# Houston v. City of Fairfield

> District Court, E.D. California · November 21, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10752490

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** November 21, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 DANIELLE N. HOUSTON, No. 2:22-CV-01045-JAM-SCR
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
14 CITY OF FAIRFIELD, a public
entity; City of Fairfield
15 Police Officers JOSHUA SMITH
(BADGE #1730), BRENDAN BASSI
16 (BADGE #1716), DAVID REEVES
(BADGE #927), GAIL HILL
17 (BADGE #1201), individually,
jointly and severally;
18
Defendants.
19
20 INTRODUCTION
21 Before this Court are cross-motions for summary judgment
22 under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
23 parties filed four briefs in support of and in opposition to the
24 cross motions including Plaintiff Danielle Houston’s
25 (“Plaintiff”) motion for partial summary judgment, Plf.’s Partial
26 Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF no. 70; Defendants’ City of
27 Fairfield (the “City”), Joshua Smith, David Reeves, Gail Hill,
28 and Brendan Bassi (“Officers,” collectively with the City,
1 “Defendants”) cross-motion for summary judgment, Def.’s Mot. for
2 Summary Judgment, ECF no. 85; Plaintiff’s opposition/reply to
3 Defendants’ cross-motion, Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s Mot. for Summary
4 Judgment (“Plf.’s Reply”), ECF No. 88; and Defendants’ reply in
5 support of cross-motion, Def.’s Reply In Support of Mot. for
6 Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 92. For the reasons
7 stated below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for summary
8 judgment with respect to her unlawful arrest claim. For all
9 other Fourth Amendment claims, the court denies Plaintiff’s
10 motion and grants Defendants’ motion on these claims. The Court
11 also grants Defendants’ motion on Plaintiff’s Monell claim and
12 punitive damages claim.1
13 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
14 Plaintiff Houston filed a civil rights action following an
15 investigatory encounter with the City of Fairfield Police. The
16 key facts are undisputed, and the relevant events were captured
17 on video or body worn cameras (“BWC”). See Video Exhibits, ECF.
18 Nos. 70 & 85. At approximately 8:20pm on August 7, 2020, a
19 concerned citizen called the Fairfield Police and Fire Emergency
20 line to report a physical fight involving a man with a gun in a
21 shopping plaza parking lot. Ex. U (Def.’s Compilation Video),
22 ECF No. 85. The person with a gun was described as a light-skin
23 or Hispanic male wearing a white t-shirt. He was reported to have
24 entered a black four-door vehicle. Id. The shopping plaza was
25 known by law enforcement to be located in a high crime area. Ex.
26 K (Sgt. Gail Hill Depo.) at 125:21-23, 127:10-13.
27

28 1 A hearing on this cross-motion was held on September 24, 2024.
1 Sergeant Gail Hill was first to respond to the scene and
2 observed a group of individuals and several black cars that
3 matched the description given by the emergency caller. Id. at
4 61:17-21. Sgt. Hill subsequently ordered back-up to detain the
5 group of individuals and ordered all black cars in the plaza to
6 be stopped. Id. at 100:18-24; Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s Statement
7 of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”), Fact No. 68, ECF No. 88-1.
8 Around the same time of the call, Plaintiff Houston parked
9 her black four-door vehicle in the shopping plaza and entered a
10 store near the group of individuals. Ex. U at 4:21; Plf.’s
11 Video, Exhibit 5 at ECF No. 70-9. As Plaintiff Houston exited
12 the store, she interacted with some members of the suspect group
13 before getting into her car. Ex. U at 6:35-8:30. As Plaintiff
14 Houston drove out of her parking spot, an individual from the
15 same group wearing a white t-shirt approached her vehicle and
16 appeared to lean into Plaintiff Houston’s open passenger window.
17 Id. at 8:50-9:01. This interaction was witnessed by Sgt. Hill
18 and Officer Bassi, who had parked nearby. Id.; Ex. K at 97:10-
19 16.
20 Officer Bassi proceeded to follow Plaintiff Houston as she
21 exited the plaza parking lot and initiated a “high-risk” stop to
22 investigate her possible involvement in the reported gun crime.
