# Cecil v. Kijakazi

> District Court, E.D. Virginia · June 20, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10690591

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Virginia
- **Decided:** June 20, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

)
MARIAH C.,1 )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-0811 (LRV)
)
MARTIN O’MALLEY, )
COMMISSIONER )
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,2 )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt.
Nos. 11 & 12). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Mariah C. seeks judicial review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”),
denying her claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act. The
Commissioner’s final decision is based on a finding by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and
Appeals Council for the Office of Appellate Operations (“Appeals Council”) that Plaintiff was not
disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and applicable regulations. For the reasons stated

1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of
the United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security
cases, federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last initials.

2 On December 20, 2023, Martin O’Malley was sworn into office and, therefore, was automatically
substituted in place of Acting Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi as Defendant in this action. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 25(d).
below, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion, GRANT Defendant’s Motion, and AFFIRM the
final decision of the Commissioner.3
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 22, 2020, Plaintiff applied for DIB with an alleged onset date of May 15, 2015
(which she later amended to May 22, 2020 (AR 44, 236)), due to the following alleged

impairments: major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, herniated discs pushing on
sciatic nerve, deteriorating discs and narrowing of spine, and high blood pressure. (AR 124.) On
March 25, 2021, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application. (AR
122.) On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the denial, and on October 27, 2021,
the SSA affirmed its denial. (AR 137.) On November 18, 2021, Plaintiff requested a hearing
before an ALJ. (AR 162.) On March 24, 2022, Plaintiff appointed Colleen Ilacqua of Trajector
Disability, LLC, as her representative. (AR 234.)
On November 1, 2022, ALJ Brian Rippel conducted a hearing via telephone conference.4
(AR 40, 217.) Plaintiff provided testimony and answered questions posed by the ALJ and her

representative. (AR 45 et seq.) A vocational expert (“VE”) also answered questions from the ALJ
and Plaintiff’s representative. (AR 55 et seq.) On November 15, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision
finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.
(AR 10, 25.) Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision, and on May
24, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request, finding no reason under its rules to review

3 The Administrative Record (“AR”) in this case has been filed under seal, pursuant to Local Civil
Rules 5 and 7(C). (See Dkt. No. 6.) In accordance with those rules, this opinion excludes any
personal identifiers such as Plaintiff’s social security number and date of birth (except for the year
of birth). The discussion of Plaintiff’s medical information is limited to the extent necessary to
analyze the case.

4 The hearing before the ALJ was conducted by telephone due to the extraordinary circumstances
presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.
the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1, 4; see also AR 330–33 (Plaintiff’s brief on appeal).) As a result, the
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, and Plaintiff was given sixty days
to file a civil action challenging the decision. (AR 1–2); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
On June 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed this civil action seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g). (Dkt. No. 1.) On August 28, 2023,

the Commissioner filed the Administrative Record (“AR”). (Dkt. No. 6.) On September 21, 2023,
the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of the deadline to file her opening
brief and set a briefing schedule. (Dkt. No. 8.) On October 23, 2023, upon the consent of all
parties, the Court ordered that the matter proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. (Dkt.
No. 10.)
On November 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed her opening brief. (Dkt. No. 11.) On December 18,
2023, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s brief and a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.
No. 12.) Plaintiff filed a Reply on January 5, 2024. (Dkt. No. 13.) Neither party requested a
hearing. The parties’ motions are thus ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Social Security Act, the district court should affirm the Commissioner’s final
decision “when an ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence.” Moscio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Bird v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012)); accord Shelley C. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 61 F.4th 341, 353 (4th Cir. 2023); Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470,
472 (4th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.
1148, 1154 (2019). It consists of “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat
less than a preponderance.” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640,
642 (4th Cir. 1966)). In determining whether an ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the Court does not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Id. (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)). In other words, “[i]t is the ALJ’s duty, and not that of the reviewing

court, to resolve evidentiary conflicts, and the ALJ’s decision must be sustained if supported by
substantial evidence.” Maggie W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 1:22CV1157 (CMH/JFA), 2023 WL
6121246, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2023) (citing Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996)),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6120606 (E.D. Va. Sept. 18, 2023).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Summary of Evidence Before the ALJ
The following is a summary of the relevant evidence before the ALJ regarding Plaintiff’s
biographical information, medical history, and treatment.5
Plaintiff was born in 1981 and was 38 years old on the date of her DIB application.

