# Butler v. Louisiana State Penitentiary

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · December 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753122

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** December 2, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753122

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”
- holding employee of entity receiving federal assistance could not be held individually liable under RA

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BRANDEE BUTLER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

versus
24-cv-162-SDD-EWD
LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, ET AL.

RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss1 filed by:
(1) Defendants the State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections (“DPSC”), Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), Warden Timothy Hooper
(“Warden Hooper”), Liz McGraw (“Chaplain McGraw”), Warden Nicholas Sanders
(“Warden Sanders”), and the Louisiana Department of Health (“LDH”) (collectively,
“Removing Defendants”); and (2) Defendants Parish Forensics, L.L.C. (“Parish
Forensics”) and Amelia Nakanishi (“Dr. Nakanishi”).2 Defendants argue that the federal
claims asserted by Plaintiffs Brandee Butler (“Butler”), Tomeka Robinson (“Robinson”),
and Kalob Jacquet (“Jacquet”), the surviving children of Eddie Williams, Jr. (“Williams” or
the “Decedent”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are prescribed.3 Defendants further contend
Plaintiffs fail to state constitutional violations against them and that the supplemental state

1 Rec. Docs. 8, 10.
2 Hereinafter, the Court refers to all defendants collectively as “Defendants.”
3 Rec. Docs. 8-1 at p. 3, 10-1 at p. 5. Defendants originally asserted that Plaintiffs’ claims were
untimely for failure to file suit within one year of Williams’ death. However, Plaintiffs responded
that suit was electronically filed on January 12, 2024, confirmed via fax the same day, and
accepted by the Clerk of Court on January 16, 2024. Rec. Doc 23-1 at p. 3. Thereafter,
Defendants withdrew their prescription argument. Rec. Docs. 24 at p. 2, 25 at p. 2. Thus, the
Court need not address the timeliness of Plaintiffs’ suit.
law claims should be dismissed.4 Alternatively, Defendants seek a more definite
statement under Rule 12(e).5 Plaintiffs submitted a bare-bones Opposition to each
motion.6 Defendants replied.7
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss8 shall each be
granted in part, and Plaintiffs’ federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice. Further,

because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, Plaintiffs’ state law
claims are dismissed without prejudice.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs originally filed this action in the Twentieth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of West Feliciana, State of Louisiana.9 Plaintiffs filed federal and state claims
against Defendants for the death of Williams on January 12, 2023, who was allegedly
sleeping when he was attacked, punched, stabbed, beaten, and stomped repeatedly for
hours by Inmate Doe.10 Williams was an inmate in Camp D of LSP, serving a life sentence
for second degree murder.11 Plaintiffs allege Williams’ screams and cries for help went
unanswered by an unknown on duty corrections officer.12 At 4:00 a.m. on January 13,

2023, the unknown officer came to his cell and found Williams alive but unconscious.13
Williams was relocated to the Prison Hospital where he died at around 7:30 a.m.14

4 Rec. Docs. 8, 10.
5 Id.
6 Rec. Docs. 23, 17.
7 Rec. Docs. 24, 25.
8 Rec. Docs. 8, 10.
9 Rec. Doc. 1-3.
10 Rec. Doc. 1-3, p. 4.
11 Id. at p. 5.
12 Id. at p. 4.
13 Id.
14 Id.
Plaintiffs claim Inmate Doe was a young man with a history of violence and that
had been determined not to be suitable to live in the general population.15 On the day of
the attack, Inmate Doe was livid because his mother had died and he was unable to
attend the services.16 Plaintiffs claim that hearing the hopes of Williams for his release
caused Inmate Doe to experience explosive emotional outbursts.17 Plaintiffs claim Inmate

Doe recently stabbed another inmate while “on the yard.”18 He was placed in solitary
confinement to appear before the Disciplinary Board, who then transferred him to Camp
D where he was housed with Williams.19
Plaintiffs assert Williams expressed fear for his life to prison officials, and to his
family, in his letters, sometimes including requests for administrative transfers to
lockdown for his own safety.20 Williams was allegedly treated with hostility, disdain, and
harassment from Correction Officer Blackwell and by other correction officers.21
Williams’ mother Betty J. Williams (“Betty”) was informed of her son’s death by her
daughter Brandee. Betty then called Chaplain McGraw to inquire about particulars of her
son’s death, but she was not told how he died, where he died, or how he died.22 Plaintiffs

claim that after multiple phone call attempts, Butler was accidentally transferred to
Warden Sanders, who made light of her father’s passing and informed her he was killed.23
Inmate Doe’s identity has yet to be disclosed.24

