# Tarjanyi v. Ohio Dept. of Ins.

> Ohio Court of Appeals · November 1, 2024 · 257 N.E.3d 430

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10742769

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** November 1, 2024
- **Citations:** 257 N.E.3d 430; 2024 Ohio 5239
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Epley
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

[Cite as Tarjanyi v. Ohio Dept. of Ins., 2024-Ohio-5239.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY

RYAN TARJANYI :
:
Appellant : C.A. No. 30085
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CV 03220
:
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellee :
:

...........

OPINION

Rendered on November 1, 2024

...........

P.J. CONBOY,II, Attorney for Appellant

LINDSAY A. MILLER SCHLIE & CHRISTIE LIMBERT, Attorneys for Appellee

.............

EPLEY, P.J.

{¶ 1} Ryan Tarjanyi appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of

Common Pleas, which affirmed the Ohio Department of Insurance’s (ODI’s) decision to
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revoke his Ohio resident insurance agent license. For the following reasons, the trial

court’s judgment will be affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} According to ODI’s order on appeal, which confirmed and incorporated by

reference the hearing officer’s report and recommendation, Tarjanyi was licensed as a

resident insurance agent in Ohio on December 7, 2009. Since May 2012, he has also

been licensed as an investment company and variable contracts products representative

(IR). In May 2016, he became registered as an IR through his association with Bankers

Life Securities, Inc.

{¶ 3} On or about January 7, 2018, a Bankers Life client lodged a complaint

against Tarjanyi. ODI began an investigation, which was assigned to Investigator

Mathew Taylor. Three months later, Bankers Life notified ODI that Tarjanyi had been

terminated for cause.

{¶ 4} In February 2021, Tarjanyi entered into a Financial Industry Regulatory

Authority (FINRA) Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent (AWC), which became final

on March 5, 2021. Under the terms of the letter of acceptance, Tarjanyi agreed not to

associate with a FINRA member entity in any way. Tarjanyi did not report the AWC to

ODI until he submitted a license renewal application on January 5, 2022.

{¶ 5} In March 2021, Tarjanyi submitted agent appointment applications to work

with Safeco Insurance, AAA Insurance, Westfield Insurance, and Foremost Insurance

Group. On his applications, he denied that he had had any relationship with an

insurance company that terminated him for alleged misconduct and/or that he had been
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involved as a party in an administrative disciplinary proceeding regarding his license.

Tarjanyi knew, however, that he had been terminated for cause by Bankers Life in 2018

and was a party to the FINRA AWC in 2021.

{¶ 6} In mid-October 2021, Investigator Taylor sent Tarjanyi a subpoena for an

interview to be held on November 10, 2021. Before the date of the interview, Tarjanyi’s

attorney sought a postponement due to medical procedures Tarjanyi had scheduled.

Taylor requested documentation to verify Tarjanyi’s medical status. Tarjanyi did not

appear for the November 10 interview, but Tarjanyi’s attorney informed Taylor that

documentation would be forthcoming. On November 22, 2021, his attorney sent a letter

purportedly from a physician at UC Health concerning Tarjanyi’s medical status. Taylor

was unable to verify that a physician by that name was licensed in Ohio.

{¶ 7} On July 20, 2022, ODI sent Tarjanyi a Notice for Opportunity for Hearing,

alleging 11 violations of Ohio insurance law. The allegations asserted that Tarjanyi had:

(1) submitted of a forged annuity withdrawal form to Bankers Life in violation of R.C.

3905.14(B)(26) (Count One); (2) been terminated for cause by Bankers Life for

“intentionally providing false or misleading information to the home office, a regulator, or

law enforcement personnel” in violation of R.C. 3905.14(B)(9) (Count Two); (3) been

subject to the FINRA AWC in violation of R.C. 3905.14(B)(17) (Count Three); (4) failed

to timely report the FINRA AWC to ODI in violation of R.C. 3905.22(A) (Count Four);

(5) provided incomplete, incorrect, misleading, or materially untrue information on a

license applications in violation of R.C 3905.14(B)(1) (Counts Five through Nine);

(6) failed to appear for the November 10, 2021 interview without being released from the
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subpoena in violation of R.C. 3905.14(B)(22) (Count Ten); and (7) submitted on

November 22, 2021 a fraudulent document regarding his health in violation of R.C.