(AR 124.) Plaintiff has an eleventh-grade education and previously worked in childcare and retail.
(AR 260.) Plaintiff testified that her last employment was approximately seven years ago. (AR
46.) Plaintiff does not have a GED. (AR 45.)
In an Adult Function Report dated April 27, 2020, Plaintiff reported that she is unable to
work and perform many daily activities because of the pain caused by conditions in her back. (AR

5 The AR contains more than 3,000 pages of medical records from various sources relating to
Plaintiff’s medical treatments. This summary provides an overview of Plaintiff’s medical
treatments and conditions relevant to the errors asserted in her appeal and is not intended to be an
exhaustive list of every medical treatment; it is also limited to the evidence relevant to Plaintiff’s
amended AOD of May 22, 2020, which is consistent with the ALJ’s review and analysis of the
record. (Compare AR 122 (original AOD of May 15, 2015), with AR 44 (amending AOD to May
22, 2020); see also AR 10, 45 (noting amended AOD).)
270 et seq.) For example, Plaintiff reported that she “can’t do much of anything” because her back
“hurts too much.” (AR 271; see also AR 274 (“Everything I used to do I can’t because of my
back.”).) Although Plaintiff reported that she is able to prepare some meals, do some laundry, and
shop in stores, she has trouble standing and walking. (AR 271–74.) In response to a question
about whether Plaintiff had “any problems getting along with family, friend, neighbors, or others,”

Plaintiff reported that she “argue[s] every once in a while, but that’s normal. Nothing that’s not
normal.” (AR 275.) Plaintiff further reported that she has trouble following verbal instructions
(AR 275), that she hasn’t “had any problems” getting along with authority figures (AR 276), that
she does not handle changes in routine “too well” (AR 276), that she is not “able to concentrate on
what [she’s] trying to do” when in pain (AR 277), and that she “always” has problems
understanding instructions “due to dyslexia” (AR 277). In a Function report dated July 4, 2021,
Plaintiff similarly noted issues with her back and related pain. (AR 292 et seq.) For example,
Plaintiff reported that her “pain has stopped all activities.” (AR 296.) Plaintiff reported that she
is “good” with written instructions, “OK” with verbal instructions, gets along “OK” with authority

figures, and that she does not handle stress well. (AR 298.)
In a psychological testing report from December 2018, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Major
Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Severe, with Anxious Distress, as well as Generalized Anxiety
Disorder. (AR 368; see also AR 2209 (diagnoses remained current as of February 2020).) Plaintiff
had a full-scale IQ score of 77. (AR 367.) In 2020, Plaintiff had regular appointments with her
local community services board. In March 2020, Plaintiff denied a history of inpatient psychiatric
treatment, but reported “feeling overwhelmed, helpless, hopeless, amotivation, and isolated.” (AR
2209.) Plaintiff reported that she managed her diagnoses and symptoms through medication
management and “1:1 therapy.” (Id.) In appointment notes from March 2020 through December
2020, it was noted that Plaintiff often presented as “cooperative” (AR 2080, 2117, 2163, 2180,
2290, 2319, 2343, 2379, 2432), had pressured speech (AR 2032, 2080, 2117, 2144, 2163, 2180,
2290, 2319, 2343, 2370, 2379, 2401, 2432), a “flat” and/or “depressed” mood and affect (AR 2032,
2080, 2117, 2144, 2163, 2180, 2290, 2319, 2343, 2370, 2401, 2432), and appropriate cognition.
(AR 2032, 2080, 2117, 2144, 2163, 2180, 2290, 2319, 2343, 2370, 2379, 2401, 2432). In June
2020, it was noted that Plaintiff “attended her appointments as scheduled,” was “medication

compliant,” and attended 1:1 therapy appointments as scheduled one time per month. (AR 2059,
2061.)
In October 2020, Plaintiff presented to the emergency room for a panic attack after running
out of medication five days earlier. (AR 2464; see also AR 2276.) The treating physician noted
that Plaintiff was “very anxious,” with a “depressed mood and affect,” and suspected that Plaintiff
was “experiencing an acute panic attack” due to an “acute grief reaction after relative recently
passed away.” (AR 2466–67.) On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with
Erica Bindrim, NP, at Family Psychiatric Services. (AR 2585.) In the initial visit intake form,
Ms. Bindrim indicated that Plaintiff had been in therapy with the office’s counselor, Donna Carson,

LPC, “for over a year.”6 (AR 2585.) Ms. Bindrim indicated that Plaintiff had recently
decompensated due to multiple deaths of relatives and friends, and that her symptoms at the time
were 7/10 in severity. (AR 2585.) At the initial intake appointment, Ms. Bindrim conducted a
Mental Status Exam, and noted that Plaintiff was “attentive,” that she “had poor eye contact,” that
she “appeared cooperative and worried,” that she had a cooperative attitude with a “depressed and
downcast” mood. (AR 2586.) Ms. Bindrim further noted that Plaintiff had normal speech,

6 Donna Carson previously treated Plaintiff at the Youth for Tomorrow practice, at which Erica
Bindrim also worked and treated Plaintiff as a medication management provider. (See AR 2276
(noting Plaintiff would be seeing therapist and medication management provider “Erica” at new
practice); AR 399–402 (notes from therapy session with Donna Carson at Youth for Tomorrow
practice in August 2019); AR 432–35 (evaluation by Erica Bindrim at Youth for Tomorrow
practice in September 2019).)
appropriate thought content, unrealistic judgment that was “impaired about [her] health care and
impaired about social situations,” and that she was oriented but had “low normal
attention/concentration and low normal sustained attention seen on exam.” (AR 2586.) Plaintiff
also had “low normal” memory, “mildly impaired verbal intelligence and mildly impaired
nonverbal intelligence,” “mildly impaired cognitive flexibility,” and “moderately impaired

abstraction on exam.” (AR 2587.) Finally, Ms. Bindrim reported that Plaintiff had “mildly
impaired verbal cognitive/social judgment,” and mild to moderately “impaired executive
functioning.” (AR 2587.)
On October 27, 2020, Plaintiff reviewed her medications with Ms. Bindrim and reported
that she was “feeling a little better.” (AR 2588.) On November 10, 2020, Plaintiff reported side
effects of the medication that she was taking to Ms. Bindrim, who noted that a medication
reconciliation was performed, and that Plaintiff continued to be seen by her PCP and a pain
specialist for back pain. (AR 2590.) Ms. Bindrim noted that Plaintiff “[f]eels that [her medication]
help[s] with sleep and anxiety and allergies.” (AR 2590.) In appointment notes from November

