# Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Taste and Spirit, LLC

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 21, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10742227

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 21, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., et al.

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:22-cv-1790-VMC-SPF

TASTE AND SPIRIT, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.
/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Default Judgment
Against Defendants (Doc. 25). For the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended that the
Motion be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 5, 2022, Plaintiff Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) and a number of other
named plaintiffs (set forth below), filed a complaint against Defendants Taste and Spirit, LLC
and Tony Tannus (Doc. 2). Plaintiffs raised thirteen claims of copyright infringement.
Defendants were properly served with the Complaint, but failed to respond (Docs. 15, 16).
On September 13, 2022, the Clerk of Court entered defaults against Defendants (Docs. 19,
20). On December 12, 2022, Plaintiffs moved for default judgment against Defendants (Doc.
25). Plaintiffs served Defendants with a copy of the Motion (Doc. 25 at 16), but they have
not responded to it and the time to do so has passed. Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for
consideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[w]hen a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and
that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Once

this has occurred, “the party must apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b)(2). A court may enter a default judgment against a party who has failed to respond to
a complaint if the complaint provides a sufficient basis for the judgment. See Surtain v. Hamlin
Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015). “A defendant, by his default, admits
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact” set forth in the operative complaint. Eagle Hosp.
Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted). As such, if well-pleaded, liability is established by virtue of a default. See Buchanan
v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987).
Damages, however, are not admitted by virtue of default. Miller v. Paradise of Port

Richey, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999). “Rather, the Court determines the
amount and character of damages to be awarded.” Id. If, in order to enter or effectuate
judgment, it is necessary to conduct an accounting to determine the amount of damages, the
court may conduct hearings or make referrals as it deems necessary and proper. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(2). Damages may be awarded “without a hearing [if the] amount claimed is a
liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation,” as long as “all essential evidence
is already of record.” S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231, 1232, 1233 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th
Cir. 1985)); see also Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105,
111 (2d Cir. 1997) (a hearing is not necessary if sufficient evidence is submitted to support the
request for damages).
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff BMI is a corporation that has been granted the right to license the public

performance rights in approximately 18.7 million copyrighted musical compositions (the
“BMI Repertoire”), including those owned by the other Plaintiffs (Doc. 2 at ¶ 3). The other
Plaintiffs in this case are: (1) House of Cash, Inc.; (2) Screen Gems-EMI Music, Inc.; (3)
Fourteenth Hour Music Inc.; (4) Springtime Music, Inc.; (5) Sony/ATV Songs LLC d/b/a
Sony/ATV Acuff Rose Music; (6) R–Key Darkus Publishing; (7) Orbi–Lee Publishing; (8)
Roys Boys LLC; (9) Muscle Shoals Sound Publishing; (10) Peermusic III Ltd.; (11) EPA
Publishing; (12) Rondor Music International, Inc.; (13) Gibb Brothers Music; (14) Crompton
Songs; (15) Siren Songs; (16) Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp.; and (17) Universal –
Songs of Polygram International, Inc. (collectively, the “Publisher Plaintiffs”) (Id. at ¶¶ 4–21).

These Plaintiffs own copyrights in the musical compositions that are the subject of this lawsuit
(Id.).
Defendant Taste and Spirit, LLC (“T&S”) is a Florida limited liability company that
operates, maintains, and controls an establishment known as Meadows Village Pub, located
in Sarasota, Florida (“the Establishment”) (Id. at ¶ 22). Defendant Tony Tannus is a manager
of T&S, and he has responsibility for the operation and management of T&S and the
Establishment (Id. at ¶ 25). Defendant Tannus also has the right and ability to supervise the
activities of T&S (Id. at ¶ 26). Defendants T&S and Tannus have a direct financial interest in
the Establishment (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 26).
In connection with the operation of the Establishment, Defendant T&S publicly
performed musical compositions and/or caused musical compositions to be publicly
performed (Id. at ¶ 23). Specifically, on November 20, 2019, Defendants publicly performed
or caused to be publicly performed at the Establishment the musical compositions identified

