# Hall v. Gestamp West Virginia, LLC

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · August 11, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729863

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** August 11, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729863

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the Supreme Court of Appeals has “consistently held that cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII” (internal citation omitted)
- explaining that “[d]ifferential treatment” of an employee for whom allegations of misconduct are substantiated as compared to employees for whom allegations of the same misconduct are not substantiated “is not evidence of pretext”
- concluding, in the context of an FMLA-interference claim, that an employee was ineligible for FMLA leave in part because her doctor had returned her to work without restrictions

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON

AMBER D. HALL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00146

GESTAMP WEST VIRGINIA, LLC,
KENNETH SUPRENANT,
and SCOTT HUGHES,

Defendants.

MEMORANUDM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, filed on November 6, 2020 (ECF No. 75).
I. Background
A. The complaint
The plaintiff commenced this action on or about April
18, 2018, by filing a complaint in Kanawha County Circuit Court.
See ECF No. 1-1 at 11-20. The complaint alleges the following.
The plaintiff was employed at a facility of defendant
Gestamp West Virginia, LLC (“Gestamp”) located in South
Charleston, West Virginia, from February 2014 to April 25, 2017.
See id. ¶ 1. While at work on December 3, 2016, the plaintiff
suffered an anxiety attack stemming from her post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”) and left Gestamp’s facility by
ambulance. See id. ¶ 3. After receiving medical treatment from

her healthcare provider, the plaintiff was placed on leave under
the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq., from December 3 to December 16, 2016. See id. ¶ 3. On
January 17, 2017, the plaintiff suffered another anxiety attack
at work and was placed on FMLA leave from January 17 to March
20, 2017. See id. ¶¶ 5-6.

The plaintiff alleges that, in January 2017, during
her second leave period, she called defendant Scott Hughes,
Gestamp’s human resources department manager, to inform him that
she was uncertain when she would be able to return to work. See
id. ¶ 7. She alleges that Mr. Hughes informed her that she had
three months of FMLA leave to use in 2017. See id. ¶¶ 8, 13.
When the plaintiff called Mr. Hughes again on March 15, 2017,
however, he informed her that she had used up all her FMLA
leave; denied having told her that she had three months of FMLA
leave in 2017; and referenced a letter he had sent her informing
her that her FMLA leave had been used up, a letter that the
plaintiff says she did not receive until later in the day on

March 15, 2017. See id. ¶¶ 11-15. In any event, the
plaintiff’s healthcare provider certified on March 17, 2017,
that she could return to work with no limitations. See ECF No.
91-6 at 1. The plaintiff then returned to work on March 20,
2017. See id. ¶ 16.

During the plaintiff’s absence, her subordinate, team
leader Aaron Lambert, had covered her supervisory duties as a
group leader. See id. ¶ 17. Upon returning to work, defendant
Kenneth Suprenant told the plaintiff that her duties as group
leader had not changed despite alterations in the managerial
structure that had occurred during her absence. See id. ¶ 18.

However, when she returned, the plaintiff alleges that Mr.
Suprenant told her that her desk would remain Mr. Lambert’s
until another supervisor approved her return to it and that Mr.
Suprenant treated Mr. Lambert as the plaintiff’s superior. See
id. ¶¶ 20-21, 24.
On April 11, 2017, the plaintiff was at work speaking

with three of her team leaders when another Gestamp employee,
Erica Haynes, approached the group and joined the conversation.
See id. ¶¶ 26-29. The plaintiff alleges that, during this
conversation, she and Ms. Haynes “exchang[ed] positive comments
about each others’ posteriors,” and Ms. Haynes “made a comment
praising [the] [p]laintiff’s breasts.” Id. ¶¶ 29-30. The
plaintiff understood the interaction to be in jest and alleges
the conversation ended without any complaints. See id. ¶¶ 31-
32.

Soon after the conversation, Ms. Haynes submitted to
the plaintiff a request for a leave of absence, which the
plaintiff denied based on Gestamp’s staffing policies. See id.
¶¶ 33-35. Ms. Haynes was incensed by the plaintiff’s denial.
See id. ¶¶ 33, 36.

On Friday, April 21, 2017, Ms. Haynes filed with
Gestamp a complaint of sexual harassment against the plaintiff.
See id. ¶ 37. The plaintiff alleges that she heard from other
Gestamp employees that Mr. Suprenant had “coached” Ms. Haynes to
file the complaint. Id. ¶ 39. Neither Mr. Suprenant nor other
Gestamp supervisors discussed the complaint with the plaintiff
until Monday, April 24, 2017, see id. ¶¶ 41-45, and the
plaintiff supervised Ms. Haynes during the intervening weekend
shift, see id. ¶ 40, 43.

On April 24, 2017, the plaintiff confronted Mr.
Suprenant after hearing of the complaint from one of her team
leaders, and he moved their conversation to Mr. Hughes’ office,
where the plaintiff met with Mr. Suprenant, Mr. Hughes, and two
other Gestamp employees. See id. ¶¶ 44-47. The plaintiff asked
whether they were investigating the comments the plaintiff had

made to Haynes, did not deny making the comments, and gave them
context regarding the conversation in which the comments had
been made. See id. ¶ 48. Gestamp terminated the plaintiff’s
employment the next day, April 25, 2017, for her sexual
harassment of Ms. Haynes. See id. ¶ 49.

