# Martin v. Burgess

> District Court, S.D. Texas · October 17, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10678158

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** October 17, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10678158

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute, as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, requiring trial judges, at trials for specified sexual offenses, to exclude the press and public from the courtroom during the testimony of victims under 18 years old
- holding that a judge could not constitutionally close all but three days of six weeks of voir dire examinations
- holding that “the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT October 17, 2024
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
SCOTT MARTIN, §
§
Plaintiff. §
§
V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-cv-03228
§
MARILYN BURGESS, et al., §
§
Defendants. §

OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before me is an Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (“Application”) filed by Plaintiff Scott
Martin (“Martin”). Dkt. 1. Also pending is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Harris
County Clerk Marilyn Burgess (“Burgess”), Judge Shannon Baldwin (“Judge
Baldwin”), and Judge Genesis Draper (“Judge Draper”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) in their official and individual capacities. Dkt. 22. Having
considered the parties’ briefing and oral arguments, the record, and the applicable
law, I DENY Martin’s Application, and GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Martin is in the business of collecting and distributing criminal defendants’
contact information and providing full-service mailing to private defense
attorneys. For decades, Martin has primarily obtained criminal defendants’
contact information from bonds filed in public court records.
On June 27, 2023, Judge Draper—at the time, the Presiding Judge of the
Harris County Criminal Courts at Law (“HCCCL”)—issued Administrative Order
2023-02 (the “Bond Order”):
Pursuant to TEXAS GOV’T CODE § 75.403 (designating the
Presiding Judge of Harris County Courts at Law as the chief
administrator of court-related ministerial services in misdemeanor
cases), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Harris County District
Clerk keep confidential the contents of any General Order Bond
[GOB] or Personal Bond [PR Bond] filed in misdemeanor criminal
cases assigned to the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law. The title,
filing date, and page enumeration of the filed General Order Bond or
Personal Bond is to remain viewable to the public.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that General Order bonds and
Personal Bonds are only to be filed as confidential documents until
the current plan to segregate a defendant’s personal identifying
information to a separate confidential page can be implemented. Once
this plan is implemented, the Harris County District Clerk is
ORDERED to resume the practice of publishing the portions of the
General Order Bonds and Personal Bonds that do not contain the
defendant’s personal identifying information. Until such time, no
person or entity is permitted to access confidential bond filings unless
such person or attorney of record, or entity is party to the action or for
good cause shown, as determined by a presiding judge of a Harris
County Criminal Court at Law.
Dkt. 1-2 at 1.
According to Martin, Burgess has gone “beyond enforcing the four corners
of the Bond Order” by making “confidential many non-GOB or PR Bonds (Other
Bonds) from the HCCCL, as well as many GOB, PR, and Other Bonds from the
Felony Courts.” Dkt. 1 at 4. The enforcement of the Bond Order has severely
damaged Martin’s business. Martin contends that “the restriction of access to
[criminal defendants’ contact] information is a violation of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id.
On August 31, 2023, Martin instituted this lawsuit against Defendants1
seeking injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and costs, and damages for violations of
his civil rights. Defendants have moved to dismiss, arguing that the suits against
them in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and
the suits against them in their individual capacities are barred by judicial
immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and/or official immunity.
Defendants also contend that they did not violate Martin’s constitutional rights.

