# English v. United States of America

> District Court, S.D. Texas · August 27, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10677947

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** August 27, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10677947

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
- finding that district court’s grant of motion to dismiss in favor of state-court judge under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 27, 2024
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION

JAMES-THOMAS ENGLISH, §
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-00283
§
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., §
Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Judge John
Hafley, Judge Keith Stewart, Montgomery County Courthouse, and Montgomery County
Jail (collectively, “Montgomery County Defendants”). (Dkt. 12). Having carefully
reviewed the complaint,1 motion, response, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS the
motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s pleadings are disjointed and unclear regarding (1) how any specific
causes of action are connected to the named defendants and (2) what relief he is seeking.
For purposes of the Court’s consideration of the pending motion, the following facts
alleged in the complaint (Dkt. 1) and response (Dkt. 34) are taken as true. Plaintiff James-
Thomas English was arrested in 2023 and charged with failure to identify and resisting
arrest. In the instant complaint, which he filed in 2024, he alleges violations related to that

1 On June 6, 2024, 30 days after the instant motion to dismiss was filed, English filed an amended
complaint (Dkt. 41) without the Court’s leave. The amended complaint does not indicate that it
was filed with consent from the opposing parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Thus, the amended
complaint is STRICKEN.
arrest, his time spent in the Montgomery County jail, and the criminal proceedings before
Judges Hafley and Stewart in the Montgomery County Courts at Law that followed from
his charges. He appears to assert several claims (some of which are difficult to parse and

many of which are directed at Judges Stewart and Hafley) that sound in state law, criminal
law, international law, and civil rights, including violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments; due process violations; theft; false arrest;
and emotional distress. He also appears to make a claim under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act against Judges Stewart and Hafley. English seeks monetary damages as well

as injunctive relief.
In the pending motion, Montgomery County Defendants argue that (1) English’s
claims against Judges Hafley and Stewart should be dismissed because they have judicial
immunity; (2) his claims against Montgomery County Courthouse and Montgomery
County Jail should be dismissed because both entities lack the legal capacity to be sued

and that even if English intended to sue Montgomery County, English has failed to plead
a claim under Monell v. Dep’t. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); and (2) the
Younger abstention doctrine precludes his requested relief because this case involves
constitutional challenges to pending state criminal proceedings. (Dkt. 32 at 3–4). The
Court considers these arguments below.

LEGAL STANDARD
I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a
pleading’s compliance with this requirement and is “appropriate when a defendant attacks
the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim.” Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). A complaint can be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) if its well-pleaded factual allegations, when taken as true and viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, do not state a claim that is plausible on its face. Amacker v.
Renaissance Asset Mgmt., LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011); Lone Star Fund V
(U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). As the Fifth Circuit

has further clarified:
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. This includes the basic requirement that the facts plausibly
establish each required element for each legal claim. However, a complaint is
insufficient if it offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.

Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 763–64 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).

Courts construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants under a less stringent standard of
review. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, “[a]
document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ Estelle [v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)], and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). Nevertheless, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (observing that courts
“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”); see
also Payton v. United States, 550 Fed. App’x 194, 195 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal

of pro se complaint that “failed to plead with any particularity the facts that gave rise to
[the plaintiff’s] present cause of action”) (“[T]he liberal pro se pleading standard still
demands compliance with procedural standards.”).
When considering a motion to dismiss, a district court generally may not go outside
the pleadings. Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010). The court’s

review is limited to the complaint; any documents attached to the complaint; any
documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by
the complaint; and matters subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2022); George v. SI Group, Inc., 36
F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions,
the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any
attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). A
motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the
subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Id. The party asserting that

federal subject matter jurisdiction exists bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance
of the evidence. Ballew v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 668 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012).
Under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider any of the following: (1) the complaint alone;
(2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.
Walch v. Adjutant General’s Department of Texas, 533 F.3d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2008).

ANALYSIS
III. International Law Claims
Plaintiff appears to invoke international laws in his complaint and response, such as
the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human
Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. (Dkt. 34 at 36–41; Dkt.

