# Palermo Villa Inc v. IJ White Corporation

> District Court, E.D. Wisconsin · September 19, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10719008

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
- **Decided:** September 19, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10719008

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding third- party plaintiffs stated indemnification claim against third-party defendant where they had already settled with and paid plaintiff
- noting that indemnification requires a showing that “a person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by another” (emphasis added) (quoting 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indemnity p. 688, sec. 2)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

PALERMO VILLA, INC.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 21-CV-516-JPS
v.

I.J. WHITE CORPORATION,

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff, ORDER
v.

KUHLMAN INCORPORATED,

Third-Party Defendant.

1. INTRODUCTION
The above-captioned breach of contract case is currently set for a jury
trial beginning on March 18, 2024. ECF No. 91. Plaintiff Palermo Villa, Inc.
(“Palermo’s”) alleges in the Complaint that Defendant I.J. White
Corporation (“IJW”) breached its agreement with Palermo’s by failing to
provide a freezer capable of meeting Palermo’s required specifications. ECF
No. 1 at 4, 6. IJW disputes this contention. See generally ECF No. 6 (IJW’s
Answer and Affirmative Defenses). Further, IJW has filed a third-party
complaint against Kuhlman Incorporated (“Kuhlman”), alleging that “the
deficiencies in the [freezer’s] performance are a direct and proximate result
of deficiencies and/or defects in Kuhlman’s design and manufacture of the
refrigeration components for the [freezer].” ECF No. 17 at 2. IJW therefore
brings third-party claims for indemnification and contribution against
Kuhlman. See generally id.
On December 15, 2022, Kuhlman filed a motion in limine, ECF No.
52, and supporting brief1 asking the Court to bar IJW “from presenting
evidence at trial in support of its tort claims against Kuhlman for
indemnification and contribution.” ECF No. 53 at 1. Making this
evidentiary determination requires the Court to rule on “whether there is a
legal basis for the jury to assess comparative fault between IJW and
Kuhlman for [Palermo’s] claimed damages (if any) in the context of a breach
of contract claim by Palermo against IJW.” Id. at 1–2. The Court heard oral
argument on the motion during a January 24, 2023 hearing (which primarily
addressed a separate motion in limine). ECF Nos. 80, 81. Upon
consideration of this material, the Court will grant in part and deny in part
Kuhlman’s motion on the terms stated in the balance of this Order and
allow IJW’s indemnification claim to proceed.
2. RELEVANT FACTS2
Palermo’s contracted with IJW for an Ultra Series Blast Freezing
System (the “Spiral Freezer”). Palermo’s alleges that the IJW Spiral Freezer
is not capable of meeting the specifications provided in the contract
between Palermo’s and IJW, namely to freeze 150 rising pizza crusts per

1The supporting brief lays out both Kuhlman’s arguments for its motion
together with IJW’s arguments in opposition and is signed by the attorneys for
each party. See generally ECF No. 53.
2The Court adopts the statement of facts from the supporting brief, ECF
No. 53 at 2–3, with minor, non-substantive edits. Counsel for IJW signed the
supporting brief and raises no dispute as to the facts as described and expert
opinions as characterized therein. See generally id. Additional facts that were
discussed during oral argument are included where applicable, with citations to
the oral argument transcript, ECF No. 81; additional citations to the record are
made where necessary.