1 Judge Baldwin has since assumed Judge Draper’s role as the Presiding Judge of the
HCCCL and has not rescinded the Bond Order.
After briefing was complete, Martin filed a supplement complaining that
“the Clerk’s office has moved criminal defendants’ addresses to a restricted ‘second
page’ on most bonds, further restricting Plaintiff’s access to that information,
including on felony bonds and other bonds that were not included in the Bond
Order.” Dkt. 27 at 2. According to Martin:
Information that has been moved includes both phone numbers and
addresses; on felony bonds in particular, which were not included in
the Bond Order, addresses had been widely available before the
change, but are now restricted.
Even bond types that are typically unrestricted, such as surety
bonds, out-of-county bail bonds, and cash bonds are now sometimes
restricted. Specifically, since this change took place, there were 222
surety, out-of-county, and cash bonds, and 61 of those were restricted
without explanation. Moreover, the only obtainable phone numbers
from bonds since the change were from previous, pre-change data.
Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the district court to hear a case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). A claim is properly
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when “the
court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim.” In re
FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig. (Miss. Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281,
286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). District courts are generally expected to
“determine their own subject-matter jurisdiction before proceeding to a
determination on the merits.” Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Priv. Ltd., 882
F.3d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 2018). A claim of Eleventh Amendment sovereign-immunity
implicates a federal district court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case. See
Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254 (2011).
B. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
When a plaintiff sues a county judge in her official capacity, the suit is
treated as a suit against the county itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985) (“As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity
to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity.”). Because county judges are an arm of the State, they
“are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted against them
in their official capacity.” Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).
A narrow exception to this immunity was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Fifth Circuit has explained the
Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity:
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private citizens against
a state in federal court, irrespective of the nature of the relief
requested. A plaintiff may not avoid this bar simply by naming an
individual state officer as a party in lieu of the State. Yet, few rules are
without exceptions, and the exception to this rule allows suits against
state officials for the purpose of enjoining the enforcement of an
unconstitutional state statute. This exception rests on the fiction of Ex
parte Young—that because a sovereign state cannot commit an
unconstitutional act, a state official enforcing an unconstitutional act
is not acting for the sovereign state and therefore is not protected by
the Eleventh Amendment.
Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). But the
exception applies only in equity and only where a plaintiff seeks “prospective relief
against a state employee acting in his official capacity.” Nelson v. Univ. of Tex. at
Dall., 535 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2008).
C. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
“A judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis v.
Tarrant Cnty., 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009). The “two circumstances under
which judicial immunity may be overcome” are (1) “actions not taken in the judge’s
judicial capacity,” and (2) actions that, although “judicial in nature,” are “taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation omitted). Such actions are
ultra vires—“actions that fall outside the scope of their duties.” In re Ondova Ltd.,
914 F.3d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 2019).
Even when a judge is entitled to judicial immunity, however, the Supreme
Court has held “that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief
against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity.” Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.
522, 541–42 (1984); see also Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“Judicial immunity does not extend to suits for equitable and declaratory relief.”).
D. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
“The test for whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is long-
standing and familiar.” United States v. Abbott, 110 F.4th 700, 706 (5th Cir. 2024).
The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of persuading the court that
“(1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm
without an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) an
injunction is in the public interest.” Id. “The first factor—likelihood of success on
the merits—is the most important.” Id. (quotation omitted).
E. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6)
A complaint may be dismissed when the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
At the initial pleading stage, I accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the Complaint. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.
ANALYSIS
Ordinarily, I would address the multitude of immunity defenses before
turning to the merits of the lawsuit. In this case, however, Martin seeks prospective
injunctive relief in addition to a declaratory judgment and damages. Even if
Eleventh Amendment immunity and judicial immunity apply here, such
immunities do not shield Defendants from Martin’s application to enjoin the Bond
Order. Because decades-old Supreme Court precedent—Los Angeles Police
Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999)—rendered
Martin’s Application dead on arrival, I will skip any question of immunity and
proceed straight to the merits.2
A. THE BOND ORDER IS FACIALLY CONSTITUTIONAL.
In United Reporting, the defendant was “a private publishing service that
provide[d] the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals to its
customers, who include[d] attorneys, insurance companies, drug and alcohol
counselors, and driving schools.” Id. at 34. “Before July 1, 1996,” California law
“generally required state and local law enforcement agencies to make public the
name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency.” Id.
Effective July 1, 1996, California amended the law to restrict access to arrestees’
addresses to individuals who declared under penalty of perjury that the address
would “not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service.” Id. United
Reporting, like Martin here, “sought declaratory and injunctive relief . . . [that the
law was] unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 36.
The district court held, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, “that the
statute was facially invalid under the First Amendment” because it “restricted
commercial speech.” Id. at 37. The United States Supreme Court reversed.

