# Harris v. State of Tennessee

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · November 12, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10739369

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** November 12, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

RICKY HARRIS, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3: 19-cv-00174
) Judge Richardson/Frensley
CANDACE WHISMAN, )
Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This pro se 42 U.S.C. §1983 action is before the court on sole remaining defendant Candace
Whisman’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Docket No. 177) and Plaintiff Ricky
Harris’s motions for discovery and other matters. Docket Nos. 165-69. Plaintiff opposes the
motion to dismiss, and the motion is ready for disposition. After reviewing the record and the
briefs, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED. The
Plaintiff’s motions will be addressed by separate order.
I. BACKGROUND
Tennessee inmate Ricky Harris and others filed this 42 U.S.C. §1983 action against
defendant Candace Whisman, former Director of Sentence Management Information Services for
the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC), and others, asserting that Tennessee’s statutes
regarding life sentences and calculating sentence credits are unconstitutionally vague in violation
of their rights to due process, and that the TDOC’s process for addressing a prisoner’s request to
recalculate his sentence violates the due process clause and the Eighth Amendment. Docket No.
36, generally. Plaintiff sues Whisman in her official capacity only. Plaintiff has been assisted by
court-appointed counsel during periods of this litigation but is currently proceeding pro se. Harris,
sole remaining plaintiff, alleges the following in his 46-page, second amended complaint.1 He is
currently housed at Bledsoe County Correctional Complex. Docket No. 164, p. 7. Whisman had
broad responsibility for calculating sentences for TDOC prisoners and setting and overseeing those
sentence calculation procedures. Id. at p. 6.
On March 1, 1988, Harris was convicted of first-degree murder, and on May 4, 1988, was

sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Docket No. 164, pp. 9-10, 22, Docket No.
164-1, p. 3. Plaintiff alleges he was tried and convicted under the Class X Felonies Act of 1979,
Criminal Sentence Reform Act of 1982, Judge Sentencing Act of 1982, and the Tennessee
Comprehensive Improvement Act of 1985. Id., p. 10. He alleges that Tennessee relies on a web of
sentencing and parole statutes, many of which incorporate each other by reference. Id. He alleges
that none of the four Acts state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given
criminal statute. Id., p. 10
Plaintiff alleges that he has asked Whisman to calculate or recalculate his sentence, but she
refused to do so. Docket No. 164, p. 13. Plaintiff alleges that Whisman has failed to properly

calculate life sentence credits to reduce the expiration dates of his sentence and failed to list
expiration dates on his inmate sentence summary sheet. Id., at pp. 5, 13.
Plaintiff alleges that Whisman has calculated his sentence length--as an individual
sentenced to life in prison--and calculated sentence credits pursuant to a statutory system that is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1 A review of the record shows that the complaint now before the court is Plaintiff’s third amended
complaint. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on February 22, 2019. Docket No. 1. The court
granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, Docket No. 69, and Harris filed an amended
complaint on January 11, 2021. Docket No. 72. Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint
on September 18, 2023. Docket No. 143. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on June 7, 2024.
Docket No. 164.
Docket No. 164, pp. 11-14. He further alleges that the TDOC, through Whisman, has not
maintained an adequate process for addressing a prisoner’s requests to recalculate his sentence in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id., at p. 17-22. He alleges there is no question
that his life sentence is a determinate sentence, and that Defendant’s processes and procedures are

not adhering to statute. Id., p. 17.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks, among other things, declaratory and injunctive relief that would
require Defendant to recalculate his sentence to include newly applied sentencing credits. Id., pp.
40-43.
Defendant now moves to dismiss on the basis that habeas corpus relief is the exclusive
remedy for Plaintiff’s claim. Docket No. 178. Defendant contends §1983 is not the appropriate
vehicle for an inmate to challenge his sentence calculation or request sentencing credits.
Defendant argues that any such requests must first be made pursuant to the procedures set forth in
the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”), which Plaintiff has failed to do,

