# Holcomb v. West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · September 27, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729916

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** September 27, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729916

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “the broad categories of training, supervision, and employee retention, as characterized by respondent, easily fall within the category of ‘discretionary’ governmental functions”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON

SHAWN HOLCOMB,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00767

WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION
OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER DUSTIN WILSON,
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ERIC HARRON,
and CNA MISTY POTTER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending is Defendant West Virginia Division of
Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Motion to Dismiss, filed
February 25, 2021. ECF No. 6. The plaintiff has failed to
respond.
I. Background
On November 20, 2020, plaintiff Shawn Holcomb filed a
civil action against the West Virginia Division of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (“WVDOCR”), Correctional Officer Dustin
Wilson, Correctional Officer Eric Harron, and CNA Misty Potter.
Compl., ECF No. 1. The complaint alleges that while Holcomb was
incarcerated at St. Mary’s Correctional Facility, defendant
Potter falsely accused Holcomb of assault. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 32−33.
As a result of this purported false accusation, Holcomb asserts
that on the afternoon of December 12, 2018, defendants Wilson
and Harron sprayed him with a chemical agent, slammed him to the

floor, and punched him in the head. Id. at ¶¶ 11−12, 19.
Holcomb states the correctional officers then handcuffed him and
continued to spray him and make “malicious” comments. Id. at
12.
The complaint asserts five causes of action: (I)
battery, (II) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (III) “violation

of policy and procedure,” (IV) conspiracy to conceal wrongful
conduct, and (V) deliberate indifference/outrageous conduct.
Id. at ¶¶ 14−36.
While only Count III of the complaint explicitly names
defendant WVDOCR, prefatory paragraph two states “Defendant,
West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation is

liable to the plaintiff under the theory of Respondeat
Superior/vicarious liability.” Id. at ¶ 2.
II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that
a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6)
correspondingly provides that a pleading may be dismissed when
there is a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”

To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must recite
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007); see also Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d
380, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Giarratano v. Johnson, 521
F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008)). In other words, the “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation
omitted).
A district court’s evaluation of a motion to dismiss
is underlain by two principles. First, the court “must accept
as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
[pleading].” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). Such factual allegations should
be distinguished from “mere conclusory statements,” which are
not to be regarded as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.”). Second, the court must “draw[] all
reasonable factual inferences . . . in the [nonmovant’s] favor.”
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
III. Analysis
A. Battery, Conspiracy to Conceal Wrongful Conduct, and Vicarious
Liability
Count I of Holcomb’s complaint alleges that defendants
Wilson and Harron battered him when they pushed him to the
ground and sprayed him with a chemical agent. Compl. ¶ 15.
Count IV of Holcomb’s complaint alleges the individual
defendants conspired to write false reports about the events
described in the complaint. Compl. ¶ 29.

Plainly read, these claims are asserted against only
the individual defendants. Nevertheless, WVDOCR has moved the
court to dismiss the claims, arguing that the agency is
“incapable” of committing either tortious act. ECF No. 7, at 5,
8. Inasmuch as the agency is not named in either cause of
action, WVDOCR could only be held liable under these counts if
the court were to broadly interpret Holcomb’s allegation in

paragraph 2 that WVDOCR is vicariously liable for the wrongs
alleged in the complaint.
In order for an employer to be vicariously liable for
the acts of its employees, the acts must have been committed
within the scope of the employees’ employment. W. Va. Reg’l
Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 766 S.E.2d 751, 768 (W. Va.
2014).1 Factors that are used to determine whether an act was
within the course of employment include: (1) the nature of the
act, (2) whether the conduct occurred within the time and space

of the employees’ work, (3) whether the conduct was committed
“at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master,” and (4) if
force was used, whether “the use of force is not unexpectable by
the master.” Id. at 769 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 228 (1958) (emphasis omitted)); Hughes v. White, No. 2:20-CV-
00730, 2020 WL 7753104, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 29, 2020).

Courts have consistently found in scenarios like the
one presented here that intentional tortious acts “do not fall
within the scope of employment.” Hughes, 2020 WL 7753104, at
*4; Hamilton v. Hill, No. 2:20-CV-00368, 2020 WL 3472420, at *2
(S.D.W. Va. June 25, 2020); Gilco v. Logan Cnty. Com’n, No.
CIV.A. 2:11-0032, 2012 WL 3580056, at *8 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 17,
2012) (“A political subdivision is not liable ‘for any
intentional malfeasance on the part of [its employee].’”)
(quoting Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville, 477 S.E.2d 525, 533 (W.
Va. 1996)). Accordingly, to the extent that Holcomb’s complaint

1 Because the employer in this case is a state agency,
Holcomb would also have to prove that the agency is not entitled
to qualified immunity for these acts. Syl. Pt. 11, A.B., 766
S.E.2d at 756. Inasmuch as the court finds that the alleged
acts were not within the scope of the employment of the
individual defendants, it need not address whether the agency
has qualified immunity for these claims.
seeks to hold the agency liable for the intentional torts of
battery and conspiracy contained in Counts I and IV of the
complaint, WVDOCR’s motion to dismiss is granted.2

B. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Both Count II and Count V of Holcomb’s complaint
assert claims for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. WVDOCR
argues that it is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims because it is not a person under the statute. ECF No. 7,
at 5−6, 10. Holcomb’s complaint plainly states that Holcomb “is
not asserting a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 against the
State agency.” Compl. ¶ 7. Indeed, a plain reading of Count II
indicates that it is being asserted against defendants Wilson
and Harron. Id. at ¶ 19.3 Similarly, Count V is asserted
against defendant Potter. Id. at ¶¶ 32−36. Inasmuch as the §
1983 claims are not asserted against WVDOCR, its motion to
dismiss them is denied as moot.4

2 WVDOCR argues in its motion that Holcomb has asserted a
standalone claim of vicarious liability that is “untethered” to
any other claim. ECF No. 7, at 10−11 (citing Wale v. Hayhurst,
No. 2:20-CV-00713, 2020 WL 7775430 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 30, 2020)).
Inasmuch as no such standalone count is alleged, the court
declines to address this argument.
3 Additionally, paragraph 22 concludes with a sentence
stating, “Plaintiff is not making a § 1983 claim against the
WVDOCR but solely against the individual defendants.” Compl. ¶
22.
4 Count V contains an alternative cause of action for
“outrageous conduct.” Compl. ¶ 36. This alternative claim is
C. Violation of Policy and Procedure

The remaining claim in Holcomb’s complaint, Count III,
alleges that WVDOCR “violated its own policies and procedures
when it continued to employ and retain defendants Wilson and
Harron.” Compl. ¶ 24. Additionally, it contends that WVDOCR
violated its own policies and procedures by failing to conduct
background checks and psychological evaluations on the officers
and by failing to remove the officers from contact after
excessive force claims were made against them by other inmates.

Id. at ¶¶ 25−26.
Judges in this district have construed similar claims
as claims for negligent hiring and/or retention. See Hughes,
2020 WL 7753104, at *4; Hamilton, 2020 WL 3472420, at *2.

Under West Virginia law, a claim for negligent hiring
requires a court to consider the following:
When an employee was hired, did the employer
conduct a reasonable investigation into the
employee's background vis a vis the job for which
the employee was hired and the possible risk of
harm or injury to co-workers or third parties

not asserted against defendant WVDOCR, however, even if it were,
the agency could not be held vicariously liable for Potter’s
alleged outrageous conduct for two reasons. First, the
complaint does not allege that Potter was an employee of WVDOCR.
See Compl. ¶ 5 (stating that Potter was employed by Wexford
Health Sources). Second, even if she was an employee of WVDOCR,
filing false reports would not have been within the scope of her
employment.
that could result from the conduct of an unfit
employee? Should the employer have reasonably
foreseen the risk caused by hiring an unfit
person?
Tomashek v. Raleigh Cnty. Emergency Operating Ctr., 344 F. Supp.
3d 869, 877 (S.D.W.V 2018) (quoting McCormick v. W. Va. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 503 S.E.2d 502, 506 (W. Va. 1998)). Similarly,
“[t]o hold an employer liable for negligent retention, the
employer must have been able to foresee ‘the possible risk of
harm or injury to co-workers or third parties that could result
from the conduct of an unfit employee.’” C.C. v. Harrison Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 859 S.E.2d 762, 776 (W. Va. 2021) (quoting
McCormick, 503 S.E.2d at 506).
WVDOCR asserts that it is entitled to qualified
immunity for this count. ECF No. 7, at 6−7. Under the doctrine
of qualified immunity, government actors, including state
agencies, “performing discretionary functions are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” State v. Chase
Sec., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591, 595 (W. Va. 1992) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
WVDOCR’s alleged failure to follow its own hiring,

supervision, and retention policies is a discretionary act. See
A.B., 766 S.E.2d at 773 (finding that “the broad categories of
training, supervision, and employee retention, as characterized
by respondent, easily fall within the category of
‘discretionary’ governmental functions”). Accordingly, the

court must determine whether the alleged conduct violates a
clearly established statutory or constitutional right. See
Chase Sec., 424 S.E.2d at 595. To make such a showing, Holcomb
“must do more than allege that an abstract right has been
violated,” but rather “must make a ‘particularized showing’ that
a ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violated that right’ or that ‘in light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness’ of the action was ‘apparent.’” A.B., 766 S.E.2d
at 776 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)); Hamilton, 2020 WL 3472420, at *3.

Holcomb makes no allegation that WVDOCR’s failure to
comply with its own policies and procedures violates any
statutory or constitutional provision. Without such an
allegation, Holcomb cannot overcome WVDOCR’s claim of qualified
immunity. See Hamilton, 2020 WL 3472420, at *3; Cordwell v.
Widen, No. 2:18-CV-00913, 2019 WL 3887547 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 15,
2019); Searls v. W. Va. Reg'l Jail, No. CV 3:15-9133, 2016 WL
4698547, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 7, 2016). Consequently, the

claim contained in Count III of the complaint is dismissed.
Iv. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant West
Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 6) be, and hereby is, GRANTED. Defendant West
Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation is DISMISSED
from this action.

The Clerk is requested to transmit this order to all
counsel of record and to any unrepresented parties.

ENTER: September 27, 2021

seal ee □
Jo . Copenhaver, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729916. Public record. Not legal advice.