1 at 10). He also asserts that the “refusal to recognize international documents, such as the
World Passport, contravenes . . . customary international law.” (Dkt. 1 at 10). The Court
will dismiss these claims. English cannot bring a claim under any of the international
instruments he invokes.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[e]ven when treaties are self-executing in

the sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that international
agreements, even those directly benefitting private persons, generally do not create private
rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts . . . absen[t] . . . express
language to the contrary.” Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n. 3 (2008) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Paralleling the presumption discussed in Medellin

is the Seventh Circuit’s observation that “[i]t is well established that individuals have no
standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the
sovereigns involved.” Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990);
see also United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 & n. 3 (5th Cir. 2001).
The Fifth Circuit has affirmed that “individual plaintiffs do not have standing to

raise any claims under the United Nations Charter,” “the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Dickens v. Lewis,
750 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1984); see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734–735
(2004) (explaining that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “does not of its own
force impose obligations as a matter of international law” and the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights “was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations
enforceable in the federal courts”); Martinez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 500, 502 (5th
Cir. 2006) (“[T]his Court cannot grant relief under the [International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights] because it is not a self-executing treaty.”). The Seventh Circuit has
explained that the United States has signed but not ratified the American Convention on

Human Rights and “so that document does not yet qualify as one of the ‘treaties’ of the
United States that creates binding obligations.” Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 925 (7th
Cir. 2001). And the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man “is an
aspirational document” that “did not on its own create any enforceable obligations on the
part of any of the [Charter of the Organization of American States] member nations,” which

includes the United States. Id. Finally, although customary international law is an accepted
source of international law in the United States, English has not cited any custom that is
applicable to “refusal to recognize international documents, such as the World Passport”
(Dkt. 1 at 10). See United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2010).
English has no basis on which to claim a legal interest under international law that
is enforceable against the Montgomery County Defendants. Accordingly, his international
law claims against the Montgomery County Defendants are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.
IV. Criminal Laws
English mentions 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 in his complaint (Dkt. 1 at 13) although
it is not clear that he is stating a cause of action under either criminal statute. To the extent
that he is, neither is applicable to this civil proceeding.

18 U.S.C. § 241 “which criminalizes conspiracies to deprive a person of ‘any right
or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,’ does not give
rise to a private cause of action.” Lang v. Quinlan, 990 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1993). 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 “is a criminal statute with no correlating civil cause of action.” Hebrew v. Houston
Media Source, Inc., No. 09-CV-3274, 2010 WL 2944439, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Tex. July 20,

2010), aff’d sub nom. Hebrew v. Houston Media Source, 453 F. App’x 479 (5th Cir. 2011);
see Parham v. Clinton, No. 09–20681, 2010 WL 1141638, at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. Mar. 17,
2010) (unpublished); Johnson v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. CV H-16-1337, 2016
WL 9776489, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2016) (18 U.S.C. § 242 does “not provide a private
cause of action”). Accordingly, English’s claims under either statute against the
Montgomery County Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
V. Claims for Prospective Injunctive Relief and the Younger Abstention
Doctrine
English seeks injunctive relief related to his pending state-court case. Indeed, he
concedes in his response that his “pending criminal cases surrounding the same facts as
this case is precisely why this complaint was filed.” (Dkt. 34 at 21). He states that “the
lower court has consistently refused to provide a fair resolution. Therefore, the only

recourse left is to elevate this situation to a higher court to rectify the fraud being committed
by the lower court.” (Dkt. 34 at 53).
Although English appears to list many requests for relief in his complaint and
response, many of those are requests that this Court review Defendants’ actions in his
criminal proceeding and/or take some action to hold Defendants accountable, rectify

injustices, or impose requirements on Judges Hafley and Stewart. For example, he asks the
Court to “hold[] Judge Hafley and Judge Stewart accountable for their actions that violate
their oath of office. This may include judicial review of their conduct, disciplinary
measures, or other appropriate remedies to ensure that the integrity of the judicial system
is upheld. . . Relief can be granted by holding the judges accountable for their breach of
oath and violation of constitutional rights, ensuring that justice is administered fairly and

