# Castello v. Arbogast

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · December 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753225

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 2, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753225

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that probable cause requires only a “fair probability” that a person committed the relevant crime
- holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”
- holding that probable cause requires only a “fair probability” that a person committed the relevant crime

## Opinion text

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTHONY MICHAEL CASTELLO, : CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-1032
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
TYLER ARBOGAST, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Factual Background
This pro se prisoner lawsuit comes before us for consideration of a motion to
dismiss, (Doc. 21), which seeks the dismissal of some, but not all, of the plaintiff’s
claims. With respect to this motion, the well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint,
which guide our consideration of the motion, recite as follows:
Anthony Castello is a prisoner housed in the Union County Prison. According
to state court records, Castello was convicted of resisting arrest, public drunkenness,
criminal mischief, and harassment in August of 2024 and received a nine-to-twenty
four month sentence. Commonwealth v. Castello, CP-60-CR-0000190-2023.
Castello alleges in his complaint that these charges arose out of a May 4, 2023
incident in which he experienced a medical emergency. (Doc. 1). State police

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scene. (Id.) Castello alleges that he suffered facial fractures, hematoma, pinched
nerves, lacerations, contusions, and a concussion at the hands of the arresting
troopers. (Id.)

While the factual narrative in support of Castello’s complaint speaks solely in
terms of an excessive force claim lodged against the arresting troopers, this complaint
sweeps more broadly. In addition to an excessive force claim, which the individual
defendants do not challenge in their motion, Castello alleges that the defendants

engaged in false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. (Id.) The
complaint also sweeps broadly in terms of the named defendants. In addition to
naming the three arresting troopers as defendants, the complaint also names the

Pennsylvania State Police and State Police Troop F command center as institutional
defendants. (Id.)
With Castello’s claims framed in this fashion, the defendants have filed a
motion to dismiss many of these claims. While the defendants do not challenge the

excessive force claim brought against the individual troopers, they have moved to
dismiss the institutional defendants, and have further moved for the dismissal of the
false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims against all

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resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted.
II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for
the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the
legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal

court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the
possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

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reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a
plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions
will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which
relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,

a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

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Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a
review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts

that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District
Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but
may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,
a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

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As the court of appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-
step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,

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268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims
are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White

Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose
contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but
which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express

Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a
district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document
integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without

converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court
may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when
determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. The State Police Institutional Defendants and Individual Official
Capacity Damages Claims Will Be Dismissed.

At the outset, in his pro se federal civil rights complaint Castello names the
Pennsylvania State Police and State Police Troop F command center as institutional

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This he may not do. Indeed, Castello’s claims against the state police as an
institution run afoul of basis and insurmountable legal obstacles:
First, as a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the ... States....”, U.S. Const. amend XI. By
its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal
courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state
agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or
her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and therefore also
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state
officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune
from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law
unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by
Congress. Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional
immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the
Pennsylvania State Police and the Commonwealth clearly has not
waived its immunity. Quite the contrary, the Commonwealth has
specifically by statute invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). This, while Pennsylvania has, by law, waived
sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the
Commonwealth in state court; see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522, Section
8521(b), which flatly states that: “[n]othing contained in this subchapter
shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from
suit in federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 8521(b).

The constitutional protections afforded to the states under the Eleventh
Amendment also expressly apply to the state agencies that are integral

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State Police. Therefore, the “Eleventh Amendment bars claims for
damages against the P[ennsylvania] S[tate] P[olice], a state agency that
did not waive its sovereign immunity.” Atkin v. Johnson, 432 F. App'x
47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, as a matter
of statutory interpretation, the plaintiff cannot bring a damages action
against this state agency or state officials in their official capacity since
it is also well settled that a state, a state agency, or a state official acting
in an official capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the principal federal civil rights statute. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

Andresen v. Pennsylvania, No. 1:20-CV-989, 2021 WL 9273956, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
July 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-CV-989, 2021 WL
9273955 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2021).
Simply put, Castello’s federal civil rights claims for damages against the State
Police are barred both by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
and by cases construing the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore,
since the State Police as an agency of state government cannot be sued in this fashion
in federal court, the State Police and State Police Troop F command center as
institutional defendants will be dismissed as institutional defendants from this action.
Likewise, Castello may not bring damages claims against individual
defendants solely in their official capacities. As to such official capacity claims, it is
well established that, “[r]elying on the plain language of § 1983 and Congress's intent
in enacting the statute, the Supreme Court has held that a state and state officers acting
in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ against whom a claim for money damages

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373 F.Supp.2d 484, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 n. 10 (1989)). Of course, Castello may still maintain these
damages claims against the individual trooper defendants in their individual

capacities. Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 303 (3d Cir. 2016) (section
1983 “has long provided for money damages against state officials sued in their
individual capacities”). In this regard, we construe the complaint as making such
individual capacity damages claims in addition to any official capacity claims. See

Jones v. Garman, No. 1:21-CV-01715, 2022 WL 21756146, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 10,
2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-01715, 2022 WL
21756143 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2022).