23 Ex. N (Officer Bassi’s BWC) at 2:00-2:35; Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s
24 SUF, Fact No. 89. Plaintiff Houston was then ordered out of her
25 vehicle, questioned, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a
26 patrol vehicle by Officer Reeves. Ex. U at 9:36-12:00; 13:38.
27 Plaintiff’s person and car were searched by Officers Bassi,
28
1 Smith, and Taylor2, and both her and her vehicle were cleared of
2 any person or weapons within minutes of her being stopped.
3 Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 106; Ex. U at 12:15; 13:30.
4 Indeed, Plaintiff Houston maintained that she “did not have
5 anything” and “didn’t do anything” throughout her detention.
6 However, even after no weapon was uncovered on her person,
7 Plaintiff remained detained in handcuffs in the back of the
8 patrol car for almost twenty more minutes. Ex. U at 13:30-29:46.
9 Plaintiff Houston asked for her handcuffs to be removed and
10 complained of discomfort while being detained, but did not seek
11 any medical care the night of the incident. Ex. U at 27:34;
12 Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 176. Interactions between
13 Plaintiff and Officers were respectful throughout the
14 investigatory stop and Plaintiff Houston fully complied with
15 orders at all times throughout the incident.
16 Plaintiff Houston now brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
17 against the individual police officers involved in the incident
18 and the City, alleging that Defendants violated her rights to not
19 be unlawfully searched or seized under the Fourth Amendment when
20 they stopped her vehicle following the emergency call (First
21 Cause of Action). Plaintiff further alleges a Monell violation
22 against the City of Fairfield (Second Cause of Action). See
23 First Amended Compl., ECF No. 34.
24 II. OPINION
25 A. Legal Standard
26 Summary judgment is granted “if the movant shows that there
27

28 2 Officer Taylor was dismissed from this action.
1 is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
2 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
3 Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
4 case. Nat'l Ass'n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682
5 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012). A dispute is genuine “if the
6 evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
7 for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
8 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
9 When, as here, a video of the incident exists and neither
10 party questions its accuracy, the Court views “the facts in the
11 light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
12 381 (2007). The Court will not “‘credit a party's version of
13 events that the record, such as an unchallenged video recording
14 of the incident, quite clearly contradicts.’” Sabbe v. Washington
15 Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 84 F.4th 807, 816 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting
16 Williamson v. City of Nat'l City, 23 F.4th 1146, 1149 n.1 (9th
17 Cir. 2022)). The Court therefore takes as true facts that are
18 clearly depicted in the recordings. See Id. at 380–81.
19 B. Analysis
20 1. Qualified Immunity
21 Because Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity,
22 Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 23, Plaintiff Houston must
23 demonstrate that Officers Smith, Bassi, Reeves, and Hill
24 violated her Fourth Amendment rights by searching or seizing her
25 in a manner that was clearly established as unconstitutional at
26 the time of the incident. See Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles,
27 935 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2019).
28 Even if an officer's conduct is objectively unreasonable,
1 “‘[q]ualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does
2 not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
3 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id.
4 (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per
5 curiam)). Public officials are shielded from liability unless
6 the plaintiff can prove (1) the official violated a statutory or
7 constitutional right (2) that was clearly established. Ashcroft
8 v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). For a right to be
9 “clearly established,” existing “precedent must have placed the
10 statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” such that
11 “every” reasonable official, not just “a” reasonable official,
12 would have understood that he was violating a clearly
13 established right. Id. at 741.
14 2. Officers’ Initial Stop Was Constitutional
15 Plaintiff alleges that Officers detained her in violation
16 of her Fourth Amendment rights because they lacked reasonable
17 suspicion. See Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 8-
18 11. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Officers’ seizure of
19 her was unreasonable because they mistook certain descriptive
20 facts and did not have particularized suspicion to stop her in
21 relation to the reported gun crime. Id.
22 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to
23 be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
24 unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
25 There are two categories of police seizures under the Fourth
26 Amendment: Terry stops and full-scale arrests. See Allen v. City
27 of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995). Terry stops
28 require reasonable suspicion and arrests require probable cause.