25, 2020, Ms. Bindrim wrote that Plaintiff had a “lack of focus and attention issues with
completing tasks and at time experiencing what feels like anxiety getting overwhelmed.” (AR
2592.) Ms. Bindrim prescribed ADHD medication. (Id.)
On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff met with Donna Carson, LPC, and reported that she
continued to experience symptoms of depression. (AR 2595.) On December 9, 2020, Plaintiff
met with Ms. Bindrim and reported that “her mood has been stable” but that she had trouble staying
asleep at night. (AR 2596.) Plaintiff also reported that her focus “is a bit better” and that she felt
“that she has been doing ok.” (Id.) On January 5, 2021, Plaintiff saw Ms. Carson and reported
that her medication seemed to be helping with her symptoms, but that she “feels like she cannot
make changes in her life since she cannot work with her back pain and her limited reading skills.”
(AR 2604.) On January 6, 2021, Plaintiff saw Ms. Bindrim and reported that her medication was
“working [with] no side effects” and that her mood was stable. (AR 1260.) On January 20, 2021,
Plaintiff reported to Ms. Bindrim: “I feel great no complaints,” and that she needed refills of her
medication. (AR 2608.)
In February 2021, Plaintiff presented to the emergency room for a possible allergic reaction

to an antibiotic. (AR 2454.) It was noted that Plaintiff was alert and oriented with normal mood
and affect. (AR 2456.) Plaintiff was treated with a dose of oral steroids and discharged. (AR
2457.) On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff had an appointment with Ms. Carson, who noted that
Plaintiff “feels depressed and anxious at times but feels there is nothing she can do.” (AR 2611.)
Ms. Carson further noted that Plaintiff “wants to remain in service but agrees she has very little to
share in session and very little she is trying to change,” and set Plaintiff’s next appointment for
two months out. (Id.)
At her next appointment with Ms. Carson on April 6, 2021, Plaintiff “stated she has been
anxious,” but noted that she was “eating better and her diabetes is more controlled.” (AR 2612.)

Ms. Carson noted that Plaintiff “has been medication compliant and has an appointment with the
nurse practitioner [Ms. Bindrim] the following day to look at her medication.” (Id.) Finally, it
was noted that Plaintiff “was alert and oriented times four,” that she “reported symptoms of
depression and anxiety,” that her “affect was within normal limits,” that her “memory was intact”
and “attention was normal,” that her “mood was euthymic,” she was “disheveled” with normal eye
contact and slowed motor activity, and that she was “cooperative” with “fair” insight and
judgment. (Id.)
On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff met with Ms. Bindrim and reported that “her mood has been up
and down” and that “[p]ain is preventing her from working.” (AR 2614.) On April 12, 2021,
Plaintiff presented to the emergency room for a panic attack coupled with chest pressure.
(AR 2446.) It was noted that Plaintiff had normal mood, affect, and behavior. (AR 2448.)
Plaintiff was given a dose of anti-anxiety medication and discharged. (AR 2450–51.) On June 7,
2021, Plaintiff had an appointment with Ms. Carson, at which she reported feeling “depressed and
anxious at times” and “helpless,” including because she had been denied social security disability
benefits. (AR 2617.) Ms. Carson noted that Plaintiff was alert and oriented with an intact memory

and normal attention, a euthymic mood, normal eye contact, slowed motor activity, fair judgment
and insight, and cooperative behavior. (Id.)
In April 2022, Plaintiff again saw Ms. Carson for counseling following the passing of her
father. (AR 3110.) At an appointment on April 4, 2022, Ms. Carson noted that Plaintiff was alert
and oriented, reported symptoms of depression and anxiety, and had a depressed mood with normal
attention and eye contact. (Id.) On May 12, 2022, Plaintiff met with Ms. Bindrim to refill her
medication. (AR 3112.) Ms. Bindrim’s treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff reported anxiety due
to family illnesses, that Seroquel had helped “balance her mood,” and that she was “[l]ess irritable
and more stable overall” prior to her father’s death.7 (Id.) On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff met with

Ms. Carson and reported that she has “‘bad days,’ in which she misses her father.” (AR 3116.)
On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff met with Ms. Bindrim and reported that despite her “ongoing issues

