# State v. Peoples

> Ohio Court of Appeals · November 12, 2024 · 2024 Ohio 5381

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10743129

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** November 12, 2024
- **Citations:** 2024 Ohio 5381
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Boggs
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

[Cite as State v. Peoples, 2024-Ohio-5381.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 24AP-254
v. : (C.P.C. No. 01CR-4150)

David A. Peoples, : (ACCELLERATED CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on November 12, 2024

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.

On brief: David A. Peoples, pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BOGGS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, David A. Peoples, appeals the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas’ decision and entry denying Peoples’s motion for leave for a new trial. For
the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} We have previously recounted the history of this case as follows:
“On July 20, 2001, Peoples was indicted on one count of
aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, a felony in the
first degree, with two firearm specifications in violation of R.C.
2941.145 and 2941.146, and one count of having a weapon
while under disability. With respect to the first firearm
specification, R.C. 2941.145, Plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio,
alleged that Peoples displayed, brandished, indicated
possession of, or used a firearm to commit the offense. With
respect to the second firearm specification, R.C. 2941.146, the
No. 24AP-254 2

state alleged that Peoples discharged a firearm from a motor
vehicle when he committed the underlying offense.
The case was tried to a jury on June 27, 2002, and the jury
found Peoples guilty of aggravated murder and the two firearm
specifications. The court sentenced Peoples to a term of 25
years to life imprisonment on the aggravated murder charge,
plus 6 years for [the] R.C. 2941.146 firearm specification, and
three years on the R.C. 2941.145 firearm specification, for a
total of 34 years. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences
on the counts.
The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See State
v. Peoples, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-925, 2003-Ohio-4680.
On April 16, 2008, the trial court issued a corrected judgment
entry because the original judgment entry erroneously
indicated that prison was not mandatory. In the corrected
judgment entry, the court imposed the same sentence,
including a six-year sentence for the drive-by firearm
specification.”
State v. Peoples, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-850, 2019-Ohio-2141,
¶ 2-5.
The 2008 corrected judgment entry also added the life tail for
Peoples’[s] aggravated murder count of 25 years to reflect what
the trial judge had imposed at the 2002 sentencing hearing.
Following the 2008 corrected judgment entry, Peoples
continued to file various pleadings challenging his sentence.
“[O]n March 20, 2017, Peoples filed a motion to vacate his
sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly imposed a
period of post-release control on his aggravated murder
conviction. The court denied that motion on April 6, 2017.
Peoples then filed another motion on June 26, 2017, requesting
to amend his March motion, which had already been denied.
Peoples sought to amend the motion to argue that the six-year
term for the drive-by specification was invalid. In its response
to the motion to amend, the state agreed that the drive-by
specification, R.C. 2941.146, mandated a five-year term, not a
six-year term. On August 3, 2017, the trial court denied the
motion.
Peoples filed a motion to vacate void sentence on August 7,
2017, again arguing that the six-year term imposed for the
drive-by specification was void. Peoples filed a supplemental
memorandum in support of this motion on September 1, 2017.
On October 10, 2018, the trial court denied the motion.”
Id. at ¶ 6-8.
No. 24AP-254 3

