# Com. v. Brown, R.

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · October 13, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10745589

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 13, 2021
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Olson
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10745589

## Opinion text

J-S21026-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROLAND BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 528 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 8, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013828-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROLAND BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 529 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 8, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013829-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROLAND BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 530 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 8, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013830-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
J-S21026-21

:
v. :
:
:
ROLAND BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 531 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 8, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013831-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROLAND BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 532 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 8, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013834-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROLAND BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 533 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 8, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013836-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:

-2-
J-S21026-21

ROLAND BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 534 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 8, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013837-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: Filed: October 13, 2021

Appellant, Roland Brown, appeals from an order entered on January 8,

2020, in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County that dismissed, without a hearing, his petition filed pursuant to the

Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the factual history as follows:

[Over several weeks in August and September 2012, Appellant
and his paramour, Mary Jeffries, engaged in a spree of violent
robberies in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Following a two-day
bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of nine counts of
simple assault; seven counts of possessing an instrument of
crime; six counts of robbery; five counts each of criminal
conspiracy to commit robbery, theft by unlawful taking, and theft
by receiving stolen property; three counts each of recklessly
endangering another person and terroristic threats; two counts of
using an incapacitation device; and, one count each of robbery of
a motor vehicle, aggravated assault, and criminal conspiracy to
commit simple assault.]

At trial, all of the victims testified that [A]ppellant robbed and, on
most occasions, assaulted them[.] Appellant’s victims also
testified that he was accompanied and assisted by a woman during
[these episodes]. Commonwealth witness, Mary Jeffries, testified
that she was the woman that accompanied [A]ppellant on all of
these occasions and provided testimony as to both her and
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

-3-
J-S21026-21

[A]ppellant’s criminal involvement in the robberies. She further
testified that she had entered into an open guilty plea
arrangement for the role she played in the robberies.

On April 22, 2016, following his conviction, [A]ppellant was
sentenced [to 45-90 years’ incarceration]. On May 12, 2017, [this
Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence]. Appellant then
filed a timely [p]etition for [a]llowance of [a]ppeal with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on September 19,
2017. Appellant then filed a petition seeking a writ of certiorari
from the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on June
18, 2018.

On March 18, 2019, [A]ppellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.
On May 14, 2019, [A]ppellant’s court appointed counsel filed an
amended petition on his behalf. [The Commonwealth filed a
motion to dismiss Appellant’s amended petition on August 20,
2019].

[On September 26, 2019, the PCRA court, after thoroughly
reviewing the filings of the parties, the issues raised by Appellant
and the law relating to this matter, and after hearing the
arguments of counsel, issued a 20-day notice of its intent to
dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
907. Thereafter, on January 8, 2020, the PCRA entered its order
formally dismissing Appellant’s amended petition].

On February 7, 2020, [A]ppellant filed a timely [n]otice of
[a]ppeal, together with [a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)1].

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/15/21, at 1-2.

Appellant’s brief raises the following questions for our review.

Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with [Appellant] prior to
____________________________________________

1 Because Appellant included a notice of appeal at each PCRA court docket
affected by the order dismissing his petition, his notice of appeal is compliant
with our Supreme Court’s mandate in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d
969 (Pa. 2018).

-4-
J-S21026-21

trial and prepare an appropriate defense; failing to request all
compulsory discovery information regarding agreements between
a witness and the Commonwealth; failing to impeach the
credibility of a witness based on crimen falsi conviction;
improperly cross-examining the Commonwealth witnesses; and
failing to file pretrial motions to dismiss or suppress evidence[?]

Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish a
violation of [A]ppellant’s constitutional right to due process based
on the prosecution’s willful or inadvertent withholding of
exculpatory or impeachment evidence, as well as by a conviction
based upon evidence that did not prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt[?]

Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary
hearing[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

We have carefully reviewed the certified record, the submissions of the

parties, and the Rule 1925(a) opinion issued by the PCRA court. Based upon

our review, we conclude that the PCRA court has adequately and accurately

examined the claims raised in this appeal and that Appellant is not entitled to

relief for the reasons expressed in the PCRA court’s opinion.2 Accordingly, we

adopt the PCRA court’s opinion, as amended below, as our own. The parties

are directed to attach a copy of the PCRA court’s opinion to all future filings

pertaining to the disposition of this appeal.

____________________________________________

2 We add only that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

instant petition without convening an evidentiary hearing. See
Commonwealth v. Hand, 252 A.3d 1159, 1165 (Pa. Super. 2021) (PCRA
court may exercise its discretion and decline to conduct a hearing where
collateral claims lack merit and enjoy no record support).

