# Alem v. Diaz > District Court, W.D. Washington · April 22, 2022 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10706044 ## Case - **Court:** District Court, W.D. Washington - **Decided:** April 22, 2022 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10706044 ## Opinion text THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 EZRA ALEM, CASE NO. C22-0513-JCC 10 Plaintiff, MINUTE ORDER 11 v. 12 ADRIAN DIAZ, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable John C. 16 Coughenour, United States District Judge: 17 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. The Court must dismiss an in forma 18 pauperis complaint before service if the action fails to state a claim, raises frivolous or malicious 19 claims, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(e)(2)(B). On April 21, 2022, United States Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson 21 granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and recommended that the complaint be 22 reviewed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) before the issuance of a summons. (Dkt. No. 4.) 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain 24 statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the 25 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). Conclusory 26 allegations of law and unwarranted factual inferences are not sufficient to state a claim. Vasquez 1 v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate if a complaint fails to 2 put forth “a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 3 Cir. 1988). Similarly, courts may dismiss based on qualified immunity under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) 4 “if it is clear from the complaint that the plaintiff can present no evidence that could overcome a 5 defense of qualified immunity.” See Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016). 6 Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain grounds showing that he is entitled to the relief he 7 seeks. Plaintiff names Seattle Chief of Police Adrian Diaz and King County Prosecuting 8 Attorney Daniel Satterberg as Defendants. (Dkt. No. 5 at 2, 4.) He alleges that, under Chief 9 Diaz’s direction, unnamed Seattle Police Department officers “falsely accused me of committing 10 a serious offense . . . and falsely stated a claim of threatening a government facility while in 11 custody.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]he Prosecuting attorney later dropped charges 12 for a D.V. assault against my attacker” for “unknown” reasons. (Id. at 5.) 13 Even applying the Ninth Circuit’s directive to construe pro se complaints liberally, the 14 Court cannot find that Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Hebbe v. 15 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). First, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to demonstrate how the 16 conduct at issue violated clearly established law—a requirement to defeat a police officer’s 17 qualified immunity. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 593 (9th Cir. 1989). Second, to hold 18 Chief Diaz liable for an officer’s conduct, Chief Diaz must have “participated in or directed the 19 violation, or knew of the violation and failed to prevent it.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 20 (9th Cir. 1989). The complaint contains no such allegations. (See generally Dkt. No. 5.) Third, 21 nothing in the complaint suggests that Prosecuting Attorney Satterberg was not acting as an 22 officer of the court when he undertook conduct that Plaintiff considers to be actionable. (See id. 23 Dkt. No. 5.) Therefore, the claims sought against Mr. Satterberg are barred by prosecutorial 24 immunity. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009). 25 Although the Court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 26 granted, it will not dismiss the underlying claims unless “it is absolutely clear that no amendment 1 can cure the [complaint’s] defect[s].” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff file an amended complaint no later than 21 days 3 from the date of this order. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff must allege facts (not legal 4 conclusions) addressing the infirmities described above. If he is unable to do so, the Court will 5 dismiss the case. 6 The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff. 7 8 DATED this 22nd day of April 2022. Ravi Subramanian 9 Clerk of Court 10 s/Sandra Rawski 11 Deputy Clerk 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10706044. Public record. Not legal advice.