# Brown v. Millar

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · November 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10743502

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** November 18, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10743502

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that wrongful act of a single employee is not enough to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality
- noting that an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”

## Opinion text

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DANA BROWN, B-45793, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-000304-GCS
)
SALLY MILLAR and )
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Dana Brown, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”), brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
deprivations of his constitutional rights at Centralia Correctional Center (“Centralia”).
(Doc. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sally Millar administered an insulin
dose that was too high, and Wexford’s failure to adequately staff the prison caused or
worsened the harm he suffered. The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary
review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen
prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).
Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

1 The Court has jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff’s motions and to screen his Complaint due
to his consent to the full jurisdiction of a magistrate judge (Doc. 5) and the limited consent to the
exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandums of Understanding
between the IDOC, Wexford, and this Court.
is immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,
the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez

v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is dependent on insulin, which he receives by injection three times a day.
(Doc. 1, p. 7). His doses are administered via a “KwikPen,” an insulin dispenser that
allows dosages to be adjusted up or down by the twist of a knob. The dosage selected is
displayed in a window. Plaintiff alleges that the KwikPen has a bright yellow warning

label that indicates the contents cannot be transferred to a different syringe or a severe
overdose may occur. An overdose can cause very low blood sugar and can jeopardize a
patient’s life. Plaintiff alleges that Eli Lilly makes a specific needle to be used with the
Kwik Pen because the use of a generic syringe can result in an overdose of up to five
times.

Plaintiff alleges that on November 16, 2021, at 3:45 am, Defendant Sally Millar was
the nurse assigned to distribute medications in his living area. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Millar told
Plaintiff that she had forgotten the needle for his quick pen. Plaintiff said that he would
wait for Millar to get the correct needle from the healthcare unit, but Millar informed him
that she had already used another syringe to draw his dose. At this time, Plaintiff did not

know that the KwikPen had a sticker that warned against using an alternative syringe.
Millar assured Plaintiff that the dose was the same as his normal dose and that he would
be fine, but she also told him not to tell anyone about the incident so that she would not
get in trouble.
Within an hour of receiving the insulin, Plaintiff’s condition quickly deteriorated,
and he could tell his sugar level was low. He ate a whole box of cakes and four packets

of ramen noodles that he had in his cell to no avail. He then fell asleep for the next ten
hours. When he awoke, his entire body and his bedding were drenched in sweat. He was
upset and distraught, as he realized he may have been given an overdose of insulin.
Around 4:00 pm a non-party nurse came to Plaintiff’s cell. The nurse asked
Plaintiff what was wrong with his KwikPen, and he told her what happened with Millar.
The nurse asked if Plaintiff was okay and told him he was lucky to be alive because the

insulin he receives is highly concentrated, and he was administered five times the dose
he should have received. (Doc. 1, p. 9).
Plaintiff states that he is suing Millar in her individual capacity for acting with
deliberate indifference when she knowingly ignored the warnings on his KwikPen and
administered a dose that was five times higher than what was appropriate. He sues

Wexford for “developing policies, procedures and practices of not providing adequate
medical treatment, by not ensuring that a regularly assigned doctor is employed at
Centralia.” He further alleges that Wexford is at fault because there was no doctor on site
to direct a response to his overdose, and he was not examined after the overdose. He also
alleges Wexford has not ensured that the medical unit staff is properly trained.

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following
claims:
Claim 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendant Millar for administering an unsafe dose of Plaintiff’s
KwikPen insulin;
Claim 2: Monell claim against Wexford for failing to adequately staff
Centralia and/or for failing to adequately train staff.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (noting that an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).
DISCUSSION
To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, an inmate
must show that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that condition. See
Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475-476 (7th Cir. 2017). “Every claim by a prisoner that he has

not received adequate medical treatment is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”
Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2016). To determine if a medical professional
acted with deliberate indifference, courts look to the provider’s subjective state of mind.
Id. at 728. An inmate need not show that a doctor explicitly intended harm or believed it
would occur, but he must show more than negligence, medical malpractice, or even
objective recklessness. Id. Deliberate indifference is a culpability standard akin to criminal

