# NIETO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · November 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10751223

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** November 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming where the ALJ compared evidence in the record to the Commissioner’s Listings requirements and provided a thorough analysis showing he relied on substantial evidence in the decision.

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL A. N.,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-22755 (ZNQ)
v.
OPINION
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

QURAISHEL District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Michael N.’s (“Plaintiff’) appeal
of the Social Security Administration’s denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits
under Title IT of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423, ef seg. (ECF No. 1.) The Court has
jurisdiction to review this appeal under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) and reaches its decision
without oral argument under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.
After reviewing the parties’ submissions and the Administrative Record (“AR”), the Court
finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision was based on substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the decision will be AFFIRMED,
I. BACKGROUND
The issues before the Court are: (1) whether the ALJ failed to properly categorize
Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments (“MDIs”) as severe or non-severe; (2) whether the
ALJ properly examined Plaintiff's MDIs at Step 3 against the Commissioner’s Listings separately

' The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial only, See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10,

and in combination, and (3) whether the decisional Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) was
based on substantial evidence and reflective of the ALJ’s findings.
A. Procedural Posture
Plaintiff is a veteran who has been awarded a 100% disability rating by the Veteran’s
Association related to a combination of conditions including traumatic brain injury (“TBI”),
migraines, and posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) related to his service, (PI, Br. at 12, 18;
AR 35, 79.) This is Plaintiff's second application for social security disability insurance benefits
and a period of disability in front of the same ALJ. (Compare AR 34 with id. 85.) On December
10, 2021, Plaintiff filed a protective application for a period of disability and for disability
insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset date of January 12, 2021. (AR 24.)* The Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) denied the request both initially and on reconsideration. (Jd)
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held in Richmond, Virginia on May 24, 2023.
Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and an impartial vocational expert also appeared at the
hearing. Ud.) On July 11, 2023, the presiding ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff is not
disabled under sections 223(d) and 216() of the Social Security Act, and Plaintiff appealed. □□□
1, 37.) The SSA’s Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, finding no grounds for
review of the ALJ’s decision. Ud. 1.) Accordingiy, Plaintiff initiated the instant appeal before this
Court. (ECF No. 1.)
On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Opening Brief (“Pl, Br.,” ECF No. 9). The
Commissioner filed a brief in opposition (“Def. Br...” ECF No. 11).

? The full Administrative Record in this case can be found from ECF No. 4-4—-14. All citations from these documents
wiil be directly to the AR number rather than document specific page numbers. The alleged onset date for the
application on appeal was later modified to January 21, 2021,

B. The ALJ’s Decision
On July 11, 2023, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the prevailing
Administration regulations. (See generally AR 24-37.) The ALJ set forth the five-step process
for determining whether an individual is disabled. (/d. 25-27 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 et seq.)
) Plaintiff had a prior disability claim for a different time period adjudicated by the same presiding
ALI. (Ud. 27; “Prior Decision,” AR 67-89, The ALJ in the instant matter set forth the standard
in the Fourth Circuit for a subsequent adjudication after an ALJ has adjudicated a previously filed
disability claim covering a different time period. (/d, 27.)* In the Fourth Circuit,
“where a final decision by an Administrative Law Judge ... contains
a finding required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for
determining disability, the agency must consider such finding as
evidence and consider its persuasiveness in light of all relevant facts
and circumstances when adjudicating a subsequent disability claim
involving an un-adjudicated period.”
(/d.) In determining the persuasiveness of a prior finding, the subsequent ALJ should consider
factors such as:
“(1) whether the fact on which the prior finding was based is subject
to change with the passage of time, such as a fact relating to the
severity of a claimant's medical condition; (2) the likelihood of such
a change, considering the length of time that has elapsed between
the period previously adjudicated and the period under consideration
in the subsequent claim; and (3) the extent that evidence not
considered in the final decision on the prior claim provides a basis
for making a different finding with respect to the period being
adjudicated in the subsequent claim.”
(id. (citing Social Security Acquiescence Ruling [“SSAR”] 00-1(4)).)
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not “engaged in substantial gainful activity”
since the disability onset date, January 21,2021. Ud. 27 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 ef seg.) □ At

The prior application alleged a period of disability and disability insurance benefits with an onset date of October 1,
2019. (AR 67.) The prior decision was issued January 14, 2021. (AR 85.)
4 Plaintiff and the ALJ appear to be located in the Fourth Cireuit.

