# Tartt v. Martin

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · June 25, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10731751

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** June 25, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10731751

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD

JASON B. TARTT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-00327

DALTON T. MARTIN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court is defendants’ amended motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 46). For the reasons explained
below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Background

This case arises from a police interaction, in which
plaintiff Jason Tartt was arrested and charged with obstruction
of law enforcement officers for “refus[ing] to give his
information to identify him[,]” (McDowell Cty. Criminal Compl.,
ECF No. 46-2), despite providing his name when initially
requested.
On a motion for summary judgment, courts “view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and refrain
from “weighing the evidence or making credibility
determinations.” Lee v. Town of Seaboard, 863 F.3d 323, 327
(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jacobs v. North Carolina Admin. Off. of
the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, the
court recites the following facts in the light most favorable to
Mr. Tartt and his fellow plaintiffs.

On August 7, 2020, the Chief Deputy of the McDowell County
Sheriff’s Department, defendant James “Boomer” Muncy, received
an investigative tip on Facebook. (See ECF No. 46-3). The
sender of the Facebook messages, Michelle Bradley, informed
Chief Deputy Muncy that she had reason to believe “they” were
growing marijuana in “the black camp”:
Hey up there where budda used to live
in the camp they say it smelled like
marijuana so bad the smell would knock u
out. I know that they are growing it up
there maybe just check it out if you wanted
too [sic]. Thanks so much for checking on
us als0 [sic].

. . . .

Budda little fon. His name was Willard
Allen. But the exact directions is go up
the holler and instead of going towards
where Ramona Benton lives turn across that
first wooden bridge where that church is the
camp. Rex and them all said you can smell
it really strong as you go in the black
camp[.]

Id. To investigate the tip, Chief Deputy Muncy assigned
defendant Dalton Martin, who was then a Sheriff’s Deputy. (See
Muncy Dep. Tr. at 10:4-5, ECF No. 46-6).
That evening, Deputy Martin, accompanied by defendant
Deputy Jordan Horn, interviewed Ms. Bradley at her home. (See
Horn Dep. Tr. at 15:10-17, ECF No. 50-3). She told them the
general area where the suspected marijuana was being grown and,
according to Deputy Horn, she specifically told them that

“there’s a church located up in that area, and she had stated
that up by that church there was a strong odor of marijuana in
that area and her kids had told her that because they ride ATVs
in that area.” (Id. at 16:17-24). She then gave them
directions “to where the church was.” (Id. at 20:16-20).
Armed with this information, the deputies went to
investigate. On their route to the church, they drove down a
gravel driveway that led to two houses and a dead-end. (See id.
at 21:10-16). Beyond the end of the driveway, and up a “well-
worn” ATV trail a good distance from the two houses, and on a
separately owned property, was the church described by Ms.
Bradley. (See id. at 27:12-21, 29:5-6). Defendants describe

the church and the trail leading to it as appearing to be “open
to the public, and there are no signs indicating that the road
is private property, nor a barrier limiting access to the
public.” (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 14, ECF No. 47).
Before investigating the area around the church, however,
the deputies knocked on the door of the house closest to the ATV
trail. (See Horn Dep. Tr. at 23:1-2, ECF No. 50-3). When no
one answered, the deputies turned their attention to the house
further from the ATV trail where plaintiffs Donnie and Ventriss
Hairston, a retired African American couple, lived. (See id. at
23:1-18). The Hairstons allege that they “initially waved at
[Deputy Martin] as he approached [but] as he neared, [he]

appeared to be agitated and angry.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 13, ECF
No. 3). They allege that then “[w]ithout providing any context,
or asking any other questions, [Deputy Martin] immediately asked
[them] if they were growing marijuana.” (Id.). This account is
undisputed insofar as Deputy Martin “just come out and asked
them if they growed [sic] marijuana.” (Horn Dep. Tr. at 23:6-7,
ECF No. 50-3).
The Hairstons, who had recently moved to McDowell County,
allege that they felt threatened by the officers and called
their landlord, a longtime resident of McDowell County, Mr.
Tartt. (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 15-16, ECF No. 3; Tartt Dep. at
42:15-43:1-21, ECF No. 50-5). Mr. Tartt rented the two homes to

Hairstons and their neighbors, the Fergusons. (See id). Mr.
Tartt and the Fergusons were African American as well. (See id.
¶ 80; Pls.’ Resp. at 17, ECF No. 50). The Hairstons informed
Mr. Tartt that “police officers had arrived on the properties
owned by him, and were walking around, looking through windows
and had accused the Hairstons of growing marijuana.” (Am.
Compl. at ¶ 16, ECF No. 3). Mr. Tartt lived nearby and began
driving his side-by-side utility vehicle to the Hairston’s home
in response to their call. (See Tartt Dep. Tr. at 42:15-22, ECF
No. 50-5).
In the meantime, the deputies walked up the ATV trail and

beyond the church to a neighboring property where they
discovered what they believed to be four marijuana plants. (See
Horn Dep. Tr. at 26:11-14, 29:2-6, ECF No. 50-3). Deputy Horn
testified that there “was also a bag of Miracle-Gro laying on
the ground beside of the marijuana.” (Id. at 29:3-4). When they
returned down the trail and back to the Hairston residence,
Deputy Horn claims that he also saw a bag of Miracle-Gro in an
ATV parked in front of the Ferguson residence. (See id. at
29:7-11). When the deputies returned to the Hairston residence,
Mr. Tartt had joined them on the front porch. (See id. at 31:5-
8).
At this point, Deputy Martin activated his body-worn

camera, which initially shows 63-year-old Ms. Hairston asking
for the deputies’ names so that she could write them down. (See
Martin Body Cam., ECF No. 46-1). She explained that she wanted
their names “just because in the season that we’re living in, I
think it’s important that I have your names.” (Id.) She later
explained that by “season we’re living in” she was referring to
the “George Floyd incident” that had occurred only months
earlier. (See Pls.’ Resp. at 6 n.9, ECF No. 50). In the body-
camera footage, Ms. Hairston continued, “having your name makes
me feel more secure. As I said, we came here June 28th—we’re
actually new here. And for the police officers in this area to
come up and say ‘are you growing marijuana’—that is preposterous

to me.” (See Martin Body Cam., ECF No. 46-1).
As Deputy Martin began to argue with Ms. Hairston about his
investigative approach, Mr. Tartt interjected and asked the
deputies, “Y’all looking for something over here at his house”?—
referring to the Ferguson’s home where the officers had
initiated their investigation. (See id.). This prompted Deputy
Martin to ask for Mr. Tartt’s name, to which he responded—on the
first request—“Jason Tartt.” (See id.). Deputy Martin then
repeated, “Jason Tartt.” (See id.). Deputy Martin then
immediately returned his attention to Ms. Hairston and inquired,
in a confrontational fashion, “What do you mean by the season
we’re living in, ma’am”? (Id.). This prompted Mr. Tartt to

intervene again and ask Deputy Martin “What do you need? You got
any questions for me”? (Id.).
Deputy Martin responded, “No, I will collect some
information from you in a minute—your name, date of birth, and
such.” (Id.). To which, Mr. Tartt responded, “What do you need
my information for”? (Id.). Deputy Martin responded, “These
two homes is near that marijuana grow, so i’d just like to have
your name.” (Id.). Mr. Tartt stated, “I don’t feel comfortable
giving you my name and date of birth.” (Id.). Deputy Martin
replied, “Well this is a criminal investigation—you own these
two homes, so by law, you do have to give me your name and date
of birth.” (Id.).