Page 2 of 15
minute down to a temperature range of 0°F ± 10°F. Palermo’s is claiming
damages for breach of contract and breach of express and implied
warranties based on IJW’s alleged failure to manufacture a Spiral Freezer
capable of meeting those specifications.
Palermo’s contracted with Kuhlman to provide refrigeration valves
and piping for the Spiral Freezer. Palermo’s makes no claims against
Kuhlman. No contract exists between IJW and Kuhlman.
IJW’s freezer and refrigeration expert, Robert Sterling (“Sterling”),
has offered opinions critical of Kuhlman’s work. Sterling opines that
Kuhlman selected suction valves for the Spiral Freezer that are too small,
which creates excessive pressure/temperature drop in the system. ECF No.
47-29 at 182–88 (Sterling deposition transcript); ECF No. 47-22 at 35, 40
(Sterling expert report). According to Sterling, this has several negative
impacts on system performance, including preventing lower temperatures
at the coil, and driving lower suction temperatures at the compressor,
which results in subcooled liquid stacking inside the coil that can lower the
coil’s capacity to freeze Palermo’s rising crust product in high volumes. ECF
No. 47-29 at 182–83; ECF No. 47-22 at 35, 40. Sterling also recommends the
installation of a P-trap to ensure that liquid stacking does not occur at the
coil in the Spiral Freezer to lower the coil efficiency. ECF No. 47-29 at 184–
85; ECF No. 47-22 at 38.
Importantly, a loss of coil operating capacity (i.e., thermal
performance) impacts the ability of IJW’s Spiral Freezer to meet the product
specifications provided by Palermo’s of freezing 150 rising crusts per
minute within 21 to 25 minutes. ECF No. 47-29 at 159; ECF No. 47-22 at 33–

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35. The failure to meet this specification is the basis of Palermo’s loss of
production claim of over $7,412,891. ECF 47-31 at 6.3
Sterling testified that even if Kuhlman changed the valves, piping
and defrost cycle, the freezer still would not meet the specifications
provided in the contract between Palermo’s and IJW due to the inadequate
dwell time provided by Palermo. ECF No. 47-29 at 182:20–83:4, 190:14–
191:19. Sterling believes the valves, piping, and defrost cycle are “non-
issues” with a longer dwell time (referring to the length of time a product
must spend in a given freezer before reaching the desired product exit
temperature range). Id. at 191:20-192:11. With larger valves and an adequate
dwell time, Sterling believes “[e]nergy costs go down.” Id. at 192:6-192:15.
Increased energy costs are not a part of Palermo’s damages claim
against IJW. ECF No. 47-30 at 9 (deposition of Palermo’s corporate
representative). Neither Brian Hudecek (Palermo’s damages expert) nor
Benjamin Darrah (IJW’s damages expert) directly attributed any damages
to Kuhlman. ECF No. 51-7 at 11 (Hudecek deposition transcript); ECF No.
51-11 at 2–3 (Darrah deposition transcript).
3. LEGAL STANDARD4
A district court has broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary
questions presented before trial through motions in limine. Jenkins v.

3Sterling also criticizes Kuhlman for selecting a defrost cycle that did not
include a dedicated soft hot gas step, which impacted the Spiral Freezer
performance until being rectified by changes to include a “liquid push-out” step
to the defrost cycle in November of 2020. ECF No. 47-22 at 36–38.
4Kuhlman’s motion in limine functionally stands in for a dispositive
motion. See ECF No. 53 at 4 (asking the Court to find that IJW’s claims against
Kuhlman are “improper under Wisconsin law and should be barred at trial”).

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Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). “A district court’s
power to exclude evidence in limine derives from its authority to manage
trials.” Allen v. Am. Cyanamid Co, No. 11-CV-0055, 2021 WL 1092804, at *1
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2021) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4
(1984)).
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “The court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
4. ANALYSIS
Kuhlman moves for a finding that IJW’s third-party contribution and
indemnification claims against Kuhlman are either not legally valid under
Wisconsin law or barred by the economic loss doctrine. See generally ECF
No. 53. If the Court makes such a finding, Kuhlman argues, then no
evidence as to these claims5 should be admitted at trial. See id. at 1. Further,

Indeed, the questions the motion in limine presents would have been much better
addressed on a motion to dismiss. The supporting brief does not state what legal
standard ought to govern the Court’s ruling on the motion.
5It seems likely that this evidence would primarily take the form of
testimony from Sterling, who has opined that Kuhlman’s work was at least
partially responsible for the Spiral Freezer not meeting the specifications provided
in the contract between Palermo’s and IJW. Palermo’s filed a Rule 702 motion to
preclude Sterling from offering his opinions “about dwell times” or “whether it
was within industry standards for IJW—as the Spiral Freezer manufacturer—to
simply accept Palermo’s dwell time testing as true and for IJW to not perform any