step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: degenerative
dise disease of the spine; status-post cervical fusion; migraines; neurocognitive disorder; status-
post traumatic brain injury (“TBI”); posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); and depression. (id.
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).) These are the same severe impairments found in the prior
adjudication. (id) The ALJ found Plaintiff had the following non-severe impairments and prior
symptoms the medical record showed he had been treated for: sleep apnea; irritable bowel
syndrome; hypertension, hyperlipidemia; left shoulder osteoarthritis and tendinopathy;
gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD); reactive airway disease; obesity; and right ankle
degenerative joint disease, (/d. 28.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have “an impairment or
combination of impairments” that qualifies under the SSA’s listed impairments. (/d. 29 (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404,1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).) The ALJ considered Plaintiff's physical and mental
impairments singly and in combination against the Commissioner’s Listings. (/d.) The ALJ also
considered medical opinions and the prior determination that Plaintiff did not meet the listing
criteria. (ld, 31,)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to:
“perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he
can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently; sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; stand and/or
walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb
ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds;
frequently balance, stoop, and kneel; occasionally crouch and
crawl; can tolerate occasional exposure to weather; can tolerate no
exposure to unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts; can
concentrate in the workplace for two (2) hours before requiring a
break; can perform simple, routine tasks; can frequently interact
with supervisors and coworkers; can occasionally interact with the

general public; and can frequently respond appropriately to
changes in a routine work setting,”
(Ud. 31.) The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. (/d.
35.) Then, at the fifth step, the ALJ concluded that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy” that Plaintiff can perform. (/d (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569,
404,1569a).) The ALJ relied on the impartial vocational expert’s testimony at the hearing to find
that Plaintiff could perform the following jobs: marker; office helper; and photocopy-machine
operator. Ud. 36.)
I. LEGAL STANDARD
On appeal, a district court “shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of
the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). To survive judicial review, the
Commissionex’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402
US. 389, 401 (1971); see Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence
is “more than a mere scintilla, It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v.
NERB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, substantial
evidence “may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Ginsburg v. Richardson,
436 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3d Cir, 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the court “may not weigh the evidence or
substitute [its own] conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), Even if the Court would have decided
differently, it is bound by the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Fargnoli y, Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 Gd Cir. 2001). The court must “review the record as a
whole to determine whether substantial evidence supports a factual finding.” Zirnsak v. Colvin,
777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Schaudeck v. Comm’r of SSA, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir.
1999)). “Since it is apparent that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong
reason,” courts require an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative evidence has
been rejected to determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper. Cofter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 706-07 (3d Cir. 1981).
Ill. DISCUSSION
On review of the ALJ’s decision, (see AR 24-37), and the Administrative Record, (see
generally AR), the Court finds good cause to affirm the Commissioner’s decision. In reaching a
decision, an ALJ must evaluate the evidence and explain the reasons for accepting or rejecting
evidence. Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706. Here, the ALJ provides extensive and thorough reasoning for
his findings, and relies extensively on the medical evidence in the record, The Court determines
that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
A. Step Two
Step Two is a threshold analysis which determines whether the ALJ should continue to
evaluate Plaintiffs claims for disability. “In effect, the inquiry at Step Two functions as a de
minimus screening device to dismiss unfounded claims.” Bouchard y. Colvin, No. 13-5283, 2014
WL 7011190, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2014) (citing Newell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541,
546 (3d Cir. 2003)). A medically determinable impairment is one that “result[s] from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and “must be established by medical evidence
consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [Plaintiffs] statement of

symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908, According to the Commissioner's regulations, “an

impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit [the claimant's] physical ability to do
basic work activities.” Newell, 347 F.3d at 546 (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),
404.1521{a). Basic work activities are “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,
including, for example, walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or
handling.” /d. (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S, 137 (1987)).
Here, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision “eliminates half a dozen medically determinable
impairments, rendering them ‘not severe’ while any fair or neutral understanding of the
impairments and the severity standard would clearly indicate that each presents substantially more
than a ‘minimal effect’ on the ability to perform basic work activities.” (PI. Br. at 7.) Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on Plaintiff's daily activities such as driving, riding
a bike, and walking his dogs when categorizing Plaintiff's physical MDIs as not severe, including
when the ALJ categorized Plaintiff's left shoulder degenerative arthritis as non-severe, as well as
his irritable bowel syndrome, obesity, and sleep apnea. (/d.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should
have seen that his obesity, when combined with physical obstructions such as bone spurs, in
combination with hypertension, digestive impairments and sleep apnea, should lead to a severe
impairment. (/d. at 8.) Plaintiff argues the error at step two is not harmless because it impacts
Plaintiff's decisional RFC, which does not directly address several of the non-severe impairments.
(d.)
Defendant argues the ALJ “reasonably found some impairments not severe,” and that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s position. (Def. Br. at 10.) Defendant further contends
that “[a] diagnosis, without more, does not establish that Plaintiff's impairments were severe, and
that Plaintiff did not meet his burden to show “these limitations significantly limited [his] ability
to do basic work activities or impaired [his] capacity to cope with the mental demands of working.”