below without license or permission to do so:
Claim Musical Writer(s) Publisher Date(s) of Reg. Nos.
No. Composition Plaintiff(s) Reg.
1 Folsom Prison John R. Cash House of Cash, 2/13/84 RE 196-295
a/k/a Folsom a/k/a Johnny Inc. 1/13/83 RE 153-380
Prison Blues Cash 9/14/56 Ep 102326
11/30/55 EU 418371
2 I’m Not Your Tommy Screen Gems-EMI 6/6/66 Eu 943841
Stepping Stone Boyce Music, Inc.
Bob Hart
3 Mustang Sally Bonny Rice Fourteenth Hour 4/27/93 RE 627-422
Music Inc. 3/22/65 Eu 873659
Springtime Music,
Inc.
4 Oh Lonesome Don Gibson Sony/ATV Songs 12/31/85 RE 275-764
Me LLC d/b/a 2/17/58 Ep 116980
Song/ATV Acuff
Rose Music
5 Oh, Pretty Roy Orbison Sony/ATV Songs 1/13/92 Re 569-701
Woman a/k/a Bill Dees LLC d/b/a 8/28/64 Ep 191739
Pretty Woman Song/ATV Acuff
Rose Music
R-Key Darkus
Publishing
Orbi-Lee
Publishing
Roys Boys LLC
6 Old Time George Muscle Shoals 11/11/77 Ep375950
Rock And Roll Jackson Sound Publishing
a/k/a Old Thomas E. Co.
Time Rock ‘N Jones, III Peermusic III Ltd.
Roll
7 Put Your Paul Anka EPA Publishing 10/3/86 RE 305-871
Head On My 10/17/58 Efo 60827
Shoulder
8 Sitting On The Steve Cropper Rondor Music 4/7/97 RE 760-653
Dock Of The Otis Redding International, Inc. 1/22/68 Eu 33492
Bay a/k/a 8/25/69 Ep264255
Sittin’ On The 3/13/75 Ep 335846
Dock Of The 3/13/75 Ep 335847
Bay 5/15/95 PAu 2-279-253
11/20/95 Pau 2-069-906
11/20/95 PA 809-368
9 Stayin’ Alive Barry Gibb Gibb Brothers 3/7/77 Eu 761684
a/k/a Staying Robin Gibb Music 2/13/78 PA 178
Alive Maurice Gibb Crompton Songs 3/19/84 PA 209-625
3/19/84 PAu 618-264
10 Still The One John Hall Siren Songs 11/4/76 Ep360043
Johanna Hall EMI Blackwood
Music, Inc.
11 Sweet Dreams Don Gibson Sony/ATV Songs 1/6/83 RE 155-468
of You a/k/a LLC d/b/a 12/30/55 Ep 95678
Sweet Dreams Song/ATV Acuff
Rose Music
12 You Make Me Thom Bell Warner- 3/11/74 EU 469664
Feel Brand Linda Creed Tamerlane 6/10/74 EP 325229
New Publishing Corp.
13 Your Song Elton John Universal – Songs 4/7/70 Eu 183663
Bernie Taupin of Polygram 6/5/70 Efo 142515
International, Inc. 12/17/70 Eo 283511

(Id. at ¶¶ 29–35; Doc. 2-2). Each musical composition listed in the table above was created
by the respectively named writer(s) (Id. at ¶ 31).
For each musical composition identified in the table above, the Publisher Plaintiff(s)
complied in all respects with the requirements of the Copyright Act and received from the
Register of Copyrights Certificates of Registration bearing the numbers listed (Id. at ¶ 32). The
listed Publisher Plaintiff(s) was (and still is) the owner of the copyright in the respective
musical compositions listed (Id. at ¶ 33). On the date of the infringement listed in the above
table, BMI was (and still is) the licensor of the public performance rights in the musical
compositions listed (Id.).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Liability
To establish copyright infringement alleging the unauthorized public performance of
a copyrighted musical composition, a plaintiff must demonstrate five elements: (1) the

originality and authorship of the compositions involved; (2) compliance with all formalities
required to secure a copyright under Title 17, United States Code; (3) that plaintiffs are the
proprietors of the copyrights of the compositions involved in the action; (4) that the
compositions were performed publicly by the defendant; and (5) that the defendant did not
receive permission from any of the plaintiffs or their representatives for such performance.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Evie's Tavern Ellenton, Inc., No. 8:11–cv–2056–T–17TBM, 2013 WL
5487066, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2013).
Plaintiffs alleged in the Complaint that each of the musical compositions listed in the
table above was created by the respectively named writer or writers. These allegations

