# Bonta, LLC v. City of Marysville

> District Court, W.D. Washington · November 14, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10699874

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Washington
- **Decided:** November 14, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
3 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
4
)
5 || BONTA, LLC, )
) CASE NO. 2:18-cv-01544-BJR
6 Plaintiff, )
) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
7 V. ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
8 || CITY OF MARYSVILLE, a municipal ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
corporation, )
? )
Defendant.
11
12
13 I. INTRODUCTION
14 This matter involves a dispute between Plaintiff Bonta, LLC (“Bonta”) and the City of
15 Marysville, Washington (the “City”) over local zoning codes and their application to commercial
16 .
property owned by Bonta. The case was removed to this Court because, in addition to its state law
17
claims, Bonta alleges violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
18
19 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Before the Court are both the City’s and Bonta’s Motions
99 || for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 22 and 25. Having reviewed the motions, oppositions thereto,
21 record of the case, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will grant the City’s motion as
22 the federal law claims and deny Bonta’s motion as to those same claims. Having done so, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and
24
dismisses them without prejudice. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows.
25

Il. BACKGROUND

At issue is property located at 1217 1% Street, Marysville, WA 98270 (the “Property”).
3, || Bonta owns the Property and leases it to Kodiak Industrial Solutions, LLC (“Kodiak”), which runs
4 ||aspray-on coating business. Dkt. No. 22 at 3-4; Dkt. No. 25 at 4. Bonta has owned the Property
5 || since 2012 and, after running a business there for some time, sold the business and began leasing
6 out the Property instead. Kodiak executed a lease with Bonta on September 11, 2017.
’ The Property is located in Marysville’s Downtown Commercial zone. On November 27,
2017, Kodiak applied to the City for a business license, describing its business as “specialty coating

10 applicator and industrial cleaning contractor.” Dkt. No. 22 at 4. At the time, Kodiak described its

11 of the Property to the City as a “base for employees where material and equipment would be
12 ||stored.” Jd. at 14 (quoting Dkt. No. 28-10 at 2). From there, Kodiak explained, “an employee
13 || arrives at the beginning of their shift to get whatever materials are needed for the specific jobs they
have for that day, load the materials into the company vehicle, and depart.” Jd. Based on this
description, the City determined that storage was the only thing the property would be used for
and classified the business as “Contractor’s Office and Storage Yard.” Jd. at 4, 14.

18 Pursuant to that classification, Kodiak was required to comply with local Marysville
19 || Municipal Code (“MMC”) § 22C.020.070(30), which provides:
20 Outdoor storage of materials or vehicles must be accessory to the primary building
area and located to the rear of buildings. Outdoor storage is subject to an approved
21 landscape plan that provides for effective screening of storage, so that it is not
2 visible from public right-of-way or neighboring properties.
23 MMC § 22C.020.070(30) (“Outdoor Storage Provision”).
24 According to the City, both Kodiak and Bonta are currently in violation of the Outdoor
25 Storage Provision because “[t]here is substantial outdoor storage (of several trucks and other

supplies). It is not in the rear of the building. There is no approved landscape plan. And this is

2 visible from virtually every direction.” Dkt. No. 22 at 2. Bonta, for its part, does not dispute that

3 is noncomplying storage at the Property. See Dkt. No, 25 at 4. Instead, it claims that the
4 should be permitted as a “historical non-conforming use” of the Property) and further
5 alleges that the City treats its property different from two nearby properties, which similarly store
vehicles and storage outside without shielding them from the public right-of-way. Jd. at 4—S.
The City first attempted to work with Kodiak to bring its business into compliance. Dkt.

9 No. 22 at 5. The City issued Kodiak a temporary permit to allow it to operate through May 1,

10 || 2018, and later extended the permit to July 1, 2018 when Kodiak requested additional time to
11 || relocate its business. Id.
Bonta, however, in an effort to assist its tenant, filed an appeal of the Marysville Director
13 of Community Development’s April 4, 2018 administrative ruling that Kodiak could continue its
4 business only if it complied with the Outdoor Storage Provision. Dkt. No. 22 at 5. On August 29,
2018, an administrative hearing was held before a Hearing Examiner, who issued a Decision

7 against Bonta on September 20, 2018. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3; Dkt. No. 22 at 8. Bonta appealed this

