# Beatty v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, W.D. Washington · April 4, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10705919

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Washington
- **Decided:** April 4, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
5 AT TACOMA
6
Marcia B.,
Case No. 21-cv-05694-TLF
7 Plaintiff,
v. ORDER REVERSING AND
8 REMANDING DEFENDANT’S
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS
9
Defendant.
10

11
Plaintiff has brought this matter for judicial review of defendant’s denial of her
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application for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits.
13
The parties have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned
14
Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73; Local Rule
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MJR 13.
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I. ISSUES FOR REVIEW
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A. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Using the Older Age Category
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B. Whether the ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluate Medical Opinion Evidence
19

20 II. BACKGROUND
21 Plaintiff first received SSI benefits in May 1993. Administrative Record (“AR”)
22 246. Plaintiff continued to receive benefits until her incarceration in 2015. AR 448.
23 Plaintiff was released from prison in July 2017 and protectively filed an application for
24 SSI on May 10, 2018. AR 107-08. Plaintiff’s application was denied upon official review
1 (AR 121) and upon reconsideration (AR 141). After plaintiff filed a request for a hearing,
2 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Chris Stuber held a hearing on October 23, 2020. AR
3 61–91. On November 30, 2020, ALJ Stuber issued a decision finding that plaintiff has
4 not been disabled since filing her May 2018 application. AR 27–60.

5 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s November 30, 2020 decision. Dkt. 10.
6 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
7 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s
8 denial of Social Security benefits if the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not
9 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Revels v. Berryhill, 874
10 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
11 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v.
12 Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal citations omitted).
13 IV. DISCUSSION
14 In this case, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

15 fibromyalgia; neuropathy; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; cirrhosis;
16 degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder; obesity; post-traumatic stress disorder
17 (PTSD); a major depressive disorder; and a borderline personality disorder. AR 37-38.
18 Based on the limitations stemming from these impairments, the ALJ found that plaintiff
19 could perform a reduced range of light work. AR 41-42.
20 Relying on vocational expert (“VE”) testimony, the ALJ found at step four that
21 plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, but could perform other light, unskilled
22 jobs at step five of the sequential evaluation; therefore, the ALJ determined at step five
23 that plaintiff was not disabled since filing her application in May 2018. AR 53.

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1 A. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Using the Older Age Category
2 The claimant’s age category is a vocational factor the Commissioner must
3 consider in deciding whether claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(a). A claimant
4 can belong to three different age categories: “younger person” (under age 50); “closely

5 approaching advanced age” (age 50-54); and “advanced age” (age 55 or older). 20
6 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b)-(e). The regulations further provide that the Commissioner:
7 will not apply the age categories mechanically in a borderline situation. If you are
within a few days to a few months of reaching an older age category, and using
8 the older age category would result in a determination or decision that you are
disabled, we will consider whether to use the older age category after evaluating
9 the overall impact of all the factors of your case.

10 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b).

11 But “an ALJ is not required to use an older age category, even if the claimant is
12 within a few days or a few months of reaching an older age category.” Lockwood v.
13 Comm'r SSA, 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). The ALJ is required by regulation
14 only to consider whether to use an older age category. Id. at 1070. An ALJ is found to
15 have properly considered using the older age category by satisfying the following the
16 requirements: (1) mentioning the plaintiff’s date of birth and age in the decision, (2)
17 citing the appropriate regulations, such as 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563, 416.963, to indicate
18 that the ALJ knew of the prohibition against mechanically applying age categories in a
19 borderline situation, and (3) evaluating the overall impact of all the factors of a plaintiff’s
20 case after relying on VE testimony. See Id. at 1072; Strissel v. Colvin, No. C16-0374-
21 RJB-MAT, 2016 WL 6242849, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2016).
22 When the ALJ issued his decision, plaintiff was 54 years old and under the
23 “closely approaching advanced age” category, but also two months away from turning
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1 55 and qualifying for the “advanced age” category. Plaintiff contends that this was a
2 borderline situation and the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether to use an older age
3 category. Dkt. 10, pp. 3–9.
4 Plaintiff argues the first Lockwood factor is not satisfied, because the ALJ