Ms. Hairston then stated to Deputy Martin that “you scared
me,” in reference to him implying that she grew marijuana.
(Id.). Deputy Martin raised his voice and asked, “Scared you?
By asking you a question”? (Id.). He then walked to his police
cruiser and back to the front porch and argued to Ms. Hairston
that “[t]o say somebody scared you because they asked you a
question is ridiculous.” (Id.). He then asked Mr. Tartt for
his name again. (See id.). Mr. Tartt responded, “I’m not
giving you my information.” (Id.). Mr. Tartt later explained
that he decided not to provide additional information to the
deputies because “[b]eing a former Military Police officer, [he]
knew that he was being victimized and retaliated against by

[Deputy Martin].” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 25, ECF No. 3).
After several requests, Mr. Tartt declined to give his date
of birth, arguing that the officers had no basis to suspect him
of committing a crime. (See Martin Body Cam., ECF No. 46-1).
Deputy Martin then ordered the Hairstons into their home,
stepped onto the porch, and nudged Mr. Hairston inside. (See
id.). Deputy Martin grabbed Mr. Tartt’s arm with both hands,
pulled it behind his back, said “I’m going to arrest you,” and
handed handcuffs to Deputy Horn to put on Mr. Tartt’s wrists.
(See id.). After Deputy Horn handcuffed Mr. Tartt, both
deputies escorted him to the police cruiser. (See id.).
Once in the cruiser, Deputy Martin asked dispatch to

“locate a Jason Tart ‘Tango Alpha Romeo Tango’ by name out of
the Hartwell area.” (Id.). The dispatcher responded, “He’s not
on file in West Virginia.” (Id.). Then another individual
chimed in on the radio and said, “If you had a date of birth on
him, you probably could run him in Virginia though, Dalton.”
(Id.). Officer Martin responded, “We located a marijuana grow
right here near his property. He’s refusing to give his date of
birth, name.” (Id.). The individual responded “obstructing”?
(Id.). Deputy Martin then informed Mr. Tartt that “[a]ll right
sir, at this time you are under arrest for obstructing.” (Id.).
On the ride to the jail, Deputy Martin asked Mr. Tartt,
“You still going to refuse to identify yourself”? (Id.). To

which Mr. Tartt responded, “You have my name, I told you my
name.” (Id.). Deputy Martin replied, “I need your date of
birth . . . I tried to run you by name before we pulled out . .
. I couldn’t find nothing.” (Id.). Deputy Horn interjected and
said, “Because he didn’t have a date of birth.” (Id.). Deputy
Martin then threatened Mr. Tartt that “I mean I’ll put you in
jail as John Doe, and when you decide to give your name and date
of birth is when you’ll get out.” (Id.). At that point Mr.
Tartt said, “My date of birth is 1973, May 4th.” Deputy Martin
then asked, “Now how easy was that”? Mr. Tartt responded, “Well
since you’re going to charge me anyway, they’re going to need
the information—I don’t have any ID on me.” (Id.). Deputy

Martin did not initially call the date of birth into dispatch
when Mr. Tartt provided it.
However, twelve minutes later while still on the way to
jail, Mr. Tartt heard on the radio traffic that they were
spelling his name “T-A-R-T” and informed Deputy Martin that it
is spelled “T-A-R-T-T.” (Id.). Deputy Martin then immediately
radioed, “Patrol, subject is going to give date of birth, you
ready”? (Id.). However, before providing Mr. Tartt’s date of
birth, Deputy Martin corrected his misspelling of Mr. Tartt’s
name: “First name Jason, last name Tartt, Tango-Alpha-Romeo-
Tango-Tango . . . 5/4/73.” (Id.). With this information,
dispatch located Mr. Tartt “on file” in West Virginia. (See

id.). The question remains whether a correct spelling of Mr.
Tartt’s name alone would have yielded the same result and been
sufficient “to identify” him in the database.
Mr. Tartt spent the night in jail, and the next day, Deputy
Martin submitted a criminal complaint to the McDowell County
Magistrate, charging Mr. Tartt with “Obstructing an Officer” for
“refus[ing] to give his information to identify him.” (McDowell
Cty. Criminal Compl., ECF No. 46-2). In support of the criminal
complaint, Deputy Martin provided the following sworn statement
of the events preceding the arrest:
This Deputy received a complaint at the
McDowell County Sheriff[‘]s Office for a
marijuana grow in the area of Baptist Dr.
This Deputy and Deputy J.A. Horn responded
to the area to investigate. Upon our
arrival we incountered [sic] by two elderly
subjects who was on the pourch [sic] and
asked them if they growed [sic] marijuana
and they stated “No”. Shorty [sic] the
above said defendant arrived and stated that
he owned the property where we was. This
Deputy and Deputy J.A. Horn began walking to
the edge of the defendant[‘]s said property
line and could smell the odor of marijuana
in the air. This Deputy and Deputy J.A.
Horn walked approximately 50 foot [sic] from
the defendant[‘]s said property line and
located 4 marijuana plants that was
approximately 5 Ft tall. This Deputy and
Deputy J.A. Horn returned to the above said
defendant and as we came walking towards him
he stated “Did yal [sic] find what you was
looking for”. There was no other homes
other than what defendant owned on the said
street. This Deputy had reason to believe
that the defendant had committed a crime and
a reasonable person would suspect that the
marijuana plants was the defendants. This
deputy asked the defendant for his
information in order to identify the
defendant and he refused stating “I don’t
feel comfortable giving you that
information”. This deputy then told the
defendant that he was required to give his
information. The defendant still refused to
give his information to identify him. This
Deputy then told the defendant that he would
be placed under arrest if he didn[‘]t
identify his-self and he stated “Well go
ahead and arrest me.” This deputy first
tried another means to identify the
defendant but it wasn[‘]t effective. This
Deputy then attempted to place the defendant
under arrest and he refused to place his
hands behind his back while stating “Don[‘]t
touch me , [sic] get your hands off me”
[sic] The defendant eventually stopped
resisting after repeated commands to place
his hands behind his back. The defendant
was placed under arrest and transported to
the McDowell County Sheriff[‘]s Office for
Processing. The above said events did occur
in the Heartwell [sic] area of McDowell
County, West Virginia.