15 Id. at 5.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at pp. 5-6.
23 Id. at p. 6.
24 Id.
Plaintiffs claim LSP officials engaged in fraud, collusion, and deceptive practices
regarding the particulars surrounding the death of Williams.25 The family allegedly had to
hire a private investigator to obtain any pertinent information and has not been able to
secure a Death Certificate.26 Plaintiffs allege Chaplain McGraw conspired and colluded
with officials at Angola to deceive the Williams family into not being able to timely claim

his body.27 Plaintiffs contend Chaplain McGraw knew that if the family did not claim the
body at the funeral home it would be returned to Angola where it would be un-ceremonially
buried immediately without the family discovering the damage to the body.28 Plaintiffs
allege the family contacted the East Baton Rouge Coroner’s office who informed them
the body had been transported to Parish Forensics.
Forensic Pathologist Dr. Nakanishi conducted Williams’ autopsy at Parish
Forensics in Lafayette, Louisiana on January 16, 2023.29 Plaintiffs allege that Dr.
Nakanishi, an employee of Parish Forensics and governed by LDH, conspired and
colluded with the officials at Angola to minimize the impact of the attack on Williams, to

mislead the family, because the autopsy diagram has minimal abrasive defensive wounds
to his body.30
Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims for violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments against all Defendants.31 Plaintiffs also allege a claim for
conspiracy under § 1983 against all Defendants.32 Plaintiffs also assert claims under the

25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at pp. 6-7.
30 Id. at p. 7.
31 Id. at p. 7-10.
32 Id.
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”)
(collectively, “ADA/RA”) against all Defendants.33 Plaintiffs assert state law wrongful
death and fraud claims against all Defendants.34 Plaintiffs seek compensatory and
punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. §
12205, costs, and legal interest.35

With the consent of Parish Forensic and Dr. Nakanishi, Removing Defendants
removed under federal question jurisdiction.36 Defendants assert Plaintiffs’ conclusory
allegations fail to state a claim for constitutional violations against them.37 In response,
Plaintiffs submitted bare-bones Oppositions.38 Defendants replied.39
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-
pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”40 The Court
may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, ‘documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.’”41 “To

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”42

33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at p. 34.
36 Rec. Doc. 1.
37 Rec. Docs. 8, 10. Defendants withdrew their prescription argument. Rec. Docs. 24, 25.
38 Rec. Docs. 17, 23. Plaintiffs offer no substantive opposition to Defendants’ motions.
39 Rec. Docs. 24, 25.
40 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K.
Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
41 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).
42 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth
the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.43
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do.”44 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”45 However, “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”46 In order to
satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that
the defendant has acted unlawfully.”47 “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-
pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”48 “On
a motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.”49

B. Section 1983 Generally
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a private right of action for
redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law.50 It

43 See 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
44 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and brackets
omitted).
45 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and brackets omitted).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ., No. H-11-2060, 2012 WL 1576099, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 3,
2012) (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir.
2004)).
49 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
50 See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984); Middlesex Cty.
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....51

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”52
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the
color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.53 A § 1983 complainant must support his claim with specific facts demonstrating
a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations.54
C. Plaintiffs Fail to State § 1983 Conspiracy Claims
Removing Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 conspiracy claims.55
Although the Complaint is unclear, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs make conclusory
allegations that Defendants conspired to “deceive the family,”56 “minimize the impact of
the attack,”57 or “withhold information”58 from the family of Williams.59 Plaintiffs’