The plaintiff alleges that, while she worked at
Gestamp, she had filed a complaint of sexual harassment against
her supervisor, Barry Holstein.1 See id. ¶ 52. The plaintiff
states that Mr. Holstein aggressively pursued a sexual
relationship with her and that, after she declined his
invitation to go out for drinks and dinner, he retaliated

against her for rejecting his advances by making her time at
work unpleasant. See id. ¶¶ 52-55. The plaintiff alleges that
she twice complained about Mr. Holstein’s conduct to the human
resources department manager – at that time, Nancy Paxton – but
that her complaints did not result in any action. See id. ¶¶
56-60. She also alleges that she twice took her complaints to
Paul Lezanic, the plant manager at the time, but that these
complaints also resulted in no action. See id. ¶ 60-62. When
she later took her complaint to a new plant manager, Walter
Thomas, he directed her to draft a formal complaint so that the
human resources department could investigate. See id. ¶¶ 63-65.

1 Mr. Holstein was named as a defendant in the plaintiff’s
complaint but was dismissed after the parties jointly stipulated
to his dismissal. See ECF No. 112; ECF No. 113.
She drafted a formal complaint and provided it to Mr. Hughes in
the human resources department. See id. ¶¶ 65-66. Mr. Hughes
later told her that the allegations in her complaint against Mr.

Holstein could not be substantiated, and the human resources
department took no action on the complaint. See id. ¶ 66.
The plaintiff alleges that Gestamp terminated her
employment “due to her medical leave,” her “disability,” and her
“gender,” in violation of the West Virginia Human Right Act
(“WVHRA”), W. Va. Code § 5-11-1 et seq, and that Mr. Suprenant

and Mr. Hughes aided and abetted, or conspired with, Gestamp in
its discrimination against her based on her disability and
gender. Id. ¶¶ 71-72, 74.
B. District court proceedings

The parties proceeded with litigation in Kanawha
County Circuit Court until the defendants removed the action to
this court on February 21, 2020. See ECF No. 1. The plaintiff

filed motions seeking leave to amend her complaint to assert a
number of additional claims. See ECF No. 19; ECF No. 21; see
also ECF No. 27.2 In an August 27, 2020 memorandum opinion and

2 In both motions, the plaintiff also asked the court to remand
the action to state court, see ECF No. 19; ECF No. 21. The
court had previously denied a separate motion to remand filed by
the plaintiff, see ECF No. 5; ECF No. 9, and the court denied
order, the court denied the motions based on undue delay and
prejudice to the defendants. See ECF No. 44. The court
explained, however, that, although “[t]he complaint does not

enumerate specific counts or causes of action,” id. at 1, “the
asserted claims in this case are violations of the [WVHRA] for
gender and disability discrimination, and violations of the FMLA
for interference with the plaintiff’s FMLA rights and for
wrongful termination or retaliatory discharge in contravention
of the FMLA” and that “[a] claim for failure to accommodate
disability may plausibly be understood as a subset of disability
discrimination,” id. at 11.

The parties proceeded with discovery in this court,
and the defendants filed the current motion for summary judgment
on November 6, 2020. See ECF No. 75. The plaintiff took a
kitchen-sink approach to opposing the summary-judgment motion,
attaching 35 exhibits to her response brief, see ECF Nos. 91-1
through 91-25; ECF No. 92-1; ECF No. 92-2; ECF Nos. 94-1 through
94-15; ECF No. 95-1, some of which the court has noted are not
even cited in the brief, see ECF No. 116, and separately filing
seven affidavits from six individuals, which are cited in her
response brief, see ECF No. 78; ECF No. 81; ECF No. 83; ECF No.

these two subsequent requests as well, see ECF No. 44.
84; ECF No. 85; ECF No. 86; ECF No. 87.

The defendants filed a motion to strike certain
portions of the plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of
her opposition to summary judgment. See ECF No. 105. In an
April 2, 2021 memorandum opinion and order, the court concluded
that it would strike the seven separately-filed affidavits
relied upon by the plaintiff. See ECF No. 116 at 7-21, 31-32
(striking ECF No. 78, ECF No. 81, ECF No. 83, ECF No. 84, ECF
Nos. 85, ECF No. 86, and ECF No. 87). The court also concluded

that, although it would not strike the remaining documents
challenged by the defendants’ motion, it would not consider
three of them (ECF No. 91-15, ECF No. 91-16, and ECF No. 95-1)
in deciding the defendants’ summary-judgment motion and would
only consider the fourth (ECF No. 94-8) to the extent it
supported factual assertions that the defendants do not dispute.
See id. at 22-32.

The defendants’ motion is now fully briefed, and the
disputes concerning the evidence that will be considered in
deciding the motion have been resolved. The motion is ready for
disposition.
II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 651, 657 (2014) (per curiam).

III. Discussion
A. Disability-discrimination and gender-discrimination claims

Under the WVHRA, it is unlawful for an employer to

discriminate against an individual based on the individual’s
gender or disability with respect to the tenure, terms,
conditions, or privilege of employment, so long as the
individual is able and competent to perform the services
required. See W. Va. Code. §§ 5-11-3(h), 5-11-9(1).
“Discrimination claims brought under the WVHRA are
governed by the burden-shifting framework of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).” Bartos v. PDC Energy,
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 3d 755, 760 (N.D.W. Va. 2017) (internal
citation omitted) (citing Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep’t v.
State ex rel. State of W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d
342, 352 (W. Va. 1983)).3 Under that framework, a plaintiff
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
employment discrimination. See id. (citing Conaway v. E.
Associated Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423, 430 (W. Va. 1986)); see
also Skaggs, 479 S.E.2d at 581. If the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, “the burden of production then shifts to the
employer to come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions.” Skaggs, 479 S.E.2d at 582; see also

Bartos, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 760. If the employer meets this
burden of production, the burden shifts “once again [to] the
employee to prove that the proffered legitimate reason is a mere

3 A plaintiff may also proceed by providing direct proof of
discriminatory animus. See Woods v. Jefferds Corp., 824 S.E.2d
539, 547 (W. Va. 2019) (citing Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479
S.E.2d 561, 581 (W. Va. 1996)). The plaintiff here does not
appear to proceed under the direct method of proof. See id. 547
& n.8 (noting that direct proof is rare because employers no
longer announce that they are acting with discriminatory intent)
(citing Skaggs, 479 S.E.2d at 582 & n.21).
pretext rather than the true reason for the challenged
employment action.” Skaggs, 479 S.E.2d at 582; see also Bartos,
275 F. Supp. 3d at 761.