1 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that officers
2 may conduct a reasonable search for weapons regardless of
3 whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
4 crime); Allen 73 F.3d at 236-37 (citing Delgadillo-Velasquez,
5 856 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[p]robable cause exists,
6 when at the time of arrest, the agents know reasonably
7 trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person
8 in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an
9 offense”). Neither party argues that Officers had probable
10 cause to arrest Plaintiff and agree that what is in dispute is
11 whether Officers possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to
12 detain Plaintiff.
13 Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), police officers may
14 conduct a brief, investigative stop of an individual when they
15 have reasonable suspicion that the “person apprehended is
16 committing or has committed a criminal offense.” Arizona v.
17 Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009). An officer cannot rely only
18 upon generalizations that “would cast suspicion on large
19 segments of the law-abiding population.” United States v.
20 Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006).
21 Courts proceed from the perspective of a “reasonable
22 officer on the scene” and must “allow for the fact that police
23 officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
24 circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—
25 about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
26 situation.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 775 (2014)
27 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)).
28 Reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop
1 exists when an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts
2 which form the basis for particularized suspicion, which
3 includes two elements: 1) assessment must be based on totality
4 of the circumstances, and 2) the assessment must include
5 reasonable suspicion that the particular person being stopped
6 has committed or is about to commit a crime. U.S. v. Keeler, 8
7 Fed.Appx. 631 (9th Cir. 2001).
8 Here, the Court finds that Officers had enough
9 particularized suspicion to stop Plaintiff Houston because she
10 drove and parked a black vehicle in the shopping plaza that
11 matched the description given by the emergency caller and Sgt.
12 Hill observed Plaintiff interacting with the group of reported
13 suspects. See Ex. U. Moreover, a tall male wearing a white
14 shirt leaned into Plaintiff Houston’s open car window, giving
15 rise to the reasonable belief that a gun may have been placed in
16 her vehicle. See Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 166; Ex.
17 H at 77:10–78:10, 92:13-15; Ex. U at 8:50 – 9:02. Thus, a
18 reasonable officer on the scene would have believed Plaintiff
19 was linked to the reported crime.
20 Supreme Court precedent supports the principle that even if
21 officers are ultimately mistaken, as long as their
22 investigations are reasonable, their actions do not violate the
23 Fourth Amendment. For example, U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
24 421 (1981) held that objective facts and circumstantial evidence
25 suggesting that a particular vehicle was involved in unlawful
26 activity was sufficient basis to justify an investigative stop.
27 To be “reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth
28 Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government
1 officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
2 community’s protection.’” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54
3 (2014) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
4 (1949)).
5 Even though the Officers ultimately determined that
6 Plaintiff Houston did not have any relation to the gun crime,
7 the Supreme Court has recognized that searches and seizures
8 based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable. Id. Thus, even
9 though these Officers mistook certain descriptive facts, this
10 does not detract from the objective reasonableness of their
11 initial stop and detention of Plaintiff under the totality of
12 these circumstances.
13 3. Officers’ Bodily Frisk and Vehicle Search Were
14 Constitutional
15 Plaintiff next argues that Officers’ bodily frisk and
16 search of her vehicle were also impermissible under the Fourth
17 Amendment. See Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 12,
18 16-18. However, contrary to this contention, caselaw is clear
19 that an officer may conduct a pat down search when he or she
20 reasonably believes that the subject “may be armed and presently
21 dangerous.” U.S. v. I.E.V., 705 F.3d 430, 432–433 (9th Cir.
22 2012). Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
23 (1977), the Supreme Court held that police may order persons out
24 of an automobile and may frisk those persons for weapons if
25 there is a reasonable belief that they are armed and dangerous.
26 As discussed previously, Officers reasonably suspected that
27 Plaintiff Houston may have been involved in the reported gun
28 crime and that the gun may have been passed through her open
1 window. Thus, based on video footage and Sgt. Hill’s
2 observations, it was reasonable for officers to pat Plaintiff
3 down because they reasonably believed the weapon may have been
4 on her person.
5 With regard to the car search, Plaintiff argues that
6 Officers search of her vehicle, wallet, and purse were
7 unreasonable, and that no Fourth Amendment exception exists
8 because she did not consent to the searches. Plf.’s Partial
9 Mot. for Summary Judgment at 16-18. However, as Defendants
10 assert in their cross-motion, the Ninth Circuit has stated that
11 all that is required for a protective search under Terry is a
12 reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed. See United
13 States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007). In Orman,
14 the court emphasized the need for officers to be able to pursue
15 their work without fear of violence and that, where a weapon is
16 readily accessible, limited protective steps are allowable. Id.