5 mistakenly used plaintiff’s age as of the date when she filed her application -- rather
6 than plaintiff’s age on the date when the ALJ issued the written decision. Dkt. 10, p. 6.
7 In the November 2020 decision, the ALJ wrote: “The claimant was born on
8 January 7, 1966 and was 52 years old, which is defined as an individual closely
9 approaching advanced age, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).”
10 AR 52.
11 Plaintiff correctly points out that in November 2020, plaintiff was 54 years old,
12 contrary to what the ALJ wrote. The Commissioner argues, however, that even though
13 the ALJ erred by mis-stating plaintiff’s age, such an error is harmless according to Dattio
14 v. Berryhill, 773 Fed. Appx. 878 (9th Cir. 2019). In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that

15 the ALJ erred in stating that plaintiff was 51 years old, even though at the time of the
16 decision, plaintiff was actually 54 years old. Id. at 882. However, the Ninth Circuit held
17 that the ALJ’s incorrect statement of plaintiff’s age in the decision was harmless,
18 because plaintiff still would have fallen under the “approaching advanced age” category
19 and the ALJ properly considered using the older category. Id. Here, under the
20 regulations, plaintiff would still be under the “closely approaching advanced age” at
21 either 52 or 54 years old.
22 Plaintiff next argues the second Lockwood factor is not met, because the ALJ did
23 not specifically cite the subsection within the regulations to indicate that he was aware

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1 that he had the discretion to use the older age category. Dkt. 10, p. pp. 6-7; AR 52. In
2 other words, plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have cited to 20 C.F.R. 416.963(b)
3 instead of generally citing to 20 C.F.R. 416.963. Plaintiff points out that other courts
4 have found that a general citation is not indicative of whether the ALJ considered using

5 the older age category. See Jeffrey John C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., Case No.
6 6:19-cv-01990-YY, 2021 WL 677900, at *4 (D. Or. 2021) (finding the generation citation
7 without further comment to be unclear whether the ALJ specifically considered “whether
8 to use the older age category”).
9 In Lockwood, the Ninth Circuit found the ALJ’s general citation to 20 C.F.R. §
10 404.156 sufficient as an indicator of the ALJ’s consideration of the plaintiff’s borderline
11 age situation. 616 F.3d 1068, 1072. The Court similarly finds here that the ALJ’s general
12 citation to 20 C.F.R. § 416.963 is enough to indicate that the ALJ knew of the prohibition
13 against the mechanical application of age categories in a borderline situation. The
14 Court, as the Ninth Circuit did in Lockwood, “presume[s] that ALJs, know the law and

15 apply it in making their decision.” 616 F.3d at 1072 n.3.
16 Finally, plaintiff argues the third Lockwood factor is not satisfied, because the
17 vocational expert (“VE”) was unable to hear the age-related portion of the hypothetical
18 posed by the ALJ during the hearing. Dkt. 10, p. 7; AR 85.
19 During the examination of the VE, the ALJ asked the VE to “assume a
20 hypothetical individual, the same age, education, and work history as the claimant” with
21 similar limitations as plaintiff. See AR 85. The VE stated that he could not hear the
22 hypothetical and asked the ALJ to repeat the question. Id. The ALJ repeated the
23

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1 limitations but did not again ask the VE to assume that the hypothetical was about an
2 individual with the same age as claimant. Id.
3 The record shows that VE was present at the start of the hearing when the ALJ
4 asked plaintiff her age, to which she replied, “I am 54. I will be 55 in January.” AR 67.

5 The record also shows that after the ALJ repeated his question, the ALJ then asked the
6 VE if he had any further questions about the hypothetical, to which the VE replied in the
7 negative. See AR 86. Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have again instructed the VE to
8 assume that the hypothetical individual was the same age as plaintiff. But plaintiff does
9 not explain why the VE would not know plaintiff’s age (given that the VE attended the
10 entire hearing) or that the VE lacked clarity on whether it was necessary to answer the
11 ALJ’s hypothetical based on an individual of the same age as plaintiff.
12 Accordingly, the Court finds the requirements of Lockwood are met.
13 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by not applying the borderline age rules
14 according to the Commissioner’s Program Operations Manual (“POMS”), which states