1. Disability-discrimination claim

a. Prima facie case. The defendants argue that the
plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of
disability discrimination. A plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of disability discrimination by showing “that [s]he
(1) is a . . . person with a disability, (2) is qualified to
perform the essential function of the job, (3) and . . . has

suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances from
which an inference of unlawful discrimination arises.” Marincil
v. Saminco, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 577, 581 (S.D.W. Va. 2009)
(citing Skaggs, 479 S.E.2d at 581 n.22).
The defendants first argues that the plaintiff has not
shown that she has a disability within the meaning of WVHRA.

Although the defendants note that the plaintiff alleges that she
suffers from anxiety and PTSD, they argue she has failed to
present evidence showing that these conditions meet the WVHRA’s
definition of disability. See ECF No. 76 at 7-8, 13-14, 16 n.5;
see also ECF No. 97 at 16. Under the WVHRA, a disability is
defined as “(1) [a] mental or physical impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life
activities[,] . . . includ[ing] functions such as . . .
working,” “(2) [a] record of such impairment,” or “(3) [b]eing

regarded as having such an impairment.” W. Va. Code § 5-11-
3(m).
Although the plaintiff cites evidence demonstrating
that she suffered anxiety attacks at work, one of which required
her to be removed from the workplace by ambulance, and that her
healthcare provider ordered her to take a medical leave of

absence from work to treat anxiety stemming from PTSD, see ECF
No. 90 at 6, she presents no argument that this evidence
demonstrates that she is disabled under any of the three
definitions provided by the WVHRA. Instead, she simply asserts
that “[i]t cannot be disputed” that she has a disability. Id.
at 28.

The court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to
establish the disability element of her prima facie case.
Although PTSD can in some circumstances constitute an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity, and thus meet
the first definition of disability under § 5-11-3(m), see
Peaslee v. Citizens Conservation Corp., Inc., No. 5:16-cv-11133,
2018 WL 296004, at *5-6 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 4, 2018), the burden is
on the plaintiff to show – by evidence and argument – that her
PTSD substantially limits a major life activity or that she is
disabled under the other definitions in § 5-11-3(m). The
plaintiff has not attempted to make that showing here, and the

court cannot do the legwork for her. See Clayton v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d 514, 521 (D.S.C. 2017) (“The
court has no obligation to fashion arguments for a party or to
further develop a party’s argument when it is wholly conclusory,
unexplained, and unadorned with citation to legal authority[,] .
. . [for, by] do[ing] so, the court edges into the impermissible
advocatory role of argument-creator.”).

b. Pretext. Even if the plaintiff had met her burden
to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination,
the court agrees with the defendants that the plaintiff has not
met her burden to show that the defendants’ proffered reason for
the plaintiff’s termination – that she violated Gestamp’s
sexual-harassment policy4 – was pretextual.

First, the plaintiff attempts to show pretext by
arguing that the defendants relied on an innocuous incident to
drum up allegations of sexual harassment against her. See ECF
No. 9-10, 34-35. For instance, she cites her own deposition

4 The plaintiff does not argue that the defendants have failed to
meet their burden to proffer a legitimate and non-discriminatory
reason for her termination. She instead argues that their
proffered reason was pretextual.
testimony discussing the incident to demonstrate that the
comment she made to Ms. Haynes was “mild” and that Ms. Haynes
had made similar comments to her during the conversation.5 ECF

No. 90 (citing ECF No. 75-2 at 18). However, when assessing
whether an employer’s reason for an adverse action was
pretextual, the issue is whether the decisionmaker “honestly
believed” that the employee deserved to be discharged for the
proffered reason. See Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487
F.3d 208, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Azimi v. Jordan’s
Meats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228, 246 (1st Cir. 2006) (“In assessing
pretext, a court’s focus must be on the perception of the
decisionmaker, that is, whether the employer believed its stated
reason to be credible.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As

5 In the plaintiff’s version of the incident, while she was
conversing with a group of co-workers, one of them commented
that she “was looking really good after [having] come back from
FMLA [leave].” ECF No. 75-2 at 18. The plaintiff responded
with a self-deprecating remark about her “butt,” causing the
group to laugh. Id. At that moment, Ms. Haynes “walked up” and
asked “what was funny.” Id. When the plaintiff relayed her
remark again, Ms. Haynes “looked around at” the plaintiff and
told her “there was nothing wrong with her.” Id. The plaintiff
responded, “‘Well, maybe one day I’ll have a butt like yours.’”
Id. In reply, Ms. Haynes “popped her butt out,” “started
rubbing it,” and said, “‘I know it’s nice. I ride horses to
keep in shape.” Id. Ms. Haynes further commented, “‘But if I
had boobs like yours, I would have it made.’” Id. The
conversation ended soon afterward. See id. The plaintiff
acknowledges, however, that the foregoing is not exactly the
version of the incident that she reported to the human resources
department investigators. See id.
the defendants point out, unrebutted evidence shows that Mr.
Hughes and another Gestamp supervisor, Rusty Mossberger, the
decisionmakers in this instance, credited the version of events