(Id.). Based on this sworn statement, the county magistrate
found probable cause to support the charge of obstructing a law
enforcement officer, in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-5-
17 (2020). (See id.). The charges were later dismissed by the
Circuit Court of McDowell County.
Mr. Tartt, along with the Hairstons, filed this lawsuit,
asserting the following claims against the deputies: (1) False
arrest of Mr. Tartt under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) malicious
prosecution of Mr. Tartt under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3)
unreasonable search and seizure of the Hairstons under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; (4) First Amendment retaliation against all plaintiffs
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs
of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (See Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 3). Also named as defendants are the McDowell County
Commission and Chief Deputy Muncy. Plaintiffs seek to hold the
McDowell County Commission liable for the individual deputies’
alleged § 1983 violations under Monell v. Department of Social
Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and they seek
to hold Chief Deputy Muncy liable for the alleged § 1983
violations under a supervisory liability theory. (See id.).
Defendants move for summary judgment on each count. They

argue that Deputies Martin and Horn are entitled to qualified
immunity from Mr. Tartt’s § 1983 claims for false arrest and
malicious prosecution, and the Hairston’s § 1983 claims for
unlawful search and seizure. (See Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 6-14,
ECF No. 47). Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ First
Amendment retaliation claims, § 1985 conspiracy claims,
supervisory liability claims, and Monell claims fail “as a
matter of law.” (See id. at 14-19).
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A party that moves for summary judgment bears
the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of
material fact exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ if proof of its
existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case
under applicable law. An issue of material fact is ‘genuine’ if
the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return
a verdict for the non-movant.” Sedar v. Reston Town Ctr. Prop.,
LLC, 988 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Wai Man Tom v.
Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020)).
Once the moving party establishes this initial burden, “the

nonmoving party must then go beyond the pleadings and affidavits
and show that there are ‘specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 129
(4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). To show a
genuine issue for trial, the nonmoving party must present more
than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence[.]” Id.
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1986)). This means “conclusory allegations or denials, without
more, are insufficient to preclude granting [a] summary judgment
motion.” Id. (quoting Wai Man Tom, 980 F.3d at 1037).
III. Discussion
A. Qualified Immunity

Deputies Martin and Horn claim qualified immunity from (1)
Mr. Tartt’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and
(2) the Hairstons’ unlawful search and seizure claims.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To that end,
“[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests—the need
to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.” Id.
“The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of
whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a
mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law
and fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567
(2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The doctrine “gives
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d
307 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5
(2013)).

The “qualified immunity analysis typically involves two
inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff has established the
violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”
Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 881 (4th Cir. 2015). “A clearly
established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he or she is
doing violates that right.” Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219,
226 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “The question of whether a
right is clearly established is a question of law for the Court
to decide.” Hupp, 931 F.3d at 317-18 (citing Pritchett v.
Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992)). “The question of

whether a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct
at issue violated that right, on the other hand, cannot be
decided on summary judgment if disputes of the historical facts
exist.” Id. (citing Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir.
2015)). In any event, “the legal question of a defendant’s
entitlement to qualified immunity under a particular set of
facts should be decided by the court, not by the jury.”
Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005).
Therefore, “when resolving the issue of qualified immunity at
summary judgment, a court must ascertain the circumstances of
the case by crediting the plaintiff’s evidence and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Williams v.

Strickland, 917 F.3d 763, 768 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v.
Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641–42 (4th Cir. 2017)).
With the relevant standards established, the court turns
now to the claims against which the deputies assert qualified
immunity.
1. False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution
Defendants combine Mr. Tartt’s false arrest and malicious
prosecution claims into one Fourth Amendment claim for purposes
of their motion for summary judgment. They do not challenge the
individual elements of the malicious prosecution claim. Rather,
they argue that Mr. Tartt’s arrest was lawful and that they are
entitled to qualified immunity from any claims arising from it.

Defendants say that Mr. Tartt cannot satisfy either prong
of the qualified immunity inquiry; they argue that Mr. Tartt
fails to establish a constitutional violation, and that the
constitutional right was not “clearly established.”
(a). Constitutional Violation
As to the first prong, Mr. Tartt alleges that the deputies
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by arresting and prosecuting him without
probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment secures “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A seizure is unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment if it is not based on probable
cause.” Hupp, 931 F.3d at 318 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213 (1979)). Assessing whether an arrest “was
reasonable or supported by probable cause is evaluated under an
objective standard, based on what a prudent officer would have
believed under the circumstances.” Merchant v. Bauer, 677 F.3d
656, 662 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 819 (1982)).
“[I]n Fourth Amendment cases, objective reasonableness is
not a jury question—it is a question of law.” Armstrong v.
Hutcheson, 80 F.4th 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2023). Therefore, at the

summary judgment stage, “the court must decide, under the
nonmovant’s version of the facts, the purely legal issue of
whether a constitutional violation has occurred.” Id. at 515.
“That means that if, after construing the historical facts in
favor of the non-moving party, the court determines the
officers’ conduct was unreasonable, summary judgment for the
officers is improper.” Id. Even when that is the case, “a
genuine question of material fact regarding [w]hether the
conduct allegedly violative of the right actually occurred . . .
must be reserved for trial.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 228-29
(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Willingham, 412 F.3d at 559).
Mr. Tartt contends that the deputies needed not only

probable cause but also an arrest warrant or exigent
circumstances to arrest him on the Hairston’s front porch. (See
Pls.’ Resp. at 13, ECF No. 50). However, this is not the case.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to
the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (emphasis added)). For that reason,
when supported by probable cause, an arrest on the porch of a
home “hardly runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Meeks v.
McClung, No. 2:20-cv-00583, 2023 WL 8791686, at *10 (S.D.W. Va.
Dec. 19, 2023) (Johnston, C.J.) (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at
590). The issue in this case is whether the deputies had

probable cause to arrest Mr. Tartt.
The deputies raise two arguments as to why probable cause
existed. They first argue that probable cause existed because
the McDowell County Magistrate found probable cause based on
Deputy Martin’s sworn statement in the “warrant’s affidavit.”
(See Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 8, ECF No. 47). Alternatively, the
deputies argue that “‘[p]utting the arrest warrant aside,’
Deputy Martin had probable cause to arrest Tartt for
obstruction.” (Id.).
Before addressing the merits of these arguments, the court
must clarify an important point: This was a warrantless arrest.
What defendants call an arrest warrant is a post-arrest criminal

complaint, in which the magistrate found probable cause to
support the obstruction charge based on Deputy Martin’s
affidavit in support of the complaint.
Turning now to the first argument, that the magistrate’s
finding of probable cause is dispositive, the court rejects it.
In some circumstances, a finding of probable cause “weigh[s]
heavily toward a finding that [an officer] is immune.” Bauer,
677 F.3d at 664 (quoting Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541
(4th Cir. 2000)). This generally applies when an officer
receives an arrest warrant before making an arrest: “When a
police officer protects a suspect’s rights by obtaining a
warrant from a neutral magistrate, the officer should, in turn,

receive some protection from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Wadkins, 214 F.3d at 543 (quoting Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942
F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1991)). This is because an officer’s
“actions in seeking the arrest warrants and the magistrate’s
determination of probable cause provide additional support for
[the officer’s] claim that he acted with objective
reasonableness.” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 262.
In this case, defendants claim that the magistrate’s
probable cause finding, which came after Mr. Tartt’s arrest,
entitles them to qualified immunity from his false arrest claim.
This is not so. The post-arrest finding sheds no light on the
reasonableness of the deputies’ conduct based on the

circumstances at the time of the arrest, unlike when officers
act pursuant to an arrest warrant issued before an arrest.
Therefore, the magistrate’s finding of probable cause in the
post-arrest criminal complaint does not entitle the deputies to
qualified from Mr. Tartt’s false arrest claims.
However, unlike with false arrest claims, a post-arrest
finding of probable cause may be relevant to malicious
prosecution claims because, in some cases, the post-arrest
finding sheds light on the reasonableness of the decision to
move forward with a criminal prosecution. See Hupp, 931 F.3d at
323-24. However, this is not the case when a magistrate’s
finding was based on an affidavit in which an officer

“deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made
material false statements in his affidavit or omitted from that
affidavit material facts with the intent to make, or with
reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit
misleading.” Miller v. Prince George’s Cty., 475 F.3d 621, 627
(4th Cir. 2007).
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr.
Tartt, Deputy Martin made material misstatements and omissions
that tainted the magistrate’s probable cause evaluation. For
example, Deputy Martin swore that “[t]his deputy had reason to
believe that the defendant had committed a crime and a
reasonable person would suspect that the marijuana plants was

the defendants.” (McDowell Cty. Criminal Compl. at 2, ECF 46-
2). This is contrary to the evidence in this case. The
marijuana was not on Mr. Tartt’s property, no evidence linked
him to it, he did not live in either of the houses where the
deputies initiated their investigation, and Deputy Martin knew
the marijuana was grown on an ATV trail accessed by the public.
Tellingly, Deputy Martin’s sworn statement was directly
contradicted by his partner’s testimony. Deputy Horn testified
that there was no reason to suspect that Mr. Tartt grew
marijuana or that he committed a crime:
Q. Did you acquire any information
during this knock and talk that Jason Tartt
had anything to do with growing marijuana?

A. No, sir.

Q. During the—during this incident did
you ever observe Jason Tartt commit any
crime.

A. No, sir. I didn’t observe him
commit any crime.

(Horn Dep. Tr. at 29:1-19, ECF No. 46-5).
Considering this testimony and the lack of evidence
connecting Mr. Tartt to the marijuana being grown on someone
else’s property, Deputy Martin’s unequivocal, sworn statement
that he believed Mr. Tartt “had committed a crime and a
reasonable person would suspect that the marijuana plants was
the defendants,” is misleading.
Similarly, Deputy Martin’s affidavit in support of the
criminal complaint repeatedly says that Mr. Tartt refused to
“give his information to identify him.” (See McDowell Cty.
Criminal Compl. at 2, ECF No. 46-2). Yet, the affidavit omits
the facts that Mr. Tartt provided his name upon first request,
and many times thereafter, and that he was never asked to
provide a government issued ID before his arrest. These
omissions are particularly troubling because there is no statute
or case law in West Virginia expressly making nondisclosure of
one’s date of birth illegal. These were material facts that the
magistrate needed to make an informed assessment of whether Mr.

Tartt “forcibly or illegally” hindered law enforcement officers,
as required to support an obstruction charge. See W. Va. Code §
61-5-17(a).
For these reasons, the magistrate’s finding of probable
cause does not entitle the deputies to qualified immunity from
Mr. Tartt’s Fourth Amendment claims.
The court turns now to the deputies’ second argument for
qualified immunity that, notwithstanding the post-arrest
criminal complaint, probable cause supported an arrest for
obstruction of a law enforcement officer under West Virginia
Code § 61-5-17.
That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person

who by threats, menaces, acts, or otherwise forcibly or
illegally hinders or obstructs or attempts to hinder or obstruct
a law-enforcement officer . . . acting in his or her official
capacity is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” Id. It is well
established that “[i]n the absence of force, ‘the key to
determining whether conduct . . . constitutes the offense of
obstruction under W. Va. Code § 61-5-17 is whether the conduct
at issue is illegal.’” Smith v. Davis, No. 1:20CV54, 2022 WL
1206089, at *4 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 22, 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting
State v. Carney, 663 S.E.2d 606, 610 (W. Va. 2008)). Notably,
“where ‘force is not involved to effect an obstruction,’ the
resulting obstruction itself is insufficient to establish the

illegality required by section 61-5-17.” Hupp, 931 F.3d at 319
(quoting Carney, 663 S.E.2d at 611).
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has been
clear that refusing to identify oneself is not illegal:
“Refusal to identify oneself to a law enforcement officer does
not, standing alone, form the basis for a charge of obstructing
a law enforcement officer in performing official duties in
violation of West Virginia Code § 61–5–17(a) (2001) (2002
Supp.).” Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State v. Srnsky, 582 S.E.2d 859
(W. Va. 2003). This is because “[t]he freedom of individuals
verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby
risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which

we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” Id. at 868
(quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)).
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Appeals has explained that “if
mere questioning of an officer does not constitute unlawful
obstruction, it stands to reason that silence alone cannot
establish the offense.” Id.
Though refusing to identify oneself to a law enforcement
officer alone does not violate the law, “the charge of
obstructing an officer may be substantiated when a citizen does
not supply identification when required to do so by express
statutory direction or when the refusal occurs after a law
enforcement officer has communicated the reason why the

citizen’s name is being sought in relation to the officer’s
official duties.” Id.
In any event, an obstruction charge requires forcible or
illegal conduct that “interferes with a police officer’s
discharge of official duties.” Jafary v. City of Beckley, No.
5:20-cv-00647, 2021 WL 6125831, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 28, 2021)
(quoting Hupp, 931 F.3d at 319) (emphasis added). It is well
settled under West Virginia law that “not every act of
questioning the authority of a police officer constitutes
obstruction.” Srnsky, 582 S.E.2d at 868 (citing Davis, 483
S.E.2d at 86).
When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr.

Tartt, it was objectively unreasonable for the officers to
arrest and jail him for not disclosing his date of birth. There
are three primary reasons why this is so: (1) The deputies
provided an overly attenuated basis as to why his name was being
sought “in relation to” their investigation, (2) Mr. Tartt’s
withholding of his date of birth did not satisfy the “illegal”
act predicate for an obstruction charge, and (3) his refusal did
not interfere with the deputies’ investigation.
(i). “In relation to” requirement
First, viewing the facts in Mr. Tartt’s favor, the deputies
provided an insufficient basis as to why his name was being

sought “in relation to” their investigation. Defendants argue
that “Deputy Martin had reasonable suspicion to question Tartt
regarding the marijuana plants; therefore, Deputy Martin had
probable cause to arrest Tartt for obstructing his investigation
because he refused to fully identify himself.” (Mem. Supp.
Summ. J. at 9, ECF No. 47).
While defendants equate this to a reasonable suspicion
requirement, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
not explained it as such, nor has that court specified what
satisfies the requirement. However, in explaining what does not
satisfy it, that court has made clear that there must be a link
between an individual and officers’ duties before a person must

supply identification. For instance, in Srnsky, the case upon
which defendants rely, the court held that an individual was not
required to supply identification to law enforcement officers
who demanded it to see if he was one of the individuals for whom
they had an arrest warrant. 582 S.E.2d at 868. The court
explained that he had no duty to identify himself because he
“was not under arrest at the time he was questioned and . . .
was not informed by the officers that they had a warrant for his
arrest or the basis on which the warrants they had were
issued[.]” Id.
In this case, defendants attempt to establish the necessary

