# Brown v. Santiago

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · March 5, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729527

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** March 5, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729527

## Opinion text

CHARLESTON DIVISION

RONALD BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-cv-00571

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SKYLER SANTIAGO, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the court is Plaintiff Ronald Brown’s (“Mr. Brown”) Amended Complaint
in which he brings claims for excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights, assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. [ECF No.
1, Ex. 2]. The Defendants have filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF
No. 27] incorporating and restating their prior Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum of Law [ECF Nos. 18 & 19]. Having reviewed the motion for summary
judgment, Mr. Brown’s response [ECF No. 28], the Defendants’ reply [ECF No. 32],
and the record evidence, I find that the use of force was not excessive and that the
Defendants are entitled to the benefit of qualified immunity. For the reasons fully
explained in the memorandum below, the motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND

This excessive force case was initiated on May 10, 2019. Mr. Brown filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia. [ECF No. 1, Ex.
1
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“count II”); and a claim brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1
The Defendants–all corrections officers at the Mount Olive Correctional
Complex (“MOCC”)–subsequently removed the complaint to this court. Plaintiff
complains that while he was incarcerated at MOCC, the Defendants forcefully

extracted him from an outdoor exercise cage on June 25, 2018. [ECF No. 1, Ex. 2].
Mr. Brown states that while he was in the exercise cage, MOCC corrections officers
removed inmates from adjacent cages forcefully and with pepper spray.
Approximately 15 minutes after the other inmates were removed, the officers asked
Mr. Brown to return to his cell. Mr. Brown at first refused, claiming that he feared
being assaulted if he left the cage. [ECF No. 1, Ex. 2 at ¶16]. Mr. Brown states that

Defendants ordered him to “prone out” for extraction and removal from the exercise
cage but that he refused to do so because the floor of the cage was covered in urine.
. at ¶13. Mr. Brown claims that he offered instead to be cuffed through the bars of
the cage. at ¶18. Plaintiff complains that Defendants then used a tactical team to
remove him from the cell and accosted him “by using excessive force against him? . . .
by, among other things, slamming plaintiff into the ground” and “hitting and kicking
plaintiff.” . at ¶13. Mr. Brown complains that as a result of this application of force,

he suffered “bruising, lacerations, abrasions, a broken finger, a concussion and injury
to his back.” . Mr. Brown states that during the extraction, the Defendants took

1 Plaintiff has withdrawn his claim for vicarious liability against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
2
kicked and punched him and bent his finger back far enough to break it. at ¶18.
He alleges that the Defendants taunted him saying “we can kill you” while they were
detaining and extracting him. at ¶21. Mr. Brown complains that he was then
removed to an area without video cameras and further beaten before Defendants
escorted him to the medical unit for examination of his injuries. at ¶19. As a result

of his injuries, Mr. Brown was transported to Montgomery General Hospital for
examination and diagnostics. at ¶20.
The Defendants claim that Mr. Brown was being disorderly while the other
inmates were being removed from their exercise cages; that he used verbally abusive
and threatening language while refusing to comply with orders despite 15 minutes of
attempts to use negotiation and dialogue to gain his compliance and to get him to

“cuff up” or “prone out”. [ECF No. 19 at 3]. Defendants state that this standoff lasted
over an hour in total before an extraction team was finally sent into the recreation
area.
Body cam footage shows the extraction team getting into formation and
preparing to enter the yard. Defendant Captain Penick led a team comprised of
Defendants Santiago, Wilson, Thomas, and Phillips plus two officers not named in
this lawsuit—Donald Slack and Charles Legg (who was wearing the body camera)––

into the yard. Upon reaching the cell occupied by Mr. Brown, Capt. Penick can be
heard asking Mr. Brown “do you want to strip out and cuff up?” Mr. Brown replied
“no.” One of the officers at the front of the column appears to point out that Mr. Brown
was holding a pen in his hands. As Capt. Penick unlocked the cell, Mr. Brown raised
3
ground, indicating that he did not intend to use it as a weapon against the group of
officers poised to forcibly extract him from the cell. The Defendants rushed into the
cell as a group, wrestled Mr. Brown to the ground and applied hand cuffs and
shackles. Mr. Brown was in obvious pain during this detainer and blood can be seen
on his forehead as he is led out of the exercise cage.

