# Cramer v. Favorite Healthcare Staffing, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 14, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10742203

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 14, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10742203

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding all decisions from the Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

ANDREW CRAMER, KIM
GRADEN, JEANNINE DONIGAN,
BRITTANY WALKER, ANITA
REDFERN, SCOTT SAKALL,
BRIDGETT WILLIAMS-COOPER,
LATOYA LATSON, and SASHA
TERAN,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 6:20-cv-1808-RBD-EJK

FAVORITE HEALTHCARE
STAFFING, INC.,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This cause comes before the Court on the parties’ Amended Joint Motion for
Approval of Settlement Agreement (the “Motion”), filed March 21, 2023. (Doc. 91.)
Upon consideration, I respectfully recommend that the Motion be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 2, 2022, Defendant, Favorite Healthcare Staffing, Inc., removed
this action to this Court from the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County,
Florida. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs alleged unpaid overtime claims in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and Florida’s common
law. (Doc. 1-7.)
Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant as registered nurses at Defendant’s
COVID-19 testing site located at the Orange County Convention Center. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiffs began work on or about March 20, 2020, until various dates between April

7, 2020, and August 21, 2020. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs allege they were required to work in
excess of 40 hours per week and that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs for all hours
worked in excess of 40 hours, as required by the FLSA. (Id. ¶ 20.)
After removal, Plaintiffs and Defendant negotiated a compromise and

settlement of Plaintiffs’ claims and filed an initial motion for approval of their
settlement agreement. (Doc. 86.) On March 7, 2023, the undersigned denied the
motion without prejudice due to deficiencies in the settlement agreement. (Doc. 90.)
On March 21, 2023, the parties filed the instant amended Motion, pursuant to Lynn’s
Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 1982). (Doc. 91.)

Plaintiff Teran and Defendant reached a settlement for $42,198.67, including
payment for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, consideration for a
general release of claims and a nondisparagement provision, and attorneys’ fees and
costs. (Doc. 91-1.) The remaining Plaintiffs subsequently reached an agreement with
Defendant for varying amounts, but their agreements do not contain a non-

disparagement provision. (Docs. 91-2–91-9.) When appropriate, the undersigned will
address the agreements for Plaintiff Teran and the remaining Plaintiffs separately.
II. STANDARD
“The principal congressional purpose in enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 was to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive
working hours, ‘labor conditions [that are] detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of
workers.’” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981)

(alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). “Any employer who violates the
provisions of section 206 or section 207 of [the FLSA] shall be liable to the employee
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid
overtime compensation, . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Section 206 establishes the federally mandated

minimum hourly wage, and § 207 prescribes overtime compensation of “one and one-
half times the regular rate” for each hour worked in excess of forty hours during a
given workweek. The provisions of the FLSA are mandatory and “cannot be abridged
by contract or otherwise waived.” Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740. To permit otherwise

would “‘nullify the purposes’ of the [FLSA] and thwart the legislative policies it was
designed to effectuate.” Id. (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707
(1945)).
The parties seek judicial review and a determination that their settlement is a
“fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute” over FLSA issues. See Lynn’s

Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354–55. If a settlement is not supervised by the Department
of Labor, the only other route for a compromise of FLSA claims is provided in the
context of suits brought directly by employees against their employers under § 216(b)
to recover back wages for FLSA violations. Id. at 1353. “When employees bring a
private action for back wages under the FLSA, and present to the district court a
proposed settlement, the district court may enter a stipulated judgment after
scrutinizing the settlement for fairness.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[s]ettlements may be permissible in the