3905.14(B)(9) (Count Eleven).

{¶ 8} Tarjanyi requested a hearing, but it was repeatedly continued. Ultimately,

he submitted a written response to ODI’s accusations in lieu of a hearing. ODI elected

to respond in writing, and the hearing was canceled. In its response, ODI withdrew

Count One.

{¶ 9} In February 2023, after reviewing the written submissions, the hearing officer

found that ODI had proven each of the ten counts on which it had proceeded. He

recommended revocation of Tarjanyi’s Ohio resident insurance agent license. Tarjanyi

objected to the hearing officer’s proposed order. However, the superintendent of ODI

confirmed and approved the proposed order and revoked Tarjanyi’s license.

{¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 119.12, Tarjanyi filed a notice of appeal in the Montgomery

County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the decision to revoke his resident

insurance agent license was “not supported by reliable, probative and substantial

evidence and [was] not in accordance with law.” On February 29, 2024, the trial court

overruled the appeal, finding that ODI’s Final Order revoking Tarjanyi’s insurance license

was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

{¶ 11} Tarjanyi appeals the trial court’s judgment. His sole assignment of error

states that the trial court erred in overruling his administrative appeal of ODI’s revocation

of his Ohio resident insurance agent license.

II. Standard of Review
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{¶ 12} R.C. 119.12 applies to appeals of decisions of licensing boards. Clem D’s

Auto Sales v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 2014-Ohio-951, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). “Under R.C.

119.12, when a decision of a state board is appealed, a court of common pleas must

decide whether the board’s order was ‘supported by reliable, probative, and substantial

evidence and is in accordance with law.’ ” Spitznagel v. State Bd. of Edn., 2010-Ohio-

2715, ¶ 14, quoting R.C. 119.12. The trial court must give deference to the board’s

resolution of factual conflicts unless they are clearly unsupportable. Clem D’s Auto Sales

at ¶ 19, citing Jackson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2009-Ohio-896, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 13} Generally, in the hearing of an administrative appeal, the trial court is

confined to the record as certified to it by the agency. R.C. 119.12(L); Seaquist v.

Dayton, 2023-Ohio-4563, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). However, “the court may grant a request for

the admission of additional evidence when satisfied that the additional evidence is newly

discovered and could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertained prior to the

hearing before the agency.” R.C. 119.12(L).

{¶ 14} The trial court may affirm the order on appeal if it finds, “upon consideration

of the entire record and any additional evidence the court has admitted, that the order is

supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.”

R.C. 119.12(N). “In the absence of this finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the

order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial

evidence and is in accordance with law. Id.

{¶ 15} An appellate court’s review is more limited than that of the trial court. We

review the trial court’s determination on whether the order was supported by reliable,
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probative, and substantial evidence for an abuse its discretion. Rossford Exempted

Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 63 Ohio St.3d 705, 707 (1992). An

abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When

reviewing whether the board’s or the trial court’s order was in accordance with the law,

our review is de novo. Spitznagel, 2010-Ohio-2715, at ¶ 14.

III. Review of the Trial Court’s Determination

{¶ 16} Tarjanyi claims that the trial court erred in determining that reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence supported four conclusions: (1) he was terminated

for cause from Bankers Life, (2) he failed to timely disclose the FINRA consent agreement

to ODI, (3) he falsified carrier appointment applications, and (4) he failed to respond to

ODI’s subpoena and submitted false documents. Upon review, we find no abuse of

discretion by the trial court.

A. Termination for Cause

{¶ 17} Tarjanyi first challenges that trial court’s determination that reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence supported ODI’s conclusion that Bankers Life

terminated Tarjanyi for cause and that he was aware of this fact at all pertinent times

(Count Two). He asserts that he was not notified by Bankers Life that his termination

was for cause and that he reasonably relied on National Insurance Producer Registry

(NIPR) reports from 2019 and 2021, neither of which reflected that his termination was

for cause. Tarjanyi thus claims that he is being punished for failing to provide information

of which he was not aware, and there is still a question of whether he was, in fact,
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terminated for cause.