specifically, Plaintiff has not previously sought a declaratory order from the state Chancery Court.
The undersigned agrees.
II. DISCUSSION
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the record in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true. See Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 2010). While a complaint
will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
material elements” necessary for recovery under a viable legal theory, this court “need not accept
as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, and conclusory allegations or legal
conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.” Id. at 275-76 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement
to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions....” Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns
& Co., Inc., 683 F.3d 239, 246-47 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Rather, ‘[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Id. at 247 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009)).
A. Section 1983
Plaintiff challenges both the calculation of his sentence and the application of sentencing
credits. The gist of his complaint is the specific amount of time he believes he must serve. Docket
No. 164, pp. 1115. Plaintiff contends the TDOC has miscalculated his sentence because they have
neither issued him an appropriate expiration date, Id. pp. 12, 16, 18, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33-34, nor
have they applied the appropriate credits to his sentence. Id. pp. 29-30, 38.
In his opposition to defendant’s motion, Plaintiff asserts that the relief he seeks would not

necessarily affect the duration of his sentence. Docket No. 179, p. 2. He claims he is not
challenging his sentence calculation or complaining about the award of sentence credits. He states
his claim is based on how Defendant's policies and procedures fail to follow state law in calculating
sentences and violate his constitutional rights with respect to his accrued sentence credits. Id. He
states he is not complaining about not receiving sentence credits and that he has received all
statutorily mandated sentence credits. Id.
An action under §1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for the type of challenge Plaintiff is
presenting, however. See Wilson v. Rutherford Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 3:19-CV-00570, 2019 WL
3574286, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2019) (habeas corpus relief is the exclusive remedy for a claim
of improper sentence calculation due to improperly applied sentencing credits.) “Federal law opens
two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254, and a [Section 1983] complaint.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004).
“Courts have long struggled to mark the appropriate boundary between these two statutes, as ‘it is
sometimes difficult to draw the line’ between them.” Kitchen v. Whitmer, 106 F.4th 525 (6th Cir.

2024) (quoting Dist. Att'y’s Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 76 (2009) (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
In Kitchen, the Sixth Circuit very recently detailed the Supreme Court’s 50-year history
involving the interplay between habeas relief and § 1983, and it is worth repeating here.
The Court first confronted the interplay of §1983 and habeas in Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). When state
prisoners used §1983 to challenge the deprivation of their good-conduct-time
credits, which would cause their immediate release if restored, the Court
acknowledged the “broad language of [§] 1983” but held that inmates must bring
their claims under habeas for three reasons. Id. at 476–77, 489, 93 S.Ct. 1827. First,
the language of the habeas statute is “more specific” than § 1983. Id. at 489, 93
S.Ct. 1827. Second, after reviewing the history of the writ of habeas corpus, the
Court concluded that “in each case” where a prisoner's “grievance is that he is being
unlawfully subjected to physical restraint,” habeas “has been accepted as the
specific instrument to obtain release from such confinement.” Id. at 486, 93 S.Ct.
1827. Third, because §1983 does not require exhaustion of state-law remedies,
allowing claims to proceed under §1983 raised “federal–state comity”
concerns. Id. at 491, 93 S.Ct. 1827. These reasons led the Court to hold that “when
a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to
immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827; see also Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78–79, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (summarizing
that “considerations of linguistic specificity, history, and comity led”
the Preiser Court to hold that claims covered by habeas cannot be brought under §
1983).

The Supreme Court later elaborated on this holding in Heck. There, a state prisoner
brought a §1983 claim seeking damages—but not release from custody—against
state officials who allegedly targeted him with an “unlawful, unreasonable, and
arbitrary investigation.” 512 U.S. at 479, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (citation omitted). In its
key holding, the Court explained that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in
a §1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. at
487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The Supreme Court spoke clearly: If a successful claim
“would necessarily imply the invalidity” of the “conviction or sentence,” then “the
complaint must be dismissed.” Id. Because a successful unlawful investigation
claim would “challenge[ ] the legality of the conviction,” the claim needed to go
through habeas instead of § 1983. Id. at 490, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

That brings us to Wilkinson, the most recent Supreme Court case to address this
issue at length. The two prisoners in Wilkinson requested parole, which the parole
board denied. 544 U.S. at 76–77, 125 S.Ct. 1242. In denying parole, however, the
board applied “parole guidelines first adopted in 1998,” which came after the
prisoners “began to serve” their terms. Id. They both asked a federal district court
to conclude that the use of the 1998 guidelines violated the Due Process Clause and
the Ex Post Facto Clause and sought an injunction that ordered a new parole hearing
under constitutionally proper procedures. Id. at 77, 125 S.Ct. 1242.