51 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
52 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3
(1979)); accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985); Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996); Young v. City
of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985).
53 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330
(1986); Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir. 1984).
54 See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807
(5th Cir. 1990); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir.1986); Angel v. City of Fairfield,
793 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1986).
55 Rec. Doc. 8-1 at pp. 8-9.
56 Rec. Doc. 1-3 at p. 6.
57 Id. at p. 7.
58 Id. at p. 13.
59 Rec. Doc. 8-1 at p. 9.
Opposition60 provides no substantive response to these contentions.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges Defendants, acting individually and together,
conspired to deprive Williams of his constitutional rights, including the right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the right to due process and equal protection of the laws under the First,

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Article IV of the United States
Constitution and § 1983.61 Plaintiffs further assert that given Williams’ tormented state of
mind at the hands of Defendants, he was suffering from a disability in accordance with §
1983 which Defendants failed to accommodate.62
Plaintiffs claim Defendants, acting individually and collectively, acted with
deliberate indifference to and disregard for Williams’ constitutional and civil rights.63
Plaintiffs allege Defendants had a duty to intervene and prevent the violations of the rights
of the decedent, but failed to do so, causing injury and death to Williams.64
To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs must show that there was

an agreement among Defendants to deprive Williams of his constitutional rights and that
such an alleged deprivation actually occurred.65 Conclusory allegations that do not
reference specific factual allegations tending to show an agreement do not suffice to state
a civil rights conspiracy claim under § 1983.66 Although the Court accepts well-pleaded
facts as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a complaint “that

60 Rec. Doc. 23.
61 Rec. Doc. 1-3 at pp. 7-8.
62 Id. at p. 8.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994); Est. of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311,
1313 (5th Cir. 1991); Jabary v. City of Allen, 547 F.App’x 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013).
66 See Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1023–24 (5th Cir. 1982).
offers labels and conclusions” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement” is not plausible for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).67 Therefore, to establish
Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim, they must plead specific, nonconclusory facts that establish
that there was an agreement among Defendants to violate his federal civil rights.68
Plaintiffs have not done that here. Plaintiffs’ Complaint lacks any specific facts that

there was any agreement between Defendants to deprive Williams of his constitutional
rights. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for conspiracy under § 1983 against
Defendants.
D. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Private Entity Liability under § 1983
Dr. Nakanishi and Parish Forensics assert Plaintiffs fail to allege they are state
actors sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.69 Dr. Nakanishi and Parish Forensics
contend Plaintiffs’ only allegation pertaining to such a relationship is the allegation that
they are governed by LDH.70 However, they assert this is insufficient to transform their
acts into state action.71 Further, Dr. Nakanishi and Parish Forensics contend that the only

act of governance LDH may exert is in the form of licensure to practice or operate in
compliance with applicable health standards.72 Dr. Nakanishi and Parish Forensics argue
that Plaintiffs offer no factual support to substantiate that the state entered a joint
enterprise with them, or exerted any influence over them.73 Thus, Dr. Nakanishi and

67 Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
68 See Priester v. Lowndes Cty., 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Allegations that are merely
conclusory, without reference to specific facts, will not suffice” to establish a § 1983 conspiracy
claim).
69 Rec. 10-1 at p. 8.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
Parish Forensics assert Plaintiffs fail to state § 1983 claims against them.74
Plaintiffs respond that the assertions by Dr. Nakanishi and Parish Forensics are
premature, and Plaintiffs seek time for additional discovery as to whether they are state
actors.75 Further, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Nakanishi’s and Parish Forensics’ contentions
as to failure to state claims under the ADA/RA are immaterial.76 However, Plaintiffs go on

to state that their claims against Dr. Nakanishi and Parish Forensics are solely premised
on state law fraud, as their involvement was post-mortem.77 Plaintiffs contend that their
involvement consisted of fraudulently manipulating the autopsy diagram and procedure
in order to minimize the impact of the attack on Williams.78 Plaintiffs state that the claims
against Dr. Nakanishi and Parish Forensics are not premised under a federal statute and
they need not be a state actor.79 Plaintiff offers no additional authority, facts, or supporting
argument beyond this response.
“[F]or a plaintiff to state a viable claim under § 1983 against any private defendant,
. . . the conduct of the private defendant that forms the basis of the claimed constitutional
deprivation must constitute state action under color of law.”80

Here, Plaintiffs offer no substantive response to the contentions of Dr. Nakanishi
and Parish Forensics. Although Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action globally references
“defendants” pertaining to conspiracy allegations for violations of federal statutes,
Plaintiffs concede that they do not state federal claims against Dr. Nakanishi and Parish

74 Id.
75 Rec. Doc. 17 at p. 3.
76 Id. at p. 4.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2001).
Forensics.81 Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs’ Complaint could be construed to assert federal
claims against Dr. Nakanishi and Parish Forensics, and considering Plaintiffs’ clarification
and concession that they assert only state law claims against them, Dr. Nakanishi’s and
Parish Forensics’ motion is granted in part and any federal claims against them are
dismissed with prejudice.

