# Dixon v. Economy Inn > District Court, E.D. Washington · August 16, 2021 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10697460 ## Case - **Court:** District Court, E.D. Washington - **Decided:** August 16, 2021 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10697460 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - noting that 18 “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.” ## Opinion text 1 FILED IN THE EASTERU N. S D. I SD TI RS IT CR TI C OT F C WO AU SR HT I NGTON 2 Aug 16, 2021 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 4 LADARRELLE DIXON, No. 2:20-cv-00312-SMJ 5 Plaintiff, 6 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 7 ECONOMY INN, Cooperate [sic] 8 Headquarters; ECONOMY INN; and BRUNSWICK POLICE DEPT., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 22, 12 filed on August 3, 2021. The Court previously directed Plaintiff to amend or 13 voluntarily dismiss their Complaint, ECF No. 20, which failed to state a claim upon 14 which relief can be granted. ECF No. 21. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts 15 claims against Economy Inn Corporate Headquarters and Economy Inn (together, 16 “Economy Inn Defendants”) as well as Brunswick Police Department. As the Court 17 noted in its prior Order, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint replaces their prior 18 complaints in their entirety. See ECF No. 21 at 15. Accordingly, those Defendants 19 not named in the Second Amended Complaint are terminated from this action, and 20 the Court will only consider those facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. 1 Liberally construing the Second Amended Complaint in the light most 2 favorable to Plaintiff and for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that 3 Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies of the initial and first amended 4 complaints. The Court thus dismisses this action with prejudice for failure to state 5 a claim upon which relief may be granted. 6 PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 7 Plaintiff alleges that while they were a customer at the Economy Inn, they 8 were asked to leave by an employee “due to a sexual misconduct complaint made 9 to the Brunswick Police Dept.” ECF No. 22 at 4. They assert that Economy Inn 10 employees engage in “sexual misconduct in view of customer.” Id. at 6. After 11 Plaintiff reported the misconduct to the Brunswick Police Department, Plaintiff was 12 escorted from the Economy Inn by the police. Id. The Brunswick Police Department 13 then wrote a police report about the complaint. Id. 14 LEGAL STANDARD 15 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) requires courts to 16 screen complaints filed by a party seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915(e); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 18 “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). Courts 19 must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, if a plaintiff has raised claims that are 20 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 1 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 2 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194–95 3 (9th Cir. 1998). 4 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or 5 in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), superseded by statute on 6 other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) 7 (en banc); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court 8 may therefore dismiss a claim as frivolous when it rests on an indisputably meritless 9 legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. 10 at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 11 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 12 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez, 13 203 F.3d at 1130–31; Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 14 The facts alleged in a complaint are to be taken as true and must “plausibly 15 give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). 16 Mere legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. The 17 complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 18 of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It must plead 19 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The 20 Court construes a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, affording the plaintiff the 1 benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 4 Federal district courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. 5 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal district court 6 presumes a civil action lies outside its limited jurisdiction and the burden to prove 7 otherwise rests on the party asserting jurisdiction exists. Id. Under Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (h)(3), a federal district court must dismiss a civil 9 action if at any time it determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A federal 10 district court has two basic types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question 11 and (2) diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Plaintiff claims that 12 federal question jurisdiction exists here. ECF No. 22 at 3. 13 1. Federal Question 14 Federal question jurisdiction applies if a complaint asserts a claim based on 15 federal law, such that it is a “civil action[] arising under the Constitution, laws, or 16 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Under the longstanding well- 17 pleaded complaint rule, . . . a suit ‘arises under’ federal law ‘only when the 18 plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal 19 law].’” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009), superseded by statute on 20 other grounds as stated in Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 883 F.3d 635, 643 1 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. 2 Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)). 