15 that in a borderline situation, the ALJ will “consider using the higher age category if it
16 results in a favorable determination, after [the ALJ] evaluates all factors (residual
17 functional capacity (RFC), age, education, and work experience) of the claim.” See Dkt.
18 10, pp. 7–9; POMS, DI 25015.006 Borderline Age. Plaintiff contends that the facts in her
19 case support the application of the older age category as outlined in POMS.
20 However, “POMS constitutes an agency interpretation that does not impose
21 judicially enforceable duties on either this court or the ALJ.” Lockwood, 616 F.3d at
22 1073. Agency interpretations are “entitled to respect,” but only to the extent they have
23 the “power to persuade.” Id. (internal quotation marks and quoted sources omitted). See

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1 also Barreras v. Saul, 803 Fed. Appx. 70, 72 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding it “inconsequential”
2 if the ALJ's decision was contrary to POMS when determining whether to use a higher
3 age category because the manual is not binding on the ALJ or the court).
4 In sum, the ALJ met the requirements of Lockwood, and because POMS is

5 neither binding on the ALJ or the Court, there is no need for a remand based on this
6 issue.
7 B. Whether the ALJ Properly Evaluated Medical Opinion Evidence
8 Plaintiff assigns error to the ALJ’s decision to discount the medical opinion of Dr.
9 Hampton and to reject the medical opinion of Dr. Packer. Dkt. 10, pp. 11–13.
10 1. Medical Opinion Standard of Review
11 Under current Ninth Circuit precedent, an ALJ must provide “clear and
12 convincing” reasons to reject the uncontradicted opinions of an examining doctor, and
13 “specific and legitimate” reasons to reject the contradicted opinions of an examining
14 doctor. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995).

15 The Social Security Administration changed the regulations applicable to
16 evaluation of medical opinions; hierarchy among medical opinions has been eliminated,
17 but ALJs are required to explain their reasoning and specifically address how they
18 considered the supportability and consistency of each opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §
19 416.920c; Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.
20 Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017).
21 Regardless of whether a claim pre- or post-dates this change to the regulations,
22 an ALJ’s reasoning must be supported by substantial evidence and free from legal
23 error. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1153-56 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Tommasetti v. Astrue,

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1 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501–02
2 (9th Cir. 1983).
3 Under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), (b)(1)-(2), the ALJ is required to explain whether
4 the medical opinion or finding is persuasive, based on whether it is supported and

5 whether it is consistent.
6 2. Opinion of Dr. Hamilton
7 Hayden Hamilton, M.D. evaluated plaintiff on November 8, 2018 by reviewing her
8 records and performing a physical examination. AR 816-22. Dr. Hamilton opined that
9 plaintiff could lift 10 pounds occasionally and frequently. AR 820.
10 Plaintiff assigns error the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Hamilton’s opinion was not
11 persuasive because it was (1) inconsistent with his own notes and (2) the longitudinal
12 record. Dkt. 10, pp. 9–12.
13 As a preliminary matter, the Commissioner argues that the new Social Security
14 regulations have affected the legal standards an ALJ must use when evaluating medical

15 opinions, and that this Court should abandon the “clear and convincing” and “specific
16 and legitimate” legal standards used for when rejecting opinions of an examining
17 physician. Dkt. 11, pp. 8–11. The only question, according to the government, is
18 whether the ALJ explained “the factors of supportability and consistency, which are the
19 two most important factors in determining the persuasiveness of a medical opinion.” Id.
20 The Ninth Circuit has not yet considered the 2017 regulations, or whether the
21 change in regulations will cause the Court of Appeals to reevaluate its holdings
22 regarding the legal standards of “clear and convincing” or “specific and legitimate.” The
23 Court is bound by precedent of the Ninth Circuit and may not overrule a decision of the

24 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See In re Albert-Sheridan, 960 F.3d
1 1188, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2020) (the decision of a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
2 cannot be overruled by a different three-judge panel; only a decision of the en banc
3 panel of the Ninth Circuit, or a decision of the United States Supreme Court, may
4 overturn a decision of a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit); In re Walldesign, Inc.,

5 872 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2017) (unless there is intervening Supreme Court or Ninth
6 Circuit en banc precedent, a legal test that has been adopted by a three-judge panel will
7 not be overturned); Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (published
8 opinions of a three-judge panel are binding authority in the Ninth Circuit, unless a
9 published opinion is overturned by an en banc decision, or the United States Supreme
10 Court).The Ninth Circuit has not yet considered the 2017 regulations, or whether the
11 change in regulations will cause the Court of Appeals to reevaluate its holdings
12 regarding the legal standards of “clear and convincing” or “specific and legitimate”
13 reasons for an ALJ to reject medical opinions.
14 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that an ALJ must have specific, legitimate