2 Martin relies heavily on Scham v. District Courts Trying Criminal Cases, 967 F. Supp.
230 (S.D. Tex. 1997), in arguing why he is entitled to relief. In Scham, the court granted
summary judgment to a criminal defense attorney who sued after the administrative
judge of the Harris County district courts unilaterally issued an order prohibiting the
release of criminal defendants’ contact information until the defendant either hired an
attorney or had one appointed. The court avoided “determining whether the plaintiff has
a federal constitutional right to the information,” holding instead that “the plaintiff has a
federal constitutional right not to be denied the information based on a void order.” Id.
at 234. I do not reach the parties’ arguments about Scham because (1) it is not binding
precedent; (2) it was issued two years before the Supreme Court’s decision in United
Reporting; and (3) any applicability that Scham might have is undercut by the fact that
the court never identifies the “federal constitutional right” that underpins its decision.
The Supreme Court held that the law was “not an abridgment of anyone’s
right to engage in speech, be it commercial or otherwise, but simply a law
regulating access to information in the hands of the police department.” Id. at 40.
The logic of that decision applies with full force to the facts of this case:
This is not a case in which the government is prohibiting a speaker
from conveying information that the speaker already possesses. The
[Bond Order] in question merely requires that if [Martin] wishes to
obtain the [personal identifying information of criminal defendants in
Harris County he] must qualify under the [Bond Order] to do
so. . . . For purposes of assessing the propriety of a facial invalidation,
what we have before us is nothing more than a governmental denial
of access to information in its possession. [Harris County] could
decide not to give out [criminal defendants’ personal
identifying] information at all without violating the First
Amendment.
Id. at 40 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
In light of this binding precedent, which seems to be on all fours with this
matter, I gave the parties an opportunity to brief the applicability of United
Reporting to this case. See Dkt. 40. Martin tries desperately to distinguish this
case, arguing that
United Reporting was about whether or not United Reporting could
access police department internal records, while this case is about
whether or not public records regarding entire classes of criminal
defendants should be removed and restricted by default, without
reaching any particularized determination as to a need for secrecy in
specific cases.
Dkt. 42 at 2. Martin goes on to note
three other key distinctions that caution against applying United
Reporting to the facts of this case: (1) United Reporting involved the
State of California passing a statute that restricted the information at
issue, whereas this case involves local district court judges restricting
public records; (2) United Reporting involved law enforcement
agencies publishing their own internal records, whereas this case
involves the government publishing public criminal trial records, as it
had done by default in the past; and (3) United Reporting involved
the agencies publishing information pursuant to a statute that was
then changed, whereas this case involves the District Clerk publishing
public records pursuant to the First and Sixth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.
Id. at 2–3. These are all distinctions without a difference. Martin offered me a
dozen cases in support of this argument. None convince me that United Reporting
should not dictate the result in this case.
The bulk of cases that Martin cites are cases concerning the First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings. See Press-Enter. Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty. (“Press-Enter. I”), 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984)
(holding that a judge could not constitutionally close all but three days of six weeks
of voir dire examinations); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk Cnty.,
457 U.S. 596, 610–11 (1982) (finding unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute, as
construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, requiring trial judges, at trials for
specified sexual offenses, to exclude the press and public from the courtroom
during the testimony of victims under 18 years old); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (holding that “the trial of a criminal case must
be open to the public”); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363–64 (5th Cir.
1983) (The Fifth Circuit “agree[s] with the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the same
societal interests that mandated a first amendment right of access to criminal trials
in Richmond Newspapers apply to pretrial criminal proceedings,” and “extend[s]
this to bail reduction hearings.” (cleaned up)). But criminal defendants’ contact
information is not a proceeding. Sure it derives from a criminal proceeding. But
no one is closing the Harris County courthouse doors to the public during bond
hearings—that would clearly be unconstitutional. Restricting public access to
criminal defendants’ contact information, however—even from a judicial record—
simply does not implicate the First Amendment right of access to criminal
proceedings.
B. THE BOND ORDER DOES NOT IMPLICATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
Throughout his briefing, Martin appears to have confused the First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings with the common law qualified
right of access to judicial records. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, these two rights
“differ in significant ways.” United States v. Sealed Search Warrants, 868 F.3d
385, 390 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017). “Where the State attempts to deny the [First
Amendment] right of access [to criminal proceedings] in order to inhibit the
disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.” Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 510 (cleaned up). Yet, when it comes to the
common law qualified right of access to judicial records, the Supreme Court has
recognized a much lower bar for restricting public access:
It is uncontested . . . that the right to inspect and copy judicial records
is not absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its
own records and files, and access has been denied where court
files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes. For
example, the common-law right of inspection has bowed before the
power of a court to insure that its records are not used to gratify
private spite or promote public scandal through the publication of the
painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case. Similarly,
courts have refused to permit their files to serve as reservoirs of
libelous statements for press consumption, or as sources of business
information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (emphasis added)
(cleaned up). Thus, only if the Bond Order implicates Martin’s First Amendment
right of access to criminal proceedings may Martin attempt to apply strict scrutiny
to the Bond Order.
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for determining
whether there is a First Amendment right of access to a particular
criminal proceeding: (1) whether the proceeding has historically been
open to the public and press; and (2) “whether public access plays a
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question.”
In re Hearst Newspapers, L.L.C., 641 F.3d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Press-
Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cali. for Riverside Cnty. (“Press-Enter. II”), 478 U.S.
1, 8–9 (1986)). As noted above, we are not dealing with a proceeding, but a record.
For this reason alone, it is clear that the Bond Order does not implicate Martin’s
First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.
Martin cites one Ninth Circuit case, presumably, for the proposition that the
First Amendment right of access extends “to pretrial release proceedings and
documents filed therein.” Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of
Wash., 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). But Martin has not
alleged that the bonds themselves are restricted from public view. Rather, “the
Clerk’s Office has moved criminal defendants’ addresses to a restricted ‘second
page’ on most bonds.” Dkt. 27 at 2. Thus, Defendants have not restricted the
public’s access to information revealing “whether [defendants] should be
incarcerated prior to trial,” which is “often important to a full understanding of the
way in which the judicial process and the government as a whole are functioning.”
Seattle Times, 845 F.2d at 1517 (quotation omitted). Martin does not advance—
and I cannot conceive of—an argument for how accessing criminal defendants’
contact information “plays a significant positive role in the functioning of” bond
hearings. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 8.3 Because the Bond Order does not
implicate the First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings, and
because the Bond Order is within HCCCL’s “supervisory power over its own
records and files,” Martin’s challenges to the Bond Order necessarily fail. Nixon,
435 U.S. at 598.