(id. at 11 (quoting Salles v. Comm’'r of Soc. Sec., 229 F. App’x 140,145 (3d Cir, 2007)) (non
precedential).)
The Court finds the ALJ did not err at Step Two, Although Plaintiff postulates that the
MDIs categorized as non-severe could cause limitations, he offers no evidence from the record
that Plaintiffs obesity in combination with his other non-severe physical impairments actually
limited his ability to do work activities during the period in question. Further, Plaintiff suggests
the ALJ picked his non-severe MDIs strategically so as to not limit Plaintiff to sedentary work,
since Plaintiff turned fifty (50) years old over the course of his disability applications and a finding
that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work “would force the flipping of the outcome,” i.e., would
lead to a finding that Plaintiff was disabled. (Pl. Br. at 9.) However, as noted above, Plaintiff does
not provide evidence of such limitations, cite to evidence in the record supporting his argument,
or medical opinions that demonstrate error on the part of the ALJ. Alejandra D. vy, Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., Civ. No. 22-175, 2023 WL 2609134, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2023) (“Plaintiff has not pointed
to any evidence in the record indicating that obesity impacted [his] impairments such that the
medical equivalency analysis would change or that [he] required additional RFC limitations due
to [his] obesity.”); see also William J.-P. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20-18081, 2022 WL 909665, at *8
(Mar. 29, 2022) (finding “remand is not appropriate as it would not change the outcome of the
case, Plaintiff has not presented any objective medical evidence to meet his burden of showing
how his obesity actually impacted his work, as opposed to merely showing that he has obesity and
struggles to work.”).
Further, the ALJ thoroughly discussed his severity findings and cited extensive objective
medical evidence underlying his determination of how to categorize each of Plaintiff's MDIs, (AR
27-29,) The ALJ relies on laboratory testing, treatment records, and testimony from the hearing

in developing his severity analysis. (/d 28.) As noted above, Plaintiff does not point to specific
error in this analysis, only that Plaintiff believes the outcome should have been different. It is not
within this Court’s power to reweigh evidence considered by the ALJ or “substitute its conclusions
for those of the fact-finder.” Williams y. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). This
limitation applies “even if [the court] would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”
Hartranft vy. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999),
Moreover, even in cases with demonstrated error at Step Two, district courts typically do
not remand decisions where the ALJ found at least one MDI and continued with the sequential
disability analysis, as he did here. See Salles, 229 F. App’x at 145 n.2 (“Because the ALJ found
in [claimant's] favor at Step Two, even if he had erroneously concluded that some of [his] other
impairments were non-severe, any error was harmless,” (citing Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553)); see
also Theresa S, vy. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 21-19997, 2022 WL 17959581, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 27,
2022) (“[E]ven if the ALJ’s determination that [claimant's] diabetes is not severe was in error, it
would be a harmless error because the ALJ did not decide against [claimant] at Step 2.”).
B. Step Three
At Step Three, an ALJ considers whether the combination of the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments meets or equals the severity of any one of the impairments in the Listing
of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)Gii). An impairment meets a listed impairment if it
satisfies “‘all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those
criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify,’” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 504 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990)). “A claimant cannot qualify for
benefits under the ‘equivalence’ step by showing that the overall! functional impact of his unlisted
impairment or combination of impairments is as severe as that of a listed impairment.” Zebley,
493 U.S. at 531. “[T]he medical criteria defining the listed impairments [are set] at a higher level