{¶ 18} Upon review of the administrative record, the trial court’s conclusion was

reasonable. In a letter dated April 9, 2018, and received by ODI on April 12, 2018,

Bankers Life notified ODI that it had changed the termination for Tarjanyi to “ ‘cause’ due

to violations of his agent contract and the agent compliance guidelines. Specifically:

Intentionally providing false or misleading information to the home office, a regulator or

law enforcement personnel.” Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 17, Ex. 7.

{¶ 19} Later, on November 19, 2018, Tarjanyi authored a letter to Investigator

Taylor regarding the complaint by the Bankers Life clients. On page 2 of the letter,

Tarjanyi discussed his termination from Bankers Life. He stated that he was orally

informed of his termination on the morning of March 28, 2018. He further wrote: “I was

not informed that I was terminated for cause until I received a letter dated April 9th, 2018.

I received it about two weeks after it was dated…The letter stated that my termination

was changed to ‘for cause’, because I ‘intentionally misled an investigator’.” Adm.R. Vol.

2, Doc. 17, Ex. 9, p. 3, 5.

{¶ 20} Tarjanyi attached two letters he had received to his objections to the

proposed order, neither of which stated that his dismissal was for cause. A March 28,

2018 letter from Bankers Life confirmed that his employment had been terminated and

that his last workday was March 28. Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 19, Ex. A. An April 9, 2018

letter from Bankers Life constituted written notification of the termination of his manager

contract, to coincide with his departure as unit sales manager. Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 19,

Ex. B.
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{¶ 21} Tarjanyi further points to two January 9, 2020 PBR reports from NIPR – one

for Ohio, his resident license state (Exhibit 3), and the other for his non-resident license

states (Exhibit 4). Those reports showed that Tarjanyi’s appointment with Bankers Life

was terminated. Although it appears that a reason for the termination could be provided,

the “termination reason” field was left blank. Adm.R. Vol. 1, Doc. 14, Ex. 3-4.

{¶ 22} Despite Tarjanyi’s evidence, the trial court reasonably found that reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence supported ODI’s conclusions that Tarjanyi was

terminated for cause and was aware of that fact as of April 2018. Although the March

28 letter did not reference termination for cause, Bankers Life notified ODI in April 2018

that Tarjanyi’s termination had been changed to “for cause.” Tarjanyi’s own written

statements acknowledged that he had also received written notification from Bankers Life

in April 2018 that Bankers Life had terminated him for cause, although apparently a

different letter than the one he attached to his objections. While the NIPR reports did not

state that Tarjanyi had been terminated for cause, they also did not indicate otherwise.

In short, Tarjanyi’s evidence did not refute ODI’s evidence, and it did not require a different

conclusion.

B. Failure to Disclose FINRA Consent Agreement

{¶ 23} Second, Tarjanyi challenges the trial court’s conclusion that reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence supported ODI’s determination that he failed to timely

disclose the FINRA order to ODI (Count 4). In reaching its conclusion, the trial court

pointed to Tarjanyi’s own admissions and certified FINRA records.

{¶ 24} Count Four of ODI’s notice alleged a violation of R.C. 3905.22(A), which
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provides: “(A) An insurance agent shall provide notice to the superintendent of insurance

of any administrative action taken against the agent in another jurisdiction or by another

governmental agency having professional, occupational, or financial licensing authority

within thirty days after the final disposition of the matter. The notice shall include a copy

of the order, consent to order, or any other relevant legal document.” (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 25} According to the FINRA AWC (Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 14, Ex. 8), Tarjanyi first

registered as an IR with FINRA in May 2012. He was registered as an IR through his

association with Bankers Life between May 2016 and March 30, 2018. Tarjanyi ceased

being associated with a FINRA member firm in 2020.

{¶ 26} In 2019, after Tarjanyi was terminated for cause from Bankers Life, FINRA

opened an investigation into Tarjanyi’s sale practices. During its investigation, FINRA

interviewed Tarjanyi under oath. FINRA ultimately found that Tarjanyi had “provided

inaccurate information during on-the-record testimony regarding a customer’s execution

of an annuity partial withdrawal form, in violation of FINRA Rules 8210 and 2010.”