-5-
J-S21026-21

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/13/21

-6-
Circulated
Received 2/28/2021 10:35:55 PM Superior 09/17/2021 11:14
Court Eastern AM
District

Filed 2/28/2021 10:35:00 PM Superior Court Eastern District
528 EDA 2020

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRIAL DIVISION -- CRIMINAL SECTION

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania CP-51-CR-0013 828-2014
CP-5 1-CR-00 13 829-2014
CP-5 i-CR-0013830-2014
CP-51-CR-0013 831-2014
CP-5 1-CR-00 13 834-2014
V. CP-5 1-CR-00 13 836-2014
CP=51-CR-0013 83 7-2014

SUPERIOR COURT Nos.
Roland Brown 528 EDA 2020
529 EDA 2020
530 EDA 2020
531 EDA 2020
532 EDA 2020
533 EDA 2020
534 EDA 2020

OPINION

Ehrlich, J.

Roland Brown, hereinafter referred to as "appellant," has filed an appeal from this Court's

Order of January 8, 2020 dismissing his petition, which sought relief pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 et seq.

Factual and Procedural History

Appellant was convicted by this Court following atwo (2) day waiver trial of nine (9)

counts of simple assault; seven (7) counts of possessing instrument of crime; six (6) counts of

robbery; five (5) counts each of criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, theft by unlawful taking

and theft by receiving stolen property; three (3) counts each of recklessly endangering another

person and terroristic threats; two (2) counts of using an incapacitation device; and single counts
of robbery of amotor vehicle, aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy to commit simple assault.

These convictions were the result of arobbery spree appellant engaged in, along with his

paramour, Mary Jeffries, over aseveral week period in August and September of 2013 in

Philadelphia.

At trial, all of the victims testified that appellant robbed and on most occasions assaulted

them as well. Appellant's victims also testified that he was accompanied and assisted by a

woman during these string of robberies and assaults. Commonwealth witness, Mary Jeffries,

testified that she was the woman that accompanied appellant on all of these occasions and

provided testimony as to both her and appellant's criminal involvement in the robberies. She

further testified that she had entered into an open guilty plea arrangement for the role she played

in the robberies.

On April 22, 2016, following his conviction, appellant was sentenced by this Court to

forty-five (45) to ninety (90) years of incarceration. On May 12, 2017, our Superior Court

rejected adirect appeal filed by the appellant, thereby affirming his judgement of sentence.'

Appellant then filed atimely Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court, which was denied on September 19, 2017. Appellant then filed apetition seeking awrit of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court which was denied on June 18, 2018.

On March 18, 2019, appellant filed atimely pro se PCRA petition. On May 14, 2019,

appellant's court appointed counsel filed an amended petition on his behalf The Commonwealth

filed aresponse to appellant's final amended petition in the form of aMotion to Dismiss on

August 20, 2019.

'Commonwealth v. Brown, 1348 EDA 2016.

2
This matter was then listed for argument before this Court. On September 26, 2019, this

Court, after thoroughly reviewing the filings of the parties, the issues raised by appellant and the

law relating to this matter, and after hearing the arguments of counsel, issued atwenty (20) day

Notice of Dismissal pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 907. Thereafter, by Order dated January 8, 2019, this

Court formally dismissed appellant's petition.

On February 7, 2020, appellant filed atimely Notice of Appeal, together with appellant's

1925(b) Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal.

On appeal, appellant raises eight (8) distinct claims of error which were set forth in his

amended PCRA petition. Appellant's Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal categorized

these eight (8) claims of error as follows:

1. Appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
analogous provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2. Appellant's constitutional rights to due process were violated by the prosecutor's
failure to disclose Brady material, as well as by aconviction based on evidence
that did not prove his guilt beyond areasonable doubt.

Appellant's 1925(b) Statement of Errors.

Discussion

I. Ineffectiveness of Counsel

Standard of Review

The law presumes that counsel was effective, and therefore Petitioner carries the burden

of proving that counsel was ineffective. Commonwealth v. Baker, 614 A.2d 663, 673 (Pa. 1992).

To establish ineffectiveness under the PCRA, aPetitioner must demonstrate (1) that the

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel's course of conduct was without any

3
reasonable basis designed to effectuate his or her client's interest; and (3) that he or she was

prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa.