1g || decision to the Superior Court for the State of Washington under Washington’s Land Use Petition
19 || Action (““LUPA”), RCW Ch. 36.70C. Dkt. No. 22 at 8.
20 Additionally, around this time, Bonta submitted numerous record requests to the City for
ai information related to the Property, with which it maintains the City has still not fully complied.
2 Dkt. No. 25 at 5-6. Along with its Land Use Petition, Bonta filed a complaint alleging four causes
of action: (1) Void For Vagueness under the United States Constitution and Washington State

25 Constitution; (2) Violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the United States Constitution

and Washington State Constitution; (3) Violation of Washington Public Records Act, RCW 42.56,

7 and (4) Intentional Interference with Busitess Expectancy. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 9-12.
3 The matter was removed from Superior Court citing Bonta’s invocation of 42 U.S.C. §
4 ||1983. Dkt. No. 1-1. On October 4, 2019 both parties moved for Summary Judgment. Dkt. Nos.
> ||22 and 25.
° Ill. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary Judgment is appropriate where “‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56. “A fact is

10 ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the case.” California Expanded Metal Prod. Co. v.

11 || Klein, 396 F. Supp. 3d 956, 967 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
12 || U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is “‘ genuine’ only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
13 || fact finder to find for the non-moving party.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992
(9th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (“a material fact is ‘genuine,’ . . . if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”). Finally, a movant
is entitled to judgment “as a matter of law” where the nonmoving party “has failed to make a

18 sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of
19 || proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
20 The movant bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact
21 || and that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Walflor
22 Indus., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).
“fW]hen simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claim are before the

95 court, the court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in

support of both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them.” Fair

> Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001); see

3 || also Massachusetts Bay Ins., 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1156. In such circumstances, the Court “rule[s]
4 each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a
5 judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” Tulalip Tribes of Washington
6 v. Washington, 783 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998)); see also Las

9 Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011) (“the court must consider each

10 party's evidence, regardless under which motion the evidence is offered”).
11 IV. DISCUSSION
12 A. Bonta’s Motion for Summary Judgment
13 1. Void for Vagueness
14 Bonta’s complaint asserts a cause of action for “void for vagueness, under the Fourteenth
= Amendment to the United States Constitution” seeking a declaration that the Outdoor Storage
‘6 Provision is unconstitutional. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 99-10. Bonta moves for summary judgment on this
claim. See Dkt. No. 25 at 8-9. The City opposes and claims that the Outdoor Storage Provision

19 is sufficiently clear, and that Bonta has failed to show otherwise. See Dkt. No. 22 at 9-12; Dkt.
20 || No. 31 at 3-5.
21 The complaint appears to challenges the regulation’s use of the words “storage,”
22 “vehicles,” and “parking,” claiming they are “impermissibly vague and ambiguous.” Dkt. No. 1-
7 2 at 10. Bonta’s motion for summary judgment, however, does little to elaborate on this cause.
Instead, in its section entitled “Downtown Commercial Code is Unconstitutionally Vague,” it

states that the City’s zoning code “violates the Washington and Federal Constitutions” and then

provides a number of conclusory statements that do not address any of the words which it
3 || challenged in its complaint. See Dkt. No. 25 at 8-9. Thus, broadly, Bonta’s complaint appears to
4 || be that the code fails to provide a clear standard to apply.
5 “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned vy. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see
also Edge v. City of Everett, 929 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2019). But, “[c]ondemned to the use of

9 words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language,” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110,

10 || and thus, “perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that
11 || restrict expressive activity.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (quoting Ward v.
12 || Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)).
13 This doctrine incorporates two related requirements. See Edge, 929 F.3d at 664. First,
“laws [must] give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; see also Connally v.

7 General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
1g an act in terms so vague that men [or women] of common intelligence must necessarily guess
19 its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law”).
20 Second, a law must “provide explicit standards for those who apply them” in order to avoid
ad “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; see also Tucson Woman's
2 Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 555 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations removed) (“[a] law is
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is

25 prohibited, or is so indefinite as to allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”).

