# Lifebridge Tech., L.L.C. v. Wright State Univ.

> Ohio Court of Claims · September 18, 2024 · 2024 Ohio 4950

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10743269

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Court of Claims
- **Decided:** September 18, 2024
- **Citations:** 2024 Ohio 4950
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Sadler
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

[Cite as Lifebridge Tech., L.L.C. v. Wright State Univ., 2024-Ohio-4950.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

LIFEBRIDGE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC Case No. 2023-00602JD

Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler
Magistrate Adam Z. Morris
v.
DECISION
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY

Defendant

{¶1} On June 28, 2024, Defendant, Wright State University (WSU), filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment, which has been fully briefed. Moreover, on July 31, 2024,
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, which has been fully briefed.
Initially, the Court shall address Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement because it
involves an alleged preexisting resolution of the case.

Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
{¶2} Plaintiff argues that the Parties reached a binding settlement agreement
during settlement negotiations, from which Defendant cannot unilaterally withdraw.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 27, 2024, Defendant extended a settlement offer to Plaintiff
which included the terms: Defendant would return Plaintiff’s property, which Defendant
still retained control or possession over in exchange for Plaintiff dismissing the instant
action with prejudice. (Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, p. 2). Plaintiff alleges
that on July 26, 2024, at 11:04 a.m., Defendant was notified of the acceptance of the
settlement offer and that Plaintiff would not file a memorandum in opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement,
p. 2). Plaintiff alleges that on July 26, 2024, at 5:29 p.m. Defendant attempted to revoke
its settlement offer. (Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, p. 2).
{¶3} In support of its Motion, Plaintiff included the Affidavit of Nicholas I. Andersen,
esq. (Andersen), counsel for Plaintiff. Anderson’s Affidavit includes the email
Case No. 2023-00602JD -2- DECISION

correspondence between the Parties’ counsel, which recounts the following
communication between counsel:
{¶4} On June 27, 2024, at 4:43 p.m., Attorney Daniel Benoit (Benoit), counsel for
Defendant, emailed Andersen the following: “I know it is my client’s desire to have the
case dismissed with prejudice. If there are issues with the settlement agreement on their
end, would your client be amendable to the return of what is in the possession of Wright
State and in return you would dismiss with prejudice without having the need to execute
the settlement agreement.” (Emphasis Added). (Andersen Affidavit, Exhibit 1-A). On
July 15, 2024, at 1:35 p.m., Benoit emailed Andersen the following; “. . . I think they will
be amenable to giving him the property that is with them at some point. . . . I will check
back in with them in a week or two, and check if we can still resolve the case through
mediation.” (Emphasis Added). (Andersen Aff., Exhibit 1-B). On July 26, 2024, at 5:29
p.m., Benoit emailed Andersen the following: “I heard back from the University and they
are not interested in resolving it as you discussed below.” (Emphasis Added). (Andersen
Aff., Exhibit 1-C).
{¶5} Upon review, Plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of a binding settlement.
A plain reading of the provided emails shows that the email correspondence between the
Parties’ counsel was not a binding settlement offer. Defendant’s counsel was clear in
that he was putting forward one potential solution to resolve the instant action, and that
the offered potential solution would require approval by Defendant. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s interpretation that such discussions constituted a binding
settlement agreement is unpersuasive.
{¶6} Additionally, O.R.C. § 2743.15 states, “(A) The director or other administrative
chief, or the governing body, of any department, board, office, commission, agency,
institution, or other instrumentality of the state: (1) With the approval of the attorney
general and the court of claims, may settle or compromise any civil action against the
state . . .” Here, no such approval for the alleged settlement was signed for or approved
by the Attorney General.
{¶7} Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is DENIED.
Therefore, before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment for a non-oral
Case No. 2023-00602JD -3- DECISION

hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4(D). For the following reasons, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Standard of Review
{¶8} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in
Civ.R. 56(C):
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in
the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule.
A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the
evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is
made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed
most strongly in the party’s favor.
“[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis
for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on a material element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St. 3d 280, 292 (1996). To meet this
initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type
listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293.
{¶9} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a
reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E):
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
Case No. 2023-00602JD -4- DECISION

there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.