3 Broadly construing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, it appears they 4 are trying to allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See infra. They allege 5 that the Brunswick Police Department escorted them from the Economy Inn and 6 filed a police report—which this Court construes as an allegation of a Fourth 7 Amendment violation. The Court therefore has federal question jurisdiction over 8 the Brunswick Police Department. But it does not appear that Plaintiff alleges a 9 federal cause of action against the Economy Inn Defendants (nor would such a 10 cause of action state a claim under the facts alleged, as explained below). 11 2. Supplemental Jurisdiction 12 The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a party’s state law 13 claims if they are “so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original 14 jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 15 1376(a). This jurisdiction extends to claims involving “the joinder . . . of additional 16 parties.” Id. 17 “A state law claim is part of the same case or controversy when it shares a 18 ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal claims and the state and federal 19 claims would normally be tried together.” See Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 20 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Trs. of the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health 1 & Welfare Tr. v. Desert Valley Landscape Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2 2003)). However, after acquiring supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, 3 a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if: 4 (1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 5 district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in 6 exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 7 8 28 U.S.C. § 1376(c). 9 Broadly construing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court concludes 10 Plaintiff has alleged that her claims against Economy Inn Defendants arise out of 11 the same transaction or occurrence as Plaintiff’s claims against Brunswick Police 12 Department. The Court thus has supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of 13 Plaintiff’s claims. 14 B. Personal Jurisdiction 15 As stated in its prior Order, this Court does not have personal jurisdiction 16 over the Brunswick Police Department. See ECF No. 21 at 7. Plaintiff has not 17 alleged any additional information which enables the Court to find personal 18 jurisdiction. The Court exercises personal jurisdiction over defendants if (1) it is 19 permitted by the state’s long-arm statute and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does 20 1 not violate federal due process. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 2 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 3 The Court “begins its personal jurisdiction analysis with the long-arm statute 4 of the state in which the court sits.” Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai 5 Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002). Washington’s long-arm statute 6 extends the Court’s personal jurisdiction to the broadest reach permitted by the 7 United States Constitution. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.185. Because 8 Washington’s long-arm statute is coextensive with federal due process 9 requirements, the jurisdictional analysis is the same. Schwarzenegger v. Fred 10 Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004). 11 Due process requires that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts with 12 [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 13 notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 14 U.S. 310, 315 (1945). In other words, (1) there must be purposeful minimum 15 contacts between the defendant and forum state; (2) the plaintiff’s injuries arise out 16 of, or relate to, those minimum contacts; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is 17 consistent with the traditional notion of “fair play and substantial justice.” Walden 18 v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014). 19 20 1 Under the “minimum contacts” analysis, jurisdiction can be general, “all- 2 purpose,” or it can be specific, “conduct-linked.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 3 117, 121 (2014). 4 To establish general jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has 5 continuous and systematic contacts sufficient to approximate physical presence in 6 the state. In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 741 7 (9th Cir. 2013). The standard is “exacting . . . because a finding of general 8 jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer 9 for any of its activities anywhere in the world.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. 10 A foreign corporation must have affiliations so continuous and systematic as 11 to render it “essentially at home” in the forum state. Goodyear Dunlop Tires 12 Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). A corporation’s place of 13 incorporation and principal place of business are paradigm bases for general 14 jurisdiction. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. Only in an “exceptional case” will general 15 jurisdiction be available elsewhere. Id. at 139 n.19. 16 Specific jurisdiction is analyzed using a three-part test: (1) the nonresident 17 defendant must have purposefully directed his activities or consummated some 18 transaction with the forum or a forum resident, or performed some act by which he 19 purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 20 thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one 1 that arises out of or relates to the nonresident defendant’s forum-related activities; 2 and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial 3 justice, i.e., it must be reasonable. See Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th 4 Cir. 2015). If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing the first two prongs, the burden 5 shifts to the defendant to set forth a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction 6 would not be reasonable. Id. at 1211–12. 7 1. Economy Inn Defendants 8 Plaintiff represents that Economy Inn has its corporate headquarters in 9 Washington State. In evaluating the sufficiency of the Complaint, the Court finds 10 that Plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to establish that Economy Inn’s principal 11 place of business is Washington State, so the Court has general jurisdiction over the 12 Economy Inn Defendants. 