15 reasons supported by substantial evidence in order to reject or discount the opinion of
16 an examining doctor if the opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion. See
17 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995); Ryan v. Commissioner of Social
18 Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2008). The “specific and legitimate reasons”
19 language used by the Ninth Circuit in precedent is an appellate standard – established
20 in Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501–02 (9th Cir. 1983), for determining whether the
21 ALJ erred; it is not an interpretation of the Social Security statutes or the 2017 revisions
22 to the federal regulations promulgated by the Social Security Administration. Cf. Kisor v.
23 Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2412-2418 (2019) (explaining the Court gives Auer deference

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1 only if the agency’s rule is ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, and it
2 is an authoritative and considered judgment of the agency); Larson v. Saul, 967 F.3d
3 914, 925 (9th Cir. 2020) (recognizing the Social Security Administration has authority to
4 make rules carrying the force of law, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)).

5 Therefore, the Social Security Administration’s new regulations cannot
6 supersede this long-standing substantive legal standard, which is subject to stare
7 decisis as precedent from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Kathleen G. v.
8 Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. C20-461 RSM, 2020 WL 6581012, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov.
9 10, 2020) (finding the new regulations do not clearly supersede the “specific and
10 legitimate” standard because the “specific and legitimate” standard refers not to how an
11 ALJ should weigh or evaluate opinions, but rather the standard by which the Court
12 evaluates whether the ALJ has reasonably articulated his or her consideration of the
13 evidence).
14 In this case, Dr. Hamilton’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s lifting limitation was

15 contradicted by the opinion a of state agency consultant. AR 1144. The Court will
16 therefore consider whether the ALJ specifically and legitimately explained how the ALJ
17 considered the supportability and consistency factors regarding Dr. Hamilton’s opinion.
18 Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198–99.
19 The ALJ’s first reason for discounting Dr. Hamilton’s opinion was its
20 inconsistency with Dr. Hamilton’s own notes. AR 45. An ALJ may give less weight to a
21 physician's opinion if the physician's clinical notes and recorded observations contradict
22 the physician's opinion. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). Here,
23 the ALJ found that Dr. Hamilton’s opinion about plaintiff’s ability to lift a maximum of 10

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1 pounds was contradicted by Dr. Hamilton’s own observations that plaintiff could
2 ambulate, walk, and get on and off the exam table independently. AR 45 (citing AR
3 818). The ALJ pointed to plaintiff’s ability to tandem walk, toe walk, heel walk, and
4 plaintiff’s normal motor strength, sensory exam, and deep reflexes. AR 45 (citing AR

5 819).
6 These observations do not negate Dr. Hamilton’s opinion about plaintiff’s lifting
7 abilities. Dr. Hamilton explained that plaintiff’s ability to lift a maximum of 10 pounds was
8 due to “chronic neck pain without radicular symptoms, chronic back pain without
9 radicular symptoms, impaired sensation in the right thumb, diffuse tenderness
10 throughout her body, impaired range of motion of the left shoulder and
11 acromioclavicular degenerative joint disease.” AR 820. The observations the ALJ cited
12 do not necessarily relate to these issues Dr. Hamilton explained as the reason for
13 plaintiff’s lifting and carrying capacity. The normal findings cited by the ALJ do not
14 necessarily negate Dr. Hamilton’s opinion, either. Plaintiff’s normal motor strength was

15 in her “bilateral upper and lower extremities” and Dr. Hamilton found that plaintiff’s “pin
16 prick is impaired in the right thumb.” AR 819-20. The ALJ’s first reason for discounting
17 Dr. Hamilton’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence as there were no
18 inconsistencies between Dr. Hamilton’s opinion and his own notes and observations.
19 Regarding the ALJ’s second reason, a finding that a
20 physician's opinion is inconsistent with the medical record may serve as a specific and
21 legitimate reason for discounting it. See 20 C.F.R. §§
22 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014).
23 Here, the ALJ pointed to plaintiff’s function indicating she was having no problems with

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1 lifting, and to medical records showing plaintiff had no weak limbs and plaintiff had
2 normal gait, motor strength and tone, and movement of all extremities. AR 243, 1451,
3 1462-63. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ had substantial evidence to support
4 this reason, and did not err.