1999); Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 105-106 (Pa. Super. 2003). Prejudice in the

context of ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires that the defendant prove that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the outcome of the trial would have

been different. Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 42 (Pa. 2002).

Failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the

claim. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 820 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003). Moreover,

ineffectiveness only occurs where the alternative not selected "offered apotential for success

substantially greater than the tactics used." Commonwealth v. Clemmons, 479 A.2d 955, 957

(Pa. 1984). Where it is clear that allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel are baseless or

meritless, then an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and the unfounded allegations should be

rejected and dismissed. Id. at 361; 479 A.2d at 957.

Appellant's amended PCRA petition set forth six (6) claims of error regarding ineffective

assistance of counsel each of which will be discussed separately below.

(1) Failure'to meet appellant prior to trial and prepare an appropriate defense.

Appellant contends that his trial counsel, Stephen T. O'Hanlon, Esquire, failed to meet

with him or prepare an appropriate defense. However, the record does not support appellant's

assertion. On the day of trial, but prior to trial beginning, this Court engaged in acolloquy with

appellant wherein appellant acknowledged that he had met with both trial counsel and counsel's

investigator. Appellant also acknowledged that his counsel advised him to "plead open." This

4
Court then explained to appellant that his counsel was giving him his best advice about how to

proceed based upon his "professional experience" N.T. 11/23/15, pp. 4-7, 9-10, 12.

Thereafter, this Court engaged in the following discussion with appellant and his trial

counsel:

COURT: And Iknow that you've discussed your case with [trial counsel]
anumber of times; is that correct?
APPELLANT: Ican't say Idid.

COURT: You've never discussed your case with [trial counsel]?
APPELLANT: No.

COURT: Mr. O'Hanlon [trial counsel]?
TRIAL COUNSEL: Your Honor, Ispoke to [appellant] at 15th and Arch prior
to his preliminary hearing. Ialso spoke to him in person at the CJC [Criminal
Justice Center]. As he said, Isent an investigator to go and see him. Itried to
arrange avideo conference hearing with [appellant]. He refused to come to the
camera at the other end. I've also had extensive written communication with
[appelIant]. Ibelieve I've sent him 12 letters and I've received various letters
that he sent to me and also court filings that he's filed.

COURT: And have you reviewed all of the necessary police paperwork
and evidence in this case to be presented?
TRIAL COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: And are you prepared to proceed?
TRIAL COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: All right. Mr. Brown [appellant]-4
APPELLANT: Your Honor, we didn't go through case by case, no we didn't.

COURT: Well, [appellant], when he tried to set up avideo conference
with you, you didn't come on the video conference. That was the purpose of
setting it up. That's why we have video conferences, so attorneys can have
confidential communications to go over this with you and to prepare for the
case. Now ... were going to move forward with this case. Ibelieve [trial counsel]
is prepared to proceed.

Id. pp. 26-27.

This Court then conducted acolloquy of the appellant and was satisfied that appellant

was knowingly and intentionally waiving his right to ajury trial. Id. pp. 28-30.

5
Accordingly, appellant's contention that his trial counsel failed to meet with him or

prepare an appropriate defense lacks any merit as counsel did meet with appellant prior to trial.

Further, as the record reflects, appellant himself thwarted any further attempt by counsel to speak

with him regarding his case. Moreover, this Court did confirm with trial counsel that he had

reviewed all necessary paperwork and evidence was prepared and ready to try the case. At trial,

defense counsel displayed athorough knowledge of the case of the evidence and testimony that

was to be presented and zealously represented appellant despite the challenges presented by

numerous witnesses all of whom had previously identified appellant as the man who robbed and

assaulted them. As such, appellant's claim that trial counsel failed to meet with him or prepare a

defense is without merit.

(2) Failure to Request discovery regarding agreements made by Commonwealth
witness, Mary Jeffries.

Appellant contends that there was an "unwritten agreement" between the Commonwealth

and appellant's accomplice, Mary Jeffries, for leniency in her sentencing in exchange for her

testimony against appellant. However, appellant failed to produce proof of any such agreement

other than the fact that Ms. Jeffries pled open and was eventually sentenced to 11 / to 23 months,
12

plus eight (8) years' probation, for her role in the robberies. Appellant incorrectly asserts that

trial counsel failed to request said "agreement" when the record does not support the fact that

there was any such agreement.

Moreover, both the counsel for the Commonwealth and defense counsel questioned Ms.

Jeffries at trial regarding her possible motive to testify against appellant, and specifically,

whether or not she was promised leniency in her sentencing.