7 Plaintiff’s opening brief asserts that, at this appointment, “Ms. Bindrim found Plaintiff had poor
eye contact, her mood was depressed and her affect was downcast and depressed, her recent
memory was impaired, she exhibited mildly impaired verbal and nonverbal intelligence, and she
demonstrated moderately impaired executive functioning.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 5 (citing AR 3113-
14).) These findings, however, were documented word-for-word in the prior mental status exam
(MSE) that Ms. Bindrim conducted on October 13, 2020. (Compare AR 2586–87 (MSE
summary), with AR 3114 (MSE summary). Upon review, the Court notes that the findings in the
“MSE” section of Ms. Bindrim’s treatment notes were never changed from the initial note on
October 13, 2020. In other words, it appears to the Court that Ms. Bindrim conducted the mental
status exam only one time, on October 13, 2020, and that those findings were merely repeated in
all subsequent treatment notes. (See “MSE” at AR 2586–87, 2605–06, 2608–09, 2615, 3114,
3120.)
with loss and grief,” she “does feel that her medication is helping to stave off depression and
anxiety as she continues the grieving process.” (AR 3118.)
During 2022, Plaintiff continued to attend appointments with her local community services
board. Appointment notes generally reflect that Plaintiff presented with appropriate, cooperative,
and/or pleasant behavior, normal speech with congruent mood and affect, and had appropriate

cognition. (See AR 3323 (January 2022), AR 3308 (February 2022), AR 3271 (April 2022), AR
3262 (July 2022).) Plaintiff, however, sometimes presented with pressured speech and a
depressed, anxious, and/or flat mood and affect. (See AR 3323 (January 2022), AR 3308 (February
2022), AR 3303 (March 2022).) During this time, Plaintiff reported that she had trouble with
missing therapy appointments due to anxiety (AR 3300), but then later reported that “she has
attended all of her therapy appointments and they have been helping her a lot” (AR 3268), and that
she “continues to see her providers and is satisfied” (AR 3259).
B. Testimony at the Administrative Hearing
At the telephonic hearing on November 1, 2022, Plaintiff appeared with her representative

before the ALJ. (AR 40.) In response to questioning by her representative, Plaintiff testified that
she is unable to work because her “back is really, really bad” and that she has “severe depression
and anxiety” which cause her “panic attacks off and on.” (AR 47.) Plaintiff testified that, due to
the pain in her back, she lays “at least 12 hours a day, if not more.” (AR 49.) She further testified
that her panic attacks are triggered by pain and being in a large crowd. (AR 51.) Plaintiff testified
that she has “mood swings” due to bipolar disorder but that she is “on medication and the
medication has helped tremendously.” (AR 52.) Plaintiff testified that “some days . . . it’s hard
for [her] to concentrate,” depending on the pain she is experiencing, and that she occasionally
needs reminders to complete tasks like taking medications and attending medical appointments.
(AR 53.)
C. The ALJ’s Decision on November 15, 2022
On November 15, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled under
Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act based on her application for DIB for the period
from the AOD of May 22, 2020 to the date of the decision. (AR 25.) When determining whether
an individual is eligible for DIB, the ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential evaluation.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The ALJ must consider whether a claimant: (1) is
currently engaged in substantial gainful employment; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an
impairment that meets or equals any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P of the
regulations that are considered per se disabling; (4) has the ability to perform past relevant work;
and (5) if unable to return to past relevant work, whether the claimant can perform other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); see also
Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). While the claimant bears the burden to
prove disability for the first four steps of the analysis, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Astrue, 667 F.3d at 472–73. The regulations promulgated by the SSA provide that all

relevant evidence will be considered in determining whether a claimant has a disability. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(3), 416.920(a)(3).
Here, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 22, 2020, the
application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: left knee mild osteoarthritis, morbid
obesity, lumbar and lumbosacral degenerative disc disease with chronic low back pain,
respiratory impairments (airway disease, asthma), left lower extremity radiculopathy, pain
disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, generalized anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder,
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and depressive disorder (to include
dysthymia, pervasive depressive disorder, and major depressive disorder) (20 CFR
416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has
the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CRF 416.967(a)
sedentary work with lifting and/or carrying up to 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10
pounds frequently, standing and/or walking up to 2 hours and sitting up to 6 hours in an 8-
hour workday. Additionally, the claimant is limited to: only occasional pushing and/or
pulling (including foot control operations) with the left lower extremity; only occasional
climbing of ramps or stairs, balancing (as it is defined in the Selected Characteristics of
Occupations), stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no climbing of ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds; only occasional exposure to vibration, respiratory irritants (such as fumes,
odors, dust, gases, and poorly ventilated areas in concentrations higher than found in a
typical household), or workplace hazards (including unprotected heights and dangerous
machinery); limited to jobs that require understanding, remembering, and carrying out
simple instructions and using judgment to make simple work-related decisions; cannot
perform work requiring a specific production rate such as assembly line work or work that
requires hourly quotas; limited to only occasional interaction with the public, co-workers,
or supervisors; and limited to dealing with only occasional changes in a routine work
setting.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
6. The claimant was born [in] 1981 and was 38 years old, which is defined as a younger
individual age 18-44, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has a limited education (20 CFR 416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant
work (20 CFR 416.968).
9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969a).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since
May 22, 20220, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
On May 24, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s
decision. In the written notification, the Appeals Council stated that Plaintiff’s proposed reasons
for why she disagreed with the ALJ’s decision provided no basis to alter the ALJ’s decision.
(AR 1.)
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed for one reason:
“The ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by substantial evidence where [the ALJ] failed
to properly evaluate the mental opinion of Erica Bindrim, PMHNP-BC.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 7.)
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously concluded that Ms. Bindrim’s opinions