13 2. Brunswick Police Department 14 On the other hand, as explained above, Brunswick Police Department is 15 located in Georgia. As alleged, this Court does not have general jurisdiction over 16 Brunswick Police Department. Nor does it have specific jurisdiction. Plaintiff 17 makes no allegations that the Brunswick Police Department had any interaction 18 with Washington State, much less that it purposefully availed itself of the privilege 19 of conducting activities in the state or purposefully directed its activities to the state. 20 See Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211. 1 C. Failure to State a Claim 2 1. Section 1983 3 The Court construes Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint as asserting a 4 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Brunswick Police Department. Section 1983 5 requires a claimant to prove that (1) a person acting under color of state law (2) 6 committed an act that deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity 7 protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 8 628, 632–33 (9th Cir. 1988). A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, 9 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in 10 another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required 11 to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” Redman v. 12 Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir.1991) (emphasis and brackets in 13 original), abrogated in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 14 (1994). 15 A complaint must set forth the specific facts upon which the plaintiff relies 16 in claiming the liability of each defendant. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 17 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Even a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not 18 supply essential elements of a claim that the plaintiff failed to plead. Id. To establish 19 liability under Section 1983, Plaintiff must set forth facts showing how each 20 Defendant caused or personally participated in causing a deprivation of Plaintiff’s 1 protected rights. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); Taylor v. List, 2 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 3 a. Economy Inn 4 The Court does not read Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to assert a Section 5 1983 cause of action against Economy Inn Defendants. Even if they did, it appears 6 the Economy Inn Defendants are not government actors. Private parties are 7 generally not considered to act under color of state law for purposes of Section 8 1983. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991). A private person may 9 act under color of state law if they willfully participate in joint action with state 10 officials to deprive others of their constitutional rights. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1048. 11 The private party must share the common objective of the conspiracy or enter into 12 an agreement with the state actor. 13 Plaintiff has alleged no facts from which the Court could infer that Economy 14 Inn Defendants, private parties, conspired with state officials to deprive Plaintiff of 15 their constitutionally protected rights or otherwise acted under color of state law. 16 Plaintiff has not alleged that Economy Inn Defendants have an agreement with the 17 Brunswick Police Department or any other state agency, nor any common objective 18 with a state actor. See ECF No. 22. Plaintiff has not set forth allegations concerning 19 a person acting under color of state law and therefore fails to state a claim under 20 Section 1983. 1 b. Brunswick Police Department 2 Because the Court finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over the 3 Brunswick Police Department, it need not address whether Plaintiff has stated a 4 claim for those Defendants. 5 2. Other Claims Against Economy Inn Defendants 6 Further, Plaintiff’s allegations against Economy Inn continue to state mere 7 legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. Even construing the sparse facts liberally 8 in favor of Plaintiff, the Court cannot determine which federal or state laws Plaintiff 9 alleges that Economy Inn Defendants violated. See ECF No. 22 at 4–6. Plaintiff 10 vaguely alleges that Economy Inn Defendants’ employees engaged in “sexual 11 misconduct,” but do not elaborate upon the circumstances surrounding the incident 12 that gave rise to a legal violation. Id. at 4, 6. Plaintiff has simply not pleaded 13 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 14 U.S. at 555.1 15 CONCLUSION 16 Despite the Court granting them several opportunities to amend their 17 1 Under the “Basis for Jurisdiction” section of the Complaint, Plaintiff states that 18 their federal constitutional or federal statutory rights which have been violated include “Governmental Discrimination Laws,” “Hostile Environment for 19 Customer,” “Third Party Sexual harassment” and “Sexual Misconduct in Workplace.” ECF No. 22 at 3. Even construing the sparse facts liberally in favor of 20 Plaintiff, the Court cannot determine what federal laws Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated. 1 Complaint, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to address the issues 2 |{identified by the Court. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Second 3 || Amended Complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 5 1. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 22, is DISMISSED 6 WITH PREJUDICE. 7 2. Any hearings and deadlines in this matter are STRICKEN. 8 3. Any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 9 4. The Clerk’s Office is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT and CLOSE 10 the file. 11 5. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal 12 of this Order could not be taken in good faith and would lack any 13 arguable basis in law or fact. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and 15 || provide copies to pro se Plaintiff. 16 DATED this 16" day of August 2021. (ens 0 hoa rdenf 17 ee tit, SF 18 SALVADOR MENDOZA>I R. United States District Judge 19 20 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10697460. Public record. Not legal advice.