6
PROSECUTOR: And were any-at any point- have any promises or
agreements been made to you as to what your sentence would be?
WITNESS: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you testified that you have no agreement in place
for sentencing; is that correct?
WITNESS: Correct.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you think you'll get, some kind of benefit out of
the testimony that you're presentism here today; is that correct?
WITNESS: - No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So why are you testifying against [appellantl?
WITNESS: Because Iwanted to.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And why do you want to?
WITNESS: Because Iwant to get this over with.

Id. pp. 167, 169-171.

Accordingly, appellant's claim that an agreement existed between Ms. Jeffries and

the Commonwealth is based upon pure conjecture and what appellant contends was alenient

sentence. Further, appellant's counsel did in fact attempt to show motive when he

questioned Ms. Jefferies as to the possibility of her expecting leniency in return for her

guilty plea and testimony at trial. As such, appellant's claim of ineffectiveness in this regard

lacks any merit as trial counsel could not request and obtain discovery that did not exist.

(3)' Failure to iml)each the credibility of Ms. Jeffries based upon crimes falsi
convictions.

Appellant claims that Commonwealth witness, Mary Jeffries, should have been

impeached with evidence of her previous convictions involving crimen falsi crimes. However,

appellant fails to state what criinen falsi crimes were committed by Ms. Jeffries and whether any

of these would have been the proper subject for impeachment. Moreover, this Court, sitting as

7
the trier of fact, was well aware of the role Ms. Jeffries played in the instant robbery spree of

numerous individuals. As such, this Court was acutely aware that Ms. Jeffries was pleading

guilty to these offenses, some of which were crimen falsi. Therefore, Ms. Jeffries credibility was

already placed before this Court for crimes involving dishonesty.

Appellant has failed to show how Ms. Jeffries' credibility would have been further called

into question by raising other crimen falsi convictions. At best, appellant's presentation of other

crimen falsi convictions would have been merely cumulative. Thus, not only has appellant failed

to_•identify any crimen falsi crimes for which Ms. Jeffries was convicted, but he has also failed to

establish any prejudice that would have resulted had there been other such crimen falsi

convictions which trial counsel failed to bring to this Court's attention. See Commonwealth v.

Treiber, 8121 A.3d 435 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130 (Pa. 2018).

Therefore, appellant's claim of ineffectiveness in this regard has no merit.

(4) Failure to properly cross-examine Commonwealth witness, Mary Jeffries.

Appellant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach

Commonwealth witness, Mary Jeffries on two (2) subjects areas. At trial, Ms. Jeffries

acknowledged that she was currently in custody and had been incarcerated since October 7,

2014. N.T., 11/23/2016, p. 169. However, she testified that she had not been "locked up" prior

to her involvement in this case. Appellant contends that Ms. Jeffries had in fact been incarcerated

prior to this case and could have been impeached on this subject. Although appellant attached to

his petition acriminal docket regarding Ms. Jeffries, this docket fails to indicate whether Ms.

Jeffries was ever incarcerated for any criminal offenses. As such, appellant again fails to set forth

any specific details regarding if and when Ms. Jeffries was incarcerated prior to this case.

8
Appellant also contends that Ms. Jeffries' testimony that she had not communicated with

appellant during his pre-trial incarceration was untrue and his counsel should have impeached

her on this subject. However, appellant again fails to set forth any evidence that Ms. Jeffries had

in fact communicated with appellant during his pre-trial incarceration and that his counsel knew

or should have known this to be true.

In both regards, appellant not only fails to provide the Court with proof of his assertions

of impeachable subjects, but fails in his burden of proving how this information, if true, would

have prejudiced him and resulted in areversal by this Court of his convictions. At trial, Ms.

Jeffries testified credibly regarding the role she played in the robbery spree. Her testimony was

corroborated by the testimony of other Commonwealth witnesses, namely, the victims involved.

As such, even if appellant's counsel were able to impeach Ms. Jeffries on these unrelated points,

appellant fails to show that he suffered '
any prejudice. See Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33,

42 (Pa. 2002).

Therefore, appellant's claim of ineffectiveness in this regard must fail.

(5) Failure to file pre-trial Motions to Dismiss or Suppress evidence.

Appellant contends that appellant was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file pre-trial

motions to dismiss and/or suppress evidence. Yet appellant failed to provide this Court with any

proof of what particular motion should have been filed and what particular evidence would have

been suppressed. Appellant merely provided this Court with bald allegations of ineffectiveness in

this regard without providing the Court with any evidence to support his allegations or the

prejudice that resulted. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 902 (A)(12)(a)-(b); Commonwealth v. Bond, 819

A.2d 33, 42 (Pa. 2002).