Thereafter, Tarjanyi reached a settlement with FINRA, which barred him from associating

with any other FINRA member in any capacity. By accepting the AWC, Tarjanyi neither

admitted nor denied FINRA’s findings. The AWC became final on March 5, 2021.

{¶ 27} Tarjanyi acknowledged that he did not report the FINRA AWC to ODI until

he applied to renew his license in January 2022, approximately nine months later. In

both his written argument in lieu of a hearing (Adm.R. Vol. 1, Ex. 14) and his objections

to the proposed order (Adm.R. Vol. 2, Ex. 19), Tarjanyi claimed that his attorney had

advised him that he was not required to inform ODI before then.
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{¶ 28} On appeal, Tarjanyi again explains why he accepted an AWC from FINRA

and states that he is “reserving the right to revisit the decision and potentially take legal

action against FINRA for malicious prosecution.” Tarjanyi also reiterates that his

attorney told him that, because FINRA is a separate entity from ODI, he only needed to

inform ODI of the AWC when he renewed his license. Tarjanyi contends that relying on

the advice of his representative was not hiding or falsifying information.

{¶ 29} Although Tarjanyi does not point us to evidence in the administrative record,

we note that Exhibit 5 to his written argument (Adm.R., Vol. 1, Ex. 14, Ex. 5) is the email

exchange between Tarjanyi and his then-counsel. On February 17, 2021, Tarjanyi

wrote, in part:

I will read it [the AWC] over and sign it later today. I’m not super worried

about the Ohio Department of Insurance. They will probably want me to

do some type of explanation. My question, do I need to disclose now?

How long will it take this to take [sic] for their side to approve?

Tarjanyi’s attorney responded: “It could take a while, depending on the workload of Wells’

[FINRA’s senior counsel’s] superiors. Regardless, there is no interim reporting obligation

for DOI as there is for FINRA. It will be a question posed during your renewal app

process.”

{¶ 30} Tarjanyi does not dispute that he entered into an AWC with FINRA on March

5, 2021 (as alleged in Count Three), nor does he contend that he notified ODI of the

consent agreement within 30 days, as required by R.C. 3905.22(A). He acknowledges

that it was reported in January 2022. Even accepting that Tarjanyi failed to notify ODI
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within 30 days based on the advice of counsel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that Tarjanyi’s failure to timely notify ODI was supported by reliable, probative,

and substantial evidence. ODI could have reasonably concluded that Tarjanyi’s reason

for failing to comply with the statute was not relevant to whether the violation had

occurred.

C. Falsified Carrier Appointment Applications

{¶ 31} Third, Tarjanyi challenges the trial court’s determination that reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence supported ODI’s finding that he had provided false

information in his carrier appointment applications (Counts Five through Nine).

{¶ 32} In March 2021, Tarjanyi submitted several carrier appointment applications.

See Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 17, Ex. 10-13. These included (1) an application submitted on

March 5, 2021 for appointment as a producer with Safeco Insurance (Ex. 10); (2) an

application submitted on March 5, 2021 for appointment as a producer with AAA and

Hensley (Ex. 11); (3) an application submitted by Tarjanyi on March 10, 2021 for

appointment as a producer with Westfield Insurance (Ex. 12); and (4) an application

submitted on March 17, 2021 for appointment as a producer with Foremost Insurance

Group (Ex. 13).

{¶ 33} Taylor requested copies of the applications as part of his investigation.

Taylor Aff., ¶ 16. He discovered that on four of the applications, Tarjanyi denied that he

had ever been terminated for cause, that he ever had an administrative action by a

regulatory entity, or both.

{¶ 34} In upholding ODI’s decision, the trial court noted that Tarjanyi knew about
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the Bankers Life termination for cause “all the way back in April 2018, as he admitted to

the Department in 2018. Furthermore, by March 2021, he had already begun the

consent process with FINRA, meaning he knew he was a party to an “occupational

licensing proceeding.” The trial court also commented that ODI’s hearing officer had

noted that the “flurry” of carrier applications came right as Tarjanyi was about to be barred

by FINRA.