regarding Plaintiff’s mental functioning limitations were not persuasive because he improperly
relied on “unremarkable objective status exam findings that only served to mischaracterize the
evidence” and failed to consider “Ms. Bindrim’s supporting treatment notes as a whole.” (Id. at
9.) Thus, if the ALJ had properly evaluated Ms. Bindrim’s opinions, he “would have inevitably
found Plaintiff disabled.” (Id. at 8, 13.)
In response, Defendant asserts that the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed because “the
record evidence amply supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the nurse practitioner’s opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work was unpersuasive.” (Dkt. No. 12 at 1.) Specifically, in
“assessing the persuasiveness of NP Bindrim’s opinion, the ALJ first addressed the required

supportability factor,” and then properly “addressed the required factor of consistency.” (Id. at
13-14.) Defendant further argues that, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not cherry-
pick evidence, but “carefully evaluated the objective evidence in the record together with
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints” to support his findings that Ms. Bindrim’s opinions were
unpersuasive. (Id. at 17.) Accordingly, because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision,
it should be affirmed.
Plaintiff filed her disability claim after March 27, 2017, so a revised regulatory framework
applied to the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions in the record. See Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (technical errors
corrected by 82 Fed. Reg. 15132-01 (Mar. 27, 2017)). Under this framework, the ALJ does not
“defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the claimant’s own]
medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ must consider the persuasiveness
of each medical opinion or prior administrative finding using the five factors listed in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c): supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and

other factors. Of these factors, the most important are “supportability” and “consistency,” and the
ALJ must specifically explain how these two factors were considered in assessing the
persuasiveness of each medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(2).
“Supportability” means that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s)
. . . the more persuasive the medical opinions” will be. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). “Consistency”
means that “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s)
is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(c)(2). The regulations further instruct that, for purposes of administrative feasibility,
an ALJ is only required to articulate these factors at the “source-level,” meaning that an ALJ does
not have to articulate how he “considered each medical opinion or prior administrative medical
finding from one medical source individually;” instead, a medical source’s opinions and findings
are considered “together[,] using the factors.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(1).
As further explained below, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed
because: (1) the ALJ applied the correct legal standard when evaluating the persuasiveness of Ms.
Bindrim’s opinions (i.e., he correctly applied the supportability and consistency factors), and
(2) substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the persuasiveness of Ms.
Bindrim’s opinions. See May v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2023 WL 2908812 (4th Cir. Apr.
12, 2023) (affirming ALJ’s supportability analysis).8
A. The ALJ Applied the Correct Legal Standard in Evaluating the
Persuasiveness of Ms. Bindrim’s Medical Opinions
As outlined above, Ms. Bindrim began seeing Plaintiff in October 2020 following an
emergency room visit due to a panic attack. (AR 2585.) On March 22, 2022, Ms. Bindrim
completed a “Mental Capacity Assessment” in which she provided her opinion regarding whether
Plaintiff had “mild,” “moderate,” “marked,” “extreme,” or “no” limitations in various areas of
mental functioning. (AR 2985–87.) In total, Ms. Bindrim provided her opinion about Plaintiff’s
mental functioning limitations for twenty-two (22) separate categories, which were grouped into
the following four sections: (1) “understanding, remembering or applying information,” (2)

“concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace,” (3) “adapting or managing oneself,” and (4)
“interacting with others.” (Id.) Under each of the four general areas, there was a space for Ms.
Bindrim to “[d]escribe the medical/clinical findings that support [her] assessment,” which Ms.
Bindrim left blank. (Id.) At the end of the Assessment, Ms. Bindrim noted that Plaintiff’s use of
alcohol or other substances had no impact on her assessment, that Plaintiff has the ability to
voluntarily control the use of alcohol or other substances, and that Plaintiff could manage benefits
in her own best interest. (AR 2987.)
In considering the persuasiveness of Ms. Bindrim’s opinions contained within the Mental
Capacity Assessment, the ALJ first summarized her opinions as follows: Plaintiff “had [1]

8 In May, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling affirming the ALJ’s decision,
concluding that (1) “the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in evaluating [plaintiff’s] claims,
particularly in terms of analyzing the supportability and consistency of the proffered medical
opinion evidence,” and (2) “that the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.”
2023 WL 2908812, at *1 (citing Bowers v. Kijakazi, 40 F.4th 872, 875 (8th Cir. 2022)). The Court
takes the same analytical approach to the issues Plaintiff raises here.
moderate to mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information, [2] marked
to mild limitations in concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace, [3] extreme to moderate
limitations in adapting or managing herself, and [4] marked to mild limitation in interacting with
others.” (AR 21.) Next, after noting that Ms. Bindrim served as Plaintiff’s “mental health
provider,” the ALJ reasoned that Ms. Bindrim’s opinions were “not persuasive” because “the

marked and extreme limitations are not supported by Ms. Bindrim’s documented observations of
normal speech rate, appropriate effect, no psychomotor agitation, cooperative attitude, appropriate
thought content, and intact remote memory.” (AR 21.) The ALJ further explained that the
opinions were not supported because, in the ordinary course of treating Plaintiff, Ms. Bindrim had
previously found only “moderately impaired abstraction, mildly impaired verbal cognitive/social
judgment, low normal spatial reasoning/orientation, low normal visuomotor construction and
coordination, low normal psychomotor speed, pure motor speed, and calculation abilities, and mild
to moderately impaired executive functioning,” all of which did not “support marked and extreme
limitations.” (AR 21–22.)