Facts
{¶10} Defendant submitted the Affidavit of its employee, Jonathan F. Hung,
Associate General Counsel in the Office of the General Counsel, with its Motion for
Summary Judgment. Hung’s Affidavit authenticates two email communications, which
include employees of Defendant and an authorized member of Plaintiff, Dr. Mark Anstadt
(Dr. Anstadt), maintained by Defendant in its normal course of business. Defendant did
not submit any Civ.R. 56(C) evidence. Accordingly, the relevant pleadings and evidence
submitted, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, show the following:
{¶11} On July 6, 2004, Dr. Anstadt, an authorized member of Plaintiff, Lifebridge
Technologies, LLC, and faculty member at WSU, established an experimental research
laboratory at WSU. (Complaint, ¶ 6-7). Dr. Anstadt set up the laboratory utilizing
equipment “owned and operated by Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ 9).
{¶12} On September 3, 2019, Dr. Anstadt was deployed by the US Army. (Compl.,
¶ 10). While deployed, post-graduate students and WSU faculty continued the use of Dr.
Anstadt’s laboratory for research. (Compl., ¶ 11).
{¶13} In December 2019, Dr. Anstadt returned to WSU’s campus to an empty
laboratory and enlisted the help of campus police to search for the missing equipment.
(Hung Affidavit, Exhibit A, Wright State_000003). On January 2, 2020, Dr. Anstadt
responded to a January 1, 2020 email correspondence from Defendant’s Chief Operating
Officer informing him that his laboratory equipment had been removed and his lab
cleared. (Hung Aff., Ex. A, Wright State_000001-Wright State_000002). On January 3,
2020, Dr. Anstadt was informed his communication with Defendant should proceed
through its Office of General Counsel. (Hung Aff., Ex. A, Wright State_000001).
{¶14} On January 7, 2020, Defendant’s General Counsel confirmed with Dr.
Anstadt via electronic communication that correspondence had been sent over a year
prior regarding the disrepair of his laboratory and that it would be cleared for safety
concerns and that the laboratory equipment, failing to have any university property
indicators, would have either been moved to storage or sold, to which Dr. Anstadt
Case No. 2023-00602JD -5- DECISION

responded to on January 9, 2020. (Hung Aff., Ex. B, Wright State_000043-Wright
State_000044). At that time, Defendant still maintained some of Plaintiff’s equipment that
had not been sold or disposed. (Hung Aff., Ex. A, Wright State_000044).
{¶15} Plaintiff filed its Complaint on September 13, 2023.

Law and Analysis
{¶16} Plaintiff asserts claims for replevin, or in the alternative, monetary damages,
conversion and unauthorized use of property pursuant to R.C. 2913.04(A), related to
Defendant’s removal of Plaintiff’s equipment from Dr. Anstadt’s experimental research
laboratory. (Compl., ¶ 15-18; 19-22; 23-25).
{¶17} Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff’s
claims are “barred by the statute of limitations for tortious claims against the State of
Ohio.” (Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2). Defendant argues that Plaintiff
had notice of the alleged incident in 2019, or 2020 at the latest, yet filed the instant action
in 2023. (Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2).
{¶18} In response, Plaintiff acknowledges the statute of limitations, but argues that
exceptions to the statute of limitations exist in this action, specifically Plaintiff’s claim for
replevin. (Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1). Plaintiff argues
that because Defendant allegedly acknowledges that they remain in possession of some
of Plaintiff’s physical property the instant action is an ongoing issue, thus the statute of
limitations for Plaintiff’s claims for replevin “is not subject to the statute of limitations.”
(Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1). Plaintiff “respectfully
requests that Defendant’s Motion be denied, in part, and that Plaintiff’s claim for replevin
be permitted to proceed.” (Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1).