“TE]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness” than criminal laws, Vill. of

2 Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982), but the “vagueness
3 || analysis still applies to such regulation,” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 757 (9th
4 1985); see also BJP, L.L.C. v. Kitsap Cty., No. 10-5678, 2011 WL 3298661, at *7 (W.D.
5 || Wash. Aug. 1, 2011). Additionally, “greater tolerance” is afforded to “enactments with civil rather
than criminal penalties” and laws that do not “inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights” are held to a less stringent standard than ones that do. Flipside, 455 U.S. at 498-99.

9 First, Bonta fails to provide sufficient evidence to support its claim. The sole evidence

10 || Provided to support its void for vagueness claim is two email chains from an associate planner
11 ||}employed by the City. See Dkt. No. 25 at 9 (relying on Dkt. No. 28-10); Dkt. No. 33 at 18-19
12 ||(relying on Dkt. No. 28-9 and Dkt. No. 28-10). .The first chain, Bonta claims, shows an
13 inconsistency in the application of the City’s zoning code because the city planner appears to
represent to a potential buyer of the Property that it may be “legal non-conforming,” i.e., that it
was grandfathered into permissible noncompliance with the Outdoor Storage Provision, whereas

7 in the case before the Court the City now claims it is not legal non-conforming. Dkt. No. 33 at

1g || 18-19 (relying on Dkt. No. 28-9). In the second email, Bonta avers that the city planner, while
19 ||emailing with other city employees, first suggested that Kodiak’s business was not permitted
20 |! downtown under the zoning code, but “less than 24 hours later,” the same employee offered a
al different categorization of Kodiak’s business which would be permitted. Dkt. No. 25 at 9 (relying
on Dkt. No. 28-10); see also Dkt. No. 33 at 2 (“The City’s own efforts to interpret its code illustrate
that the code contains no ascertainable standards for adjudication, as illustrated by the City’s

inability to confidently or consistently interpret the code.”).

The city planner’s emails, however, do not support Bonta’s challenge to the Outdoor

2 Storage Provision. The first clearly shows that the city planner told the prospective purchaser that

3 || the Property used to be legal non-conforming, but that under current zoning code, if the previous
4 was “discontinued or abandoned for a period of 12 consecutive months or more,” then the
5 Property would lose its non-conforming status. Dkt, No. 28-9 at 2, The city planner makes no
affirmative conclusion on the status of the Property and clearly states, “I would likely need to
contact the building owner to determine when the previous tenant actually stopped operating.”

9 || No. 28-9 at 2

10 The second email chain merely shows that the city planner was inquiring as to what the
11 || classification might be, not having as of yet decided. Dkt. No. 28-9 at 2-3. She enquires if “there
12 || were not any conversations that [she was] not aware of that may have given them permission to
13 operate this type of business at the location.” Jd. at 3. Later, however, she follows up explaining
to her co-workers that she has spoken with a representative from Kodiak, who has explained their
business. Based on that explanation, she states that “I suppose, based on his description of

7 activities, we could categorize it as a Contractors’ office and storage yard,” which is the

18 || determination later designated, but that the categorization is “subject to the outdoor storage of
19 || materials/vehicles being accessory to the primary building area and located to the rear of buildings,
20 || and an approved landscape screening plan.” Jd. at 2.
Thus, neither email chain shows either a vagueness in the ordinance itself nor in the
application of the zoning code as a whole. In fact, neither email even addresses the Outdoor
Storage Provision specifically, nor its use of the “storage,” “vehicles,” and “parking.” Both

25 email chains show no indeterminacy, merely a city planner’s process of applying the zoning code

i in her day-to-day work.

Having determined that Bonta has failed to produce evidence of vagueness, the Court
3 || determines that there is no suggestion that the ordinance itself, or the words “storage,” “vehicles,”
4 and “parking,” would leave a person of ordinary intelligence without a reasonable guide to what
> Vis prohibited. In fact, the statute is quite clear as to the actions it prohibits. Further, those
prohibitions do not extend so far as to permit arbitrary enforcement. Instead, it applies only to
certain defined categories of business, in certain defined zones, and provides a clear means of