As to consistency, the ALJ explained that the “marked and extreme limitations are not
consistent with the evidence the claimant’s mood was stable and her symptoms improved with
medication.” (AR 22.) To support his conclusions, the ALJ cited several of Ms. Bindrim’s
treatment notes during the relevant period—including those from October 2020, January 2021,
April 2021, and May 2022—which reflect her objective findings, as well as Plaintiff’s subjective
statements during appointments. (AR 22.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Bindrim’s
opinions were not persuasive.
Upon review, the Court finds that ALJ applied the correct legal standard in evaluating Ms.
Bindrim’s mental limitation opinions because he applied both the supportability and consistency
factors in determining the persuasiveness of those opinions, as required under 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b). As outlined above, the ALJ reviewed Ms. Bindrim’s opinions, explained that
those opinions were not supported by the medical evidence contained in her treatment notes,
explained that those opinions were not consistent with other evidence in the record (including
Plaintiff’s own statements), and provided citations to the record evidence that supported his
conclusions. In doing so, the ALJ properly “buil[t] an accurate and logical bridge from the

evidence to his conclusion,” which is all that is required. Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189
(4th Cir. 2016); see 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5858 (analysis under 404.1520c intended to allow the
“reviewing court to trace the path of [the ALJ’s] reasoning”).
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding Ms. Bindrim’s opinions unpersuasive because
he cited only “unremarkable objective status exam findings” that “mischaracterized the record”
and “cherry-picked objective evidence to discount an opinion based on inherently subjective
impairments.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 11.) But putting aside whether the ALJ’s conclusions are supported
by substantial evidence (which is discussed in detail below), Plaintiff does not specifically argue
that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard—i.e., that the ALJ failed to assess the supportability

and consistency factors altogether. As explained above, the regulations require an ALJ to
expressly explain how the supportability and consistency factors are considered in assessing the
persuasiveness of each medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(2). There is, however,
“no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision.”
Reid v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395
F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005)); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5858 (explaining that the
Commission “consider[s] all evidence” received, but standard for review “does not require written
analysis about how [an ALJ] considered each piece of evidence”). Nor do the regulations require
the ALJ to explain how each piece of evidence supports (or does not support) a medical source’s
opinion; rather, opinions are to be considered at the “source-level,” through applying the applicable
factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(1).
Additionally, although Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s reference to the so-called
“unremarkable objective status exam findings” in Ms. Bindrim’s treatment notes, that is precisely
the type of evidence that the ALJ is required to consider when assessing supportability and

consistency. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff’s reliance on the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Shelley C. is also unpersuasive, as that case involved the ALJ’s failure to properly
weigh a treating physician’s opinion under a prior version of the applicable regulation—a question
not at issue here. See Shelley C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 61 F.4th 341, 354 & n.6 (4th Cir.
2023) (finding ALJ “failed to address each of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)’s six factors”); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (Section 404.1527 applies only for claims filed before March 27, 2027).
In sum, while Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion regarding the
persuasiveness of Ms. Bindrim’s opinion, that does not mean that the ALJ applied the wrong legal
standard in evaluating that opinion. Thus, because the ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of Ms.

Bindrim’s opinions and explained how, in his view, those opinions were (1) not supported by Ms.
Bindrim’s prior observations, and (2) not consistent with additional evidence in the record, the
Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard in evaluating those opinions.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Conclusions Regarding the
Persuasiveness of Ms. Bindrim’s Medical Opinions
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ relied on “cherrypicked findings” that “do not form the
substantial basis for the rejection of Ms. Bindrim’s opinion,” and, therefore, the “RFC
determination was not supported by substantial evidence.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 7, 11.) Other than
contesting the ALJ’s treatment of Ms. Bindrim’s opinion, however, Plaintiff does not challenge
the ALJ’s RFC determination on any other basis. 9 In response, Defendant argues that the “medical
evidence of record support the reasonableness of the ALJ’s” supportability and consistency
assessments, and thus, that substantial evidence supports his decision. (Dkt. No. 12 at 13, 19.)
Upon review, the Court finds that substantial evidence—i.e., “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”—supports the ALJ’s

conclusion that Ms. Bindrim’s opinions were not persuasive because they were not well supported
and were inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th
Cir. 2001).
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the treatment notes expressly cited by the ALJ
reasonably support his conclusions regarding Ms. Bindrim’s opinions. (AR 22.) As previously
noted, Ms. Bindrim left blank the sections of the Mental Capacity Assessment requesting that she
“[d]escribe the medical/clinical findings that support [her] assessment.” (AR 2985.) As such, Ms.
Bindrim arguably did not provide any explanation (whether based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports
or not) as to why she marked Plaintiff’s limitations as “marked” or “extreme” for certain areas of

functioning. (AR 2985–87.) Nevertheless, the ALJ specifically relied on, and cited to, the
objective medical evidence in Ms. Bindrim’s treatment notes from October 2020, January 2021,
April 2021, and May 2022, to evaluate the persuasiveness of her opinions.10 See 20 C.F.R.