3 Nor does accessing criminal defendants’ contact information implicate the principles
that undergird the common law qualified right of access to judicial records. The Fifth
Circuit has identified “three mutually reinforcing reasons” for why “judges must protect
public accessibility” to judicial records: “(1) the public has a right to monitor the exercise
of judicial authority; (2) judges are the primary representatives of the public interest in
the judicial process; and (3) the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy depends on public
trust.” Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
Yet, none of these fundamental tenets is impacted by Martin’s inability to access criminal
defendants’ phone numbers and addresses. For all these reasons, Martin cannot state a
First Amendment claim against Defendants.
C. THE BOND ORDER IS NOT A PRIOR RESTRAINT ON SPEECH.
Martin also claims “[t]he Bond Order is an . . . unconstitutional prior
restraint on Plaintiff’s and his clients’ protected commercial speech.” Dkt. 1 at 10.
Not so.
“Prior restraints typically involve administrative and judicial orders such as
temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are
to occur, or, in other words, laws which require a speaker to obtain prior approval
for any expressive activities.” Gibson v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins.—Div. of Workers’ Comp.,
700 F.3d 227, 235 (5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Here, the Bond Order does not
purport to restrict Martin’s ability to publicize criminal defendants’ contact
information.4 The Bond Order simply makes it more difficult for Martin to access
such information. Because the Bond Order does not bar future speech, it is not a
prior restraint. See Gibson, 700 F.3d at 235.5
D. MARTIN DOES NOT HAVE A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS’ CONTACT INFORMATION.
Finally, Martin takes issue with the manner in which he lost access to
criminal defendants’ contact information, arguing that such information cannot

4 This is a stark contrast to the law at issue in United Reporting. In that case, United
Reporting ultimately prevailed on its First Amendment challenge because “if [United
Reporting] signed the declaration required by the statute it could be prosecuted for
indirectly using arrestee addresses to sell a product or service.” Final Judgment on
Consent at 5, United Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Cali. Highway Patrol, Case No. 96-cv-
888 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2001), ECF No. 155. Martin faces no such threat of prosecution for
publishing criminal defendants’ contact information should the HCCCL Presiding Judge
find “good cause” for permitting him access to such information. Dkt. 1-2 at 1.
5 To the extent Martin would argue the Bond Order is an unconstitutional prior restraint
on his First Amendment right to receive speech, that argument would also fail. “Freedom
of speech presupposes a willing speaker.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). Given that the HCCCL is the only
conceivable entity with the ability to “speak” criminal defendants’ contact information—
by permitting access through the court’s electronic filing system—and the Bond Order is
evidence of its unwillingness to do so, it is difficult to fathom who would be a willing
speaker in this scenario.
“be removed and restricted by default, without reaching any particularized
determination as to a need for secrecy in specific cases.” Dkt. 42 at 2. Martin
appears to believe that he has been deprived of “property interests without any
form of process.” Dkt. 1 at 10. To succeed with such an argument, Martin must
show that he has a vested property interest in criminal defendants’ information.
Martin’s best argument on this front appears to be that he has long had access to
such information. But that is not the standard.
The Supreme Court has held that “the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement
must be decided by reference to state law.” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344
(1976). In Texas, “[a]ccess to information collected, assembled, or maintained by
or for the judiciary is governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas or
by other applicable laws and rules.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.0035(a). The
Texas Rules of Judicial Administration, promulgated pursuant to § 72.024 of the
Texas Government Code, provide that “[a]ny record reflecting any person’s home
address [or] home or personal telephone number” is “exempt from disclosure.”
TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 12.5(d). Against the backdrop of this law, it is difficult to
imagine any viable argument that Martin has a vested property interest in criminal
defendants’ contact information.
* * *
For all these reasons, Martin’s constitutional challenges to the Bond Order
fail.
CONCLUSION
Martin’s Application (Dkt. 1) is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 22) is GRANTED. I will issue a final judgment separately.
SIGNED this 17th day of October 2024.

______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10678158. Public record. Not legal advice.