17 at 1177-78. Additionally, the need for a protective search
18 applies regardless of whether carrying a concealed weapon
19 violates state law. Id. at 1177 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407
20 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
21 Supreme Court precedent further illuminates the
22 permissibility of car and container searches where officers
23 possess a reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed. In
24 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983), the Supreme Court
25 emphasized that protective searches are justified when police
26 have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, noting
27 that roadside encounters between police and suspects are
28 especially hazardous and danger may arise from the possible
1 presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. Thus, a
2 search “limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed
3 or hidden” is permissible if the officers have a reasonable
4 belief that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain
5 immediate control of weapons. Id. at 1033.
6 Based on these precedents, the Court finds that Officers’
7 search of Plaintiff’s car, purse, and wallet were reasonable
8 protective measures for officer safety given their suspicion
9 that a gun may have entered through her window and that the gun
10 could have been hidden in her car or purse.
11 Given the independent Fourth Amendment basis justifying
12 Officers’ search, the Court does not need to reach the issue of
13 whether an exception exists or whether Ms. Houston gave
14 voluntary consent for Officers to search her vehicle. Even if
15 there were a question as to the reasonableness of Officers’
16 search of her car or the items within Plaintiff Houston’s car,
17 Plaintiff has not pointed to any analogous cases that put
18 Defendants on notice as to the unconstitutionality of searching
19 a purse or wallet during an investigatory stop for weapons,
20 necessitating the conclusion that Defendants would be entitled
21 to qualified immunity in the alternative case.
22 4. Plaintiff’s Terry-Stop Became An Unlawful Arrest
23 Despite Officers’ initial compliance with the Fourth
24 Amendment’s constitutional requirements, Plaintiff argues that
25 her Terry stop turned into a de facto arrest unsupported by
26 probable cause. Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 13.
27 Defendants do not challenge that they lacked probable cause to
28 arrest Ms. Houston, Hearing Transcript p. 41, line 6, ECF No.
1 102, and the Court finds that under Washington v. Lambert, 98
2 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996), Officers are not entitled to
3 qualified immunity on this claim. Rather, Plaintiff is entitled
4 to summary judgment on her unlawful arrest claim because
5 Washington clearly put Officers on notice such that every
6 officer would have understood that he was violating Plaintiff’s
7 clearly established right to not be subject to overly-intrusive
8 police tactics under these circumstances.
9 There is no bright-line rule to determine when an
10 investigatory stop becomes an arrest. Id. at 1185. Rather, in
11 determining whether stops have turned into arrests, courts
12 consider the “totality of the circumstances.” United States v.
13 Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting United
14 States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1988). In looking
15 at the totality of the circumstances, courts consider the
16 intrusiveness of the stop, the aggressiveness of the officer’s
17 actions and how much the plaintiff’s liberty was restricted, and
18 the reasonableness of the officer’s methods under the
19 circumstances. Washington, 98 F.3d at 1188-89.
20 The Ninth Circuit has advised that “[u]nder ordinary
21 circumstances, when the police have only reasonable suspicion to
22 make an investigatory stop, drawing weapons and using handcuffs
23 and other restraints will violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at
24 1187. More intrusive measures may be appropriate: 1) where the
25 suspect is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that
26 raises a reasonable possibility of danger or flight; 2) where
27 the police have information that the suspect is currently armed;
28 3) where the stop closely follows a violent crime; and 4) where
1 the police have information that a crime that may involve
2 violence is about to occur. Id. at 1189. Courts also consider
3 how many officers are present at the scene. Id. at 1190.
4 In this case, the Court finds that each Washington factor
5 weighs in Plaintiff Houston’s favor because Officers only
6 possessed reasonable suspicion and no factors indicate that this
7 was an extraordinary circumstance requiring the use of more
8 intrusive measures like handcuffs or other restraints.