E. Plaintiffs Fail to State Claims under § 1983 Against Removing
Defendants

Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims for violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.82 Removing Defendants seek dismissal of those claims
against them for failure to state a claim for relief.83
Plaintiffs assert “Defendants” deprived Williams of his constitutional rights,
including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right to due process and equal protection
of the laws under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Article IV of
the United States Constitution.84 Plaintiffs further allege Defendants’ customs, polices,
patterns, and practices deprived Williams’ civil and constitutional rights in violation of the
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.85 Plaintiffs allege Defendants did so
with deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates in their care, custody, and control,
particularly Williams.86 Plaintiffs further allege Defendants, including Warden Hooper,
failed to protect Williams from Inmate Doe.87 Plaintiffs claim Defendants failed to properly

81 Rec. Doc. 1-3. at p. 4.
82 Id. at pp. 7-9, 24.
83 Rec. Doc. 8-1 at pp. 4-9.
84 Id. at p. 28.
85 Id.
86 Id. at p. 29.
87 Id. at p. 10
monitor Williams, confining him in unsafe, unreasonable, and unsafe conditions by locking
him in a cell, knowing harm would likely come to him.88 Plaintiffs assert Wardens Hooper
and Sanders are vicariously liable in their official capacity for the actions of the employees
of LSP and LDPSC.89
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, however, does not clearly set forth claims or sufficient factual

allegations under each amendment and as to each Defendant. Plaintiffs offer no
substantive Opposition to the motion, merely devoting two paragraphs to Removing
Defendants contentions.90 Plaintiffs simply contend the motion is premature.91 Plaintiffs’
failure to adequately brief or substantively oppose dismissal of their federal claims alone
is grounds for the Court to determine Plaintiffs have waived their claims and dismiss
them.92

88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Rec. Doc. 23-1 at p. 4.
91 Id.
92 See Gray v. City of Denham Springs, 2021 WL 1187076, at *5 (M.D. La. Mar. 29, 2021); Jordan
v. Gautreaux, 2022 WL 897549, at *15 n.2 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2022) (deeming claims waived for
failure to substantively oppose dismissal of the claims); JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., L.L.C. v.
United States, 831 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that, “[t]o avoid waiver, a party must
identify relevant legal standards and any relevant Fifth Circuit cases.”). The Court’s local rules
also require parties support their arguments with “a concise statement of reasons . . . and citations
of authorities.” M.D. La. LR 7(d). The parties do not directly address Plaintiffs’ alleged claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Defendants seek dismissal of all federal claims
against them and Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains no allegations under the Fourteenth Amendment
other than a mere reference to the amendment. As discussed herein, Plaintiffs waived those
claims in failing to substantively oppose their dismissal and, to the extent it may be construed to
include a Fourteenth Amendment claim, it is dismissed. As to Plaintiffs’ claims under the First,
Fourth, and Eighth Amendments briefed by Removing Defendants, the Court deals with those in
turn.
1. Plaintiffs fail to state claims against DPSC, LSP, and LDH as
“state actors” under § 1983.