context of a suit brought by employees under the FLSA for back wages because
initiation of the action by the employees provides some assurance of an adversarial
context.” Id. at 1354. In adversarial cases:
The employees are likely to be represented by an attorney
who can protect their rights under the statute. Thus, when
the parties submit a settlement to the court for approval, the
settlement is more likely to reflect a reasonable compromise
of disputed issues than a mere waiver of statutory rights
brought about by an employer’s overreaching. If a
settlement in an employee FLSA suit does reflect a
reasonable compromise over issues, such as FLSA coverage
or computation of back wages, that are actually in dispute;
we allow the district court to approve the settlement in order
to promote the policy of encouraging settlement of
litigation.
Id.
When evaluating an FLSA settlement agreement, the district court considers
whether the settlement is fair and reasonable to the employee, or “internal” factors,
and whether the settlement frustrates the purpose of the FLSA, or “external” factors.
Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Moreno v. Regions
Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1350–51 (M.D. Fla. 2010). Factors considered “internal”
include: “(1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of plaintiffs’
success on the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of the
counsel.” Hamilton v. Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 6:05-CV-592-ORL-22JGG, 2007 WL 328792,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2007). There is a “‘strong presumption’ in favor of finding a

settlement fair.” Id. (quoting Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1336, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977)).1
III. DISCUSSION
A. Settlement Sums
The Settlement Agreements indicate that Defendant has agreed to pay Plaintiffs

the following unpaid wages for work during the relevant time periods:
• Plaintiff Teran - $14,000 in unpaid wages; $14,000 in liquidated damages, for a
total of $28,000.
• Plaintiff Cramer - $5,000 in unpaid wages; $5,000 in liquidated damages, for a
total of $10,000.

• Plaintiff Redfern - $5,000 in unpaid wages; $5,000 in liquidated damages, for a
total of $10,000.
• Plaintiff Sakall - $5,000 in unpaid wages; $5,000 in liquidated damages, for a
total of $10,000.

• Plaintiff Williams-Cooper - $5,000 in unpaid wages; $5,000 in liquidated
damages, for a total of $10,000.
• Plaintiff Walker - $4,500 in unpaid wages; $4,500 in liquidated damages, for a

1 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding all
decisions from the Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981, are binding on
the Eleventh Circuit).
total of $9,000.
• Plaintiff Donigan - $3,000 in unpaid wages; $3,000 in liquidated damages, for a

total of $6,000.
• Plaintiff Graden - $3,000 in unpaid wages; $3,000 in liquidated damages, for a
total of $6,000.
• Plaintiff Latson - $3,000 in unpaid wages; $3,000 in liquidated damages, for a

total of $6,000.
(Docs. 91 at 6–7; 91-1–9.)
In their answers to the Court’s interrogatories, Plaintiffs claimed they were
entitled to more wages than they will receive in the settlements, set forth as follows:
• Plaintiff Teran - $338,972.22

• Plaintiff Cramer - $95,240.77
• Plaintiff Redfern - $137,096.15
• Plaintiff Sakall - $323,272.59
• Plaintiff Williams-Cooper - $337,364.51

• Plaintiff Walker - $97,331.33
• Plaintiff Donigan - $96,888.37
• Plaintiff Graden - $97,177.65
• Plaintiff Latson - $39,718.04

(Docs. 13–15, 19, 22–25, 39.)
Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an employee damaged by a violation of the FLSA is
entitled to unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation, plus an
additional, equal amount, as liquidated damages. On review, I find that the settlement

sums the parties have agreed to accept in satisfaction of their claims to be fair and
reasonable, considering that all parties are represented by counsel and wish to avoid
the risk and further expense of litigation. Thus, I find that the settlement sum
represents a fair resolution of a bona fide dispute between the parties and that Plaintiffs
have not unfairly compromised their claims.

B. Attorney Fees

The Motion further indicates that Defendant has agreed to pay Plaintiffs’
attorneys the following fees and costs:
• Plaintiff Teran - $12,198.67 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
• Plaintiff Cramer - $6,500.00 in attorneys’ fees; $1,437.50 in costs, for a total of
$7,937.50.
• Plaintiff Redfern - $6,500.00 in attorneys’ fees; $1,437.50 in costs, for a total of
$7,937.50.