9 Plaintiff Houston was fully cooperative and did not take
10 any actions at the scene to raise a reasonable possibility of
11 danger or flight; Officers search of Plaintiff revealed she was
12 unarmed; Officers had no specific information Plaintiff Houston
13 was involved in the physical fight; and there was no indication
14 that any future crime was about to occur. By the time Officer
15 Reeves handcuffed Plaintiff and placed her into the patrol
16 vehicle, no facts suggest that Ms. Houston was armed,
17 uncooperative, dangerous, or a flight risk. By all accounts,
18 Plaintiff’s actions demonstrated her absolute compliance with
19 every officer instruction and willingness to answer every
20 question asked. See generally, Ex. U. Moreover, there were
21 sixteen officers on the scene with at least four officers
22 specifically attending to Ms. Houston. See Plf.’s Reply to
23 Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 40; Ex. U.
24 Defendants argue that their intrusive actions of keeping
25 Plaintiff handcuffed in the back of a police vehicle did not
26 turn her detention into an arrest. Def.’s Mot. for Summary
27 Judgment at 29. Defendants cite Garza v. City of Salem, 690
28 F.Supp.3d 1188 (D. Or., Sept. 4, 2023) and Gallegos v. City of
1 Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) to support their
2 argument. However, these cases are distinguishable because they
3 involved individuals whose uncooperative actions themselves
4 disrupted and prolonged officers’ investigations, implicating
5 the extraordinary circumstances that permit use of more
6 intrusive measures under Washington. In contrast, Plaintiff
7 Houston was fully cooperative throughout the entire
8 investigation.
9 Defendants also suggest that their intrusive actions are
10 justified by the third Washington factor because their
11 investigation followed a violent crime. The Court disagrees and
12 reads the third prong in Washington, as elaborated by fn. 14, to
13 require specific information that an individual be involved in
14 the purported violent crime or “closely match” a description
15 given to police. 98 F.3d 1181 (citing United States v. Jacobs,
16 715 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1983). The undisputed facts show
17 that Plaintiff Houston did not match the description given by
18 the emergency caller and was not involved in the reported
19 physical fight since she is female and arrived in the parking
20 lot after the altercation occurred. No reasonable officer would
21 have believed Plaintiff to be the individual involved in the
22 physical fight and as such, Plaintiff does not implicate any of
23 the extraordinary factors delineated by Washington.
24 Defendants also argue that having two crime scenes was a
25 unique circumstance justifying Plaintiff’s prolonged arrest.
26 See Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 19. However, the fact
27 that other officers were attending to a separate crime scene
28 does not influence the Washington factors as applied to
1 Plaintiff Houston or the priority of her constitutional rights.
2 Under a straightforward application of Washington, Plaintiff
3 Houston’s detention squarely became an unreasonable arrest.
4 In sum, Washington v. Lambert is controlling authority that
5 puts Officers on notice that they unconstitutionality converted
6 Plaintiff Houston’s detention from an investigatory stop into an
7 arrest by using unreasonably intrusive restraints for an
8 unnecessary period of time. The Court finds that Officers are
9 not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
10 Because “a plaintiff must establish the integral
11 participation of the officers in the alleged constitutional
12 violation,” Monteilh v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 820 F. Supp. 2d
13 1081 665 F.3d 1076, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2011), and simply “being
14 present at the scene of an alleged unlawful act” is
15 insufficient, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
16 allege sufficient facts that Defendants Hill and Smith were
17 integral participants in her unlawful detention. However,
18 Officers Bassi and Reeves, by virtue of handcuffing Plaintiff
19 Houston and keeping her in the police vehicle had “fundamental
20 involvement” in her unlawful arrest and are thus liable for the
21 constitutional violation. Id.
22 5. Plaintiff Fails to Show Officers Used Excessive
23 Force
24 Plaintiffs final Fourth Amendment challenge alleges that
25 officers used excessive force in two ways: 1) by pointing guns
26 when stopping Plaintiff Houston and 2) by using tight handcuffs.
27 Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 19-23. In an
28 excessive force case, the Court views “the facts in the light
1 most favorable to the nonmovant, but [is] ‘limited to
2 considering what facts the officer[s] could have known at the
3 time of the incident.’” Sabbe v. Washington Cnty. Bd. of
4 Comm'rs, 84 F.4th 807, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Est. of
5 Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Gelhaus, 871 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir.
6 2017)).