recklessness. See Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 722 (7th Cir. 2021).
Generally, caselaw does not support a finding that a single dose of an incorrect
medication is sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Merriweather
v. Ashley, Cause No. 3:22-CV-727-DRL-MGG, 2023 WL 1100433, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30,
2023) (collecting cases for the proposition that a one-time misadministration of

medication does not support a finding of deliberate indifference); Ehrenberg v. Wisconsin
Dept. of Corrections, No. 10-C-1022, 2010 WL 5089484, at *2 (E.D. Wisc. Dec. 7, 2010)
(finding that an inmate did not state a sufficient claim where Plaintiff alleged he was
given the wrong dose of medication on a single occasion). However, there are cases where
inmates have been allowed to proceed on the theory that he received an overdose and
suffered ill-effects. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Williams, Case No. 19-cv-01236-JPG, 2022 WL

594877, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2022) (analyzing an inmate’s claim against a prison nurse
for giving him an overdose of antibiotics that caused physical ill-effects and finding at
summary judgment that the inmate failed to establish the requisite level of deliberate
indifference); West v. Fuchs, No. 01-2862, 38 Fed. Appx. 323, 326 (7th Cir. April 18, 2002)
(analyzing an inmate’s deliberate indifference claim that staff were deliberately

indifferent for giving him an overdose of a seizure medication that caused ill-effects and
concluding the court was correct to determine there was no deliberate indifference by the
staff so the claim could not survive summary judgment). Here, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Millar acted contrary to the medication directions boldly displayed on his
KwikPen when she administered his dose the morning of November 16, 2021. She also

asked him not to tell anyone about her actions so that she would not get in trouble, which
suggests that she knew her actions were incorrect or risky. Plaintiff suffered immediate
effects. At initial review, these allegations are sufficient to proceed against Defendant
Millar.
Plaintiff also faults Defendant Wexford Health Sources, the prison’s medical
contractor, for understaffing and inadequate training of staff. However, Plaintiff does not

explain how either of these alleged issues caused the harm that he suffered, i.e., the
overdose. Most importantly, he does not allege that Wexford knew about the situation
that he faced, or that understaffing slowed down any potential response. In fact, Plaintiff
does not allege that when he first noticed symptoms, he even tried to alert anyone or to
ask for medical assistance. Instead, he laid down and went to sleep without alerting
personnel. Eventually, Plaintiff saw another nurse about twelve hours after the overdose.

He does not allege that he asked her for any specific sort of help or follow-up care and
was denied. Instead, Plaintiff simply says that she asked if he was okay and does not
suggest he told her otherwise. Thus, on the facts presented it is not apparent that
Wexford’s alleged understaffing caused him any harm.
Instead, it appears that the incident he suffered was the misdeed of a single

employee, which is not sufficient to sustain a claim against Wexford. See, e.g., Monell v.
Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (noting that
wrongful act of a single employee is not enough to impose § 1983 liability on a
municipality). Plaintiff’s failure to train allegations are too generic. He does not allege
what sort of training was needed, who needed to be trained, or how the lack of training

might have caused Millar’s actions and led to his harm. See, e.g., Chatman v. Davis, 839
F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that an inmate’s failure to train claim about a nurse’s
failure to use the proper asthma attack protocol was insufficient because she did not show
the lack of training posed a risk of substantial harm, Wexford knew about this risk, or the
nurse’s lack of training caused his specific harm). Plaintiff also does not allege that the
policy or practice extended beyond his own one-time experience, and generally single

incidents are insufficient to support claims of this nature. Id. at 685. Thus, Claim 2 against
Wexford is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
DISPOSITION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 1 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives
initial screening as described above against Sally Millar. By contrast, Claim 2 against
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., is insufficient to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to TERMINATE Wexford.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendant Sally Millar: (1) Form
5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of
the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of

employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the
Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be
maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues
stated in this Merits Review Order.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with
this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in
dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 41(b).
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 18, 2024. Digitally signed by
. Judge Sison
Glet Desne ate: 2024.11.18
13:02:08 -06'00"
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your
lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,
the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will
likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,
but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants
have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important
information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not
submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed as a series of
hurdles that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a
hurdle, but it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial
screening only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff
to some relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts
alleged actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery.
Trial is the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.

Page 9 of 9

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10743502. Public record. Not legal advice.