presented by Ms. Haynes – who described the plaintiff’s conduct
as more egregious and reported that she did not make the
reciprocal comments alleged by the plaintiff6 – because Ms.
Haynes’ version was corroborated by the conversation’s other
participants. See ECF No. 76 at 11-13 (citing ECF No. 75-6 ¶¶
18, 20, 21; id. at 48; ECF No. 75-7 ¶¶ 8, 10; id. at 9; ECF No.
75-8 ¶¶ 7, 8; ECF No. 75-14 ¶¶ 9, 10; ECF No. 75-15 ¶ 4, 6; ECF
No. 75-18 at 15, 17-18, 22-23). The plaintiff does not argue,
or point to any evidence demonstrating, that Mr. Hughes and Mr.
Mossberger did not honestly believe Ms. Haynes’ version of the
incident and that the plaintiff should be discharged for the
incident. See Holland, 487 F.3d at 217 (explaining that the

plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his employer’s decision to

6 In Ms. Haynes’ version of the incident, the plaintiff “came up
to [her] and told [her] that [Ms. Haynes] had a nice butt” and
“that she wish[ed] that she had [Ms. Haynes’] butt.” ECF No. 14
¶ 6, 9. “Right after she ma[de] the comment,” “the plaintiff
also “strok[ed] [Ms. Haynes’] hair.” Id. The plaintiff had
stroked Ms. Haynes’ hair on at least three earlier occasions,
and Ms. Haynes had previously asked her to not do it again. Id.
¶¶ 3, 5-6. Although the plaintiff’s comment “made [Ms. Haynes]
uncomfortable,” she “responded that [she] rides horses to keep
in shape.” Id. ¶ 6. Ms. Haynes says she never “made [a]
comment to [the plaintiff] regarding her chest” or “ma[d]e any
comments about the plaintiff’s anatomy.” Id. ¶ 10.
discharge him was pretextual because “the uncontested evidence
established that . . . []the decisionmaker[] honestly believed
that [the plaintiff] deserved to be discharged for threatening

[his supervisor], regardless of whether [the plaintiff] did in
fact issue the threats”).
Similarly, the plaintiff argues that the real reason
Ms. Haynes reported the incident was because the plaintiff had
earlier denied Ms. Haynes’ request for leave. See ECF No. 90 at
10, 34. The plaintiff fails to explain, however, how any

ulterior motives on the part of Ms. Haynes – who had no role in
deciding whether to terminate the plaintiff’s employment –
demonstrates that Mr. Hughes and Mr. Mossberger – the
decisionmakers in this case – did not honestly believe that the
plaintiff engaged in the conduct that they determined merited
her termination.

The plaintiff further points to evidence that she
claims shows Mr. Suprenant “talked [Ms. Haynes] into going to
[the human resource department] to file the complaint against
[the plaintiff]” and that Mr. Hughes drafted statements
regarding the incident, which Ms. Haynes later signed. ECF No.
90 at 35. The evidence that the plaintiff relies on, however,
shows that, although Mr. Suprenant approached Ms. Haynes because
she appeared to be in an emotional state, she did not report the
incident to him at that time. See ECF no. 75-14 ¶ 7. Instead,
several days later, Ms. Haynes approached Mr. Suprenant to
report the incident, and Mr. Suprenant told her she should

discuss the incident with the human resources department and
“walked [her] to [Mr.] Hughes’ office.” Id. ¶ 8; see also id. ¶
12. The evidence also shows that Mr. Hughes drafted short
memoranda describing his two interviews with Ms. Haynes and that
Ms. Haynes “read” and “signed” them because “[t]he information
in [them] is true and correct to the best of [her] knowledge.”
Id. ¶ 11; see also id. at 6-7. To the extent the plaintiff
argues this evidence shows that Mr. Suprenant and Mr. Hughes
contrived to bring a sexual-harassment claim against her, it is
not reasonable to infer such contrivance from the evidence
presented. More importantly, the plaintiff fails to explain how
the facts that Mr. Suprenant encouraged Ms. Haynes to report the

incident or that Mr. Hughes drafted interview memoranda for Ms.
Haynes to review and sign show that the decisionmakers here did
not honestly believe Ms. Haynes’ account of the incident or that
the plaintiff’s conduct warranted termination.
Second, the plaintiff attempts to show pretext by
arguing that Gestamp rarely enforced its sexual-harassment

policy and thus that its decision to do so in her case was a
ruse to conceal the discriminatory reasons for her termination.
To demonstrate that Gestamp rarely enforced its policy, the
plaintiff relies chiefly on affidavits from individuals who
attest to alleged violations of the policy that they claim

Gestamp did not investigate or otherwise address. See ECF No.
90 at 12-25, 35 (citing ECF No. 78; ECF No. 83; ECF No. 84; ECF
No. 85; ECF No. 86; ECF No. 87). She also relies on a complaint
filed in state court against Gestamp by another former employee.
See id. at 21-22 (citing ECF No. 95-1). In its April 2, 2021
memorandum opinion and order, the court determined that it would
strike the affidavits and disregard the complaint on which the
plaintiff relies. See ECF No. 116. Accordingly, the court will
not consider these documents in assessing whether the plaintiff
has presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute
regarding Gestamp’s enforcement of its sexual-harassment policy.