Therefore, appellant's claim of ineffectiveness in this regard must fail.

9
(6) Failure to preserve at trial or challenge on appeal appellant's sentencing rights.

Appellant contends that appellant was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to preserve at

trial or challenge on appeal appellant's sentencing rights. Again, appellant fails to provide this

Court with any proof of what particular challenge(s) trial counsel failed to preserve. Appellant

merely provides this Court with bald allegations of ineffectiveness in this regard without

providing this Court with any evidence to support his allegations or the prejudice that resulted.

See Pa. R. Crim. P. 902 (A)(12)(a)-(b); Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 42 (Pa. 2002).

Moreover, appellant did raise the issue of the discretionary aspects of his sentence on direct

appeal and this issue was addressed and rejected by our Superior Court.'

Therefore, appellant's claim of ineffectiveness in this regard must fail.

II. Brady Violation

Standard of Review

It is well settled law that in order to present ameritorious claim under Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963), an appellant must prove: "(1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the

accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the evidence was

suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued."

Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 611 Pa. 280, 337 (2011) (Citing Commonwealth v. Lambert, 584

Pa. 461, 884 A.2d 848, 854 (Pa. 2005)). In Brady, the United States Supreme Court found that

"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates

Z Commonwealth v. Brown, 1348 EDA 2016.

10
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment; irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

Evidence is material only if "there is areasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669 (1985). Additionally, "[a] `reasonable probability' is aprobability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Therefore, if the evidence in question is

of anature that, if it were made available to the defense, it would likely not have changed the

outcome, there is no due process violation.

(7) Failure of the Commonwealth to disclose plea arrangement with witness, Mary
Jeffries.

As previously stated, appellant claims without any evidence whatsoever, but merely upon

conjecture, that there was an unwritten agreement between Commonwealth witness, Mary

Jeffries, and the Commonwealth for leniency in her sentencing in exchange for her guilty plea

and agreement to testify against the appellant. However, mere conjecture as to an agreement

between the Commonwealth and awitness is not sufficient to establish aBrady violation.

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa. 2001).

Therefore, this Court finds that appellant has failed to establish that there was aBrady

violation committed by the Commonwealth. As such, appellant's argument in this regard has no

merit and no relief is due.

11
Ill. Constitutional Challenge: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Standard of Review

The standard of review for insufficiency of evidence is well established. The [reviewing

court] must decide whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish all of the

elements of the offense beyond areasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Rollins, 525 Pa. 335, 339,

580 A.2d 744, 746 (1990). Any doubts as to adefendant's guilt must be resolved by the fact-

finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as amatter of law no probability of

fact can be drawn from the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa.

Super. 2007). Determining the credibility of evidence submitted by both parties is within the

exclusive province of the factfinder. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 2015 PA Super 13, 109 A.3d

711, 723 (citing Commonwealth v. Forbes, 2005 PA Super 37, 867 A.2d 1268, 1273-74 (Pa.

Super. 2005).

(8) Failure to prove appellant's guilt beyond areasonable doubt.

Appellant contends that his constitutional rights were violated when the Commonwealth

failed to meet their burden of proving the elements of each of the crimes for which he was

convicted. Appellant's contention in this regard seems to center again on the testimony of

Commonwealth witness, Mary Jeffries. Appellant does not contend that the elements of each

offense were not proven but that they were presented by false testimony. However, appellant at

trial and now on appeal, fails to present any evidence to support his bald assertion that Ms.

Jeffries or the other Commonwealth witnesses provided false or inaccurate testimony regarding

appellant's guilt.

12
This Court, sitting as the trier of fact heard all of the testimony, including that of

Commonwealth witness, Mary Jeffries, and found all of the Commonwealth witnesses to be

credible and persuasive. This Court found their testimony, together with all of the evidence

presented to this Court at trial, sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offenses for which

appellant was convicted, beyond any reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d

1168 (Pa. Super. 2018).

As such, appellant's assertion in this regard has no merit and was properly denied.

CONCLUSION

In summary, this Court has carefully reviewed the entire record and finds no harmful,

prejudicial, or reversible error and nothing to justify the granting of appellant's request for relief

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed.

Date HONORABLE CHARLES A. EHRLICH

13

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10745589. Public record. Not legal advice.