The camera followed as Mr. Brown was escorted to the medical room. On the
way, he was doubled over, but no obvious additional blows or beatings are discernible.
In the medical room doorway, the camera lagged behind the action and Mr. Brown
was next seen on the ground hollering and saying that he was sorry for disobeying
orders. The Defendants lifted him into a chair for medical observation and at one
point, Mr. Brown appears to slip in and out of consciousness.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary
judgment. A court “may grant summary judgment only if, taking the facts in the best
light for the nonmoving party, no material facts are disputed and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” , 352
F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 2003). “Facts are ‘material’ when they might affect the
outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue’ exists when the evidence would allow a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
, 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010).
The moving party may meet its burden of showing that no genuine issue of fact
exists by use of “depositions, answers to interrogatories, answers to requests for
4
, 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). “[A] party opposing a properly
supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or
denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” , 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party is not

enough to withstand summary judgment; the judge must ask whether “the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” . at 252.
III. DISCUSSION
The Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing (i) that the applied use
of force was not violative of Mr. Brown’s Eighth Amendment rights because it was a
good faith effort to restore order and safety; (ii) that Mr. Brown’s assault and battery

claims must therefore fail as a matter of law; (iii) that no deviations from MOCC
policy occurred and that if one had occurred, such deviation is not a
constitutional violation and; (iv) that the Defendants are entitled to the benefit of
qualified immunity.
A.
Section 1983 subjects to civil liability any person who, acting under color of
state law, deprives an individual of his or her constitutional or federal rights.

Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability.” , 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Thus, “immunity is a
threshold issue which the court addresses before considering any of the defendants’
proffered substantive bases for summary judgment.” , 139 F. Supp. 3d
5
the doctrine of qualified immunity, “[g]overnmental officials performing discretionary
functions are shielded from liability for money damages so long ‘as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’ , 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Thus, I must undertake a two-part inquiry: (1) viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Mr. Brown, the court must determine if there was a constitutional
violation; and (2) if so, whether the right violated was clearly established at the time
of the violation. , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). If the answer to either
question is no, then the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. I will first
examine the question of whether a constitutional violation has taken place in this

case.
The Eighth Amendment “serves as the primary source of substantive
protection to convicted prisoners . . . where the deliberate use of force is challenged
as excessive and unjustified.” , 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986);
, 727 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has extended
the application of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ to the treatment of prisoners by prison officials.”). A claim brought

under the Eighth Amendment must contain both an objective and a subjective
element. , 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). To satisfy the
objective element, an inmate must show that that the “deprivation suffered or injury
inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious.” . For excessive force claims, an
6
“significant” pain or injury to establish the objective element, but must only show
that more than a de minimis pain or injury occurred. , 77 F.3d at 761.
The objective component is “contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of
decency.” , 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992).
To satisfy the subjective element, an inmate must demonstrate that “the prison

official . . . acted with ‘wantonness in the infliction of pain.’” , at 77 F.3d at
761 (quoting , 475 U.S. at 322). The Supreme Court has stated that the
unnecessary infliction of pain includes inflictions of pain that are “totally without
penal justification.” , 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed.
2d 59 (1981). “When prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is

whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” , No. 2:14-cv-
17419, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134737, 2016 WL 5723601, at *19 (S.D. W. Va. Aug.
23, 2016), , No. 2:14-cv-17419, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 134135, 2016 WL 5660339, (quoting , 475 U.S. at 320–21).
In determining whether the use of force violates the Eighth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has utilized the following factors:

(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between
the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of any
reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended
to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.
7
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the Defendants were engaged in “a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Taking the first factor, it is
clear that there was a need for some degree of force. The parties do not dispute that
Mr. Brown was disorderly and that he refused to comply with repeated requests to
either “prone out” or “cuff up” after a lengthy period of attempts to win his

cooperation. Taking as true (as I must in deciding this motion) Mr. Brown’s allegation
that the floor was covered in urine, this fact does not support Mr. Brown’s position
that his refusal to comply with orders was entirely because MOCC officers were
ordering him to lie in urine. Mr. Brown also rebuffed offers to simply be handcuffed
and led off the yard including a final, good faith effort at non-forceful resolution by
Captain Penick. Mr. Brown essentially dared the Defendants to physically remove

him from the exercise cage, leaving them with no choice but to do just that. While Mr.
Brown’s amended complaint states that he offered to “cuff up,” the video evidence
belies that point. Captain Penick can be heard asking Mr. Brown one last time if he
was willing to come out and Mr. Brown refuses. [ECF No. 19, Ex. B];
Depo. of Brian Penick [ECF No 32, Ex. B].
As to the second factor, the relationship between the need for force and the
amount of force used, I find that the video evidence demonstrates that the Defendants

used the amount of force that was necessary to restrain and subdue Mr. Brown. Video
6 shows the extraction team quickly take Mr. Brown to the ground, apply restraints
and lead him out. Mr. Brown did sustain injuries to his head, back and finger during
this encounter. However, the extent of the injuries he received is not the primary
8
of a good faith security effort—is not necessarily indicative of a constitutional
violation. The video evidence that I have reviewed does not show a beating or an
application of force that was “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
, 250 F. Supp. 2d 593, 603 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2002) (quoting ,
156 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531 (D. Md. July 18, 2001)).

