# Williams v. United States

> United States Court of Federal Claims · October 18, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10733754

## Case

- **Court:** United States Court of Federal Claims
- **Decided:** October 18, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Elaine D. Kaplan
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
(Pro Se)

)
DEWAYNE A. WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 23-1965C
v. ) (Filed: October 18, 2024)
)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Defendant. )
)
)
)

Dewayne A. Williams, Pro Se, The Colony, Tex.

Collin T. Mathias, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Washington, D.C., with whom were William J. Grimaldi, Assistant Director,
Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, for Defendant. Captain Andrei Kouzema, U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the
Judge Advocate General, General Litigation Division, Of Counsel.

OPINION AND ORDER

KAPLAN, Chief Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Dewayne A. Williams was administratively separated from the United
States Navy in 2016 under other than honorable conditions. His administrative separation
followed court-martial proceedings during which he entered guilty pleas to multiple criminal
charges.

In this action, which is currently before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the
administrative record, Mr. Williams contends that the Navy violated his pretrial agreement and
the general court-martial order by administratively separating him rather than transferring him to
the Fleet Reserve. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Mr. Williams’
arguments lack merit. Therefore, Mr. Williams’ motion is DENIED, and the government’s
cross-motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND

I. The Charges Against Mr. Williams

Mr. Williams enlisted in the Navy in September 1993 and served on active duty for over
22 years as an Information Systems Technician. Admin. R. (“AR”) at 0048, 0079, Docket No.
12. In June 2015, Mr. Williams received notice that multiple criminal charges and specifications
against him had been referred to a general court-martial. Id. at 0071–76. The charges included,
among others, engaging in sexually inappropriate and physically intimidating conduct with
sailors junior in rank to him, wrongfully intercepting electronic communications, making false
official statements to law enforcement officials, willfully disobeying and violating lawful orders,
and wrongfully destroying another sailor’s personal property. Id. at 73–76.

II. Mr. Williams’ Pretrial Agreement

Beginning in December 2015, Mr. Williams was confined pending trial at Fleet
Activities Yokosuka, in Japan. AR at 0077. On January 6, 2016, Mr. Williams—who was then
represented by counsel—entered a pretrial agreement (“PTA”) with Rear Admiral M.J. Carter,
the convening authority.1 Id. at 0024–38. Mr. Williams agreed to plead guilty to most of the
charges against him. Id. at 0028–34. In return, Rear Admiral Carter agreed to withdraw the
remaining charges. Id. at 0027. Rear Admiral Carter also agreed to (1) remit any punitive
discharge Mr. Williams received from the general court-martial; (2) suspend any sentence of
confinement in excess of eight years; (3) limit any fines adjudged against Mr. Williams to
$5,000.00; and (4) suspend a reduction in rank below the pay grade of E-5 for the period of Mr.
Williams’ confinement. Id. at 0036–37.

In addition, the PTA contained the following provision, which serves as the basis for Mr.
Williams’ claims in this case:

I further understand that I will not receive any pay or allowances during any
period of confinement I may serve. This Convening Authority will not initiate any
administrative separation processing that may interfere with my request for
transfer to Fleet Reserve. In addition, this Convening Authority will endorse the
transfer to Fleet Reserve at the paygrade of E-5 or that which was adjudged,
whichever is higher. However, this does not preclude any subsequent Convening
Authority from initiating a separation action triggered by a request for transfer to
Fleet Reserve. In exchange, I will immediately submit my request for transfer to
Fleet Reserve. I will request transfer to the Fleet Reserve but this agreement does
not affect the outcome of any administrative separation that results in a retirement
grade determination board.

1
A “convening authority” is a commanding officer who has the authority to convene a court-
martial. See Manual for Courts-Martial, Part II, Rules for Courts-Martial 103(6), 504(a),
504(b)(1) (2012); 10 U.S.C. § 822(a).