9 compliance (an “approved landscape plan” that hides the storage from public rights-of-way).
10 Thus, as the ordinance is not facially vague and Bonta provides no support for its claim,
11 || the Court will deny its Motion for Summary Judgment.
12 2. Equal Protection
13 Next, Bonta advances a cause of action for a “violation of the Equal Protection Clause
4 under the United States Constitution.” Dkt. No. 1-2 at 10. The complaint, rather vaguely, asserts
that “[t]he land use provisions as applied to the Property, Bonta, and Bonta’s tenant(s) are
unconstitutional in that the city has acted arbitrary and capricious manner.” Jd. Bonta now moves

18 for Summary Judgment on its claim. See Dkt. No. 25 at 10-11. The City opposes the motion.
19 || Dkt. No. 22 at 12-15; Dkt. No. 31 at 5-8.
20 Bonta’s motion claims that “the City clearly violated the Washington and Federal
21 || Constitutions by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in its application and enforcement of the land
22 use provisions of the code when it permitted others to use their properties in a manner that clearly
violates current codes applicable to the [Downtown Commercial] zone.” Dkt. No. 33 at 2-3. The

sole evidence for Bonta’s alleged Equal Protection violation is that the City has permitted two

i nearby properties to store vehicles and storage in a manner Bonta is prohibited from doing. See

2 id, at 19; see also Dkt. No. 25 at 5, 10-11.
4 The Supreme Court has recognized a “class of one” cause of action for plaintiffs alleging
4 || they have been “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
5 |l rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
5 (2000). The bar is extremely high and “must be enforced with particular rigor in the land-use
context because zoning decisions ‘will often, perhaps almost always, treat one landowner

9 differently from another.” Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 251 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting

10 Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 (Breyer, J. concurring)). Thus, “to succeed on its ‘class of one’ claim,
11 ||[Bonta] must allege that the City: (1) intentionally (2) treated [Bonta] differently than other
12 || similarly situated property owners (3) without a rational basis.” Bldg. 11 Inv'rs LLC v. City of
13 Seattle, 912 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (citing Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564; North
M4 Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008)).
In order to meet this standard, a plaintiff must show “an extremely high degree of similarity

7 between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.” Hood Canal Sand &

1g || Gravel, LLC v. Brady, 129 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (quoting Ruston v. Town
19 || Bd. for the Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also Haglund v. Sawant, No.
20 || 17-1614, 2018 WL 2216154, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2018), aff'd, 781 F. App'x 586 (9th Cir.
al 2019). Additionally, local governments “generally have broad discretion when it comes to the
22 enactment of land use and zoning laws and regulations.” Waimea Bay Assocs. One, LLC v. Young,
438 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1190 (D. Haw. 2006), afd sub nom. Waimea Bay Assocs. One, LLC v.

25 Thielen, 264 F. App'x 561 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
10

; 61, 68 (1981) (“The power of local governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad

> and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in both urban
3 ||and rural communities.”). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that without a rational basis
4 || they have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated. Thornton v. City of
5 |] sv. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v.
6 Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Here, Bonta identifies two “similarly situated” properties. The first is the “old Welco

9 property,” located at 1218 1st Street down the street from the Bonta Property, which Bonta claims

10 || was vacant for some time before the City purchased it in 2016. “Since the City took ownership,”
11 || Bonta avers, “the property has consistently been used to store construction trucks, machines and
12 || materials, which is not a historical non-conforming use, and is completely visible from public
13 right-of-way and neighboring properties.” Dkt. No. 25 at 5; see also Dkt. No. 33 at 6.
M4 According to the City, it purchased the Welco property “with the intention of using it to
stage construction vehicles for freeway improvements” which is a temporary use, terminating

7 when construction is completed. Dkt. No. 22 at 13. ‘This is a completely different use from the

1g || “Contractor’s Office” into which Kodiak falls. Jd. As the City asserts, “[i]t is a different use and
19 ||purpose.” Jd. Further, the City asserts, the properties were treated exactly the same. As the City
20 || claims, “both properties received a temporary permit for the storage. The only difference is that
a Kodiak's permit has” now expired. Jd at 14. Bonta fails to refute or even address the
2 dissimilarities pointed out by the City. See generally Dkt. No. 33 at 6, 19 (merely repeating its
claim that the City’s use of the property “would clearly be in violation of the current codes

25 applicable to the [Downtown Commercial] zoned properties”).
11

The Court, therefore finds that the Welco property does not constitute an instance of

7 disparate treatment. First, Bonta has failed to demonstrate that the properties are in fact similarly
3 situated. Bonta has also failed to demonstrate that the City intentionally dissimilarly zoned the
4 || properties or enforced the Outdoor Storage Provision. See N. Pacifica LLC, 526 F.3d at 486 ([a]
5 || class of one plaintiff must show that the discriminatory treatment ‘was intentionally directed just
E at him, as opposed . . . to being an accident or a random act’”) (quoting Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d
93, 96 (2d Cir. 2001)).