The next factor, the extent of the reasonably perceived threat to the
officers, also weighs in Defendants’ favor. The parties are in agreement that Mr.
Brown was using profanity and threatening language to the guards who were trying
to reconcile the situation without the use of force. Brown Depo. at 35 [ECF No.
19, Ex. C]. It was not unreasonable for MOCC officers to believe that Mr. Brown posed
a threat to order and safety.

Finally, the video clearly shows that Captain Penick gave Mr. Brown a final
chance to leave the exercise cell without having to undergo a forcible removal. In
deposition, Mr. Brown was asked, “Do you agree that Major Ward spent a significant
amount of time trying to deescalate that situation?” Mr. Brown replied, “I know he
was out there talking to us, yes.” [ECF No. 28, Ex. C]. There is no genuine issue of
fact then that the Defendants attempted to temper the situation without force. The
final factor therefore (efforts made to temper) favors the Defendants.

Viewing the record in the most favorable light to Mr. Brown, I find that the
Defendants’ conduct was a good faith effort to maintain order and security and not
an excessive use of force in violation of Mr. Brown’s Eighth Amendment rights. The
video evidence does not support the Plaintiff’s version of the events. “When opposing
9
so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of
the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
, 550 U.S. 372, 380, (2007). Mr. Brown has failed to present any evidence to
overcome the Defendants’ video evidence showing that the application of force was
done in a good faith manner to restore discipline and not maliciously to cause harm.

Because there was no constitutional violation, the Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity. The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count III
is GRANTED.
B.
Mr. Brown also brings state law claims for assault and battery (Count I) and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II), both of which arise out of the

same set of facts as his excessive force claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Mr. Brown’s claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress are matters of state tort law.
, 551 F. App'x 666, 677 (4th. Cir 2014) (a constitutional claim of
excess force and a state criminal charge or tort claim of assault and battery charge
are based on distinct legal concepts and foundations). Under West Virginia law, the
legal phrase “assault and battery” is used to refer to the tort of battery. The

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 13 (1965), sets out the elements of the tort of battery
as follows: an actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person,
or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the
10
cv-07358, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139725 (S. D. W. Va., Aug. 28, 2014) (quoting
, 498 S.E.2d 702, 710 (1997)) (“In order to be liable for a battery,
an actor must act with the intention of causing a harmful or offensive contact with a
person.”).
In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim for intentional or reckless infliction

of emotional distress, four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that
the defendant's conduct was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as
to exceed the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with the intent to inflict
emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain or substantially certain
emotional distress would result from his conduct; (3) that the actions of the defendant
caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and, (4) that the emotional distress

suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it. , 202 W. Va. 369 (1998).
Having already found that there is no genuine issue of fact on the excessive
force claim, I find that there is also no issue of fact on these state law claims. Because
the Defendants did not engage in excessive force, their conduct was reasonable under
the circumstances. Therefore, no reasonable jury could find that the Defendants acted
with the intent to cause an offensive, harmful contact instead of with the intent to

subdue an unruly inmate and to restore discipline and order. Nor was the effort to
restore discipline and order “atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as
to exceed the bounds of decency.” The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as
to counts I and II is GRANTED.
11
C. Violation of Policy and Procedure
In Count V of the Amended Complaint, Mr. Brown alleges that Defendant West
Virginia Department of Corrections recklessly or negligently failed to follow its own
procedures put in place to prevent retaliation against inmates who file complaints
and lawsuits. [ECF No. 1, Ex. 2]. Defendants argue that there was no policy violation
and that even if there were, such violation does not create an independent cause of
action. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument in his response to the motion for
summary judgment and appears to have dropped this count along with his
supervisory liability claim. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Fact and Law in Response
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment ECF No. 28 at 1 (“Mr. Brown has
asserted claims against the defendants as follows: 1) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
cruel and unusual punishment/excessive force ... 2) Intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and 3) Assault and battery”). Defendants’ discussion of MOCC
policy directives is contained within their argument related to excessive force. I take
it therefore that Mr. Brown has withdrawn Count V.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
[ECF 18] is GRANTED. The complaint [ECF No. 1, Ex. 2] is DISMISSED and the
matter ordered to be REMOVED from the docket.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record
and any unrepresented party.
ENTER: March 5, 2021

JOSEPH &. GOODW
ew STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10729527. Public record. Not legal advice.