5 As the ALJ has provided one valid reason, supported by substantial evidence, for
6 discounting Dr. Hamilton’s opinion, the Court finds that the previous error (consistency
7 between the opinion of Dr. Hamilton, and the doctor’s own notes) committed by the ALJ
8 was harmless. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155,
9 1162-1163 (9th Cir. 2008).
10 3. Opinion of Dr. Packer
11 Brent Packer, M.D. reviewed plaintiff’s medical records, including assessments
12 by Dr. Niems (10-19-2018), AR 784-799, and Dr. Staker (10-3-2018), AR 800-813; on
13 November 2, 2018 and opined that plaintiff’s work-related limitations were “marked” for
14 “Gross/fine motor restrictions and ability to maintain regular workplace attendance”. AR

15 1140. Dr. Packer opined that plaintiff’s highest work activity would be “less than
16 sedentary.” AR 1140.
17 Plaintiff assigns error to the ALJ’s decision not to discuss Dr. Packer’s opinion.
18 Dkt. 10, pp. 12–13. The Commissioner admits that the ALJ did not discuss Dr. Packer’s
19 opinion, but insists that the ALJ’s error was harmless. Dkt. 11, p. 11–13.
20 An ALJ errs when they reject a medical opinion by ignoring it or by asserting,
21 without explanation, that other evidence is more persuasive. Garrison v. Colvin, 759
22 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). Further, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that it is not
23 harmless error for the ALJ to fail to discuss a medical opinion. Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d

24 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (noting that this Ruling
1 requires the evaluation of “every medical opinion” received)). Here, the ALJ made no
2 mention of Dr. Packer’s medical opinion in his entire decision, even though it was
3 included in the list of exhibits. AR 59.
4 The Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Packer’s

5 opinion was harmless because “there is no reasonable likelihood that it would have
6 affected the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.” Dkt. 11, p. 13.
7 But this reasoning is an ad hoc justification of the ALJ’s omission of Dr. Packer’s
8 opinion. Yet, Dr. Packer’s opinion found more restrictive physical limitations and would
9 have potentially changed the hypothetical given to the VE. See AR 87-88.
10 The Court will not speculate on what the ALJ would possibly have thought about Dr.
11 Packer’s opinion, if the ALJ had actually considered it.
12 See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.2003) (error to affirm ALJ's
13 credibility decision based on evidence ALJ did not discuss). Therefore, the Court finds
14 that the ALJ’s failure to address Dr. Packer’s medical opinion was harmful error.

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16 V. REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
17 “‘The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to
18 award benefits[,] is within the discretion of the court.’” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664,
19 682 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). If
20 an ALJ makes an error and the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the court should
21 remand to the agency for further proceedings. Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045
22 (9th Cir. 2017). Likewise, if the court concludes that additional proceedings can remedy
23 the ALJ’s errors, it should remand the case for further consideration. Revels v. Berryhill,

24 F.3d 648, 668 (9th Cir. 2017).
1 The Ninth Circuit has developed a three-step analysis for determining when to
2 remand for a direct award of benefits. Such remand is generally proper only where
3 “(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative
proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to
4 provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant
testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited
5 evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the
claimant disabled on remand.”
6
Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 682-83 (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir.
7
2014)).
8
The Ninth Circuit emphasized in Leon v. Berryhill that even when each element is
9
satisfied, the district court still has discretion to remand for further proceedings or for
10
award of benefits. 80 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017).
11
As discussed above, the ALJ harmfully erred with respect to Dr. Packer’s medical
12
opinion. On remand, the ALJ is directed to evaluate Dr. Packer’s opinion and allow
13
plaintiff to provide additional testimony and evidence, as necessary to clarify the record.
14
CONCLUSION
15
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court finds the ALJ erred in finding
16
plaintiff to be not disabled. Defendant’s decision to deny benefits therefore is
17
REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings.
18
Dated this 4th day of April, 2022.
19
20
21 A

22 Theresa L. Fricke
United States Magistrate Judge
23

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10705919. Public record. Not legal advice.