2
Id. at 0037.

III. General Court-Martial, Sentencing, and Transfer

At his January 13, 2016 court-martial, Mr. Williams entered guilty pleas to a number of
the charges as provided in the PTA. AR at 0040–45, 0048. The presiding military judge
sentenced him to be “reduced to the paygrade of E1 . . . confined for 12 years . . . and
. . . discharged from the Naval Service with a Dishonorable Discharge.” Id. at 0054; see also id.
at 0020, 0045. Consistent with the PTA, Rear Admiral Carter then directed that Mr. Williams’
sentence be reduced to eight years and that his dishonorable discharge be suspended for the
period of confinement and remitted without further action. Id. at 0045–46; see also id. at 0020–
21.

After sentencing, Mr. Williams was once again confined at Fleet Activities Yokosuka. Id.
at 0054. On February 29, 2016, he was transferred to Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar to serve
the remainder of his sentence in accordance with permanent change of station orders. Id. at 0284;
see Naval Mil. Pers. Manual (“MILPERSMAN”) 1640-030 (identifying Naval Consolidated
Brig Miramar as a confinement facility for “members serving adjusted sentences not to exceed
10 years”). At Miramar, he was attached to a new commanding officer (the Commanding Officer
of Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar) and a different court-martial convening authority (the
Commander of Navy Personnel Command).

IV. Mr. Williams’ Administrative Separation

On April 15, 2016, in accordance with paragraph 2 of MILPERSMAN 1616-040, which
details commanding officers’ reporting obligations following courts-martial proceedings, the
Commanding Officer of Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar submitted a report regarding Mr.
Williams’ misconduct to the Commander of Navy Personnel Command. AR at 008. The report
included the results of the court-martial and the Commanding Officer’s request that Mr.
Williams be administratively separated from the Navy “with an Other Than Honorable
Characterization of Service due to a guilty finding of serious misconduct.” Id.; see also
MILPERSMAN 1616-040 ¶ 2(c) (If at the conclusion of the court-martial, the defendant was
found guilty but a discharge was not awarded, “the [commanding officer] must provide a
recommendation for or against administrative separation processing.”).

On May 24, 2016, the convening authority that then had jurisdiction over Mr. Williams,
the Commander of Navy Personnel Command, directed that Mr. Williams be processed for
administrative separation pursuant to, among other provisions, MILPERSMAN 1910-142, which
sets forth policies and procedures for separating service members who commit serious offenses.
AR at 0007, 0048. Mr. Williams received notice of his processing on November 14, 2016. Id. at
0004–06; see MILPERSMAN 1910-402 ¶ 1(b). He affirmatively waived his rights to counsel
and an administrative board. AR at 0004.

The processing notice also advised Mr. Williams of his right to request transfer to the
Fleet Reserve in lieu of administrative separation, but he neither indicated that he was electing

3
that right nor waiving it. Id. at 0005. Likewise, he refused to sign an acknowledgement that he
had received the notice. Id.

On December 2, 2016, the Commanding Officer of Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar
sent the Commander of Navy Region Southwest a formal recommendation that Mr. Williams be
administratively separated. Id. at 0002–03. The Commander of Navy Region Southwest then
forwarded the recommendation to the Commander of Navy Personnel Command on December
19, 2016. Id. at 0001–03. The Commanding Officer stated in the recommendation that Mr.
Williams’ “serious misconduct is detrimental to operational readiness and is inconsistent with
Navy core values.” Id. at 0003. The Commanding Officer concluded that Mr. Williams “has no
potential for further naval service due to his behavior and therefore should be separated for
misconduct—commission of a serious offense.” Id.

As noted, Mr. Williams did not request transfer to the Fleet Reserve in the form that
notified him of his administrative separation. Id. at 0005. Nonetheless, the Chief of Naval
Personnel considered whether such a transfer was appropriate and, concluding that it was not,
recommended that the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs “administratively separate [Mr. Williams] with an Other than Honorable characterization
of service” rather than transfer him to the Fleet Reserve. Id. at 0048–50.