Peoples appealed the trial court’s October 10, 2018 decision
denying his motion to vacate a void sentence for the six-year
term imposed for the drive-by firearm specification. This court
agreed with Peoples that the imposed prison term was unlawful
and not in accordance with R.C. 2941.146 and
2929.14(B)(1)(c)(i) and was therefore void. This court reversed
the trial court’s judgment and remanded the matter for further
proceedings regarding the drive-by firearm specification.
Peoples at ¶ 15.
On May 12, 2023, Peoples filed a motion for resentencing,
pursuant to Crim.R. 43(A), wherein he argue[d] that he should
have been allowed the opportunity to be present in 2008 when
the trial court issued a corrected judgment entry. On May 30,
2023, the trial court denied Peoples’[s] motion.
State v. Peoples, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-374, 2024-Ohio-1220, ¶ 2-5.
{¶ 3} This court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying Peoples’s motion for
resentencing. Id. at ¶ 12. On February 2, 2024, Peoples filed a motion for leave for a new
trial, pursuant to Crim.R. 33, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. On March 12, 2024,
the trial court denied his motion. Peoples now appeals that denial.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 4} Peoples argues one assignment of error: “did the trial court lose its
jurisdiction when it failed to hold a hearing pursuant to State [v.] Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d
362, 2022-Ohio-783.” (Appellant’s Brief at 1.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 5} We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for leave to file a motion
for a new trial under an abuse of discretion analysis. State v. Hill, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-576,
2023-Ohio-1954, ¶ 15, citing State v. McNeal, 169 Ohio St.3d 47, 2022-Ohio-2703, ¶ 13.
Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-38, 2022-Ohio-4073, ¶ 19,
citing State v. Angel, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-771, 2021-Ohio-4322, ¶ 68, citing Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶ 6} In his assignment of error, Peoples argues that the trial court erred by failing
to hold a hearing on his motion for leave for a new trial. We do not agree.
{¶ 7} “A trial court’s decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a
motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial is * * * discretionary.” State v.
No. 24AP-254 4

Dodson, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-388, 2023-Ohio-701, ¶ 14, citing State v. Hoover-Moore, 10th
Dist. No. 14AP-1049, 2015-Ohio-4863, ¶ 14. In this respect, “ ‘[a] criminal defendant “is
only entitled to a hearing on a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial if he submits
documents which, on their face, support his claim that he was unavoidably prevented from
timely discovering the evidence at issue.” ’ ” Id., quoting State v. Ambartsoumov, 10th Dist.
No. 12AP-878, 2013-Ohio-3011, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Cleveland, 9th Dist.
No. 08CA009406, 2009-Ohio-397, ¶ 54, citing State v. McConnell, 170 Ohio App.3d 800,
2007-Ohio-1181, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 8} Under Crim.R. 33(B), “when a new-trial motion is premised on newly
discovered evidence, the defendant must file the motion within 120 days of the date of the
jury’s verdict.” McNeal at ¶ 15. However, “Crim.R. 33(B) excuses a defendant’s failure to
move for a new trial within the * * * 120-day deadline * * * if the defendant proves by clear
and convincing evidence that he or she was unavoidably prevented from discovering the
evidence on which the motion would be based within that time.” Id. at ¶ 16. A defendant
is unavoidably prevented from discovering new evidence if he “had no knowledge of the
existence of the new evidence and, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have
learned of its existence within the time prescribed for filing a motion for new trial.” State
v. Lundy, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-505, 2020-Ohio-1585, ¶ 11.
{¶ 9} Upon examination of Peoples’s motion, we do not find an abuse of discretion
by the trial court. Peoples’s motion focuses on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
namely the alleged mistakes of his counsel at trial and on appeal. However, when a
defendant seeks leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial under Crim.R. 33(B), “the trial
court may not consider the merits of the proposed motion for a new trial until after it grants
the motion for leave.” State v. Hatton, 169 Ohio St.3d 446, 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 30, citing
Bethel at ¶ 41, citing State v. Brown, 8th Dist. No. 95253, 2011-Ohio-1080, ¶ 14. “The sole
question before the trial court when considering whether to grant leave is whether the
defendant has established by clear and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented
from discovering the evidence on which he seeks to base the motion for a new trial.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. Peoples’s motion does not show, through clear and convincing
proof, that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he bases
his ineffective assistance argument within the time frame for filing a timely motion for a
No. 24AP-254 5

new trial. We also note that Peoples’s motion was well beyond the 120-day deadline.
Peoples’s trial was on June 27, 2002, he was found guilty on July 5, 2002, and the trial
court sentenced him on July 31, 2002. On August 28, 2002, Peoples appealed his
conviction, but it wasn’t until February 2, 2024 that Peoples filed his motion for leave for a
new trial. We accordingly overrule Peoples’s sole assignment of error.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 10} For the reasons stated above, we overrule Peoples’s sole assignment of error
and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and LELAND, JJ., concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10743129. Public record. Not legal advice.