establish the first element of copyright infringement. In satisfaction of the second element,
Plaintiffs alleged their compliance with the formalities of the Copyright Act and provided the
numbers of the copyrights they thereby received. Plaintiffs established the third element by
alleging that they were, and still are, the owners of the copyrights for the musical compositions
performed at the Establishment. Plaintiffs established the fourth element by alleging that
Defendants publicly performed the musical compositions at the Establishment on November
20, 2019 or caused the musical compositions to be publicly performed at the Establishment
on that date. Finally, Plaintiffs established the fifth element by alleging that Defendants
publicly performed the musical compositions, or caused them to be publicly performed,
without a license or permission to do so. Accordingly, the well-pleaded allegations in the
Complaint, which Defendants are deemed to have admitted, establish each of the elements of
copyright infringement. These allegations are sufficient to establish that T&S, the owner of
the Establishment where the infringement occurred, is liable for copyright infringement as
alleged in the Complaint.

Defendant Tannus, as a corporate officer of T&S, may be jointly and severally liable
with T&S for copyright infringement. Quartet Music v. Kissimmee Broad., Inc., 795 F. Supp.
1100, 1103 (M.D. Fla. 1992). “‘An individual, including a corporate officer, who has the
ability to supervise infringing activity and has a financial interest in that activity, or who
personally participates in that activity is personally liable for the infringement.’” S. Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Assoc. Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 811 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting Lauratex
Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 900, 904 (S.D.N.Y.1981)). Liability
attaches even if the corporate officer was ignorant of the infringement. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Tannus has both the right and ability to supervise the activities of

T&S and the responsibility to operate and manage the Establishment (Doc. 1 at ¶ 25).
Plaintiffs further allege that Tannus has a direct financial interest in the Establishment (Id. at
¶ 26). These allegations are sufficient to establish that Tannus is liable for copyright
infringement as alleged in the Complaint.
B. Damages
The Copyright Act permits a plaintiff to elect either actual or statutory damages. 17
U.S.C. § 504. In this case, Plaintiffs elect to receive statutory damages (Doc. 2 at 7; Doc. 25
at 8). In support of their request for statutory damages, Plaintiffs present the Declaration of
Gayle Brown, Assistant Vice President, Licensing, for BMI (Doc. 25-2). Ms. Brown states

that BMI learned sometime before December 2018 that the Establishment was offering
musical entertainment without a license from BMI and without permission from the copyright
owners whose music was being publicly performed (Id. at ¶ 3). BMI sent various letters,
including a cease-and-desist letter, to Defendants from December 2018 through May 2019,
but Defendants did not respond (Id. at ¶¶ 3–5). Additionally, Ms. Brown states that BMI

licensing personnel telephoned the Establishment on 18 occasions and on a number of those
occasions spoke to persons associated with the Establishment’s operation (Id. at ¶ 7). Despite
these efforts, Defendants did not enter into a licensing agreement with BMI and they
continued to offer unauthorized public performances of BMI-licensed music (Id. at ¶ 8).
On November 20, 2019, BMI sent an investigator to the Establishment (Id. at ¶ 9). The
investigator made an audio recording and prepared a written report regarding the public
performance of copyrighted musical compositions at the Establishment (Id.). Review of the
audio recording made by the investigator confirmed that the musical compositions identified
in the Complaint and attached schedule were publicly performed at the Establishment (Id. at

¶ 10). On December 5, 2019, BMI sent a letter to Defendants informing them of the
investigation (Id. at ¶ 11, p. 57). Ms. Brown avers that, had the Defendants entered into a
license agreement at the time BMI first contacted them, the estimated license fees between
December 2018 and December 2022 would have been $9,516.60 (Id. at ¶ 16).
Based on this evidence, Plaintiffs request an award of $21,412.35 in statutory damages
representing three times the lost licensing fees.1 Statutory damages must be calculated
according to the number of separately copyrightable works infringed, not on the number of