{¶ 35} On appeal, Tarjanyi states that he did not falsify his applications but,

instead, relied on his counsel’s advice and the information available to him. He points to

the termination letters he received from Bankers Life in March and April 2018 and the

NIPR reports. In addition, Tarjanyi explains that he filed numerous applications at once

because he had just accepted a position with AAA, which works with multiple insurance

companies. He asserts that the timing of the applications and the AWC was coincidental.

Tarjanyi further points to documentation showing that, once he became aware that ODI

believed he had not answered the application questions truthfully, he made efforts to

amend the applications. See Adm.R. Vol. 1, Doc. 14, Ex. 6-8.

{¶ 36} Upon review of the administrative record, the trial court’s conclusion was

not an abuse of discretion. Although Tarjanyi asserts that he relied on the letters from

Bankers Life and the NIPR reports, there was other evidence, including written

statements from Tarjanyi himself, demonstrating that he was aware in 2018 that he had

been terminated for cause from Bankers Life. The evidence also reasonably supported

the conclusion that Tarjanyi was attempting to conceal the FINRA AWC, despite

Tarjanyi’s alternative explanation. The fact that Tarjanyi tried to rectify the situation later
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did not require a different conclusion. Rather, that evidence could reasonably be

construed as an attempt to mitigate any negative consequence he might face.

D. Failure to Respond to Subpoena and Submission of False Documents

{¶ 37} Finally, Tarjanyi claims that the trial court erred in finding that reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence supported ODI’s conclusion that he had failed to

comply with an ODI subpoena (Count 10) and that he submitted fraudulent and

unauthenticated correspondence to ODI regarding his inability to appear for the subpoena

(Count 11).

{¶ 38} It is undisputed that Tarjanyi was subpoenaed to appear for an investigative

interview on November 10, 2021. See Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 17, Ex. 14. Tarjanyi’s

attorney reached out to reschedule the interview, stating that Tarjanyi was not available

to interview due to medical reasons. Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 17, Taylor Aff., ¶ 22. On the

morning of the interview, Taylor requested documentation to support Tarjanyi’s inability

to answer questions, indicating that he would consider Tarjanyi a “no show” if such

documentation was not provided. Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 17, Ex. 15. After additional email

exchanges between Taylor and Tarjanyi’s counsel, the interview was postponed while

documentation was obtained.

{¶ 39} Tarjanyi’s attorney ultimately provided a letter dated November 5, 2021,

purportedly from Dr. Kammal Bari at UC Health. Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 17, Ex. 15 & Taylor

Aff., ¶ 23. The letter stated: “Mr. Tarjanyi is currently under my care and will be having

surgery on November 23rd, 2021. At this point it is anticipated that Mr. Tarjanyi will need

roughly 8 weeks of recovery time before he is able to return to his normal work duties.
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This is solely an estimate and depending on his recovery could require a longer period

before he is able to resume his daily duties.”

{¶ 40} Taylor tried unsuccessfully to authenticate the doctor’s note. According to

Taylor’s affidavit, he searched the State Medical Board of Ohio’s licensing database to

verify whether an individual named Kammal Bari was licensed as a physician in Ohio; his

search yielded no results. Taylor Aff., ¶ 24. He also called the State Medical Board of

Ohio to verify whether any individuals named Kammal Bari were licensed as doctors in

Ohio; the representative for the Board stated that it had no record of an individual by that

name. Id., ¶ 25-26. Taylor contacted UC Health to determine whether any doctor at UC

Health generated the letter. Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 17, Ex. 16-17 & Taylor Aff., ¶ 27-29.

UC Health confirmed that Tarjanyi was a patient. Taylor Aff., ¶ 30. It indicated,

however, that it did not have a doctor on staff by the name of Kammal Bari, although it

had a doctor with a similar name. Id., ¶ 31-32. UC Health notified Taylor that the doctor

on staff had not produced the letter that Tarjanyi’s attorney had provided, and UC Health

did not know where the letter had been produced. Id., ¶ 33.

{¶ 41} On December 6, 2021, in a conference call between Tarjanyi’s attorney,

Taylor, and Taylor’s supervisor, ODI notified Tarjanyi’s attorney that the Bari letter

appeared not to be genuine. Id., ¶ 34. Tarjanyi and his attorney were provided an

opportunity to validate the letter, but no information was provided. Id., ¶ 35-37. Taylor

stated that he received no additional medical records or correspondence from any

medical provider regarding Tarjanyi’s medical condition or inability to interview. Id., ¶ 38.