To begin its analysis, the Supreme Court surveyed the cases discussed above and
reasoned that, throughout the “legal journey from Preiser” onward, “the Court has
focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus” when
“they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through
an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial
determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's
custody.” Id. at 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242. A §1983 action is thus barred “if success in that
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.” Id. at 81–82, 125 S.Ct. 1242. Applying that rule, the Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs’ claims were “cognizable under § 1983” because neither prisoner
sought “an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release,” and “a favorable
judgment” would “not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or
sentences.” Id. at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (cleaned up).

Our circuit applied this rule in two cases relevant here. In Wershe v. Combs, a state
prisoner's “initial opportunity for parole was denied after a public hearing in 2003,”
and the board decided not to consider him for parole again until 2017. 763 F.3d
500, 502 (6th Cir. 2014). The prisoner alleged that he was procedurally given only
cursory consideration. Id. At 505-06 (complaining of “perfunctory consideration,”
the parole board's failure to interview him, and its refusal to explain its reasoning).
The prisoner brought a §1983 suit against Michigan Parole Board members
“alleging that the parole consideration process did not afford him a meaningful
opportunity for release,” id. at 502, essentially bringing a claim under Graham.
Rather than challenge a specific statute, the prisoner challenged parole procedures
and administration: The inmate “does not seek direct release from prison or a
shorter sentence; he seeks a change in the procedures used to determine whether he
is eligible for parole.” Wershe, 763 F.3d at 504. Because success would “not
necessarily affect the duration of his sentence because prison officials would retain
discretion regarding whether to grant him parole,” the Heck line of cases did not
bar the §1983 claim. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir.
2007)).

Three years later, this court addressed a similar question in Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d
193 (6th Cir. 2017). The plaintiffs in Hill asserted that Michigan's “policies and
procedures governing access to prison programming and parole eligibility,
consideration, and release deny them a meaningful opportunity for release on parole
before the end of their natural lives.” Id. at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Hill court noted that “claims that ordinarily fall within the scope of §1983 are
unavailable to prisoners if they necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or
sentence.” Id. at 207 (cleaned up). And the “word ‘necessarily’ must not be
ignored—if invalidation of a conviction or speedier release would not automatically
flow from success on the §1983 claim, then the Heck doctrine is
inapplicable.” Id. The court then reasoned that, because the prisoners “do not seek
direct release from prison or a shorter sentence, but instead seek an examination”
of the parole “policies and procedures,” this “circuit has already expressly found
such challenges cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 210.

A clear and consistent two-part rule emerges from this precedential backdrop.
Prisoners can “use only habeas corpus” if “they seek to invalidate the duration of
their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier
release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the
unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242. So
prisoners can “proceed under § 1983” if (1) they do not seek an “injunction ordering
immediate or speedier release into the community,” and (2) “a favorable judgment
would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or
sentences.” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 533–34, 131 S.Ct. 1289 (cleaned up). The
Supreme Court most recently summarized it this way: The “simplest cases” for
when a claim must be brought through habeas “arise when an inmate, alleging a
flaw in his conviction or sentence, seeks immediate or speedier release from
prison,” but the “[s]lightly less obvious” cases occur “when the relief he seeks
would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’ ” Nance v.
Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 168, 142 S.Ct. 2214, 213 L.Ed.2d 499 (2022) (quoting Heck,
512 U.S. at 481, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364). These less obvious cases nevertheless “lie
within the core of habeas corpus.” Id. at 167, 142 S.Ct. 2214 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

With this legal rule in mind, we turn to this case. The district court below—and
now Kitchen on appeal—reason that Kitchen's requested relief would not
necessarily lead to an early release from prison, so Kitchen can bring his claim
under § 1983. R.31, pp.4–5, PageID 153–54; Appellee Br. at 19–20. Defendants
disagree. They contend that it is “flawed” to focus on whether Kitchen will get an
early release because it ignores whether success for Kitchen would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his sentence. Appellants Br. at 47, 49–53. And Defendants
believe there is “no way for Kitchen to challenge Michigan's parole jurisdiction
statute” without “invalidating his underlying criminal sentence.” Id. at 32.
Defendants have the better argument. We hold that Kitchen's claim must be brought
through habeas for two reasons. First, the district court focused solely on whether
a successful claim would spell an early release for Kitchen and overlooked whether
the claim implicates the validity of his sentence. Second, once we apply the correct
legal test, we see that Kitchen's claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
sentence if successful. The relief granted by the district court and its own reasoning
demonstrate this very point.

