amended Complaint
Gaddy has moved for leave to file an amended complaint (Doc.
12). The proposed amended complaint supplements and modifies some
of the factual allegations in the original complaint and adds a
state claim for wrongful termination. (Doc. 12-1.) Gaddy argues
that granting her leave to file her amended complaint would neither
cause undue delay nor cause UNC Health to suffer any prejudice.
(Doc. 12 ¶¶ 6,7.)
In response, UNC Health argues that Gaddy’s amended complaint

would be futile. It contends that her proposed factual amendments
still fail to allege sufficiently similar comparators to survive
a motion to dismiss her Title VII claim. (Doc. 15 at 12-18.) UNC
Health also argues that Gaddy’s claim for wrongful termination is
barred by sovereign immunity. (Id. at 8-9.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B), a
plaintiff may amend the complaint once as a matter of course within
twenty-one days after the earlier of (1) service of a responsive
pleading or (2) service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f).
After that period, a party may amend only with either the opposing
party's written consent or the court's leave. Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). The court therefore has the discretion to entertain the
pending motion to dismiss, or to consider the motion to amend and
then permit the parties to re-brief the motion to dismiss. Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (noting that “the grant or
denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the
District Court”). And while district courts have discretion to
grant or deny a motion to amend, the Fourth Circuit has interpreted
Rule 15(a) to provide that “leave to amend a pleading should be
denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing
party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party,
or the amendment would have been futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438
F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see Foman, 371
U.S. at 182 (same).

“[I]f the proposed change advances a claim or defense that is
legally insufficient on its face, the court may deny leave to
amend.” Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218,
225 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Charles A. Wright & Arthur Miller,
Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civil, § 1487, at 637 (1991) (quotation omitted
and alterations adopted)); see Joyner v. Abbott Labs, 674 F. Supp.
185, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (same). In determining whether a proposed
amended complaint would be futile, the court reviews the proposed
complaint under the standard used to evaluate a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Amaya v. DGS Constr., LLC, 326
F.R.D. 439, 451 (D. Md. 2018) (citing Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming,

Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011)). Thus, “[a] motion to
amend a complaint is futile ‘if the proposed claim would not
survive a motion to dismiss.’” Pugh v. McDonald, 266 F. Supp. 3d
864, 866 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (quoting James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82
F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). “Leave to amend, however,
should only be denied on the ground of futility when the proposed
amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.”
Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986)
(citing Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.
1980)).
Gaddy has no direct evidence of discrimination and therefore
proceeds with her Title VII disparate treatment claim under the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, to state a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1)
she is a member of a protected class, (2) she performed
satisfactorily at her job, (3) she suffered an adverse employment
action, and (4) other similarly-situated employees who are not
members of the protected class were treated more favorably. See
Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).
In assessing those comparators, it is relevant whether they “dealt
with the same supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards
and[,] ... engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating
or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct

or the employer's treatment of them for it.” Cowgill v. First
Data Techs., 41 F.4th 370, 381 (4th Cir. 2022) (alteration in
original) (quoting Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App'x 355, 359 (4th
Cir. 2010) (per curium)). While “a comparison between similar
employees ‘will never involve precisely the same set of work-
related offenses occurring over the same period of time and under
the same sets of circumstances,’” id. (quoting Cook v. CSX Transp.
Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993)), “the plaintiff must
provide evidence that the proposed comparators are not just similar
in some respects, but ‘similarly-situated in all respects,’”
Spencer v. Va. State Univ., 919 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.
1992)).

Gaddy easily satisfies the first three prongs of her prima
facie claim under Title VII, and UNC Health does not argue
otherwise. She is a black woman, a member of a protected class.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Gaddy has alleged that she worked for
UNC Health for fourteen years and that “[t]hroughout her tenure as
an employee, [she] has consistently exceeded Defendant’s
expectations in her annual performance appraisals.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 5,
7.) And she suffered an adverse employment action when her
employment was terminated by UNC Health. See Giles v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 59 F.4th 696, 704 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Holland
v. Wa. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007)). Concerning

the fourth prong, Gaddy describes four similarly-situated
employees in both her complaint and her amended complaint. In her
original complaint, the positions and supervisors for these
comparators were not provided. However, in her proposed amended
complaint, she provided some of this missing information, and at
least two of the comparators are alleged to be similarly situated
to Gaddy.
The third comparator, a Human Resources Consultant, was
reported by her co-workers for making racially-derogatory comments
at work and was determined by UNC Health to have made such
comments. (Doc. 12-1 ¶¶ 43-45.) This employee, a white female,
was neither disciplined nor terminated. (Id. ¶ 47.) She is
employed by UNC Health in a similar position as Gaddy; neither is

in management, and both have positions involving working with
others, where their professionalism and amiability may be relevant
to their work performance. This employee also allegedly engaged
in conduct similar to but more serious than Gaddy’s by making
offensive comments to co-workers. While it is not alleged that
she shared the same supervisor, that is not always required. See
Cowgill, 41 F.4th at 382.
The fourth comparator is also similarly situated to Gaddy.
This employee, again a white female, worked in the Financial
Navigation Department and reported to the same supervisor as Gaddy,
Jennifer Headen. (Doc. 12-1 ¶ 48.) She allegedly made offensive

comments at work, and these comments were reported to Headen, but
the employee was neither disciplined nor terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 48-
52.) Thus, this fourth comparator worked in a position similar to
Gaddy’s, reported to the same supervisor, and was not disciplined
for her offensive comments made at work. This employee is also
sufficiently similar to Gaddy to serve at this pleading stage as
an example of similarly-situated employees who are not members of
the same protected class and were treated more favorably.
As these were UNC Health’s principal challenges to Gaddy’s
amended complaint, the amended complaint as to her Title VII claim
is not futile. The motion to dismiss will therefore be denied as
moot and the motion to amend in this respect will be granted.
Gaddy’s state claim for wrongful termination in her proposed

amended complaint, however, does not fare as well. It is barred
by sovereign immunity. UNC Health is a state agency, Singh, 659
F. Supp. 3d at 669-72, and is immune from suits seeking monetary
damages pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, Harter v. Vernon, 101
F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). North Carolina has not waived
this immunity for wrongful termination claims. See Hooper v. North
Carolina, 379 F. Supp. 2d 804, 812 (M.D.N.C. 2005). Therefore,
Gaddy’s motion to file an amended complaint will be denied in so
far as it seeks to bring a wrongful termination claim against UNC
Health.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS ORDERED that Gaddy’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint (Doc. 12) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Gaddy
is directed to file her proposed amended complaint in the form
attached (Doc. 12-1) as to her Title VII claim forthwith but
without her wrongful termination claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNC Health’s motion to dismiss
(Doc. 8) is DENIED as to the contention of insufficient service of
the summons and complaint and otherwise DENIED AS MOOT.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
December 3, 2024

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753902. Public record. Not legal advice.