link by arguing that “[b]ased upon the close proximity of the
marijuana plants and the similar bags of ‘miracle grow’ near the
four-by-four ATV, the Deputies had reasonable suspicion to
question Tartt about the marijuana plants.” (Mem. Supp. Summ.
J. at 9, ECF No. 47). What defendants fail to mention, however,
is that the ATV where the bag of Miracle-Gro was located was not
the utility vehicle driven by Mr. Tartt. It belonged to the
Fergusons and was parked in front of their home before Mr. Tartt
arrived. (See Horn Dep. 29:7-11, ECF No. 50-3; Tartt. Dep.
53:17-18, ECF No. 50-5; Martin Body Cam. at 16:00, ECF No. 46-
1). If anything, the bag of Miracle-Gro being in a vehicle
parked at the Ferguson home—where the deputies initiated their

investigation—undermines the deputies’ argument that there was
reason to suspect Mr. Tartt of growing the marijuana. The truth
of Deputy Horn’s testimony that he saw the Miracle-Gro and that
it caused suspicion of Mr. Tartt is also debatable because there
is no mention of it in the criminal complaint’s affidavit, which
wants for evidentiary enhancement.
Also, defendants’ argument that Mr. Tartt was in “close
proximity” to the alleged marijuana plants is not true and does
not link him to the investigation. The plants were not on his
property, he did not live in either of the houses the deputies
were investigating, and the ATV trail was accessible to the
public. Based on the circumstances before the deputies, Mr.

Tartt was only in “close proximity” when summoned to the
property by the Hairstons.
(ii). Illegal Act Predicate
Even if the officers had a sufficient link between Mr.
Tartt and the investigation to require his identification, he
did not commit an illegal act by not providing his date of
birth: “[W]hen force is not used, obstruction lies only where
an illegal act is performed.” Hupp, 931 F.3d at 319. The law
requires only that a person “supply identification” after
officers explain why his “name” is being sought in connection
with official police duties. See Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Srnsky,
582 S.E.2d at 859.

Defendants concede that Mr. Tartt provided his name upon
first request and several times thereafter, but argue, without
legal support, that “[a] name is not always sufficient to
identify oneself to a law enforcement officer; however, as here,
Tartt did not object to providing his name but refusing his date
of birth was insufficient to clearly identify him.” (Mem. Supp.
Summ. J. at 9, ECF No. 47).
The court rejects this argument. As an initial matter, a
reasonable interpretation of “supply identification” would
suggest that a person must provide a government issued photo ID
or their name. The deputies never asked for a photo ID and Mr.
Tartt provided his name multiple times. Defendants point to no

authority to support the deputies’ contention that a person must
be located in a police database before he or she can be deemed
to “supply identification.” Even if that were the case, drawing
inferences in Mr. Tartt’s favor, they would have found him in
that database had they verified the spelling of his name and
called it in correctly, and he adequately “supplied
identification” when he provided his name multiple times without
hesitation.
Also, under this view of the facts, it was not illegal for
Mr. Tartt to refuse to provide more information to the deputies.
He only refused after the deputies became increasingly hostile,
and he reasonably believed, based on his experience as law

enforcement officer, he was the victim of police retaliation.
The law in West Virginia is clear that individuals possess the
First Amendment right to peacefully oppose police authority
“without thereby risking arrest.” Srnsky, 582 S.E.2d at 868.
And for that reason, “lawful conduct that effects an
obstruction, including questioning or challenging police
officers, is not sufficient to establish the statutory offense
[of obstruction].” Jafary, No. 5:20-cv-00647, 2021 WL 6125831,
at *4.
(iii). Interference
Additionally, even assuming for the sake of argument that
it was illegal for Mr. Tartt not to provide his date of birth to

the deputies, there is no evidence that it interfered with the
deputies’ investigation: “[T]o secure a conviction under
section 61-5-17(a), the State must show ‘forcible or illegal
conduct that interferes with a police officer’s discharge of
official duties.’” Hupp, 931 F.3d at 319 (emphasis added)
(quoting State v. Davis, 735 S.E.2d 570, 573 (W. Va. 2012)).
“To ‘interfere’ is to check or hamper the action of the officer,
or to do something which hinders or prevents or tends to prevent
the performance of his legal duty . . . .” Davis, 735 S.E.2d at
87 (quoting State v. Johnson, 59 S.E.2d 485, 487 (1950)).
Mr. Tartt’s refusal to provide his date of birth had no
tendency to prevent the deputies’ from performing their legal

duties. The deputies had no evidence linking him to the
suspected crime; he did not live in either of the houses they
were investigating; and he identified himself to the deputies
several times.
For these reasons, when resolving inferences against the
deputies, they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Tartt for
obstruction. The next question in the qualified immunity
analysis is whether the deputies violated Mr. Tartt’s clearly
established rights.
(b). Clearly Established
“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a
right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” Reynolds v. Singh, No. 5:23-CV-207-
FL, 2024 WL 1311336, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2024). Therefore,
“[i]f a person is arrested when no reasonable officer could
believe . . . that probable cause exists to arrest that person,
a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to
be arrested only upon probable cause ensues.” Jafary, No. 5:20-
cv-00647, 2021 WL 6125831, at *6 (quoting Rogers v. Pendleton,
249 F.3d 279, 290 (4th Cir. 2001)).
The deputies argue that Mr. Tartt has not established the
violation of a clearly established right because “[u]nder the
circumstances presented to Deputy Martin, a reasonable officer

could have concluded that Tartt’s refusal to answer questions in
relation to the nearby plot of marijuana plants constituted
obstruction.” (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 10, ECF No. 47). The
court disagrees.
As discussed above, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Mr. Tartt, the deputies arrested him without
probable cause, and no reasonable officer would have found
probable cause to arrest him for not providing his date of
birth. Therefore, if a jury resolves these inferences against
the deputies, they violated his clearly established right
against unreasonable seizure.
In addition to defendant’s qualified immunity argument,

they argue that “Deputy Horn did not ‘seize’ Tartt as a matter
of law because he did not arrest him.” (Id.). However, this
argument is meritless because Deputy Horn placed the handcuffs
on Mr. Tartt’s wrists and escorted him into the back of the
police car. (See Martin Body Cam. at 5:58, ECF No. 46-1). The
deputies also acted in concert throughout the encounter, so it
is immaterial which one physically arrested him.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Mr.
Tartt’s Fourth Amendment claims.
2. Search and Seizure of the Hairstons
The court now turns to the deputies’ assertion of qualified
immunity from the Hairston’s unreasonable search and seizure

claims. Defendants again challenge both prongs of the qualified
immunity inquiry, arguing that the deputies did not violate the
Hairston’s constitutional rights and that those rights were not
clearly established.
(a). Constitutional Violation
The Hairstons allege two Fourth Amendment violations:
unreasonable search and unreasonable seizure. The court begins
with the unreasonable search claims.
The Hairstons allege that the deputies executed an
unreasonable search of their property because they “engaged in a
general search of the curtilage of their property . . . .” (Am.