First, the correct legal test. As mentioned, the district court analyzed only whether
Kitchen's requested relief would lead to a quicker release and ignored the question
of invalidity, an essential part of the Supreme Court's test. Indeed, our court has
emphasized that a focus only on whether a challenge will lead to a speedier release
is a “crabbed reading” of Supreme Court caselaw. Sampson v. Garrett, 917 F.3d
880, 882 (6th Cir. 2019) (criticizing Fuller v. Nelson, 128 F. App'x 584, 586 (9th
Cir. 2005), because Fuller reasoned that Heck does not apply when the requested
relief would not yield immediate release). The Supreme Court does “not
consider Heck inapplicable only because the claims’ success would not mean
release.” Id. (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242). Rather, the
Supreme Court has “emphasized” that “new parole procedures (or even a grant of
parole for that matter) would not imply the invalidity of the prisoners’ original
sentences.” Id. (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 83–84, 125 S.Ct.
1242). Sampson thus clarifies that courts must consider both speedier
release and invalidation of the sentence to remain faithful to Supreme Court
guidance.

Kitchen, 106 F. 4th at 525, 537-40.

Defendant counters that like Kitchen, Plaintiff has attempted to satisfy only one part of the
Supreme Court’s test and he ignores the question of the validity of his conviction or sentence.
Defendant notes Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s alleged actions have denied him both a “timely
release” or a “meaningful opportunity for release.” Docket No. 164, pp. 17-19.
As outlined above in Kitchen, habeas is the exclusive remedy for any such claims implying
an unlawfulness of custody.
Here, Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering speedier release by reducing his sentence
expiration date by application of sentencing credits. Docket No. 164, p. 42. Granting his requested
injunction to recalculate his sentence by applying certain credits would necessarily imply the
invalidity of the TDOC’s current sentence calculation. Plaintiff’s §1983 claim fails both prongs
of the Kitchen test and thereby fails to state a claim for relief.
B. Failure to Exhaust
Defendant also contends Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
state remedies because he has not filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Davidson County

Chancery Court. The undersigned agrees.
In Tennessee, an inmate seeking to challenge the award of post-judgment sentence
reduction credits, including “good time” or behavior credits, for example, must follow the
procedures set forth in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). See Yates v.
Parker, 371 S. W. 3d, 152, 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“The proper avenue to address post-
judgment jail credit for prisoners is through the TDOC administratively.”). Plaintiff here must
similarly follow the UAPA to challenge his sentence expiration date or release eligibility date. See
Hughley v. State, 208 S. W. 3d 388, 395 (Tenn. 2006) “[t]he validity of any sentence reduction
credits must be addressed through the avenues of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.”,

quoting Carroll v. Raney, 868 S. W. 2d 721, 723 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (emphasis added).
Under the UAPA, to exhaust a sentence calculation challenge, an inmate must first seek a
declaratory order regarding the sentence calculation from the TDOC. Stewart v. Schofield, 368 S.
W. 3d 457, 464 (Tenn. 2012); Bonner v. Tenn. Dep’t. of Corr., 84 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2001) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-5-225(b)). If the TDOC refuses to issue a declaratory
order, the petitioner may seek judicial review by seeking a declaratory judgment in the chancery
court and may appeal the chancery court’s adverse decision to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
Stewart, 368 S.W.3d at 464; Bonner, 84 S. W. 3d at 578.
Here, Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that he submitted a motion for declaratory order to
the TDOC and was denied his request. Docket No. 164, p. 5. He has failed to pursue judicial relief
as required under the UAPA by seeking a declaratory judgment in the chancery court.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim (Docket No. 177) be GRANTED and Plaintiffs claims
be DISMISSED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to
this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have
fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any
response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this
Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed. 2d 435 (1985),
reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

— 2 Xe
eee
United States Magistrate Judge

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10739369. Public record. Not legal advice.