On October 16, 2017, the Acting Assistant Secretary concurred with the
recommendation, citing Mr. Williams’ “egregious and prolonged misconduct.” Id. at 0051. The
Acting Assistant Secretary directed that Mr. Williams be administratively separated, as
recommended, with an other than honorable characterization of service. Id.

V. The Present Action

On November 3, 2023, Mr. Williams filed his complaint in this court. Compl., Docket
No. 1. In his complaint, he alleges that, in separating him from the Navy and not transferring him
to the Fleet Reserve, the Navy violated the PTA as well as the terms of his general court-martial
order, which he says stated that he would be returned to the pay grade of E-5 upon release from
confinement. Id. at 1–2. He seeks an order directing the Navy to transfer him to the Fleet
Reserve, retroactive to 2016, and an award of the back pay that he alleges he would have
received had he been transferred at that time. Id. at 3.

The government filed the administrative record on February 22, 2024. On March 15,
2024, Mr. Williams filed his motion for judgment on the administrative record. Pl.’s Mot. for J.
on Admin. R. (“Pl.’s MJAR”), Docket No. 13. The government filed its cross-motion on May
15, 2024. Def.’s Cross-Mot. for J. on Admin. R. and Resp. to Pl.’s MJAR (“Def.’s MJAR”),
Docket No. 17. Mr. Williams filed his response to the government’s cross-motion on May 29,
2024. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s MJAR and Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s MJAR (“Pl.’s Resp.”), Docket No.
18. The government filed its reply on June 12, 2024. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Def.’s MJAR
(“Def.’s Reply”), Docket No. 19.

The Court held an oral argument on the parties’ cross-motions on September 30, 2024.
See Order, Docket No. 20.

4
DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

The Court of Federal Claims reviews decisions of military officials on the basis of the
administrative record. See, e.g., Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Parties may move for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to RCFC 52.1. In ruling on
such a motion, the Court makes “factual findings from the record evidence as if it were
conducting a trial on the record.” Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1353–54 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).

The scope of review of a military official’s decision is a narrow and deferential one.
Prestonback v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 380, 383 (2018). The Court is “limited to determining
whether a decision . . . is arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary
to applicable statutes and regulations.” Melendez Camilo v. United States, 642 F.3d 1040, 1044
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

Application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review “does not require a
reweighing of the evidence, but a determination whether the conclusion being reviewed is
supported by substantial evidence.” Heisig, 719 F.2d at 1157. Substantial evidence is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Strand v. United States, 951 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court may not “substitute [its] judgment for that
of the military departments when reasonable minds could reach differing conclusions on the
same evidence.” Heisig, 719 F.2d at 1156.

II. The Navy’s Decision to Process Mr. Williams for Administrative Separation Rather
than Transfer Him to the Fleet Reserve Was Consistent with Its Regulations and the
Pretrial Agreement

Mr. Williams argues that the Navy erred in processing him for administrative separation
and that it should have instead transferred him to the Fleet Reserve. Pl.’s MJAR at 2–4. This
argument lacks merit. The Navy’s actions were consistent with, and in fact compelled by, its
regulations and, as described below, did not violate the PTA.

A. The Navy Followed Its Rules that Mandated Processing Mr. Williams for
Administrative Separation

The Navy’s administrative separation policy provides a means for it to, among other
things, “[a]ssess the suitability of persons to serve on the basis of their conduct and their ability
to meet the required standards of performance” and “[m]aintain standards of performance and
conduct through characterization of service in a system that emphasizes the importance of
honorable service.” MILPERSMAN 1910-010 ¶ 1(a)–(b). Navy rules provide that “[c]ertain
bases for administrative separation . . . are so detrimental to good order and discipline, mission
readiness, and appropriate standards of performance and conduct, that processing for
[administrative separation] is mandatory.” MILPERSMAN 1910-233 ¶ 1. For example,

5
commanding officers must process individuals for separation where they engage in “sexual
misconduct that could be charged as a violation of . . . articles 120, 120a, 120b, or 120c” of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. MILPERSMAN 1910-233 ¶ 1(a). Mr. Williams pleaded
guilty to violations of Article 120a (stalking). AR at 0042–43, 0048, 0054, 0058–60. Therefore,
Navy rules required Mr. Williams’ commanding officer to process him for administrative
separation.