of severity than the statutory standard” because the “listings define impairments that would prevent
an adult, regardless of his age, education, or work experience, from performing any gainful
activity, not just ‘substantial gainful activity.”” Jd. at 532 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a)).
Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not meet or equal the criteria for any of the
Commissioner’s Listings. (AR 29.) Regarding Plaintiffs physical impairments, the ALJ
considered; Listing 1.15 (Disorders of the skeletal spine resulting in compromise of a nerve root);
Listing 1.16 (lumbar spinal stenosis); and Listing 11.02 and SSR-19-4p in combination (whether
Plaintiff's headache disorder meets or medically equals listing 11.02). (Ud) The ALJ found
Plaintiff did not meet any of the criteria when his physical impairments were considered singly
and in combination. (/d.) The ALJ also found that the severity of Plaintiff's mental impairments
when considered singly and in combination did not meet the Commissioner’s criteria. Ud.) The
ALJ examined: Listing 12.02 (neurocognitive disorders); Listing 12.04 for depressive, bipolar, and
related disorders; and 12.15 for trauma and stressor-related disorders. (AR 29-31.)
In making his decision, the ALJ relief on testimony from Plaintiff, medical treatment
records, including from the Veteran’s Administration (“VA”), and evaluations from both state and
non-state medical consultants. (/d.) In particular, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had received
minimal mental health treatment following the alleged disability onset date, despite the VA’s
determination that Plaintiff was 100% disabled at least partially due to PTSD. (/d. 30) He also
relied on the ALJ’s prior decision in this case. (/d. 31.)
Plaintiff argues evidence in the record supports a finding that he meets Listings 12.02,
12.04, and 12.15, or that he otherwise equals a combination of those Listings given the ALJ’s
finding that he has four severe mental MDIs. (PL.’s Br. at 9-24.) Plaintiff argues that he satisfies
the “A” criteria of those Listings, and that the ALJ “cherry-pick[ed]” isolated observations rather

10

than relying on the objective medical evidence to find that Plaintiff did not have “marked”
limitations and therefore that he did not meet the listing criteria due to not meeting the “B” criteria.
Ud. at 12.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the VA’s finding that Plaintiff was 100% disabled
“due to PTSD for suffering a traumatic brain injury after a direct rocket hit on his convoy” should
have weighed more on the analysis, and that the ALJ did not properly evaluate how Plaintiff's
severe mental MDIs affected his ability to work. (/d. 15.)
To meet Listing 12.02, 12,04, or 12.15, a plaintiff must prove that he satisfies a
combination of the respective “A” and “B” criteria or “A” and “C” criteria. 20 C.F.R, Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00. The Third Circuit “does not require the ALJ to use particular language
or adhere to a particular format in conducting [his] analysis” at step three. Jones, 364 F.3d at 505
(discussing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc, Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir, 2000)). Instead, the ALJ
is required to issue a decision that, “read as a whole,” contains a “sufficient development of the
record and explanation of [the ALJ’s] findings to permit meaningful review.” Jd.
An ALJ must ensure “sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to
permit meaningful review.” /d. (citing Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120); see also Fargnoli v. Massanari,
247 F.3d 34, 42 3d Cir, 2001). It is well-settled that this “requires more than just a conclusory
statement that a claimant does not meet the listings.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. The Third Circuit
“has stated that it is the ALJ’s ‘responsibility . . . to identify the relevant listed impairment(s)’ and
‘develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.” Torres v, Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
279 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120 n.2). Here, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff does not meet or equal the Listings because he does not meet the “B” or “C” criteria.
(AR 29-31.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has mild and moderate, as opposed to

il

marked or extreme, limitations across the four functional “B” criteria,’ and that under the “C”
criteria Plaintiff's impairments do not result in marginal adjustment or a minimal capacity to adapt
to changes in environment or to demands not already part of daily life. Ud.) After careful review,
the Court finds that substantial evidence in the record, when “read as a whole,” supports the ALJ’s
conclusions at step three, Jones, 364 F.3d at 505,
The ALJ’s decision explicitly considers Plaintiff's testimony and treatment records of
providers when determining that Plaintiff has only mild or moderate limitations across each
functional “B” criterion, including Plaintiffs ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. (AR
29-30 (citing Hearing Testimony, Exs. B6F, B7F.) Regarding the “C” criteria, the ALJ’s decision
found the record did not support a finding that “claimant received medical treatment, mental health
therapy, psychosocial support, or that he lived in a highly structured setting that was ongoing and
that diminished the symptoms and signs of his mental disorder” and therefore Plaintiff did not
meet the “C” criteria. Ud. 30.) Plaintiff has not provided adequate support from the record or
shown error in the ALJ’s analysis that merits remand on Step Three.
The Court will therefore affirm the ALJ’s decision at Step Three, as it is supported by
substantial evidence. Cop v. Comm’'r of Soc. Sec., 226 F. App’x 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming
where the ALJ compared evidence in the record to the Commissioner’s Listings requirements and
provided a thorough analysis showing he relied on substantial evidence in the decision.)
C, The RFC Findings
An individual’s RFC is an assessment of their maximum remaining ability to do sustained
work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis, 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a); SSR 96-8p. The RFC assessment is an administrative finding and the ALJ alone