Conversion and Unauthorized Use of Property
{¶19} “[C]onversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the
exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding it from his possession under a claim
inconsistent with his rights.” Joyce v. General Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 (1990).
To establish the tort of conversion, Plaintiff must show: “(1) the plaintiff had ownership or
the right of possession of the property at the time of conversion; (2) the defendant’s
Case No. 2023-00602JD -6- DECISION

conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff’s property or property rights; and
(3) damages resulted therefrom.” RAE Assocs., Inc. v. Nexus Communications, Inc.,
2015-Ohio-2166, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.). A plaintiff must also show that they demanded the
return of the property after the alleged conversion, and defendant refused. Cent. Funding,
Inc. v. Compuserve Interactive Servs., Inc., 2003-Ohio-5037, ¶ 62 (10th Dist.).
{¶20} Plaintiff brings its unauthorized use of property claim based on R.C. 2913.04,
which is titled “Unauthorized use of property – computer, cable, or telecommunication
property.” R.C. 2913.04(A) states, “[n]o person shall knowingly use or operate the
property of another without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give
consent.”
{¶21} R.C. 2743.16(A) provides, “civil actions against the state . . . shall be
commenced no later than two years after the date of accrual of the cause of action or
within any shorter period that is applicable to similar suits between private parties.”
Moreover, a cause of action generally “accrues at the time the wrongful act is committed.’”
Nazareth Deli LLC v. John W. Dawson Ins. Inc., 2022-Ohio-3994, 200 N.E.3d 652, ¶ 29
(10th Dist.), quoting Harris v. Liston, 86 Ohio St.3d 203, 205, 714 N.E.2d 377 (1999). A
takings or conversion claim maintains a “discovery rule” that requires the wrongdoer first
be discovered and, as such, “the cause of action accrues ‘at the time when the plaintiff
discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the complained
of injury.’” Koe-Krompecher v. City of Columbus, 2005-Ohio-6504, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.),
quoting Investors REIT One v. Jacobs, 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 179 (1989).
{¶22} Upon review, the Court finds that the Civ.R. 56(C) evidence submitted by
Defendant establishes that Plaintiff’s cause of action for conversion and unauthorized use
of property accrued, at the latest, on January 7, 2020, when Defendant, through its Office
of General Counsel, confirmed that “[t]he equipment was either moved to storage or sold
as unclaimed surplus.” (Hung Aff., Ex. B, Wright State_000044). Although Plaintiff’s
authorized member, Dr. Anstadt, returned to an empty laboratory in December 2019, it
was not until January 7, 2020, that Plaintiff affirmatively learned Defendant removed the
equipment.
{¶23} As such, Plaintiff had until January 7, 2022, to file the instant action. But
Plaintiff filed its Complaint on September 13, 2023, well past the two-year statute of
Case No. 2023-00602JD -7- DECISION

limitations. Accordingly, Defendant has met its initial burden as the moving party seeking
summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶24} Upon review, Plaintiff did not submit any Civ.R. 56(C) to meet its reciprocal
burden that Plaintiff’s claims for conversion and unauthorized use of property are not
barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, Plaintiff seemingly abandons such claims.
(See Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1 (“Plaintiff respectfully
requests that Defendant’s Motion be denied, in part, and that Plaintiff’s claim for replevin
be permitted to proceed.”)).
{¶25} Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and
granting of summary judgment in its favor because Plaintiff’s claims for conversion and
unauthorized use of property are barred by the statute of limitations.

Replevin
{¶26} Plaintiff fails to provide any authority establishing that actions for replevin,
under the facts and evidence before the Court, would not be subject to the two-year
statute of limitations established by R.C. 2743.16(A) or that replevin is a viable stand-
alone claim in the Court of Claims. Instead, Plaintiff argues that failure to allow their action
of replevin, “. . . would be a gross miscarriage of justice and is not the purpose of the
statute of limitations found in ORC 2734.16(A).” (Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 1). Plaintiff states that “Defendant admits in the documents
attached to the Affidavit of Jonathan F. Hung that some of Plaintiff’s tangible property,
including equipment, is still in Defendant’s possession.” (Plaintiff’s Response to Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 1).
{¶27} Defendant argues that “[e]ven if the Plaintiff is correct, if the claims allowing
for money damages are time barred, the only remaining claim would be one in equity.
The Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction over solely equitable claims.” (Defendant’s
Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3). Upon review, the Court agrees that it does
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s replevin claim.
{¶28} “Replevin has no statutory duty in Ohio but has always been a statutory
cause of action.” America Rents v. Crawley, 77 Ohio App.3d 801, 803 (10th Dist. 1991).
“Replevin is solely a statutory remedy in Ohio. It is an action at law, not in equity and,
Case No. 2023-00602JD -8- DECISION