1 BMI represents that its total lost licensing fees totaled $9,516.60 over a period of four years
or approximately $2,379.15 per year. BMI is reducing its request to three years to account to
the COVID-19 pandemic and the effect that it had on businesses such as the Establishment
(Doc. 25 at 12). Accordingly, BMI seeks three times the lost licensing fee of $7,137.45.
infringements. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Law, No. 6:07–cv–1153–Orl–18GJK, 2008 WL 203393,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2008). Courts have discretion to award between $750 and $30,000
in statutory damages for all infringements of each work. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). When the
copyright owner sustains the burden of proving that an infringement was committed willfully,

the court may increase the award of statutory damages up to $150,000 for each infringement.
Id.
“‘The employment of the statutory yardstick, within [these] set limits, is committed
solely to the court which hears the case....’” Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc.,
902 F.2d 829, 852 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)).
In awarding statutory damages, the Court may consider several factors, including (1) the
infringers’ blameworthiness (willful, knowing, or innocent); (2) the expenses saved and the
profits reaped by the defendants in connection with the infringement; (3) the revenues lost by
the plaintiffs due to the defendants’ conduct; and (4) the deterrent value of the damages

imposed.” Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Evie’s Tavern Ellenton, Inc., 772 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir.
2014) (citing FW Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 229–30 (1952)). In
awarding statutory damages, the Court’s objective is not just compensating Plaintiffs for their
injury, but also to discourage wrongful conduct. Id. Thus, many courts ensure that statutory
damages exceed the unpaid license fees to give defendants an incentive to obey copyright
laws. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Bloodhound Brew, LLC, No. 6:14-cv-1705-Orl-22KRS, 2015
WL 12830484, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2015) (“[C]ourts have considered an amount three
times the licensing fee to be appropriate for discouraging the wrongful conduct.”).
Having carefully considered the evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ request for

$21,412.35 in statutory damages is appropriate. This amounts to $1,647.10 per infringed
work, well within the range permitted by 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). This number accounts for the
fact that Defendants knowingly infringed on Plaintiffs’ works and also accounts for the
expenses saved by Defendants in failing to pay for BMI’s licensing fee. In light of the
continued unauthorized performance of the copyrighted musical compositions despite the

repeated receipt of cease-and-desist letters and telephone conversations with BMI licensing
personnel, a penalty that exceeds the amount of the licensing fees avoided by Defendants is
appropriate to deter future infringing acts. See Bloodhound Brew, 2015 WL 12830484, at *7
(“The Court finds that BMI’s requested damages of $15,210, three times its estimated license
fee, is a reasonable amount given [Defendant’s] deliberate infringement of BMI’s copyrighted
works.”); Milk Money Music v. Oakland Park Entm't Corp., No. 09–cv–61416, 2009 WL
4800272, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2009) (awarding $7,000.00 in statutory damages for each
of four compositions infringed, for a total of $28,000.00).
C. Injunctive Relief

The Copyright Act provides for injunctive relief to prevent further infringement of a
copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. PRB Prods., Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1917-Orl-
31KRS, 2014 WL 3887509, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2014). “Injunctive relief is a traditional
remedy for copyright infringement, and is especially favored where there is a history of
continuing infringement and a substantial threat of continued infringement.” Sony Music
Entm't Inc. v. Global Arts Prod., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999). To obtain
injunctive relief, the moving party must show: “(1) it has achieved actual success on the
merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened
injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause; and (4)
if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” PRB Prods., Inc., 2014
WL 3887509 at *5.
All four elements for granting an injunction have been established. First, by nature of
Defendants’ defaults, BMI has established the first two elements—a likelihood of success on

the merits and irreparable harm. See Reiffer v. Legendary Journeys, Inc., No. 8:17-cv-2748-T-
35AAS, 2019 WL 2029973, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2019) (“By obtaining default judgment
on liability, [Plaintiff] established likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.”).
As to the first element, the Court finds that the threatened injury to BMI, specifically the costs
and hardship of continuing to protect its copyrighted works, is outweighed by any damage
the injunction may cause to Defendants. The effect of an injunction is to preclude Defendants
from publicly performing BMI’s copyrighted works without permission. The Court does not
find this a sufficient harm to outweigh the substantial justification for imposing an injunction
in this case. Finally, imposing an injunction is in the public interest because it promotes the
purposes of the Copyright Act. See id. (stating that the “public has an interest in protecting

copyrighted works”). Therefore, the Court will grant BMI’s request for injunctive relief. The
text of the permanent injunction is listed below with this report’s recommendations.
D. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
A court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a copyright
action. 17 U.S.C. § 505. The plaintiff is regularly awarded attorney's fees at the default-
judgment stage of a copyright-infringement case. See Arista Records, Inc. v. Beker Enters., Inc.,
298 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315–16 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (awarding reasonable attorney’s fees at
default-judgment stage); Clever Clovers, Inc. v. Sw. Fla. Storm Defense, LLC, 554 F. Supp. 2d