7 As discussed above, Officers initially believed that a gun
8 may have passed into Plaintiff’s vehicle and Plaintiff’s
9 temporary detention became an unlawful seizure once reasonable
10 suspicion of her involvement in the alleged gun crime had
11 dissipated. While her prolonged detention without probable
12 cause is clearly unconstitutional under Washington, Washington
13 is not an excessive force case. The principal question in
14 Washington was “whether the police action constituted a Terry
15 stop or an arrest,” Washington at 1185. To the extent that
16 Washington put officers on notice, it only does so with regard
17 to the constitutional standards for unlawful arrest and this
18 Court does not read Washington to extend to excessive force
19 claims.
20 The caselaw cited by Plaintiff for her excessive force
21 claim is not persuasive because the cases do not contain
22 analogous facts and are not sufficiently similar to place
23 officers on notice. For example, Plaintiff cites to Robinson v.
24 Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving a
25 gun pointed at point blank range), Tekle v. United States, 511
26 F.3d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a gun pointed at an
27 individual’s head and fifteen to twenty officers), Espinosa v.
28 City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (involving use
1 of deadly force), and Green v. City & Cnty. Of San Francisco,
2 751 F.3d 1039, 1049 (involving six officers conducting an
3 investigation for a stolen vehicle). These cases either involve
4 far more severe conduct by police officers or do not involve
5 investigation of a suspected gun crime.
6 Plaintiff also raises Sen v. City of Los Angeles, 2022 WL
7 2236085, at *8, 9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2022) (cleaned up), but
8 Sen specifically found that the mere use of handcuffs, without
9 more, did not violate the Fourth Amendment and granted qualified
10 immunity to the officers involved. Similarly, Defendants point
11 to Pernell v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.Supp.3d 910, 927-28
12 (C.D. Cal 2022), which held that mere use of handcuffs, without
13 more, does not support an excessive force claim.
14 Ultimately Plaintiff’s cited authorities do not clearly
15 establish that the use of drawn weapons or the use of handcuffs
16 constitutes excessive force in similar circumstances. Thus, the
17 Court finds that qualified immunity attaches to the excessive
18 force claims and grants Officers’ motion for summary judgment on
19 this claim.
20 6. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish Monell
21 Liability
22 Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to summary judgment
23 on her Monell claim because Fairfield Police Department has an
24 unconstitutional practice of employing high-risk stops. See
25 Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 23. To avoid
26 summary judgment for the City on the Section 1983 claim,
27 Plaintiff Houston must demonstrate that a City policy, practice,
28 or custom caused a deprivation of rights. Steel v. Alameda
1 Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 428 F. Supp. 3d 235, 238 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
2 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of the City of N.Y.,
3 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). However, as covered in the Court’s Fourth
4 Amendment discussion above, the Court does not find that
5 Officers violated any constitutional right of Plaintiff except
6 when Plaintiff’s prolonged detention became an arrest.
7 Under Monell, proof of “a policy or practice requires more
8 than a few occurrences of challenged conduct. A single or even
9 a few isolated and sporadic incidents of unconstitutional
10 conduct are not enough to impose municipal liability under
11 Section 1983.” See Escobar-Lopez v. City of Daly City, 527 F.
12 Supp. 3d 1123, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Gant v. Cnty. of
13 Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also Gordon
14 v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021).
15 In Plaintiff Houston’s case, her allegation of “no more
16 than an ‘isolated or sporadic incident[ ]’ ... cannot form the
17 basis of Monell liability for an improper custom.” Saved
18 Magazine v. Spokane Police Dept., 19 F.4th 1193, 1201 (9th Cir.
19 2021) (quoting Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.
20 1996)). Plaintiff has not shown an unconstitutional practice
21 that is “‘so persistent and widespread as to practically have
22 the force of law.’” Escobar, 527 F. Supp. 3d at 1128 (quoting
23 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)).