• Plaintiff Sakall - $6,500.00 in attorneys’ fees; $1,437.50 in costs, for a total of
$7,937.50.
• Plaintiff Williams-Cooper - $6,500.00 in attorneys’ fees; $1,437.50 in costs, for
a total of $7,937.50.

• Plaintiff Walker - $6,00.00 in attorneys’ fees; $1,437.50 in costs, for a total of
$7,437.50.
• Plaintiff Donigan - $4,500.00 in attorneys’ fees; $1,437.50 in costs, for a total of

$5,937.50.
• Plaintiff Graden - $4,500.00 in attorneys’ fees; $1,437.50 in costs, for a total of
$5,937.50.
• Plaintiff Latson - $4,00.00 in attorneys’ fees; $1,437.50 in costs, for a total of

$5,437.50.
(Doc. 91 ¶¶ 15, 22.)
Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), “[t]he court [in an FLSA action] shall . . . allow
a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” As
the parties represent that these amounts were negotiated separately from the amount

received by Plaintiffs, and the settlement is otherwise reasonable on its face, further
review is not required. (Doc. 91 ¶¶ 15, 23); Bonetti v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., 715 F. Supp.
2d 1222, 1228 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (stating that if the parties “represent[] that the
plaintiff's attorneys' fee was agreed upon separately and without regard to the amount
paid to the plaintiff, . . . the Court will approve the settlement without separately

considering the reasonableness of the fee to be paid to plaintiff's counsel.”)
C. Additional Provisions
i. Plaintiff Teran
In return for additional, separate consideration, Plaintiff Teran has agreed to a
non-disparagement clause (Doc. 91-1 ¶ 8) and the following release:
In exchange for, and in consideration of, the payments,
benefits, and other commitments described above, TERAN
knowingly and voluntarily releases and forever discharges,
to the full extent permitted by law, FAVORITE
HEALTHCARE STAFFING, INC., and its parent
corporations, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions,
predecessors, successors and assigns, joint employers, joint
ventures, and the current and former employees, officers,
directors, owners, insurers, and agents thereof (all
singularly and collectively referred to in this provision as the
“Released Parties”), of and from any and all claims, known
and unknown, accrued and unaccrued, asserted and
unasserted, TERAN has or may have against the Released
Parties as of the date of execution of this Agreement,
including, but not limited to, any alleged violation of:

• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended;
• The Civil Rights Act of 1991;
• Sections 1981 through 1988 of Title 42 of the United
States Code, as amended;
• The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, as amended;
• The Immigration Reform and Control Act, as
amended;
• The Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended
• The Equal Pay Act, as amended;
• The Family and Medical Leave Act, as amended;
• The Age Discrimination in Employment Act; as
amended
• The Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended;
• The Workers Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, as amended;
• The Occupational Safety and Health Act, as
amended;
• The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002;
• The Florida Civil Rights Act – Fla. Stat. §760.01 et
seq.;
• The Florida Workers’ Compensation Retaliation
Statute -- Fla. Stat. §440.205;
• The Florida Whistleblower Act – Fla. Stat. §448.101
et seq.;
• The Florida Minimum Wage Act and any other
Florida wage payment laws;
• Fla. Stat. §448.08;
• Any other federal, state or local civil or human rights
law or any other local, state or federal law, regulation
or ordinance;
• Any public policy, contract, tort, or common law;
and
• Any claim for costs, fees, or other expenses including
attorneys’ fees incurred in these matters.