9 The second property Bonta points to as evidence of inequitable treatment is the New

10 Baptist Church, located at 114 Beach Ave. See Dkt. No. 25 at 5. Bonta claims that the Church
11 “purchased property across the alley to the north of the Bonta Property in 2007” and now parks
12 || buses at the property. Jd. Bonta claims this shows inequitable treatment as the parking lot “is not
13 adjacent to the Church” and “not a historical Hioneenieneine use” but that the City “has allowed
the Church to use it as a parking lot for its buses and occasional storage containers for almost a
decade.” Id.
16
7 The City responds that the Church does indeed have two buses and a storage container but

1g || that “[t]hese are accessory uses to the church, as they are subordinate and incidental to the primary
19 || use, ie., church activities.” Dkt. No. 22 at 14. Bonta does not contest this difference, and instead
20 || merely reiterates its conclusory claim of disparate treatment. See Dkt. No. 33 at 6.
Similar to the Welco property, it is clear that the Bonta Property and the Church are not
similarly situated. The underlying purposes and uses of each building are facially dissimilar,
providing numerous rational bases for treating the properties differently. One basis provided by

25 the City, for example, is the frequency and primacy of the outdoor storage. As the City points out,
12

1 the Church’s use of parking is only ancillary to its primary purpose and limited to a small number

5 of buses and occasional outdoor storage. By contrast, the City points out that Kodiak’s primary
3 || purpose for using the Bonta Property is for storage of commercial vehicles and equipment, which
4 ||“directly contradicts the code itself.” Dkt. No. 22 at 14. Bonta, for its part, has provided no
5 evidence to show that the properties are similar in nature. See Thornton, 425 F.3d at 1168
6 (“Evidence of different treatment of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim.”).
Bonta, therefore, has failed to present any evidence to support its claim for an Equal

9 Protection violation. Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny Bonta’s Motion for Summary
10 Judgment.
1 B. The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment
12 The City moves for summary judgment in its own right on Bonta’s Void for Vagueness
13 |! and Equal Protection claims, arguing that Bonta has failed to meet its burden to establish its claims.
i Dkt. No. 22 at Dkt. 9-12, 12-15. As established above, Bonta has failed to establish a prima facie
case for either claim. As such, the Court will grant the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment as
to both claims.

18 C. Remaining Claims
19 Bonta’s remaining invocation of federal law is for “[a]n award of Bonta’s costs and
20 || reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Dkt. No. 1-2 at
21 |! 13; see also Dkt. No. 25 at 1-2 (only mention of § 1983 in summary judgment motion is “Bonta
Ae seeks summary judgment and the granting of an order . . . award[ing] [] Bonta’s costs and
°° reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988”).
Both statutes require Bonta to show an actual deprivation of a protected constitutional right.
13

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“[e]very person who, under color of any statute. subjects... any citizen

> of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
3 || Constitution and laws .. .); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[i]Jn any action or proceeding to enforce a
4 || provision of [list of civil rights statutes], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
5 || other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs”). As Bonta has not
6 prevailed on any of its federal law claims, there are no grounds to grant such fees.
’ The remainder of Bonta’s claims are state law claims. The Court will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismisses them without prejudice. 28

10 U.S.C. § 1367; see also Wade v. Reg'l Credit Ass'n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where
11 || district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for resolution, it should decline
12 || jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.”).
V. CONCLUSION
4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary
8 judgment, Dkt. No. 22, and DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 25, and
DISMISSES Plaintiffs federal claims with prejudice and Plaintiffs state claims without prejudice.

18
19 DATED this [fries of Novown ber’, 2019.
20 /)
L CA ARC gb
21 BARBARA caida
9 UNITED STAVES DISTRICT JUDGE
23
24
25
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10699874. Public record. Not legal advice.