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the parties have stipulated that if the Court grants Kuhlman’s motion in
limine, Kuhlman should be dismissed from the case. Id. at 1. The Court
examines each of Kuhlman’s arguments for exclusion of evidence (and
accordingly for its dismissal from this case) in turn.
4.1 Legal Basis for IJW’s Claims Against Kuhlman
The parties dispute whether IJW’s asserted contribution and
indemnification claims against Kuhlman “are valid on their face” as a
matter of law. Id. at 5. Kuhlman’s position focuses on the fact that no
contract exists between IJW and Kuhlman: “[t]he parties’ relationship and
mutual obligations for the work at issue . . . were defined solely by their
respective contracts (i.e., Palermo’s agreement with IJW and Palermo’s
separate agreement with Kuhlman)” and so “[t]he obligations of each are
governed by contract law.” Id. at 4. IJW had no contract with Kuhlman nor
were these two parties jointly liable to Palermo’s, so it is improper for IJW
to “seek[] indemnification and/or contribution from Kuhlman for sums
which may be adjudged against IJW for its breaching its own contract with
Palermo.” Id. at 5. Further, IJW’s contribution and indemnification claims
against Kuhlman cannot proceed in tort because “Wisconsin [law] does not
recognize a tort claim for negligent performance of a contract term.” Id. at
6. Ultimately, Kuhlman argues, there is no legally valid basis for Kuhlman
to be held responsible for damages arising from any breach of the contract
between IJW and Palermo’s.

additional testing or calculations to confirm IJW’s Spiral Freezer could provide the
required specifications within the requested dwell time.” See generally ECF No. 60.

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IJW argues that its indemnification and contribution claims against
Kuhlman are both “legally valid and necessary in equity to ensure that IJW
does not pay more than its fair share of fault for Palermo’s claimed
damages.” Id. at 14. IJW seems to assert principles of equity and fairness—
rather than any black letter law—as the primary legal bases for its claims.
Id. at 15–16 (“If several parties each contribute to cause a breach and a single
injury results, applying the current liability rules used in contract law
would render an unduly harsh result. . . . In contrast, the application of
comparative fault principles would result in greater fairness to all of the
parties involved.”).6
4.1.1 Contribution
The Court concurs with Kuhlman that IJW has not stated a
contribution claim. “When no express agreement confers a right of
contribution, a party’s right to seek contribution against another is
premised on two conditions: (1) the parties must be liable for the same
obligation; and (2) the party seeking contribution must have paid more than
a fair share of the obligation.” Kafka v. Pope, 533 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Wis. 1995)
(citing Wait v. Pierce, 210 N.W. 822, 823 (Wis. 1926)). IJW’s claim fails on the
first prong. It was not liable to Palermo’s for the same obligation as

6Indeed, IJW explicitly acknowledges that, in a contract action, although “a
plaintiff’s total injury may have been the result of many factors in addition to the
defendant’s tort or breach of contract,” “[g]enerally” the “defendant [must] pay
damages equivalent to the total harm suffered.” Id. at 14 (quoting Reiman Assocs.,
Inc. v. R/A Advert., Inc., 306 N.W.2d 292, 301 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)). IJW urges that
comparative negligence principles should be applied instead to apportion fault
and damages. Id.