Aside from the affidavits and state-court complaint
that the court will not consider, the plaintiff relies on her
own deposition testimony regarding complaints against three
other Gestamp employees, namely, Bill Hardman, Mark Chandler,
and Mr. Holstein. See ECF No. 90 at 12; see also id. at 3-5, 7.
With respect to the complaints against Mr. Hardman and Mr.
Chandler, the plaintiff testified that she or other employees

complained about being sexually harassed by them, that Ms.
Paxton, the human resources department manager at the time,
investigated the complaints, and that Ms. Paxton’s
investigations did not result in termination of their
employment. See ECF No. 75-1 at 19-20. As the defendants point

out, however, these complaints were made before Mr. Hughes
became the human resources department manager, see ECF No. 75-6
¶¶ 1, 11, and there is no evidence that either Mr. Hughes or Mr.
Mossberger, the decisionmakers in this case, were aware of the
complaints.
The plaintiff’s arguments regarding non-enforcement of

Gestamp’s sexual-harassment policy against other employees calls
to attention the use of comparator evidence in employment
discrimination cases. Ever since the emergence of the indirect
method of proof outlined by McDonnell Douglas, “federal courts
now routinely rely on comparator evidence when deciding whether
an adverse employment action was driven by a discriminatory
motive,” in large part because “the task of identifying whether
an employer has treated more favorably a person who is situated
similarly to the plaintiff (but for the characteristic at issue)
is a relatively straightforward and manageable inquiry.” Laing
v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 719-20 (4th Cir. 2013).
However, “[d]isputes abound as to who is a valid comparator and

who is not.” Id. at 720. “[T]o establish a valid comparator,
the plaintiff must produce evidence that the plaintiff and
comparator dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the
same standards[,] and engaged in the same conduct without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would

distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them
for it.” Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223-
24 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
ellipsis omitted) (quoting ultimately Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp.,
964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). “Where a plaintiff attempts
to rely on comparator evidence to establish circumstances giving
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, . . . ‘the
similarity between comparators must be clearly established in
order to be meaningful.’” Swaso v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
698 F. App’x 745, 748 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal brackets and
ellipsis omitted) (quoting Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545
F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008)).

Decisions from the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals appear to be consistent with federal law regarding
reliance on comparator evidence. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, State
ex rel. W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n v. Logan-Mingo Area Mental
Health Agency, Inc., 329 S.E.2d 77, 79 (W. Va. 1985). And,
federal district courts have used the same analysis in assessing

WVHRA employment discrimination claims. See Wright v. Int’l
Ass’n of Sheet, Metal, Air, Rail & Transp. Workers Local Union
No. 33, No. 2:19-cv-00753, 2020 WL 2751897, at *3-4 (S.D.W. Va.
May 27, 2020); Lasure v. Sam’s E., Inc., No. 1:14CV127, 2015 WL
8664280, at *4 n.6, 6-9 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 11, 2015); see also

Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (W. Va.
1995) (noting that the Supreme Court of Appeals has
“consistently held that cases brought under the West Virginia
Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework
and structures developed under Title VII” (internal citation
omitted)).

To demonstrate pretext by pointing to Gestamp’s
unequal enforcement of the sexual-harassment policy, the
plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker who enforced the
policy against her was aware of others violating the same policy
and did not enforce the policy against them to the same extent.
See Opsatnick v. Norfolk S. Corp., 335 F. App’x 220, 222-23 (3d
Cir. 2009); Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir.
1989); Duggan v. Sisters of Charity of Providence Hosp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 469-70 (D.S.C. 2009). Here, the plaintiff has
failed to show either that Mr. Hughes and Mr. Mossberger, the
decisionmakers who enforced Gestamp’s sexual-harassment policy
against her, were aware of Mr. Hardman’s and Mr. Chandler’s

alleged misconduct or that they had any role in deciding to
treat Mr. Hardman and Mr. Chandler more favorably than they
treated the plaintiff. Accordingly, Mr. Hardman and Mr.
Chandler are inapt comparators for purposes of demonstrating
pretext. See Forrest v. Transit Mgmt. of Charlotte, Inc., 245

F. App’x 255, 257 (4th Cir. 2007) (“If different decision-makers
are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”).
As for Mr. Holstein, the plaintiff points to evidence
of numerous instances of what she views as his mistreatment of
her while he was her direct supervisor. See ECF No. 90 at 3-5,
7, 12. Although the plaintiff notes that she brought her

complaints to several Gestamp supervisors, including two plant
managers, she offers no indication of Mr. Hughes’ or Mr.
Mossberger’s involvement in investigating her complaints or in
determining how Mr. Holstein should be treated. See id. at 3-5,
7. Although the plaintiff argues that she complained that Mr.
Holstein had sexually harassed her, she does not identify who
this complaint was made to. See id. at 12.

The defendants, on the other hand, present unrebutted
evidence that Mr. Hughes became involved with the plaintiff’s
complaints against Mr. Holstein only when the plaintiff provided
Mr. Hughes with three written complaints between October 26 and
November 3, 2016.7 See ECF No. 76 at 5-6 (citing ECF No. 75-1 at

7 Mr. Mossberger apparently had no involvement with the
plaintiff’s complaints against Mr. Holstein.
31-32, 36, 161-66, 176-81; ECF No. 75-6 ¶ 13; ECF No. 75-10 ¶
8). Mr. Hughes states in his affidavit that the written
complaints he received from the plaintiff did not allege that

Mr. Holstein had sexually harassed her, see ECF No. 75-6 ¶ 13.d,
and that they largely concerned “general workplace
dissatisfaction,” ECF No. 75-18 at 18; see also id. at 29. The
defendants point to unrebutted evidence that Mr. Hughes
investigated the plaintiff’s complaints by interviewing at least
nine employees whom the plaintiff had identified, none of whom,
he determined, corroborated the plaintiff’s allegations. See
ECF No. 76 at 7 (citing ECF No. 75-6 ¶ 13; EFC No. 75-9 ¶ 14;
ECF No. 75-10 ¶ 9). Mr. Hughes therefore concluded that the
plaintiff’s complaints were unsubstantiated, and Gestamp took no
action against Mr. Holstein. See ECF No. 75-6 ¶ 13; ECF No. 75-
10 ¶ 9.