9 Plaintiff has thus waived any other argument on review. See Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC,
856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an argument by failing to present it in its
opening brief or by failing to ‘develop [the] argument’—even if [the] brief takes a passing shot at
the issue.” (quoting Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 923 (4th Cir. 2015))); Harris v. Kijakazi,
21-1853, 2022 WL 2987928, at *2 (4th Cir. July 28, 2022) (argument waived in social security
appeal where plaintiff failed “to explain his argument or support it with citations to a voluminous
record,” which “render[ed] review impossible”).
10 The mental status exams contained in the record are important because, pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1513(a)(1), an ALJ must consider “objective medical evidence,” which includes “medical
signs” and “laboratory findings.” As relevant to alleged mental impairments, “[p]sychiatric signs
are medically demonstrable phenomena that indicate specific psychological abnormalities, e.g.,
§ 404.1520c(c)(1). As the ALJ explained, Ms. Bindrim found that Plaintiff had “normal speech
rate, appropriate affect, no psychomotor agitation, cooperative attitude, appropriate thought
contact, and intact remote memory,” as well as “moderately impaired abstraction, mildly impaired
verbal cognitive/social judgment, low normal spatial reasoning/orientation, low normal visual
motor construction and coordination, . . . and mild to moderately impaired executive functioning,”

among other findings.11 (AR 22.) The Court finds that the ALJ reasonably concluded that these
“mild,” “low normal,” and “moderate” findings did not support Ms. Bindrim’s opinions that
Plaintiff had “marked” and “extreme” mental functioning limitations.
In the face of the objective medical evidence found in Ms. Bindrim’s treatment notes,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “mischaracterized the record by omitting from consideration
Plaintiff’s subjective reports to Ms. Bindrim,” and that a proper review of Ms. Bindrim’s
“supporting treatment notes as a whole” would have led the ALJ to conclude that her opinions
were persuasive. (Dkt. No. 11 at 11). The Court disagrees. A careful review of the record
demonstrates that, even considering Plaintiff’s own subjective statements to Ms. Bindrim, there is

ample evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusions that Ms. Bindrim’s “marked” and
“extreme” mental limitations opinions were not persuasive. For example, the treatment notes that
the ALJ specifically cited in the decision also reflect the following:

abnormalities of behavior, mood, thought, memory, orientation, development, or perception, and
must also be shown by observable facts that can be medically described and evaluated.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1502(g). The mental status exams in the record measured several of these aspects of
Plaintiff’s mental functioning.

11 Plaintiff does not contend that these findings were inaccurate. Indeed, Plaintiff’s own briefing
characterizes Ms. Bindrim’s treatment notes as reflecting that “Plaintiff exhibited . . . low normal
attention/concentration, mildly impaired verbal and nonverbal intelligence, mildly impaired
cognitive flexibility, and moderately impaired executive functioning.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 10
(emphasis added).)
• On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff reported waking up “with a panic attack,” stated that
she “been feeling bad,” and reported feeling “that she is grieving,” but noted she was
“[o]therwise stable,” and “[f]eels that she has good emotional support.” (AR 2585.)
• On January 6, 2021, Plaintiff told Ms. Bindrim that she “feels her medicine is working

[with] no side effects,” and that she “[f]eels that she is stable in her mood and that the
medication is effective all but for continued disruption in sleep.” (AR 2605.)
• On January 20, 2021, Plaintiff reported to Ms. Bindrim that she was “feel[ing] great
[with] no complaints.” (AR 2608.)
• On April 7, 2021, Ms. Bindrim wrote that Plaintiff “states her mood has been up and
down” and that she “has been having bad dreams again.” (AR 2614.)
• On May 12, 2022, Ms. Bindrim wrote that Plaintiff’s sleep was “broken [due to] her
dad’s passing,” that she was “[e]ating ok at this time,” that “pain is also causing her
problems,” that she was experiencing an increase in anxiety,” but that she “feels her

medicine is working no side effects.” (AR 3113.)
As this subjective evidence shows, Plaintiff often reported to Ms. Bindrim that her mood was
stable and that her medication improved her symptoms, and Plaintiff does not otherwise explain
how this evidence would compel the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff had “marked” or “extreme”
limitations, including in areas such as the “ability to perform a task the patient knows how to do,”
or “make plans independently of others.” (AR 2986.)
Additionally, the specific treatment notes cited by the ALJ are largely consistent with Ms.
Bindrim’s other treatment notes in the record, providing further support for the ALJ’s conclusions.
For example, on October 27, 2020—two weeks after her initial appointment with Ms. Bindrim—