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Kuhlman; rather, the parties had different obligations to Palermo’s under
different contracts.
Even considering that “contribution, at its root, is an equity
principle,” Kafka v. Pope, 521 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Wis. 1994), IJW overstates the
breadth of the equitable contribution remedy. “[Contribution] is founded
upon the relationship between persons paying a ‘just proportion,’ not upon
express contract.” Kafka, 521 N.W.2d at 176. But IJW has provided no
authority demonstrating that this “relationship” can be separate contracts
with a common party. IJW and Kuhlman were working on the same project,
broadly speaking, but IJW has not established that this qualifies as a
common obligation for purposes of a contribution claim. The case law
appears to require more. See id. at 176 (“Kafka and Pope both signed
personal guarantees to the same debtor securing promissory notes for the
business in which they were majority shareholders. The guarantees state
that the undersigned would be ‘jointly and severally liable.’ By the very
terms of the guarantees, they acknowledged their joint liability. . . . In
addition to the contract, their relationship as officers and shareholders of
the corporation supports the view that this was a joint venture they
undertook together[.]”).
The reality is that Palermo’s—the only party here that had a contract
with Kuhlman—elected not to sue Kuhlman in this matter. IJW suggests
that the Court should nonetheless find that there was a “relationship”
between it and Kuhlman for purposes of a contribution claim, seemingly
asserting that an equitable contribution remedy allows it to do what
Palermo’s declined to do. In IJW’s estimation, any other holding would be

Page 8 of 15
inequitable. ECF No. 53 at 16 (“It would be highly unfair for IJW to shoulder
damages that it did not cause, simply because it was a third party
beneficiary of Palermo’s contract with Kuhlman, instead of having a direct
contractual relationship with Kuhlman.”). But Wisconsin law does not
support IJW’s arguments in favor of recognizing such a contribution claim,
and the Court will not accept IJW’s invitation to do so solely as a matter of
equity.7
Accordingly, because the Court discerns no legal basis for IJW’s
contribution claim against Kuhlman, the motion in limine will be granted
in this respect. Any evidence pertinent to such a claim would be irrelevant
and therefore must be excluded. Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Court will leave it
to the parties to determine how to implement their stipulation with respect
to the disposition of this claim. ECF No. 53 at 1.
4.1.2 Indemnification

Conversely, it appears that IJW can sustain an equitable
indemnification claim against Kuhlman. A right of indemnification may
arise as a matter of equity where “one party is exposed to liability for the
wrongful acts of another” in which that party did not join. See Est. of Kriefall
v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc., 816 N.W.2d 853, ¶¶ 34, 41 (Wis. 2012)
(“Indemnification can arise by contract or it can be based on equitable

7IJW also argues that a contribution cause of action is independent from the
nature of the underlying cause of action. ECF No. 53 at 15 (citing State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schara, 201 N.W.2d 758, 759 (Wis. 1972)); see also Schara, 201 N.W.
2d at 760 (“The cause of action that accrues depend[s] not one whit upon the nature
of the origin of liability. It is enough that a joint liability from whatever source
exist.”). But this does not help IJW because, as already discussed, IJW has not
demonstrated a key element of a contribution claim—“liab[ility] for the same
obligation.” Kafka, 533 N.W.2d at 494.

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principles. . . . Equitable indemnification seeks to shift the burden of
payment to the party who, in equity, should pay.” (citing Greenlee v.
Rainbow Auction/Realty Co., Inc., 582 N.W.2d 93, 96 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998);
1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution § 4.3(4)
(2d ed. 1993); and 63B Am.Jur.2d, Products Liability § 1879 (2012))). IJW’s
theory of why Kuhlman should be required to indemnify it for Palermo’s
damages—that some of Palermo’s damages were “actually caused by the
misconduct of Kuhlman,” ECF No. 53 at 15; see also generally ECF No. 17
(IJW third-party complaint)—tracks the legal definition of equitable
indemnification.
Kuhlman’s argument that “[i]t would be against the equitable
principles of indemnity for IJW to shift its own breach of contract burden
with Palermo to Kuhlman,” ECF No. 53 at 6, is unpersuasive. This argument
focuses too much on the formal aspects of the relationships between the
parties and not enough on the practical realities of the situation. Although
IJW and Kuhlman were not in privity of contract and did not have a
common obligation to Palermo’s for purposes of a contribution claim, see
supra Section 4.1.1, they were working on the same project, and their work
impacted one another’s. Without refrigeration (which Palermo’s contracted
with Kuhlman to provide), there could be no Spiral Freezer. Contracts
aside, it is reasonable to expect that the refrigeration mechanism for the
Spiral Freezer might have some impact on the Spiral Freezer’s ability to
perform to specifications. Whether that impact was positive, negative, or
neutral is a fact question for the jury; Kuhlman essentially conceded this
point when it declined to move for summary judgment on this issue. That