5 A plaintiff needs to show marked limitations of two, or extreme limitation of one, of the four functional “B” criteria.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00.
12

is responsible for crafting a plaintiff's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), Generally, a court
should defer to the presiding ALJ when substantial evidence supports their conclusion. See Biestek
v, Berryhill, 139 8. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). As mentioned, substantial evidence “means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d
422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). The ALJ’s full RFC finding is discussed supra.
Plaintiff argues the decisional RFC “is not based on substantial evidence, arrives without
a comprehensive rationale and is not reflective of the ALJ’s own findings.” (Pl. Br. at 24.)
Specificaliy, Plaintiff argues that due to Plaintiff's age, the RFC is specifically calculated to
support a finding that light work is appropriate, as “[a]n RFC for sedentary work would demand a
finding of disability” due to vocational rulemaking, particularly “vocational rule 201.14.” (/d. at
32.) He also complains the ALJ did not explicitly analyze Plaintiff's non-severe impairments in
the RFC determination. (/d.) Plaintiffs argument effectively boils down to an allegation that the
ALJ delivered an outcome-directed decision and did not truly start by relying on the evidence in
the record and then coming to a conclusion, instead determining what the outcome would be and
then supporting it with carefully selected citations, (/d. at 32-33.)
Defendant disagrees, and argues the ALJ considered all of the evidence, including
PlaintifPs non-severe impairments, in creating an RFC based on substantial evidence, (Def. Br.
at 14,) Further, Defendant argues “Plaintiff's assertion that a sedentary exertion level is warranted
lacks any substantive discussion or citation to the record as to how any of the nonsevere physical
impairments reduce Plaintiff to the standing, walking, lifting, or carrying of sedentary work,
despite this being his burden.” (id. at 15.) Defendant argues “the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity assessment can be reasonable discerned” and Plaintiff does “not advance any overlooked
evidence not considered by the ALJ” in his findings. (Ud. at 17.)

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After a comprehensive review of the record, the Court finds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff's RFC. An ALJ is not required “to use particular
language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis. Rather, the function . . . is to
ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit
meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505; see also Diciano v. Comm’r of Soc, Sec., Civ. No.
18-17383, 2019 WL 6696523, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2019) (“The RFC is a function-by-function
assessment based on all of the relevant evidence of an individual's ability to do work-related
activities, but an ALJ does not need to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in
conducting his RFC analysis.”).

The ALJ devoted significant space in his decision discussing the relevant medical evidence,
medical opinions, and subjective testimony. (/d 31-35.) The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s
ultimate finding that Plaintiff could engage in light work with exertional limitations because
substantial evidence supports his decision. (AR 31). The record demonstrates that the ALJ
considered all of the medical and non-medical evidence before him in determining Plaintiff's
residual functional capacity, See Cop, 226 F. App’x at 208.
For all of these reasons and given the ALJ’s thorough discussion of Plaintiff’s impairments
and reliance on medical evidence in the record, the Court finds no deficiency in the ALJ’s RFC
analysis. See Wellington W. y. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 22-05042, 2023 WL 5551030, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug.
29, 2023) [T]he ALJ did not merely announce her RFC determination without providing any
support or explanation. She appropriately evaluated the objective medical record ... and provided
a clear presentation of her reasoning .. . ..”); Jose S. v. Kijakazi, Civ, No. 19-19077, 2023 WL
5125533, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2023) (“The ALJ's detailed examination of the objective medical

14

evidence . . . indicates that his RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence and that it
resulted from his ‘careful consideration of the entire record.’”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will AFFIRM the ALJ’s decision, An appropriate
Order will follow.
—
Date: November 26, 2024 ee LX A
INLPED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10751223. Public record. Not legal advice.