B. Castello’s Malicious Prosecution, False Arrest, and False
Imprisonment Claims Should Be Dismissed.

Castello also asserts that the individual defendants, Troopers Arbogast, Horan,
and Bowers, violated his Constitutional rights by engaging in a malicious prosecution
and asserts claims of false arrest and false imprisonment alleging that the officers did
not have probable cause to arrest him, despite his subsequent conviction. These
federal constitutional claims implicate Castello’s rights under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

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and now Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const., amend. IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest without probable
cause is a constitutional violation that may be redressed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Patzig v. O'Neill,
577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978)).
However, as currently pleaded these claims fail as a matter of law. At the
outset, any malicious prosecution claims set forth in Castello’s complaint fails
because they rest upon a fatally flawed legal premise. At bottom, the plaintiff seeks

to bring a civil rights action premised on claims of malicious prosecution despite the
fact that he was convicted at trial, sentenced, and has not set aside or overturned these
convictions.

This he cannot do. Quite the contrary, it is well settled that an essential element
of a civil rights malicious prosecution claim is that the underlying criminal case must
have been terminated in favor of the civil rights claimant. Therefore, where, as here,
the civil rights plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim based

upon a state case that resulted in a conviction, the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of
law. The Third Circuit has aptly observed in this regard:
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates

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S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383(1994) (quoting Memphis Community
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d
249 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given this close relation
between § 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme Court has said that the
common law of torts, “defining the elements of damages and the
prerequisites for their recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting point
for inquiry under § 1983 as well.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)).
The Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate’s § 1983 suit,
which alleged that county prosecutors and a state police officer
destroyed evidence, used an unlawful voice identification procedure,
and engaged in other misconduct. In deciding whether the inmate could
state a claim for those alleged violations, the Supreme Court asked what
common-law cause of action was the closest to the inmate’s claim and
concluded that “malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy . . .
because unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or
imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to
legal process.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Looking to the elements of
malicious prosecution, the Court held that the inmate’s claim could not
proceed because one requirement of malicious prosecution is that the
prior criminal proceedings must have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor,
and the inmate in Heck had not successfully challenged his criminal
conviction. Id.

Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 155-156 (3d Cir. 2000).
Thus, “our precedents are clear that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging arrest and
prosecution absent probable cause may bring malicious prosecution claims under the
Fourth Amendment but are entitled to relief only if they are innocent of the crime for
which they were prosecuted.” Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d
Cir. 2014) (citing Hector, 235 F.3d at 156). Therefore, “a plaintiff claiming malicious
prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie case.”

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No. 1:14-CV-00331, 2014 WL 2472123, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2014).
In the instant case, it is clear that Castello has not achieved a favorable
termination of this state prosecution since he currently remains convicted of these

state offenses. Since a favorable termination of the plaintiff’s state criminal case is a
prerequisite to any civil rights claims based upon allegations of false arrest or
malicious prosecution, the immutable fact of Castello’s state court conviction defeats
these claims and compels dismissal of this complaint. In short, this complaint is based

upon the fundamentally flawed legal premise that the plaintiff can sue the state
for malicious prosecution even though he has not prevailed in the underlying state
case. Since this premise is simply incorrect, this complaint fails as a matter of

law. See Fleming v. Yates, No. 1:21-CV-349, 2021 WL 1899870, at *6 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 1:21-349, 2021 WL
1499315 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2021); Galloway v. Kane, No. 1:15-CV-1007, 2015 WL
3953112, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2015).

Likewise, in order to make out a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that police lacked probable cause to arrest. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d
628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, proof that probable cause was lacking is essential to

any § 1983 claim arising out of the arrest or detention of an individual. For purposes

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trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has
been committed by the person being arrested.” U.S. v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d

Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). An arrest by a police officer
without a warrant “is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is
probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). In conducting an inquiry into

whether probable cause to arrest existed, a court should consider the totality of the
circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge and information which the
officers possessed at the time of arrest, coupled with the factual occurrences

immediately precipitating the arrest.” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Although “[t]he probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification,” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003), all interpretations of

probable cause require “a belief of guilt that is reasonable as opposed to certain.”
Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)). Probable cause “does not require the same

type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support

14
149 (1972)). Accordingly, the evidentiary standard for probable cause is significantly
lower than that required for conviction. Id. (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
31, 36 (1979)); see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding

that probable cause requires only a “fair probability” that a person committed the
relevant crime). Because an arrest is made with probable cause if at the moment it
was made the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge “were sufficient
to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed or was

committing an offense,” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), the constitutional
validity of an arrest does not turn on whether the suspect actually committed any
crime. Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2003).

Thus, “[t]he determination that probable cause exists is fundamentally a factual
analysis that must be performed by officers at the scene. It is the function of the court
to determine whether the objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest
were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed.”

United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1206 (3d Cir. 1984). Although officers on
the scene may draw inferences and make deductions that might elude an untrained
person, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), “an officer's inferences

and deductions can only justify a warrantless arrest if the government satisfies its

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308 F.3d at 255.
In this case, Castello’s Fourth Amendment allegations of false arrest and false
imprisonment are fatally flawed in a fundamental way: the plaintiff has alleged no

facts whatsoever which would support a claim that the responding officers plainly
lacked probable cause to arrest him, and he was ultimately convicted of the crimes
for which he was arrested. Given these immutable facts, these claims also fail and
will be dismissed.

An appropriate order follows.

S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: December 2nd, 2024

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753225. Public record. Not legal advice.