The court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate pretext based on her complaints against Mr.
Holstein. As the defendants argue, the plaintiff has failed to
point to evidence that she complained to Mr. Hughes that Mr.
Holstein had sexually harassed her, and Mr. Hughes has testified
that the complaints he received from the plaintiff, as he

understood them, did not contain allegations of sexual
harassment. See Drummond v. Stackley, 687 F. App’x 277, 278
(4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting argument that employer’s proffered
reasons for selecting comparator, rather than the plaintiff, for
promotion must have been pretextual based on the plaintiff’s

view that employer “could not have believed the [comparator] was
more qualified than [the plaintiff]” when the plaintiff “offered
no evidence undermining the decision makers’ perception of the
[comparator] as compared to [the plaintiff]”). Thus, Mr.
Holstein cannot serve as an apt comparator because there is no
evidence that Mr. Hughes was aware that Mr. Holstein had been
accused of violating, let alone that he had violated, the same
policy enforced against the plaintiff. See Opsatnick, 335 F.
App’x at 222-23; Jones, 874 F.2d at 1541; Duggan, 663 F. Supp.
2d at 469-70. And, as the defendants further argue, Mr.
Holstein is also an inapt comparator because, unlike the
complaint against the plaintiff, the allegations in the

complaints against Mr. Holstein were not corroborated by other
employees who Mr. Hughes interviewed. See Doke v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 118 F. App’x 366, 369 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
“[d]ifferential treatment” of an employee for whom allegations
of misconduct are substantiated as compared to employees for
whom allegations of the same misconduct are not substantiated
“is not evidence of pretext”); Duggan, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 463
(“A plaintiff charging an employer with disparate discipline
must show the decisionmaker consciously overlooked misconduct by
others outside the protected class when he disciplined [the]
plaintiff more severely.” (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted)).

Because the plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination and to demonstrate that the defendants’
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating her
employment was pretextual, the defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on her disability-discrimination claim.

2. Gender-discrimination claim

To establish a prima facie case of gender
discrimination under the WVHRA, a plaintiff must show that (1)
“she is a member of a protected class,” (2) “the employer made
an adverse decision concerning her,” and (3) “but for the
plaintiff’s protected status, the adverse decision would not
have been made.” Blankenship v. Caterpillar Global Mining, LLC,

964 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (N.D.W. Va. 2013). The defendants
argue that the plaintiff has not provided evidence that can
establish the third element of her prima facie case, i.e.,
“evidence which would sufficiently link [Gestamp]’s decision and
the plaintiff’s status as a member of a protected class so as to
give rise to an inference that the employment decision was based
on” her gender. Conaway, 358 S.E.2d at 429-30.

In response, the plaintiff argues that she was
terminated for violation of a sexual-harassment policy, “when
[that policy] was ignored for men.” ECF No. 90 at 28; see also
id. at 35 (“Gestamp had a pattern of favoring men over women
when it came to sexual harassment [violations].”). Thus, the
only evidence that the plaintiff relies on to demonstrate that
her gender was a but-for cause of her termination is evidence
that the sexual-harassment policy enforced against her was not

enforced against men. See Conaway, 358 S.E.2d at 429-30
(explaining that evidence of causation “could . . . come in the
form of a case of unequal or disparate treatment between members
of the protected class and others” or “by the elimination of the
apparent legitimate reasons for the decision”).
To demonstrate that Gestamp enforced its sexual-

harassment policy against her but not against men, the plaintiff
points to examples of male employees engaging in sexual
harassment without being disciplined as attested to in the
stricken affidavits, the state-court complaint, and the
plaintiff’s own deposition testimony. See ECF No. 90 at 35.
The court will not consider the examples provided in the
stricken affidavits or in the state-court complaint. With
respect to the plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding sexual
harassment committed by Mr. Hardman, Mr. Chandler, and Mr.
Holstein, the court concludes, for the reasons set forth
previously, that none of them are comparators that can

demonstrate disparate treatment based on gender. See Duggan,
663 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (“To be similarly situated and thus
permit a valid comparison, the []male employees must have dealt
with the same supervisor[] . . . and have engaged in the same
conduct without mitigating circumstances that would distinguish
their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.”).
Thus, the court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

Even assuming that the plaintiff had established her
prima facie case, the court concludes, for the reasons expressed
previously, that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
the defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
terminating her employment was pretextual. Accordingly, the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
gender-discrimination claim.

B. Failure-to-accommodate claim

“Under West Virginia caselaw[,] [a failure-to-
accommodate claim] is generally treated as a separate cause of
action with a different test than that used for a general
[disability-]discrimination claim.” Dawson v. Kokosing Constr.
Co., Inc., No. 3:08-0287, 2009 WL 1176447, at *8 n.7 (S.D.W. Va.
Apr. 29, 2009) (citing Skaggs, 479 S.E.2d 561).8 A plaintiff

pursuing a standalone failure-to-accommodate claim under the
WVHRA must prove: “(1) [t]he plaintiff is a qualified person
with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of the plaintiff’s
disability; (3) the plaintiff required an accommodation in order
to perform the essential functions of a job; (4) a reasonable
accommodation existed that met the plaintiff’s needs; (5) the
employer knew or should have known of the plaintiff’s need and
of the accommodation; and (6) the employer failed to provide the
accommodation.” Alley v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 602
S.E.2d 506, 514 (W. Va. 2004) (quoting Syl. pt. 2, Skaggs, 479