Further, where, as here, a sailor’s misconduct requires administrative separation
processing, the commanding officer must consider whether the circumstances surrounding the
misconduct warrant an other than honorable characterization of service. See MILPERSMAN
1910-233 ¶ 1; MILPERSMAN 1910-142 ¶ 4. If so, then the sailor must be notified that they are
entitled to an administrative separation hearing and other rights. MILPERSMAN 1910-142 ¶ 4;
see also MILPERSMAN 1910-402. The sailor may choose to waive their rights and, if they do
so, the commanding officer must provide all applicable reasons for separation and assign the
sailor a characterization of service that, normally, is “commensurate with [the] least favorable
reason for processing.” MILPERSMAN 1910-708 ¶ 1(a)–(b); see also AR at 0004.

As described above, these procedures were followed in Mr. Williams’ case. His
commanding officer at Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar processed him for administrative
separation based on his “commission of a serious offense,” recommending that he be separated
with an other than honorable characterization of service. AR at 0002–03, 0008. The
recommendation went up the chain of command until it received final approval from the Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Id. at 0048–51. To the
extent, therefore, that Mr. Williams contends that the Navy did not follow its own regulations in
processing his administrative separation, or that its decision to discharge him was otherwise
arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to law, that argument lacks merit.

B. The Navy’s Decision Not to Transfer Mr. Williams to the Fleet Reserve Was
Consistent with Its Rules

The Navy also complied with its regulations in declining to transfer Mr. Williams to the
Fleet Reserve in lieu of separation. Under 10 U.S.C. § 8330(b) “[a]n enlisted member of the
Regular Navy or the Navy Reserve who has completed 20 or more years of active service in the
armed forces may, at his request, be transferred to the Fleet Reserve.” Once transferred, the
service member is “entitled, when not on active duty, to retainer pay.” 10 U.S.C. § 8330(c)(1). A
member of the Fleet Reserve who has completed thirty years of service is automatically
transferred to the retired list pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 8331(a)(1).

A decision whether to transfer an eligible sailor to the Fleet Reserve lies within the
exclusive discretion of the Secretary of the Navy. See Lowry v. United States, No. 20-682C,
2021 WL 4888874, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 19, 2021); Pope v. United States, 172 Fed. Cl. 149, 157
(2024); see also MILPERSMAN 1910-166 ¶ 1 (“Congress has granted authority to the Secretary
of the Navy (SECNAV) to approve requests to transfer those enlisted personnel who complete
20 years of creditable active duty service to the Fleet Reserve. The discretion of SECNAV to
approve such transfers is absolute.”).

6
MILPERSMAN 1830-040 provides the eligibility criteria for requesting a transfer to the
Fleet Reserve and procedures for initiating the request. It also prescribes criteria that disqualify
sailors from eligibility to initiate a request to transfer to the Fleet Reserve, including where a
sailor is “serving a sentence of a court-martial[.]” MILPERSMAN 1830-040 ¶ 4(a)(2).

Mr. Williams contends that in light of this provision, the Navy lacked the authority to
process any request on his behalf to be transferred to the Fleet Reserve. Pl.’s MJAR at 3–4. It is
unclear to the Court how this argument helps Mr. Williams, who claims that the Navy should
have transferred him. See id. at 4. Indeed, the regulations at MILPERSMAN 1910-166 gave Mr.
Williams the option to request transfer to the Fleet Reserve notwithstanding his court-martial
conviction and sentencing. Paragraph 4 of those regulations provides that a sailor serving a
sentence of a court-martial may be considered for transfer to the Fleet Reserve if they “request a
waiver of [administrative separation] processing” for that purpose. See also OPNAVINST
1811.3A ¶ 3(b) (“[T]ransfer to the Fleet Reserve of enlisted members in lieu of administrative
separation is covered in [MILPERSMAN 1910-166].”).