24 In her Reply, Plaintiff also lodges a theory based on
25 “ratification” to support her claim for Monell liability against
26 the City. Plf.’s Reply at 22. Related to this argument, the
27 Court received supplemental briefs regarding Loggervale, et al.
28 v. County of Alameda, et al., No. 23-15483, 2024 WL 4234878 (9th
1 Cir. Sept. 19, 2024), a recent Ninth Circuit opinion on
2 ratification theory. See Plf.’s Notice of Suppl. Authority, ECF
3 No. 93; Def.’s Suppl. Brief, ECF No. 97. In Loggervale, the
4 jury found that Alameda County ratified the constitutional
5 violations because Sheriff Ahern, an official policymaker,
6 specifically reviewed and approved of the internal investigation
7 findings from the incident, writing on the memo: “Briefed. No
8 further action required.”. Id. at * 3.
9 Loggervale is readily distinguishable from this case. In
10 this case, Plaintiff Houston has not presented evidence that a
11 final policymaker ratified the Officers’ actions or that a Chief
12 reviewed Sgt. Divine’s investigative memorandum. See Christie
13 v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff
14 contends that the Fairfield Police Department Manual and
15 testimony by Jausiah Jacobsen establishes that Plaintiff
16 Houston’s investigation package was reviewed by the Chief of the
17 Fairfield Police Department. See Plf.’s Notice of Suppl.
18 Authority at 1. This representation is not supported by the
19 evidence Plaintiff cites.
20 The Court agrees with Defendants that the deposition
21 transcript is ambiguous at best, and merely establishes that
22 generally, investigative memoranda “should” go to the captain
23 and that chiefs should be made aware. ECF No. 88-7, at 52:20-
24 56:13. There is no specific evidence that the Fairfield Chief
25 of Police reviewed, approved, or even knew about the
26 investigation surrounding Plaintiff Houston’s incident. Unlike
27 in Loggervale, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that a final
28 decision maker signed off on the investigative memorandum. To
1 prove ratification, Plaintiff must show that a specific
2 policymaker “made a deliberate choice to endorse” the Officer’s
3 actions. Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir.
4 1992). Plaintiff has not provided such proof and no reasonable
5 jury could so find.
6 Because Plaintiff Houston does not point to any other
7 instances of unlawful detention, can only show success under her
8 own unlawful arrest claim, and cannot prove ratification theory,
9 no reasonable jury could find the City liable for Officer Bassi
10 or Officer Reeves’s unconstitutional conduct under Monell.
11 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is
12 granted.
13 7. Punitive Damages
14 Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
15 punitive damages claim. To recover for punitive damages against
16 an individual officer in a Section 1983 case, a plaintiff must
17 show that the officers’ conduct is “motivated by evil motive or
18 intent” or “involves reckless or callous indifference to the
19 federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
20 30, 56 (1983). The Ninth Circuit has also explained that “[t]he
21 standard for punitive damages under Section 1983 mirrors the
22 standard for punitive damages under common law tort cases,”
23 which extends to “malicious, wanton, or oppressive acts or
24 omissions.” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005).
25 There are no facts in the record supporting a finding that
26 Officers Bassi or Reeves were motivated by evil intent or that
27 they were recklessly indifferent to Plaintiff’s rights. Indeed,
28 BWC footage reveals that officers were professional and
ee nen en NE IE OS ISIE, OE EE Oe ee

1 attentive throughout the investigation. See Ex. U. Plaintiff’s
2 unlawful arrest was the result of a prolonged delay and nothing
3 in the record demonstrates that Officers maliciously or
4 recklessly prolonged Plaintiff’s detention. Similarly,
5 Plaintiff stated that Officers largely treated her with respect.
6 See Ex. H (Deposition of Danielle Houston) at 40:22-25, 41:1-3.
7 Given the facts, no reasonable jury could find reckless
8 disregard for Plaintiff’s rights to support an award of punitive
9 damages.
10 Til. ORDER
11 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART
12 Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgement as to her
13 unlawful arrest claim against Defendants Bassi and Reeves for
14 their integral participation in the Fourth Amendment violation.
15 Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's
16 remaining Fourth Amendment claims. Defendants’ motion for
17 summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED on
18 the remaining claims: 1) initial seizure of Plaintiff, 2) bodily
19 frisk of Plaintiff, 3) search of Plaintiff’s vehicle and
20 | belongings, 4) excessive force, 5) Monell liability, and 6)
21 punitive damages.
22 IT IS SO ORDERED.
23 Dated: November 21, 2024
24
cp,
JOHN A. MENDEZ
26 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
27
28
21

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10752490. Public record. Not legal advice.