8 An allegation that an employer failed to accommodate an
employee’s disability may also be understood as an adverse
action forming one of the elements of a general disability-
discrimination claim. See Dawson, 2009 WL 1176447, at *8 n.7.
In their briefing, the defendants argue that the court should
summarily dismiss the plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim
because she failed to sufficiently allege any such claim in her
complaint. See ECF No. 76 at 15; ECF No. 97 at 16-17. The
court agrees that dismissal may well be appropriate on this
ground because, as the court has previously noted, “[a]ny
ambiguity or uncertainty in the [plaintiff’s] claims arises from
[the] plaintiff’s poorly-constructed complaint.” ECF No. 44 at
11. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff’s briefing treats the
defendants’ alleged failure to accommodate her alleged
disability as a standalone claim, see ECF No. 90 at 1, and
because West Virginia law provides for a separate cause of
action, the court addresses it herein as a separate claim.
S.E.2d at 568).

The defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to
present evidence supporting her failure-to-accommodate claim.
The court agrees. As discussed previously, the plaintiff has
failed to present evidence or argument that she has a disability
within the meaning of the WVHRA, and the court will not do the
legwork for her. See Clayton, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 521. For this
reason, the plaintiff cannot meet the first element of her
failure-to-accommodate claim, and summary judgment is

appropriate.
Further, the court concludes that the plaintiff has
failed to show that she has adduced evidence for the remaining
elements of her failure-to-accommodate claim. The plaintiff
seems to premise the claim on the pressure she felt to return to
work following her two anxiety attacks. See ECF No. 90 at 8

(explaining that, based on Mr. Hughes’ communications with her,
the plaintiff “was forced to get her provide[r] to allow her to
return [to work] on March 17, 2017[,] or face certain
termination”); see id. at 29 (using identical language). In
explaining how this pressure amounted to a failure to
accommodate her disability, however, the plaintiff offers only
the following argument: “[The plaintiff] was denied an
accommodation as it was clear that her physician had stated in
the FMLA documentation that [the plaintiff] would experience
flare ups [of her PTSD symptoms,] and it would be medically
necessary for [her] to be absent from work during the flare-

ups.” ECF No. 90 at 8; see also id. 29 (using identical
language); id. at 28 (asserting that there remains a genuine
dispute whether the “[d]efendant fail[ed] to accommodate [her
alleged disability] when [her] FMLA documents indicated she was
to receive time off when needed”). No further explanation or
argument is provided.

The plaintiff’s one-sentence argument is insufficient
to meet her burden at this stage. Neither her brief recitation
of the facts surrounding her return to work in March 2017, nor
her facially insufficient argument clarify, for instance, what
the essential functions of her job were, what accommodation the
plaintiff claims was required for her to perform those
functions, whether that accommodation was reasonable and
available, and whether Gestamp was aware of such an
accommodation. The court will not sift through the evidence in
order to develop arguments in this vein on the plaintiff’s
behalf. See Clayton, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 521. Because the
plaintiff has failed to present evidence to support her failure-

to-accommodate claim, the defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on that claim.
C. FMLA-interference claim

“The FMLA provides that ‘it shall be unlawful for any
employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or
the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this
subchapter.’” Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199,
203 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). “To

establish unlawful interference with an entitlement to FMLA
benefits, an employee must prove that: (1) she was an eligible
employee; (2) her employer was covered by the statute; (3) she
was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) she gave her employer
adequate notice of her intention to take leave; and (5) the
employer denied her FMLA benefits to which she was entitled.”
Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 508,
516 (D. Md. 2008); accord Propst v. HWS Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp.
3d 506, 539 (W.D.N.C. 2015); Chadwell v. Brewer, 59 F. Supp. 3d
756, 766 (W.D. Va. 2014).

Further, “[i]n order to establish a claim for
interference with the exercise of FMLA rights, [the plaintiff]
must prove not only the fact of interference, but also that the
violation prejudiced her in some way.” Ranade v. BT Ams., Inc.,
581 F. App’x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Ragsdale v.
Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)). “Such
prejudice can be proven by showing that she lost compensation or
benefits by reason of the violation, sustained other monetary
losses as a direct result of the violation, or suffered some
loss in employment status remediable through appropriate

equitable relief, such as employment, reinstatement, or
promotion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
In support of her FMLA claim, the plaintiff argues
that Mr. Hughes undercalculated the leave to which she was
entitled under the FMLA. See ECF No. 90 at 8 & n.1, 36.

Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that Gestamp was required to
calculate the plaintiff’s leave based on the average number of
hours she worked per week, which far exceeded the 40-hour
workweek that Mr. Hughes used to calculate the plaintiff’s
leave. See id. (citing ECF No. 91-7; ECF No. 91-10). Based on
his miscalculation, the plaintiff argues, Mr. Hughes incorrectly
informed her that her FMLA leave had been used up by March 17,
2020, causing her to obtain a return-to-work authorization from
her healthcare provider so that she could return to work on
March 20, 2017. See id. at 7-8, 36-37 (citing ECF No. 75-2 at
6; ECF No. 91-6; ECF No. 91-7).

The defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to
adduce evidence that she was entitled to any FMLA leave, or that
the defendants denied her any FMLA leave to which she was
entitled, after she obtained her return-to-work authorization
from her healthcare provider. The court agrees. The
plaintiff’s claim is based on her assertion that Mr. Hughes’

miscalculation of her FMLA leave time caused her to return to
work on March 20, 2017, even though she remained eligible to
remain on FMLA leave for roughly another month. However, the
plaintiff’s healthcare provider certified that she could return
to work with no limitations on March 17, 2017, see ECF No. 91-6
at 1, and the plaintiff has advanced no evidence suggesting she
remained eligible for FMLA leave beyond that date. See Pivac v.
Component Servs, & Logistics, Inc., 570 F. App’x 899, 903 (11th
Cir. 2014) (concluding, in the context of an FMLA-interference
claim, that an employee was ineligible for FMLA leave in part
because her doctor had returned her to work without
restrictions); Mayland v. St. Joseph Med. Ctr., No. Civ. JFM-00-

2981, 2001 WL 708815, at *1 (D. Md. June 11, 2001) (granting
summary judgment on FMLA-interference claim “[i]n the absence of
any evidence that any doctor thought [the plaintiff] was not fit
to return to work” during the period for which a right to leave
was alleged (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D))); Dodgens v. Kent
Mfg. Co., 955 F. Supp. 560, 564-65 (D.S.C. 1997) (granting
summary judgment on FMLA-interference claim when “it is
undisputed that [the plaintiff] was permitted to take leave
until being certified to return to work without restrictions by
his doctor”).9

Further, the court concludes that the plaintiff has
failed to present evidence showing that she was prejudiced in
some way by the alleged violation. See Ranade, 581 F. App’x at
184. The defendants point out that there is no dispute that the
plaintiff returned to the same position, along with the same
compensation and benefits, she held before taking leave. See
ECF No. 76 at 22-23. In response, the plaintiff argues only
that she “was prejudiced [because] she failed to receive full

FMLA benefits.” ECF No. 90 at 36. This conclusory argument
misses the mark. The plaintiff has not identified any “lost
compensation or benefits” or “other monetary losses” stemming
from the alleged violation. Ranade, 581 F. App’x at 184. Nor
has she identified any “loss in employment status remediable
through appropriate equitable relief.” Id. Rather, she argues
that she should have been accorded a longer leave period, an
argument that the court has already rejected and that, in any
event, does not present the kind of prejudice required to
sustain an FMLA-interference claim. See id.

9 The court notes in this regard that the plaintiff acknowledged
that she was planning on asking her healthcare provider for
return-to-work authorization before she was aware that Mr.
Hughes had determined that her FMLA leave had been used up. See
ECF No. 75-2 at 6.
Because the plaintiff has failed to present evidence
that she was denied FMLA leave to which she was entitled or that
the defendants’ alleged interference in the exercise of her FMLA

rights resulted in cognizable prejudice, the defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s FMLA-
interference claim.
D. FMLA-retaliation claim

“The FMLA prohibits employers from discriminating
against an employee for exercising her FMLA rights.” Hannah P.
v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 347 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing 29 U.S.C. §

2615(a)(2)). “Courts analyze FMLA retaliation claims . . .
under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.”10 Id.
“The McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff first to
establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation by proving
three elements: (1) ‘the plaintiff engaged in a protected
activity; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action
against her; and (3) there was a causal link between the two
events.”’’ Fry, 964 F.3d at 244-45 (brackets omitted) (quoting
Hannah P., 916 F.3d at 347). “Then, the burden shifts to the

10 A plaintiff pursuing an FMLA-retaliation claim may also
proceed under the direct method of proof, see Fry v. Rand
Constr. Corp., 964 F.3d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 2020). The plaintiff
here, however, appears to proceed under the indirect method,
applying the burden-shifting framework. See ECF No. 90 at 37.
defendant to produce ‘a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for
taking the employment action at issue.’” Id. at 245 (quoting
Hannah P., 916 F.3d at 347). “Lastly, the plaintiff is given a

chance to prove that the employer’s explanation was false and a
pretext for retaliation.” Id.
Here, the plaintiff argues, in a single sentence, that
she “engage[d] in protected activity” by “[]taking and/or
requesting . . . FMLA leave[]”; that Gestamp “took adverse
action against her” by “[]fail[ing] to allow [her] all [her]

benefits,” “terminat[ing] her [employment],” and “retaliat[ing]
against her for requesting FMLA leave”; and that these “adverse
action[s] [were] ca[us]ally connected to [her] protected
activity.” ECF No. 90 at 37. In the next sentence, the
plaintiff argues that the “[d]efendants[’] explanation” for its
actions, “if any, is pretext for FMLA retaliation.” Id. In
support of this argument, the plaintiff appears to rely only on
her view that the comment she made to Ms. Haynes was an
“extremely weak reason for her termination.” Id. at 38.

The defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to
present evidence showing a causal connection between her
requesting and taking FMLA leave and Gestamp’s decision to
terminate her employment. The court agrees. The plaintiff
provides only the conclusory argument that a causal connection
exists, without providing any further explanation or citing any
evidence. A single-sentence argument unadorned by citation to
the record or relevant legal authority is not sufficient to

establish the requisite prima facie case at this stage. See
Clayton, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 521.
The defendants also argue that they have presented a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the
plaintiff’s employment – her violation of Gestamp’s sexual-
harassment policy – and that the plaintiff has failed to present

evidence that the proffered reason was pretextual. The court
once again agrees. The plaintiff presents a conclusory single-
sentence argument and fails to meaningfully address the evidence
in the record or to support her argument with citation to legal
authority. This is again insufficient to demonstrate pretext.
See id. And, to the extent the plaintiff relies on her
arguments regarding pretext addressed to other claims, the
court, for the reasons expressed earlier, concludes that she has
failed to demonstrate pretext.

Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s FMLA-retaliation claim.
Iv. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 75) be, and
hereby it is, granted. It is further ORDERED that this action
be, and hereby it is, dismissed.

The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this
memorandum opinion and order to all counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties.

ENTER: August 11, 2021

- Bb,
Jo . Copenhaver, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge

38

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729863. Public record. Not legal advice.