Plaintiff discussed her medications with Ms. Bindrim and stated that she was “feeling a little
better.”12 (AR 2588.) Similarly, on December 9, 2020, Plaintiff told Ms. Bindrim that “her mood
has been stable,” that “she is getting help falling asleep but not staying asleep,” that her “focus is
a bit better and eating ok,” and also that she “[f]eels she has been doing ok.” (AR 2596.) And on
August 10, 2022, Plaintiff reported that she “has ongoing issues with loss and grief,” but that she
“does feel that her medication is helping to stave off depression and anxiety as she continues the

grieving process.” (AR 3118.) Plaintiff is thus incorrect that the ALJ “cherry-picked” evidence
that is inconsistent with other evidence in the record. See Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 869
(4th Cir. 2017) (ALJ may not cherry-pick facts that support a finding of nondisability while
ignoring those supporting disability).
Plaintiff is also incorrect that the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s apparent “stability
equated to an indication of non-disability.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 11; see also Dkt. No. 13 at 3.) Instead,
when considering the consistency factor, the ALJ merely reasoned that the “marked and extreme
limitations are not consistent with the evidence [that] the claimant’s mood was stable and her
symptoms improved with medication.” (AR 22 (emphasis added)). Rather than constitute error,

this “is precisely what the ALJ [was] supposed to do.” May v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
920CV02197MGLMHC, 2021 WL 7286833, at *6 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 593957 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2022), aff’d, 2023 WL 2908812 (4th
Cir. Apr. 12, 2023) (citing Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiff
further faults the ALJ for not providing record citations after the consistency discussion, but the
treatment notes cited in support of the prior sentence contain evidence of Plaintiff’s “stable
mood”—i.e., that Plaintiff “[f]eels that she is stable in her mood” (AR 22 (citing B17F 24 (i.e.,

12 Notably, the ALJ expressly cited this treatment note in his decision, noting that in October 2020,
Plaintiff was “restarted on medication and reported feeling a little better.” (AR 19 (citing B17F/6-
7 (i.e., AR 2587–88))).
AR 2605)))—which supports the ALJ’s assessment. Further, the ALJ’s reference to “evidence
[that] the claimant’s mood was stable and her symptoms improved with medication” also rebuts
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ “omit[ed] from consideration Plaintiff’s subjective reports,” as
this was a direct reference to Plaintiff’s own statements to Ms. Bindrim. (Contra Dkt. No. 11 at
10–11.)

In further support of her position, Plaintiff cites evidence that she “report[ed] continued
panic attacks as well as attention issues with completing tasks, depression, anxiety, and feelings
of hopelessness.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 10.) But “even if the allegedly contradictory evidence Plaintiff
highlights could support a different result, the court’s role is not to second-guess the ALJ’s
findings.” Brian A.H. v. Kijakazi, 3:20-CV-00654, 2021 WL 6496558, at *7 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29,
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 129127 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2022). Thus, as
long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, as it does here, the Court does not
undertake to “re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its]
judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)); see Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653
(4th Cir. 2005) (“Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a
claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].” (quoting Craig, 76
F.3d at 589)).
Finally, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination properly included several mental
functioning limitations, such that the ALJ “reasonably found that Plaintiff could perform a range
of unskilled work with additional limitations.” (Dkt. No. 12 at 11.) Specifically, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff was “limited to jobs that require understanding, remembering, and
carrying out simple instructions and using judgment to make simple work-related decisions,” that
she “cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate such as assembly line work or work
that requires hourly quotas,” that she was “limited to only occasional interaction with the public,
co-workers, or supervisors,” and that she was “limited to dealing with only occasional changes in
a routine work setting.” (AR 16 (emphasis added).) In support of these findings, the ALJ cited
evidence that, throughout the relevant period, Plaintiff had “report[ed] panic attacks” to Dr.
Bindrim,” (AR 19 (citing B17F/4 (AR 2585))), “had a depressed and anxious mood” (as observed

by Ms. Bindrim (AR 19 (citing B17F/8, 10, 12 (AR 2591, 2593))), “reported increased stress
because her father was not doing well” (AR 19 (citing B16F/11 (AR 2446))), and also “reported
her medication helped stave off depression and anxiety as she continued through the grieving
process of losing her father” (AR 19 (citing B33F/10 (AR 3118))). Accordingly, the ALJ
specifically considered not just the objective medical evidence, but also Plaintiff’s subjective
statements, including her reports to Ms. Bindrim of “continued panic attacks” and “ongoing issues
related to grief and loss” (Dkt. No. 11 at 9–10), when determining the RFC.
In conclusion, the Court finds that there is substantial evidence—i.e., “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”—to support the

ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Bindrim’s opinions were not persuasive. Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Because the Court “must uphold the
factual findings of the [ALJ] if they are supported by substantial evidence,” the Court will affirm
the ALJ’s decision. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 471 (quoting Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653
(4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).
* * *
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 11) is DENIED; it
is further
ORDERED that Defendant’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 12) is GRANTED.
The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant.

ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2024.

indsey Robinson Vaalan 7
: ala
United States Magistrate Judge

25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10690591. Public record. Not legal advice.