To be sure, Mr. Williams did not request transfer to the Fleet Reserve in lieu of
administrative separation. AR at 0005. The Chief of Naval Personnel nonetheless considered
whether to transfer Mr. Williams to the Fleet Reserve. Id. at 0048–50. But the Court fails to see
how the Navy’s decision to consider transferring Mr. Williams harmed him in any way. Mr.
Williams had affirmatively waived his right to an administrative board, and, in any event, the
Navy declined to transfer him. Id. at 0004, 0051.

Further, even had Mr. Williams affirmatively elected to be considered for a transfer to
the Fleet Reserve, the result would be the same—denial of his request. As noted, the Acting
Assistant Secretary concurred with the Chief of Naval Personnel’s recommendation not to
transfer Mr. Williams and denied the transfer in light of Mr. Williams’ misconduct. Id. at 0048–
51. That action was consistent with the MILPERSMAN 1910-166, paragraph 1, which states that
the Secretary of the Navy “may deny . . . requests [for transfer to the Fleet Reserve] . . . based on
the member’s service, conduct, performance, or for any other reason which is supported by
sufficient evidence.” Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Williams challenges the Acting Assistant
Secretary’s decision denying him a transfer to the Fleet Reserve, his arguments lack merit.

C. The Pretrial Agreement

Finally, Mr. Williams contends that the Navy violated paragraph 6 of his pretrial
agreement. Pl.’s MJAR at 2, 4. According to Mr. Williams, paragraph 6 precluded the Navy
from processing him for administrative separation and required that Rear Admiral Carter endorse
his transfer to the Fleet Reserve at the pay grade of E-5. Id.; see also AR at 0037.

Paragraph 6 is not a model of clarity. Nonetheless, there is nothing in its language that
prohibited the Navy from processing Mr. Williams for administrative separation when it did so.
Nor is there anything in paragraph 6 that precluded the Navy from denying him a transfer to the
Fleet Reserve.

7
Paragraph 6 provides that “[t]his Convening Authority will not initiate any administrative
separation processing that may interfere with my request for transfer to Fleet Reserve.” AR at
0037 (emphasis added). It further states that “this Convening Authority will endorse the transfer
to Fleet Reserve at the paygrade of E-5 or that which was adjudged, whichever is higher.” Id.
(emphasis added). But paragraph 6 also states that “this does not preclude any subsequent
Convening Authority from initiating a separation action triggered by a request for transfer to
Fleet Reserve.” Id. (emphasis added).

In this case, the “subsequent Convening Authority” (the Commander of Navy Personnel
Command) and not “this Convening Authority” (Rear Admiral Carter) initiated the separation
action. See id. at 0007, 0048. Further, because the initial convening authority (Rear Admiral
Carter) no longer had jurisdiction over Mr. Williams when his transfer to the Fleet Reserve was
under consideration, it had no role to play in “endorsing” Mr. Williams’ transfer at any particular
grade. See id. at 0037.

Finally, whatever obligations the Navy took on in paragraph 6 of the PTA were “[i]n
exchange” for Mr. Williams requesting a transfer to the Fleet Reserve. Id. Mr. Williams never
made such a request. For that reason as well, it does not appear that the Navy was obligated to do
anything further under paragraph 6.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Williams’ motion for judgment on the administrative record,
Docket No. 13, is DENIED. The government’s cross-motion, Docket No. 17, is GRANTED.
The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELAINE D. KAPLAN
Chief Judge

8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10733754. Public record. Not legal advice.