The parties acknowledge that this Agreement shall not
apply to rights or claims that may arise after the Effective
Date. Additionally, nothing in this paragraph or this
Agreement is intended to limit or restrict any rights that
cannot, by express and unequivocal terms of law, be
limited, waived, or extinguished. Moreover, nothing in this
Agreement (including, but not limited, to the release of
claims, affirmations, no re-employment, and non-
disparagement provisions): (a) limits or affects TERAN’s
right to challenge the validity of this Agreement under the
ADEA or the OWBPA; (b) prevents TERAN from filing a
charge or complaint with or from participating in an
investigation or proceeding conducted by the EEOC, the
National Labor Relations Board, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, or any other federal, state or local
agency charged with the enforcement of any laws, including
providing documents or other information; or (c) prevents
TERAN from exercising her rights under Section 7 of the
NLRA to engage in protected, concerted activity with other
employees, although by signing this Agreement TERAN is
waiving her right to recover any individual relief (including
backpay, frontpay, reinstatement or other legal or equitable
relief) in any charge, complaint, or lawsuit or other
proceeding brought by TERAN or on her behalf by any
third party, except for any right she may have to receive a
payment from a government agency (and not FAVORITE)
for information provided to the government agency.

(Id. ¶ 4) (the “Release”).
General releases in FLSA cases are frequently viewed as “a ‘side deal’ in which
the employer extracts a gratuitous (although usually valueless) release of all claims in
exchange for money unconditionally owed to the employee” and, therefore, such

releases “confer[] an uncompensated, unevaluated, and unfair benefit on the
employer.” Moreno, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1351–52 (footnote omitted). As such, “[a]
compromise of an FLSA claim that contains a pervasive release of unknown claims
fails judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 1352.
Nevertheless, courts in this District have approved such provisions where a

plaintiff received adequate, additional consideration in exchange, even where plaintiffs
comprised their FLSA claims. Deslandes v. BAM-B Enterprises of Cent. Fla., Inc., No.
6:17-cv-1393-Orl-41TBS, 2018 WL 3352937, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2018)
(approving FLSA settlement where plaintiff compromised the FLSA claim and

received $300 in separate consideration), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:17-
cv-1393-Orl-41TBS, 2018 WL 3344380 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 2018); Cooley v. Real Prop.
Specialists, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-752-Orl-41GJK, 2018 WL 5847423, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct.
4, 2018) (approving FLSA settlement where plaintiff compromised the FLSA claim
and received $500 in separate consideration for a general release), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 6:18-cv-752-Orl-41GJK, 2018 WL 5840508 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 8, 2018).
Here, Plaintiff Teran is receiving $2,000 as consideration for the non-
disparagement clause and the Release. (Doc. 91 ¶ 15.) Additionally, the parties have
indicated to the Court that Plaintiff Teran is not releasing any additional claims
pursuant to any separate agreement with Defendant. (Doc. 89.) This leads me to
conclude that the separate consideration is adequate. See Owens v. SSRMI, LLC, No.
5:16-cv-15-Oc-PGB-PRL, 2017 WL 2190646, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2017), report

and recommendation adopted sub nom. Owens v. SSRM1, LLC, 2017 WL 2172089 (M.D.
Fla. May 17, 2017) (explaining that in order for a court to make an informed
determination as to whether a general release affects the fairness and reasonableness
of a settlement, an explanation regarding any other claims that a plaintiff is knowingly

releasing and identification of any additional consideration given in exchange must be
discussed). Therefore, I conclude that the Release does not “undermine the public
policies embodied in the FLSA and other labor and employment laws.” Wilburn v.
Paradise Lawns and Landscaping, Inc. et al, 6:14-cv-1557-Orl-37TBS, 2015 WL
13793352, at *3 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2015) (citing Dees, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1242),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:14-cv-1557-Orl-37TBS, 2015 WL 13793264
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2015).
ii. Remaining Plaintiffs
The remaining eight Plaintiffs have agreed to a release in substantially the same
form, as follows:

In exchange for, and in consideration of, the payments,
benefits, and other commitments described above,
[PLAINTIFF] knowingly and voluntarily releases and
forever discharges, to the full extent permitted by law,
FAVORITE HEALTHCARE STAFFING, INC., and
Favorite Healthcare Staffing, LLC, ICS US Holdings, Inc.,
Acacium Group Limited, FHS Holdings, Inc., and
Kompass Kapital Management, LLC (all singularly and
collectively referred to in this provision as the “Released
Parties”), of and from any and all wage and hour claims,
known and unknown, accrued and unaccrued, asserted and
unasserted, [PLAINTIFF] has or may have against the
Released Parties as of the date of execution of this
Agreement, including, but not limited to, any alleged
violation of:

• The Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended;
• The Florida Minimum Wage Act and any other Florida
wage payment laws;
• Fla. Stat. §448.08;
• Any other federal, state or local regulation or ordinance
relating to wages and/or compensation;
• Any public policy, contract, tort, or common law claims for
wages and/or compensation; and
• Any claim for costs, fees, or other expenses including
attorneys’ fees incurred in these matters.

The parties acknowledge that this Agreement shall not
apply to rights or claims that may arise after the Effective
Date. Additionally, nothing in this paragraph or this
Agreement is intended to limit or restrict any rights that
cannot, by express and unequivocal terms of law, be
limited, waived, or extinguished. Further, nothing in this
paragraph or this Agreement is intended to limit or restrict
[PLAINTIFF’s] right to file a timely motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal of the September 26, 2022
Order.

(Docs. 91-2, 91-3, 91-4, 91-5, 91-6, 91-7, 91-8, 91-9 ¶ 4) (the “remaining Plaintiffs’
Release”). Unlike with Plaintiff Teran, the remaining Plaintiffs receive no additional
compensation for their releases; however, their releases are limited to “wage and hour
claims,” as opposed to Plaintiff Teran’s general release.
Judges in this District have found releases similar to the one presented here to
pass judicial scrutiny because it does not require Plaintiffs to release unknown claims
that are unrelated to their FLSA claims. Pond v. Red Lambda, Inc., No. 6:19-cv-1975-
ORL-37EJK, 2020 WL 4808744, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2020) (recommending
approval of release of “unpaid wage and hou[r] and/or related claims arising solely
out of the same facts or circumstances related to those in the above-captioned action”),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:19-cv-1975-ORL-37EJK, 2020 WL 4785449
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2020); Batchelor v. Gen. Mar. Corp., No. 6:15-cv-2082-Orl-41KRS,
2016 WL 4467136, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2016) (approving release where it was
“limited to wage claims.”); Monahan v. Rehoboth Hosp., Inc., 6:15-cv-1159-Orl-40KRS,

2015 WL 9258244, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2015) (“The undersigned sides with those
decisions holding that a release in an FLSA settlement is generally reasonable so long
as it is narrowly-tailored to the wage claims asserted in the complaint.”). Therefore,
because the remaining Plaintiffs’ Release provision releases only FLSA claims against
Defendant and does not seek to release other non-related claims against unnamed

parties, I recommend that the Court find that this Release passes judicial scrutiny. See
Moreno, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1351–52 (footnote omitted).
IV. RECOMMENDATION

Upon consideration of the foregoing, I RESPECTFULLY RECOMMEND
that the Court:
1. GRANT the parties’ Amended Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement
Agreement (Doc. 91);
2. FIND that the parties’ Settlement Agreements are a fair and reasonable
resolution of a bona fide dispute under the FLSA;
3. DISMISS the Complaint (Doc. 1) WITH PREJUDICE; and
A, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to close the file.
NOTICE TO PARTIES
The party has fourteen days from the date the party is served a copy of this
report to file written objections to this report’s proposed findings and
recommendations or to seek an extension of the fourteen-day deadline to file written
objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s failure to file written objections waives
that party’s right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual finding or legal
conclusion the district judge adopts from the Report and Recommendation. See 11th
Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
If the parties do not object to this Report and Recommendation, then they
may expedite the approval process by filing notices of no objection.
Recommended in Orlando, Florida on April 14, 2023.

aM J. KIDD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10742203. Public record. Not legal advice.