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the refrigeration mechanism might have impacted the overall performance
of the Spiral Freezer necessarily raises the question of who should pay if it
did not. These basic truisms counsel in favor of allowing IJW’s
indemnification claim to proceed.
The Court is also not persuaded by Kuhlman’s argument that “if
Palermo chose to pursue a breach of contract claim against Kuhlman (which
it did not), and IJW was allowed to seek indemnification . . . for its own
breach, Kuhlman would then be forced to pay two separate line items of
damages for the same breach (i.e., its own breach of contract with Palermo
and IJW’s breach of contract Palermo).” ECF No. 53 at 6. First, this is a self-
serving and inaccurate characterization of both IJW’s theory of the case and
arguments for indemnification. As the Court understands IJW’s theory of
the case, IJW is not simply trying to raise a “phantom” breach of contract
claim against Kuhlman that Palermo’s could have, but didn’t, raise. Id. at 7.
IJW instead is arguing as follows: if IJW breached its contract with
Palermo’s, and Kuhlman’s negligence was an underlying cause of why IJW
is found to be in breach, then Kuhlman should reimburse IJW for those
portions of Palermo’s damages which are attributable to Kuhlman. See ECF
No. 61 at 3–5 (joint final pretrial report) (framing as jury questions whether
“Palermo’s suffer[ed] damages because of [IJW’s] breach, “[w]hat duty of
care . . . Kuhlman owe[d] [IJW],” and “[w]hat damages, if any, were
suffered by [IJW] as a result of Kulman’s [sic] allegedly negligent
performance of its contract with Palermo’s”).
Second, Kuhlman has not made a persuasive argument that there is
no legal basis for IJW to bring a negligence claim against Kuhlman, or that

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the parties’ separate contracts with Palermo’s prevent IJW from doing so.
Kuhlman points out that Wisconsin does not recognize a tort of negligent
performance of a contract. ECF No. 53 at 6–7 (citing Dvorak v. Pluswood Wis.,
Inc., 358 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) and McDonald v. Century 21 Real
Est. Corp., 390 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986)). This is true, but it misses
the point. McDonald8 is inapposite because it concerns whether there may
be a tort cause of action between parties who are also parties to a contract.
See McDonald, 390 N.W.2d at 70–71 (“Because the McDonalds have not
pressed a contract claim [against the realtors], we must determine whether
[the realtors] breached any common law duty owed to the McDonalds
without regard to the terms of the listing contract.”). That is not the
situation here. Kuhlman has not explained why the lack of privity of
contract between it and IJW and the fact that they both had separate
contracts with Palermo’s necessarily means that Kuhlman cannot have
owed a duty of care to IJW. See Teacher Ret. Sys. of Tex. v. Badger XVI Ltd.
P’ship, 556 N.W.2d 415, 421 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (“[I]ndemnification is an
equitable doctrine that can apply even in the absence of contract.” (citing
Brown v. LaChance, 477 N.W.2d 296, 302 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)).
Third, and most importantly, Palermo’s did not sue Kuhlman, so any
damages Kuhlman might have to pay in this matter would be paid to IJW
only out of the total, and only if the jury finds that Kuhlman owed a duty
to IJW in installing the refrigeration mechanism for the Spiral Freezer, and
breached that duty, causing the Spiral Freezer not to meet the specifications

8Dvorak is insufficiently specific to the facts of this case. See generally Dvorak,
358 N.W.2d 544 (holding a breach of an employment contract is not a tort and
generally discussing the distinction between breach of contract and tort actions).