Removing Defendants contend that DPSC, LSP, and LDH are not “persons” under
§ 1983.93 Thus, Removing Defendants argue Plaintiffs cannot state plausible § 1983
claims against them.94
Plaintiffs respond that Removing Defendants’ motion is premature and that they
be allowed adequate time to conduct discovery and amend their Petition accordingly.95
Plaintiffs otherwise fail to substantively address Defendants’ assertions that DPSC, LSP,
and LDH are not “persons” under § 1983.
Still, to establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs must prove that a person acting
under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.96 Here, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held that DPSC and LSP are not “persons” under § 1983.97 Further, LDH is an arm of
the state and is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity.98 Congress has not
abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity from suit in federal court for claims arising
under § 1983.99 And Plaintiffs fail to support their claims that DPSC, LSP, or LDH are
state actors under § 1983. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state cognizable federal constitutional

93 Rec. Doc. 8-1 at p. 4.
94 Id. at p. 5.
95 Rec. Doc. 23-1 at 4.
96 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330
(1986); Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir. 1984).
97 See Washington v. Louisiana, 425 F. App’x 330, 333 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The State and
[Department of Public Safety and Corrections] are not persons . . . .”).
98 See Montgomery-Smith v. Louisiana Dep’t of Health and Hospitals, 299 F.Supp.3d 790, 807
(E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2018) (“For the purpose of sovereign immunity, DHH, a Louisiana state agency,
is considered an ‘arm of the state’ and, therefore, protected by the Eleventh Amendment.”)
(citation omitted); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
99 Montgomery-Smith, 299 F.Supp.3d at 807; see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63.
claims under § 1983 against DPSC, LSP, or LDH and those claims are dismissed with
prejudice.
2. Plaintiffs Fail to State § 1983 Claims Against Warden Hooper,
Warden Sanders, and Chaplain McGraw

a. First and Fourth Amendments
Removing Defendants contend Plaintiffs merely allege conclusory statements that
all Defendants violated Williams’ First and Fourth Amendment Rights.100 Removing
Defendants contend there is no factual support for these claims, and they should be
dismissed.101
Again, Plaintiffs fail to substantively oppose dismissal of these claims against
Defendants. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ First and Fourth Amendment claims are waived.102
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to allege any factual support for a First and Fourth
Amendment claim, other than raising the amendments in name alone. Thus, Plaintiffs’
claims under the First and Fourth Amendment are dismissed with prejudice.
b. Eighth Amendment
Removing Defendants seek dismissal of the individual Defendants for lack of any
factual support in the Complaint that any Defendant violated Williams’ constitutional
rights.103 Defendants contend Plaintiffs fail to allege Warden Hooper was personally
involved in the alleged constitutional violations.104 Defendants argue Plaintiffs cannot

assert a claim for vicariously liability against Warden Hooper.105 Further, Defendants

100 Rec. Doc. 8-1 at p. 9.
101 Id.
102 See JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., L.L.C. v. United States, 831 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2016).
103 Rec. Doc. 8-1 at p. 5.
104 Id. at p. 6.
105 Id.
assert Plaintiffs make conclusory allegations that Warden Hooper established policies
that caused the deprivation of Williams’ constitutional rights.106 Defendants contend
Plaintiffs’ allegations lack factual support that Warden Hooper implemented
unconstitutional policies that causally resulted in a constitutional injury or that Warden
Hooper was aware of a substantial risk of harm.107 And Defendants contend there is no

factual support for the necessary “pattern” of similar instances.108 Specifically,
Defendants state that at best, the Complaint alleges that Inmate Doe had one prior
altercation with another inmate and was released back into Camp D after he was
sentenced to solitary confinement.109
Once again, Plaintiffs fail to substantively oppose dismissal of their Eighth
Amendment claims. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims are waived.110
Still, Plaintiffs also fail to plausibly allege claims against Warden Hooper, Warden
Sanders, or Chaplain McGraw under the Eighth Amendment.
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners.111 Although prison officials generally “have a

duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other inmates,”112 “[p]rison
officials are not . . . expected to prevent all inmate-on-inmate violence.”113 “Deliberate
indifference” is the standard applied in evaluating a failure to protect claim. This term has

106 Id. at p. 7.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs. L.L.C. v. United States, 831 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2016)
111 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).
112 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833.
113 Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003).
been defined as including an element of “subjective recklessness” as used in criminal
law.114
To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must show that prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to serious threats to the inmate's safety.115 To demonstrate
that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmate's safety,

the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to
inmate . . . safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw
the inference.”116 Prison officials may not escape liability because they cannot, or did not,
identify the specific source of the risk; the serious threat can be one to which all prisoners
are exposed.117 But there must exist an intent on the part of the prison official to cause
the plaintiff harm or at least a conscious or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s right to be
protected from such harm.118 Mere negligence or “failure to alleviate a significant risk that
[the official] should have perceived but did not” are insufficient to establish a failure to
protect claim.119 Moreover, deliberate indifference requires a level of awareness of a

specific risk based upon specific information, such that general knowledge of possible
dangerousness or the like is not enough to support a failure to protect claim.120
“[Plaintiffs] must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the
constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation

114 Id.
115 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
116 Id. at 837.
117 Id. at 843.
118 Johnston v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1986).
119 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Domino v. Texas Dept. of Crim. Jus., 239 F.3d 752, 756
(5th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838)).
120 Walker v. Davis, 2019 2465298, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2019).
alleged.”121 Any allegation that the defendant is responsible for the actions of subordinate
officers or co-employees under a theory of vicarious responsibility or respondeat superior
alone is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.122 Further, in the absence of direct
personal participation by a supervisory official in an alleged constitutional violation, an
inmate plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his constitutional rights occurred as a

result of a subordinate's implementation of the supervisor's affirmative wrongful policies
or as a result of a breach by the supervisor of an affirmative duty specially imposed by
state law.123
Here, Plaintiffs state that Defendants, “individually and collectively, acted
negligently, with gross negligence and intentionally in denying reasonable and necessary
protection to [Williams], from the mentally ill and violent Inmate Doe[.]”124 Plaintiffs allege
Inmate Doe terrorized and tormented him and that Williams warned Defendants LSP,
DPSC, Warden Hooper, and Warden Sanders.125 Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to
properly monitor Williams, confining him in unsafe, unreasonable, and dangerous

conditions by locking him in a cell, knowing that harm was likely to come to him and in
inflicting physical injury and severe emotional, mental, and physical pain and suffering .126
However, Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the Defendants had specific, actual
knowledge that Inmate Doe presented a substantial risk to Williams’s safety. Plaintiffs

121 See Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995).
122 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978). See also Bell v. Livingston, 356 F. App'x. 715, 716–17 (5th Cir. 2009)
(recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory
of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”)).
123 Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768. (5th Cir. 1983).
124 Rec. Doc. 1-3 at p. 30.
125 Id.
126 Id.
fail to allege additional details regarding the personal involvement of Warden Hooper,
Warden Sanders, or Chaplain McGraw in the death of Williams. Moreover, the allegations
against Chaplain McGraw took place after Williams’ death, and consequently, after the
alleged constitutional violations.
Further, Plaintiffs make claims against Warden Hooper and Warden Sanders for

deliberately indifferent patterns and practices in their official capacities.127 Plaintiffs make
general assertions collectively against Defendants for allegedly unconstitutional policies,
patterns, and practices.128 But Plaintiffs fail to provide factual support that any of the
individual Defendants established any policies, or that any policies were so deficient that
the policy itself is a denial of constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state claims
against Warden Hooper or Warden Sanders for supervisory liability.
F. Plaintiffs fail to state ADA/RA Claims Against Defendants.
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims under the ADA/RA.129 Defendants
contend that the Complaint is devoid of any allegations or fact to support a claim under
the ADA or RA.130 Defendants argue that Williams does not allege that he was a qualified

individual with a disability, or that he was excluded from any service or program by reason
of any disability.131 Defendants argue Plaintiffs fail to allege that Williams was
discriminated against because of a qualified disability.132 Further, Defendants assert
Plaintiffs cannot state an ADA/RA claim against individual defendants.133 Thus,

127 Id.
128 Rec. Doc. 1-3 at p. 28.
129 Rec. Docs. 8-1 at p. 9, 10-1 at p. 9.
130 Id.
131 Rec. Doc. 8-1 at p. 11.
132 Id.
133 Id.
Defendants contend that any such claims against Warden Hooper, Warden Sanders, or
Chaplain McGraw should be dismissed.134 Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs provide
no facts to suggest the ADA/RA applies to the actions of Dr. Nakanishi and Parish
Forensics.135 As already noted herein, Plaintiffs provide only generic responses in
opposition.136

Under the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.”137 A plaintiff must show “(1) that he has a qualifying disability; (2) that he is being
denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is
responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such
discrimination is by reason of his disability.”138 To have a qualifying disability, a plaintiff
must demonstrate “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”139