Compl. at ¶ 56, ECF No. 3). However, the Hairstons offer no
evidence that the deputies searched their front porch or other
areas of their home.
The deputies engaged the Hairstons in a consensual, albeit
confrontational, knock-and-talk. “A ‘knock and talk’ is a
consensual encounter and therefore does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even absent reasonable suspicion.” United States v.
Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006). The officers
remained in the driveway, which was a lawful vantage point of
the front porch and the outside of the Hairston’s home:
“[W]hen the police come on to private property to conduct an
investigation . . . and restrict their movements to places

visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways,
porches), observations made from such vantage points are not
covered by the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Hatfield,
333 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.3(f),
at 506–08 (3d ed. 1996)). Thus, there was no search during the
questioning of the Hairstons.
The deputies only came upon the front porch to arrest Mr.
Tartt. Any “search” occurred by the church where the alleged
marijuana plants were. However, this was on someone else’s
property, and that search is not at issue because “Fourth
Amendment rights are personal, and may be enforced only by
persons whose own protection under the Amendment has been

violated.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978).
Therefore, the Hairstons’ unreasonable search claims fail on the
first prong of qualified immunity: there was no constitutional
violation.
The court turns next to the Hairstons’ unreasonable seizure
claims. They allege that the deputies unreasonably seized them
by “detaining them for an unreasonable amount of time,
interrogating them against their will, making them feel scared
and unsafe . . . .” and “subsequently forc[ing] the Hairstons
off their own front porch, and into their home, forcibly shoving
Mr. Hairston into his doorway, closing his front door behind

him, preventing Mr. Hairston from filming the defendant
officers’ misconduct.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 56, 60, ECF No. 3).
In arguing that no constitutional violation occurred,
Defendants argue only that the deputies “never seized” the
Hairstons during the knock-and-talk or “by ordering them inside
incident to Tartt’s arrest . . . .” (See Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at
11-13, ECF No. 47).
The court disagrees. While there was initially no seizure
during the knock-and-talk, that changed when the officers
decided to arrest Mr. Tartt, ordered the Hairstons into their
home, and nudged Mr. Hairston inside. At this point, the
Hairstons were seized.

“A ‘seizure’ triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections
occurs only when government actors have, by means of physical
force or show of authority, . . . in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.
10 (1989)). Under this standard, federal courts have found that
an individual may be seized when ordered into a home. See,
e.g., Duran v. Sirgedas, 240 F. App’x 104, 110-11 (7th Cir.
2007); Croal v. United Healthcare of Wisconsin, Inc., No. 07-CV-
837 2009 WL 913641, at *16 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2009) (citing
Duran, 240 F. App’x at 104).
In this case, the officers ordered the Hairstons inside,
entered their front porch, and pushed Mr. Hairston inside while

they arrested the Hairston’s landlord on the front porch.
Because of this physical force and show of authority, their
liberties were, “in some way restrained.” Therefore, the court
rejects defendants’ argument that the Hairstons were not seized
under the Fourth Amendment. The court will now turn to
defendants’ argument that this seizure did not violate clearly
established law.
(b). Clearly Established
Defendants argue that “it was not established law that
Deputy Martin could ‘seize’ the Hairstons by ordering them

inside incident to a lawful arrest.” (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at
12, ECF No 47). This analysis is not as straightforward as
defendants would have it, given that it is highly contested
whether Mr. Tartt’s arrest was “lawful.”
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “the
risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized
if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the
situation.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981).
Under this rationale, officers are given wide latitude to avoid
increased risk to themselves and bystanders. For example,
courts have found it reasonable for officers to order persons
inside where “extra people outside constituted an increased risk

of an incident occurring.” Croal, No. 07-CV-837, 2009 WL
913641, at *16 (citing Duran, 240 F. App’x at 104).
In this case, notwithstanding the arguably unlawful arrest
of Mr. Tartt, the deputies did not violate clearly established
law by ordering the Hairstons inside. When the Hairstons were
ordered inside, the situation was quickly escalating, and
matters could have been much worse had they remained on the
porch in close proximity to the arrest. The Hairstons were
permitted back onto the porch without interference after the
arrest. Given the wide latitude officers are afforded to
minimize additional risk to themselves and bystanders, this
brief seizure did not violate clearly established law.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
the Hairstons’ Fourth Amendment claims.
B. First Amendment Retaliation Claims
The Hairstons and Mr. Tartt also assert First Amendment
retaliation claims under § 1983 against Deputies Martin and
Horn. Plaintiffs claim that their seizures were “motivated by
retaliatory animus, [and] directly harmed each of the plaintiffs
by chilling their ability to exercise their First Amendment
rights . . . .” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 76, ECF No. 3). Notably, the
deputies do not claim qualified immunity from these § 1983
claims. Rather, they argue that the claims fail “as a matter of
law[.]” (See Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 14-16, ECF No. 47). Thus,

the only question is whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether the deputies violated plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.1

1 In their reply brief, defendants attempt—for the first
time—to raise the defense of qualified immunity to the First
Amendment claims. (See ECF No. 51 at 13). In doing so, they
affirmatively state that “[i]n the Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Deputies argued they were entitled to qualified immunity
from Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.” (Id). However, in
their opening brief addressing the First Amendment claims,
defendants make no mention of qualified immunity, address
neither prong of the inquiry, and instead only argue that the
claims fail “as a matter of law.” (See id. at 14-16). To now
“‘[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits
government officials from subjecting an individual to
retaliatory actions’ for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves

v. Bartlett, 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (quoting Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). To prove a First Amendment
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) “that
[plaintiff’s] speech was protected”; (2) “defendant’s alleged
retaliatory action adversely affected the plaintiff’s
constitutionally protected speech”; and (3) “a casual
relationship exists between [plaintiff’s] speech and the
defendant’s retaliatory action.” Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379,
387 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202
F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000)).
1. The Hairstons’ Claims
The court begins with the Hairstons’ retaliation claims.

They allege various retaliatory actions taken against them,
including being subjected to prolonged questioning, accused of
committing a crime, and ordered inside their home. (See Am.

assert that they raised qualified immunity is not accurate; the
argument was raised for the first time in the reply brief.
Therefore, the court will not consider it: “Inasmuch as this
contention was raised for the first time in the Defendants’
reply brief, it will not be considered.” Shuff v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., No. 5:20-cv-00184, 2021 WL 219105, at *4 n.3 (S.D.W. Va.
Jan. 21, 2021) (Volk, J.) (citing Moseley v. Banker, 550 F.3d
312, 325 n.7 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Compl. at ¶ 68, ECF No. 3). Defendants concede that “the
Hairstons’ statements to the Deputies during their interaction
was protected speech.” (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 16, ECF No. 47).

Even so, they argue that there was no adverse action against the
Hairstons “[t]hroughout the entirety of the exchange” because
the deputies took no affirmative action until they arrested Mr.
Tartt. (Id.). They contend that when the deputies arrested Mr.
Tartt, they ordered the Hairstons “inside their home to
effectuate the arrest of Tartt, not because of their criticism .
. . .” (Id.).
Regarding defendants’ first argument, that no adverse
action occurred during the exchange before Mr. Tartt’s arrest,
the court agrees. As discussed above, the encounter started off
as a knock-and-talk until the officers decided to arrest Mr.
Tartt. There was no adverse action taken up to that point.