1303, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (same). The party requesting attorney’s fees must provide
evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983). A court may award attorney’s fees based only on affidavits in the record. Norman
v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
The lodestar analysis applies for determining reasonable attorney’s fees in copyright-

infringement cases. Nick-O-Val Music Co., Inc. v. P.O.S. Radio, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 826, 829
(M.D. Fla. 1987) (citations omitted); BWP Media USA Inc. v. A.R. Commc'ns, LLC, No. 6:14-
CV-120-Orl-22KR, 2014 WL 5038590, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2014). The lodestar is
calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly
rate. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433.
Here, Plaintiffs seek recovery of $3,000.00 in attorney’s fees (Doc. 25-5 at ¶ 4). In
support of their request, Plaintiffs have submitted the Declaration of Zachary D. Messa, one
of their attorneys, and a time sheet (Doc. 25-5).
Attorney Messa represents that he was admitted to the Florida Bar in September 2001.

He further states that his hourly rate is $400.00 per hour. This is a reasonable rate for an
attorney with over twenty years of experience in the Tampa market in the absence of
objection. See Plum Creek Tech., LLC v. Next Cloud, LLC, No. 8:19-cv-1974-T-60CPT, 2020
WL 3317897, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL
3288033 (June 18, 2020) (finding rate of $400 per hour for a partner with seventeen years’
experience to be reasonable and “consistent with those charged for similar work in this
geographic area”); MWR Holdings, LLC v. Academy of Tampa, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-1325-T-
30MAP, 2014 WL 5590998, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2014) (hourly rates between $400 and
$475 were reasonable given the respective attorneys’ experience and the market rate in

Tampa, Florida).
Attorney Messa also submitted a time sheet showing that he worked 10.9 hours on
this matter (Doc. 25-2). Because of his firm’s fee agreement with the client, however, the
client was only billed $3,000.00 in fees. The Court finds the number of hours expended to be
reasonable and the overall fee of $3,000.00 to be reasonable. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303

(“The court, either trial or appellate, is itself an expert on the question and may consider its
own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an
independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”); see also Hepsen
v. J.C. Christensen & Assoc., Inc., 394 F. App’x 597, 599–600 (11th Cir. 2010).
Finally, Plaintiffs seek to recover the $402.00 filing fee and $110.00 in service of
process costs, for a total of $512.00 in costs. Both the filing fee and the service of process costs
are taxable costs. See 17 U.S.C. § 505; 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Therefore, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs are entitled to a total of $625.00 in costs.
Accordingly, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Default Judgment Against Defendants (Doc. 25) be
GRANTED.
2. The Court direct the Clerk to enter a final default judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs on the Complaint.
3. Plaintiffs be awarded $21,412.35 in damages, plus $3,000.00 in attorney’s fees
and $625.00 in costs against Defendants, jointly and severally.
4. Post-judgment interest accrue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
5. Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction should be granted. The

permanent injunction should read as follows:
Defendants, Taste and Spirit, LLC d/b/a Meadows Village Pub a/k/a The
Meadows Village Pub and Tony Tannus, individually and their agents,
employees, and all persons acting under their permission or authority shall be
permanently enjoined and restrained from infringing, in any manner, the
copyrighted musical compositions licensed by Broadcast Music, Inc.
6. The Court direct the Clerk to close the case.
IT IS SO REPORTED in Tampa, Florida, on April 21, 2023.

SEAN P. FLYNN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO PARTIES

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings
and recommendations or request an extension of time to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th
Cir. R. 3-1. Failure of any party to timely object in accordance with the provisions of §
636(b)(1) waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and
Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10742227. Public record. Not legal advice.