The elements necessary to plead a cause of action of disability discrimination
under the RA and the standards governing such claims are “operationally identical” to

134 Id.
135 Rec. Doc. 10-1 at p. 9.
136 Rec. Docs. 17, 23-1.
137 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
138 Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011).
139 Id. at 499–500 (internal quotations omitted).
those required to state a claim under the ADA.140 “The only material difference between
the two provisions lies in their respective causation requirements.”141
Further, under the ADA, a plaintiff may assert a claim for failure to make
“reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual.”142 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff bringing a failure-to-

accommodate claim must sufficiently plead that (a) he is a qualified individual with a
disability; (b) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the covered
entity; and (c) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.143
Title II prohibits discrimination by “public entities,”144 and state punitive institutions
fall squarely within this statutory definition.145 However, the Fifth Circuit has held that
plaintiffs cannot sue defendants in their individual capacity under the ADA or RA.146 Thus,
Warden Hooper, Warden Sanders, Chaplain McGraw, and Dr. Nakanishi cannot be held
liable in their individual capacities under the ADA or RA.
Further, Plaintiffs make a general, conclusory allegation that he suffered from a
disability.147 Plaintiffs allege that Williams requested Administrative Transfers to

Lockdown for his own safety.148 Plaintiffs claim Williams was terrified and was terrorized

140 Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 676 n.8 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Sligh v.
City of Conroe, 2023 WL 8074256, at *7-8 (5th Cir. Nov. 21, 2023).
141 Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005).
142 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
143 Sligh, 2023 WL 8074256, at *7 (citing Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015).
144 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
145 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998).
146 Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding employee of entity receiving
federal assistance could not be held individually liable under RA); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle,
184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (endorsing appellate panel's conclusion that
defendants “may not be sued in their individual capacities directly under the provisions of Title II
[of the ADA].”).
147 Rec. Doc. 1-3 at p. 8.
148 Id. at p. 5.
by the official’s refusal to grant him protective relief.149 Plaintiffs assert Williams was
treated with hostility, disdain, and harassment from correction officer Blackwell and other
correction officers.150 Plaintiffs allege that very fate that Williams feared was manifested,
just as he had expressed to the authorities at the LSP.151 Plaintiffs further allege LSP,
Warden Sanders, On-Duty Corrections Officer, CO Doe #1, and CO Doe #2 failed to

attend to the concerns expressed by the decedent, for his welfare and safety, and failed
to respond to his cries for help as he was being bludgeoned.152 Plaintiffs further allege
that, “given the decedent[sic], tormented state of mind at the hands of the defendants, he
was clearly suffering from a disability in accordance with 42 U.S.C. §12132, for which the
Defendants provided no accommodations as he had requested.”153 The Complaint,
however, contains no other allegations as to disability.
Although state prisons are subject to the ADA,154 Plaintiffs here make no attempt
to sufficiently allege the elements of an ADA/RA claim. Plaintiffs fail to provide specific
facts that give rise to the reasonable inference that Removing Defendants “intentionally
discriminated against [Williams] because of any disability.”155

Because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief under the ADA/RA, Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss156 are granted in part.

149 Id.
150 Id..
151 Id.
152 Id. at p. 7.
153 Id. at p. 8.
154 See Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1999).
155 Rec. Doc. 1-3 at p. 8.
156 Rec. Docs. 8, 10.
G. State Law Claims
Plaintiffs also assert state law claims for the wrongful death of Williams and for
fraud.157 A district court is authorized to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
if a plaintiff's state law claims raise novel or complex issues of state law, if the claims
would substantially predominate over the claims over which the Court has original

jurisdiction, if the Court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, or
for other compelling reasons.158
Here, having determined Plaintiffs fail to allege plausible federal claims, the Court
declines supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ potential state law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss159 each are hereby GRANTED IN PART, and
Plaintiffs’ federal claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Moreover, the Court hereby declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
state law claims, and they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.160

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on this _2_n_d_ day of December, 2024.

S
________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
157 Rec. Doc. 1-3 at pp. 31-32.
158 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
159 Rec. Docs. 8, 10.
160 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10753122. Public record. Not legal advice.