While that argument challenges the adverse action element,
defendants’ second argument, that the deputies did not order the
Hairstons into their home because of their speech, challenges
the causation element. To show causation, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that their “protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor in [the deputies’] decision to take adverse
action.” Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 2020).
If plaintiffs make that showing, the burden shifts to defendants
to establish “a permissible basis for taking that action.” Id.
In that case, defendants must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that they “would have reached the same decision . . .
in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id. at 299 (quoting

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
283 (1977)). “If [defendants] fail[] to carry that burden, the
inference is that but for causation . . . has been shown: the
plaintiff would not have been harmed had his rights not been
violated by the defendant.” Id. at 299.
This burden shifting framework presents disputed issues of
fact. On one hand, a jury could find that the deputies ordered
the Hairstons into their home solely for safety reasons and that
their speech played no part leading up to the adverse action.
On the other hand, a jury could reasonably find that the
Hairstons’ speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the
chain of events that led to Mr. Tartt’s arrest and them being

ordered into their home. Indeed, the body camera footage shows
that Deputy Martin became particularly argumentative on two
occasions: first when Ms. Hairston referred to “the season we
are living in” after the George Floyd incident and second after
she expressed that the deputies scared her by implying that she
grew marijuana.
However, these disputed facts are not material. None of
the adverse actions alleged by the Hairstons rise to the level
of a constitutional violation. “A plaintiff asserting adverse
action must show more than ‘de minimis inconvenience.’”
Bhattacharya v. Murray, 93 F.4th 675, 689 (4th Cir. 2024)
(citing Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ.,

411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005)). This requires a plaintiff
to allege an action that “may tend to chill individuals’
exercise of constitutional rights.” Id.
The deputies’ interference with the Hairstons’ speech was
de minimis. By the Hairstons’ own admission, they were not
initially targeted in the investigation because of their speech;
Deputy Martin accused them of growing marijuana before having
any other conversation with them. They were then able to
exercise their speech rights throughout the encounter and were
only briefly ordered into their home while Mr. Tartt was
arrested. They were then permitted to return to the porch,
where they continued to exercise free speech. The deputies’

actions did not violate the Hairstons’ First Amendment rights.
Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED as to these claims.
2. Mr. Tartt’s Claims
As to Mr. Tartt’s First Amendment retaliation claim against
the deputies, he claims that the officers subjected him to First
Amendment retaliation by “[r]epeatedly asking [him] for his
name, despite already knowing his name, for the purposes of
intimidating him and setting up a false arrest for
obstruction[,]” and “[r]epeatedly asking [him] for his date of
birth, for the purposes of intimidating him, scaring him,
invading his privacy, and setting up a false arrest for

obstruction[.]” (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 68, ECF No. 3).
Defendants argue that this claim fails on the causation
element “because a magistrate found probable cause for his
obstruction charge.” (See Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 15, ECF No.
47). Defendants also make the baseless argument that “Tartt’s
retaliation claim against Deputy Horn fails as a matter of law
because Deputy Horn did not arrest Tartt.” (Id.).
The court has already rejected these arguments, as
previously discussed at length. The magistrate’s finding of
probable cause means nothing because it was based on material
misstatements and omissions of fact in Deputy Martin’s
affidavit. The argument that Deputy Horn did not arrest Mr.

Tartt ignores the indisputable body-camera footage of Deputy
Horn handcuffing Mr. Tartt, walking him to the police car, and
otherwise acting in concert with Deputy Martin during the
encounter.
A reasonable jury could find that the deputies questioned
and arrested Mr. Tartt simply because he came to Ms. Hairston’s
defense when the deputies provoked arguments with her. There is
no question that an arrest is an adverse action: “Some adverse
actions may be easy to identify—an arrest, a prosecution, or a
dismissal from governmental employment.” Houston Cmty. Coll.
Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 477 (2022) (citing Nieves, 139
S.Ct. at 1722).

For these reasons, defendants’ arguments do not entitle the
deputies to summary judgment on Mr. Tartt’s First Amendment
retaliation claims. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
DENIED as to these claims.
C. § 1985 Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiffs claim that “Defendants Martin and Horn,
conspired for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws
of the United States and/or of the equal privileges and
immunities under the laws of the United States.” (Am. Compl. at
¶ 79, ECF No. 3). As part of this alleged conspiracy, they
allege that they were deprived of their constitutional rights

because of their race:
Plaintiffs are each African American[].
They were targeted as suspects in the
defendant officers’ marijuana plant
investigation just by virtue of their being
African American. Due to the color of
plaintiffs’ skin, the defendant officers
engaged in the outrageous behavior of
violating their privacy, private property
rights, engaging in harassment . . . despite
the fact that they had no information
indicating they had violated any law . . . .

(Id. at ¶ 80). They seek redress for the alleged deprivations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
To prove a claim under that statute, plaintiffs must
establish five elements:
(1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2)
who are motivated by a specific class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus to (3)
deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment
of rights secured by the law to all, (4) and
which results in injury to the plaintiff as
(5) a consequence of an overt act committed
by the defendants in connection with the
conspiracy.

Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 360 (4th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Defendants, however, challenge only the first of the five
elements: the existence of a conspiracy. Therefore, the court
does not consider whether plaintiffs can or cannot establish the
other four elements, because “it is not the responsibility of
the Court to ferret out, from a brief, the legal contentions of
the moving party and then to find legal and evidentiary support
for them. Likewise, it is not the responsibility of the
nonmoving party to engage in a similar exercise in rebutting a
motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp.
2d 615, 638 (E.D. Va. 2004).
As to the challenged element, defendants again assert,
based on a misstatement of indisputable fact, that Deputy Martin
alone “took [Mr. Tartt] into custody.” (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at
17, ECF No. 47). They, therefore, contend that “there was no
common plan or meeting of the minds between the Deputies when
arresting Tartt because Deputy Martin acted alone.” (Id. at
18). The court again rejects this baseless argument.
To the contrary, plaintiffs argue that there is

circumstantial evidence that the deputies “acted in concert to
deprive plaintiffs of equal protection under the law.” (Pls’
Resp. at 17, ECF No. 50). This circumstantial evidence, they
argue, is that the deputies responded to the “black camp” and
then acted together to “confront[] and accost[]” the residents
there:
While the defendants obviously did not
admit to the existence of such a conspiracy,
it was revealed that the defendants were
sent to investigate allegations of the smell
of marijuana at ‘the black camp,’ referring
to the two residences owned by Jason Tartt,
one of which was occupied by the Hairstons,
and one of which was occupied by an elderly
African American man. . . . A white woman
texted now-Sheriff Muncy that a marijuana
smell was coming from “the black camp,” and
he sent [two] white deputies to “the black
camp,” where they immediately confronted and
accosted the Plaintiffs . . . .