therefore, a court cannot provide remedies not specifically enumerated by statute.” Id.,
citing Hare & Chase v. Hoag, 27 Ohio App. 326 (6th Dist. 1927); R.C. Ch. 2737.
{¶29} “R.C. Chapter 2737, in clear and unambiguous language, states that replevin
is a prejudgment remedy that is available only if specific procedures are followed.”
Crawley at 803. “R.C. 2737.03 permits the plaintiff, in an action for recovery of specific
property, to file a prejudgment motion which, if accompanied by a proper affidavit and
bond, will allow plaintiff to recover possession of the property at issue.” Id. Authority for
replevin actions must derive from the Ohio Revised Code. Id. Any authority for replevin
must then come from the Ohio Revised Code. Id. (tracing statutory authority for replevin
to 1788 codification in the laws of the Northwest Territory). However, the Court of Claims
retains a specific jurisdiction requirement. Ohio Edison Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 86
Ohio App.3d 189, 192 (10th Dist.1993) (“Actions in mandamus or for injunctive or
declaratory relief were maintainable against the state prior to the adoption of the Court of
Claims Act. Therefore, such actions for equitable relief are not affected by the Court of
Claims Act and may be brought in the court of common pleas.”).
{¶30} “The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions against the
state for monetary damages that sound in law.” Victorian’s Midnight Café LLC v.
Goodman, 2016-Ohio-7947, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); R.C. 2743.03(A)(2). “Included within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims are civil actions presenting claims in both law and
equity.” Measles v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 2011-Ohio-1523, ¶ 7. “This jurisdiction
extends over actions that also include a claim for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief,
or other equitable relief, as long as the ancillary claim or claims arise out of the same
circumstances that give rise to the claim for money damages.” Great West Cas. Co. v.
Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 2015-Ohio-1555, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.); R.C. 2743.03(A)(2).
However, if the Complaint fails to state a claim for money damages that sounds in law,
then the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief. Cardi v. State, 2012-Ohio-6157, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.).
{¶31} Because Plaintiff’s monetary claims, conversion and unauthorized use of
property, are barred by the statute of limitations, Plaintiff has no valid claims over which
the Court has jurisdiction. Upon review, although replevin is historically a claim in law,
replevin seeks the return of specific property rather than for money damages. See
Case No. 2023-00602JD -9- DECISION

Morning View Care Ctr.-Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 04AP-57, 2004-Ohio-6073, ¶ 25 (It is well-settled that an action for money damages
was “intended to provide monetary compensation for injury to the plaintiff’s person,
property or reputation, whereas an equitable action for specific relief, which may include
the recovery of specific property, including monies, represents a particular entitlement or
privilege, and not a substitute for the loss occasioned by some prior injury.”). Accordingly,
without ruling on the merits of the claim, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim
for relief through replevin and it shall be dismissed. See Civ.R. 12(H)(3) (“Whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction on the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”).

Conclusion
{¶32} For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims for conversion and unauthorized use of property.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is DENIED. Plaintiff’s claim for
replevin is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant
to Civ.R. 12(H)(3). Judgment is rendered in favor of Defendant.

LISA L. SADLER
Judge
[Cite as Lifebridge Tech., L.L.C. v. Wright State Univ., 2024-Ohio-4950.]

LIFEBRIDGE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC Case No. 2023-00602JD

Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler
Magistrate Adam Z. Morris
v.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY

Defendant

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

{¶33} For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims for
conversion and unauthorized use of property. Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement is DENIED. Plaintiff’s claim for replevin is DISMISSED without prejudice for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3). Judgment is rendered in
favor of Defendant. All previously scheduled events are VACATED. Court costs are
assessed against Plaintiff. The Clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment
and its date of entry upon the journal.

LISA L. SADLER
Judge

Filed September 18, 2024
Sent to S.C. Reporter 10/14/24

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10743269. Public record. Not legal advice.