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in Palermo’s and IJW’s contract. In the end, carefully-crafted jury
instructions and verdict forms will best guide the jury through these
nuances.
For the reasons above, the Court finds that it is not proper, at this
juncture, to preclude IJW from presenting evidence on its equitable
indemnification claim against Kuhlman. Accordingly, Kuhlman’s motion
in limine will be denied in this respect.9

9The Court finds it worthwhile to briefly mention an issue the parties have
not explored in their submissions. “The right to receive either indemnification [or]
contribution requires a party seeking payment to prove it has made a payment, part
or all of which the party seeks to recover.” Kriefall, 816 N.W.2d, ¶ 35 (emphasis
added) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 59 N.W.2d 425 (Wis.
1953) and Brown, 477 N.W.2d 296 and summarizing Brown as “recognizing that
one element of the right to indemnification is payment by the party seeking the
remedy”)); accord Kjellsen v. Stonecrest, Inc., 176 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Wis. 1970) (noting
that indemnification requires a showing that “a person who, in whole or in part,
has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and
another should have been discharged by another” (emphasis added) (quoting 41
Am.Jur.2d, Indemnity p. 688, sec. 2)); cf. Brown, 477 N.W.2d at 302 (finding third-
party plaintiffs stated indemnification claim against third-party defendant where
they had already settled with and paid plaintiff).
Here, IJW has made no payment to Palermo’s; it is only asserting that, if
not allowed to proceed on an indemnification claim, it could potentially have to
pay those of Palermo’s damages more properly attributable to Kuhlman. Even
though no payment has yet been made, it would be inefficient to require IJW to
bring its indemnification claim in a separate lawsuit after this one concludes. See
Teacher Ret. Sys., 556 N.W.2d at 421 (“[T]here is no reason to compel two trials: the
first trial in which Skidmore’s liability, if any, to Teacher Retirement System would
be determined, and the second trial, following Skidmore’s payment of any
judgment, to determine which, if any, of the contractors were responsible for a
portion of that judgment. This would be an unnecessary imposition of fees and
costs on the parties as well as being a waste of legal resources.”) (citing Wis. Stat.
§§ 803.05; 802.07(3); and Wait v. Pierce, 210 N.W. 822, 823–25 (Wis. 1926)).

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4.2 Economic Loss Doctrine
Kuhlman contends that IJW’s claims are barred by the economic loss
doctrine because the parties have contractual remedies available. ECF No.
53 at 7–14. IJW counters that the economic loss doctrine does not apply
because there is no contract between it and Kuhlman. Id. at 17–18. For the
reasons stated in the prior section, the Court concurs with IJW that the
economic loss doctrine has no application to its equitable indemnification
claim.
5. CONCLUSION
For the reasons and on the terms stated in this Order, Kuhlman’s
motion in limine is granted in part and denied in part. Given that the state
of this case has shifted significantly in light of the Court’s rulings on this
and another motion in limine, ECF No. 84, and so that the parties may
reassess whether they are willing to stipulate to any of the issues to which
they previously could not agree, the Court will deny all remaining
outstanding motions as moot. ECF Nos. 55, 59, 72. The parties must also
update and resubmit their joint final pretrial report. The parties will have
until January 26, 2024 to file an updated joint final pretrial report and renew
any Rule 702 motions and motions in limine.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Third-Party Defendant Kuhlman
Incorporated’s motion in limine, ECF No. 52, be and the same is hereby
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the outstanding motions in this
case, ECF Nos. 55, 59, 72, be and the same hereby are DENIED as moot; and

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties meet and confer
forthwith and submit an updated joint final pretrial report and any
renewed and/or additional Rule 702 motions and motions in limine on or
before January 26, 2024.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 19th day of September, 2023.
H \ OURT:
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J.R. Stadffmeller
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10719008. Public record. Not legal advice.