(Id.).
The court agrees; this circumstantial evidence presents a
genuine issue of material fact for trial as to the conspiracy
element. It is an “established principle of a civil rights
conspiracy that plaintiffs ‘need not produce direct evidence of
a meeting of the minds,’ but can ‘come forward with specific
circumstantial evidence that each member of the alleged
conspiracy shared the same conspiratorial objective.’” Frazier
v. Cook, No. 4:17–cv–54, 2017 WL 5560864, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov.
17, 2017) (quoting Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416,

421 (4th Cir. 1996)). Because inferences necessarily require
weighing evidence, “[w]hether defendants were involved in an
unlawful conspiracy is generally a factual issue and should be
resolved by the jury, so long as there is a possibility that the
jury can infer from the circumstances (that the alleged
conspirators) had a meeting of the minds and thus reached a[n]
understanding to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives.” S.V. by
and through Valencia v. Delano Union Elementary Sch. Dist., No.
1:17–cv–00780–LJO–JLT, 2017 WL 3479009, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
14, 2017) (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192
F.3d 1283, 1301–02 (9th Cir. 1999)).
For this reason, summary judgment is not appropriate to

resolve the “conspiracy” element of plaintiffs’ § 1985 claims,
and defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to
these claims.
D. Supervisory Liability § 1983 Claims
Plaintiffs assert supervisory liability claims against
Chief Deputy Muncy, the deputies’ supervisor, for the deputies’
alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiffs allege that Chief
Deputy Muncy “had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts
by his subordinates . . . [,]” “was deliberately indifferent in
failing to train and/or supervise employees . . . [,] and “[a]s
a direct result, the Plaintiffs were injured.” (Am. Compl. at
¶¶ 96, 98-99, ECF No. 3). Plaintiffs also allege that “[u]pon

information and belief, there are multiple prior similar
incidents of [McDowell County] deputies engaging in similar
constitutional violations.” (Id. at ¶ 89).
While § 1983 claims against supervisors are termed
“supervisory liability” claims, that term is a misnomer. See
King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2023). Such
liability is not premised upon respondeat superior but upon “a
recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization
of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the
constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their
care.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir.

1984)).
In other words, a supervisor is liable only for his own
misconduct, but he may commit misconduct if: (1) the supervisor
knew of the subordinates’ misconduct and its pervasive and
unreasonable risk of constitutional injury, (2) the supervisor’s
response to that knowledge demonstrates deliberate indifference
to the risk of constitutional injury or a tacit authorization of
the conduct, and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link”
between the supervisor’s inaction and the plaintiff’s
constitutional injury. See Timpson v. Anderson Cty.
Disabilities and Special Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir.
2022) (citing Stroud, 13 F.3d at 799).

Chief Deputy Muncy argues that he is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim because “Plaintiff[s] have not developed
any evidence demonstrating that [Chief Deputy Muncy] had actual
or constructive notice of any alleged constitutional violations
by the Deputies.” (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 18, ECF No. 47). The
court agrees.
While plaintiffs allege in their complaint that other
deputies of the McDowell County Sheriff’s Department had engaged
in similar alleged misconduct before, and that the county had
notice of it, plaintiffs offer no such evidence. Likewise, they
offer no evidence that Chief Deputy Muncy knew of these
deputies’ conduct before it happened or as it transpired.

Therefore, plaintiffs cannot prove that Chief Deputy Muncy was
deliberately indifferent to the conduct or tacitly authorized
it. Although plaintiffs argue that he approved the conduct
after the fact when he testified that the deputies did nothing
wrong, (see Pls.’ Resp. at 19, ECF No. 50), there is not an
“affirmative causal link” between that after-the-fact approval
and plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.
Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED as to these claims.
E. Monell Claims
Finally, the court turns to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims
brought against the McDowell County Commission under Monell v.

Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). A § 1983 claim brought pursuant to Monell “permits
suits against a municipality for a federal constitutional
deprivation only when the municipality undertook the allegedly
unconstitutional action pursuant to an ‘official policy’ or
‘custom.’” Starbuck v. Williamsburg James Cty. Sch. Bd., 28
F.4th 529, 533 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting id. at 690-91). A
county commission is considered a municipality for purposes of §
1983 claims. See Revene v. Charles Cty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870,
874 (4th Cir. 1989). “The Fourth Circuit has recognized that
‘in the realm of county law enforcement,’ it is the ‘sheriff
[who] is the duly delegated policy maker for the county.’” Frye

v. Lincoln Cty. Comm’n, No. 2:20-cv-00403, 2021 WL 243864, at *4
(S.D.W. Va. Jan. 25, 2021) (quoting id. at 874). Plaintiffs can
prove a policy or custom of the McDowell County Commission in
four ways:
(1) through an express policy, such as a
written ordinance or regulation; (2) through
the decisions of a person with final
policymaking authority; (3) through an
omission, such as a failure to properly
train officers, that ‘manifest[s] deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens’; or
(4) through a practice that is so
‘persistent and widespread’ as to constitute
a ‘custom or usage with the force of law.’

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003).
In this case, the court found in a prior order that
plaintiffs failed to adequately allege the existence of a
written policy or custom of the McDowell County Commission.
(See Order at 10, ECF No. 38). Plaintiffs instead attempt to
prove “custom by condonation,” arguing that defendants acted
according to “a grossly unconstitutional policy and practice”
because Chief Deputy Muncy testified in his deposition that
Deputies Martin and Horn acted within department policy, and
that Chief Deputy Muncy has done nothing to rectify the conduct.
(See Pls.’ Resp. at 20, ECF No. 50).
Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence of a policy or custom
to meet the heavy burden of proof for their Monell claims.
“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly
inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to
do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be
applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable
solely for the actions of its employee.” Craven v. Novelli, 661
F. Supp. 3d 430, 450 (W.D.N.C. 2023) (quoting Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)).
Although plaintiffs allege that the supervisors at the
Sheriff’s Department knew of these events as they transpired and
condoned them, plaintiffs have offered no evidence to support
that allegation. They have also offered no evidence that the
deputies were trained in these allegedly unconstitutional

practices. It is not enough that Chief Deputy Muncy defended
the actions of his subordinates during this litigation:
“[M]erely ‘going along with the discretionary decisions made by
one’s subordinates . . . is not a delegation to them of the
authority to make policy.’” Lytle, 326 F.3d at 472.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
plaintiffs’ Monell claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, defendants’ amended motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 46) is GRANTED in part as to the
Hairstons’ Fourth Amendment claims, the Hairston’s First
Amendment claims, plaintiffs’ supervisory liability claims

against Chief Deputy Muncy, and plaintiffs’ Monell claims
against the McDowell County Commission. The motion is DENIED in
part as to Mr. Tartt’s Fourth Amendment claims, Mr. Tartt’s
First Amendment claims, and plaintiffs’ § 1985 civil-rights-
conspiracy claims. Defendants James “Boomer” Muncy and the
McDowell County Commission are DISMISSED from the action.
Defendants’ original motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 45) is
also DENIED as MOOT.
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of June, 2024.
ENTER:

David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge

51

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10731751. Public record. Not legal advice.