{¶ 42} In his written response to the allegations and subsequent objections to the
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proposed order, Tarjanyi stated that he had faced potentially life-threatening health

problems in the fall of 2021 and, consequently, his attorney had contacted ODI and

requested an extension until after the beginning of the new year. Adm.R. Vol. 1, Doc.

14; Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 19. Tarjanyi indicated that his attorney acted on the assumption

that Tarjanyi’s health would continue to decline and ODI would back down; Tarjanyi stated

that, when he requested the extension, he was not mentally or physically capable of

undergoing intense questioning for an extended period of time. He asserted that he was

not permitted to reschedule the interview after he had sufficiently recovered. Id.

{¶ 43} As to the falsification allegation, Tarjanyi stated that he had provided his

attorney “notes from multiple physicians reflecting that he had a tumor on his liver and

needed surgery.” He also stated that he had signed numerous medical releases for his

attorney and had provided his attorney contact information and medical records. He

indicated that the surgeries were performed in the fall of 2021.

{¶ 44} Tarjanyi presented documentation after Taylor’s investigation concluded.

His written response to the allegations included a September 12, 2022 note from Leslie

Pulver, who indicated that she began treating Tarjanyi for mental health on December 2,

2021. Adm.R. Vol. 1, Doc. 14, Ex. 9. Pulver wrote that he had previously received

services through another provider, and “up until January 2021, Mr. Tarjanyi suffered from

memory gaps that resulted from his recovery from alcohol and some of the medications

that he was taking at that time.” Id. She continued: “It is my opinion that the stress of

preparing for and participating in defending himself in court would be detrimental to his

mental health as he is still early in his recovery from alcohol.”
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{¶ 45} Tarjanyi attached surgical notes to his objections to the proposed order.

Adm.R. Vol. 2, Doc. 19, Ex. C. Those notes pertained to his October 25, 2021 shoulder

surgery and his November 23, 2021 surgery on his liver and pancreas. Exhibit C also

included the note from Pulver, which had previously been provided.

{¶ 46} Tarjanyi did not provide any information authenticating the Bari letter. To

the contrary, he stated in his objections that he did not know what it was or where it came

from.

{¶ 47} Based on the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s conclusions. Assuming Tarjanyi’s surgical notes are authentic, the evidence

substantiated that he had serious physical health issues around the time of the scheduled

November 10, 2021 interview. He provided evidence that he had shoulder surgery

approximately 16 days before the scheduled interview and had additional surgery on his

liver and pancreas in late November. Pulver’s notes further indicated that serious mental

health issues existed both before and after the interview date.

{¶ 48} However, none of Tarjanyi’s documentation indicated that he had been

unable to participate in the interview on November 10, 2021. The postoperative plan in

the shoulder surgery notes listed only that Tarjanyi should wear a sling for comfort and

initiate physical therapy. And while Tarjanyi required surgery on his liver and pancreas,

there was nothing stating that his physical health pre-surgery precluded him from

appearing for the interview. Pulver’s note addressed his inability to participate in court

proceedings as of September 2022. The trial court reasonably found that ODI had

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence that Tarjanyi had failed, without justification,
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to comply with ODI’s subpoena to appear for the November 10 interview.

{¶ 49} Moreover, the trial court reasonably concluded that reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence existed that Tarjanyi submitted fraudulent correspondence

regarding his inability to appear for the subpoena. Tarjanyi’s counsel provided Taylor a

letter purportedly from Dr. Kammal Bari at UC Health. Taylor made efforts to

authenticate the letter but learned that no such person was licensed in Ohio, no doctor

by that name practiced at UC Health, and the Dr. Bari on staff did not provide the letter.

The trial court reasonably concluded that the record supported the finding that Tarjanyi

had provided a fraudulent letter.

{¶ 50} In summary, the trial court reasonably concluded that ODI’s findings were

supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Accordingly, Tarjanyi’s

assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 51} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

.............

WELBAUM, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10742769. Public record. Not legal advice.