impartially. This may involve transferring the case to a higher court where impartial
adjudication can occur, allowing for a thorough examination of the legal proceedings and
addressing any fraudulent conduct.” (Dkt. 34 at 5). Similarly, he explains elsewhere in his
response that “[r]elief can be granted by the court through an examination of the actions of
Judge Stewart & Hafley to determine whether they have indeed disregarded affidavits and
motions challenging the narrative of criminal conduct without regard to constitutional
rights. If it is found that Judge [Insert Judge’s Name] has acted in a manner that
compromises impartiality, relief can be granted by reevaluating the proceedings and

ensuring that constitutional rights are upheld.” (Dkt. 34 at 16–17). And elsewhere in the
response, he asks for relief “recognizing the absence of jurisdiction, voiding any
proceedings conducted without proper jurisdiction, acknowledging the judges' exceeding
of authority, voiding any orders issued in violation of the law, and addressing violations of
rights and laws to uphold the integrity of the judicial system.” (Dkt. 34 at 26).

Montgomery County Defendants argue that the Younger abstention doctrine
precludes Plaintiff’s requested relief. (Dkt. 32 at 4). Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity does not shield state officials from claims seeking prospective injunctive relief
against ongoing violations of federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56
(1908). Nevertheless, even assuming that English has adequately pled a legally cognizable

claim against any of the Montgomery County Defendants, the Court finds that it must
abstain from exercising jurisdiction over English’s claims for injunctive relief.
The Younger abstention doctrine stands for the principle that “federal courts should
not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions unless the plaintiff shows bad faith,
harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief, such

as a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional state statute.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d
212, 222 (5th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53–54 (1971)); Rickhoff v. Willing, 457 F. App’x 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2012) (“According to
Younger, federal courts must refrain from considering requests for injunctive or declaratory
relief based upon constitutional challenges to state proceedings pending at the time the
federal action was commenced.”) (citing Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 518
(5th Cir. 2004)).

The Younger doctrine applies to three categories of state proceedings: “ongoing
criminal prosecutions,” “certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal
prosecutions,” and “pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Hood, 822 F.3d
at 222 (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). “If state proceedings fit into one of these

categories,” then the Younger doctrine applies if there is: “(1) an ongoing state judicial
proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) provides an adequate
opportunity to raise federal challenges.” Id. (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). The
Younger doctrine requires dismissal of suits for injunctive and declaratory relief, but not
suits for money damages. Id.; see also Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir.

1995).
Here, abstention is appropriate because the state criminal proceeding is ongoing.
See State of Texas v. English, James T, Jr., Case No. 23-376801, County Court at Law #1
of Montgomery County, Texas (available at https://odyssey.mctx.org/County/
CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=2621317) (last visited June 10, 2024).2 Indeed, the state criminal

proceeding was initiated on June 22, 2023, but English did not commence the instant

2 Though the case status is listed as “Inactive - Pending,” it appears that that is because there may
currently be warrants issued as to English per the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office’s Warrant
Search website. See Warrant Search (available at https://warrantsearch.mctx.org/WarrantSearch/)
(last visited June 10, 2024).
federal action until January 24, 2024. Id. These proceedings implicate Texas’s important
interests in enforcement of its criminal laws. See RTM Media, L.L.C. v. City of Houston,
584 F.3d 220, 228 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the state court proceedings provide

an adequate forum to raise the federal challenges English brings in this suit, including his
due process claims. See Google, 822 F.3d at 222. English has not pled sufficient facts to
show that any exception to the application of this doctrine would apply to his complaint.
Accordingly, the Court will abstain from considering English’s claims for prospective
injunctive relief and they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

VI. Judges Stewart and Hafley
Judges Keith Stewart and John Hafley are Texas state-court judges who preside
over Montgomery County Court at Law 5 and Montgomery County Court at Law 1,
respectively. English does not specify whether he is suing Judges Stewart and Hafley in
their official or individual capacities, but the Court finds his claims for money damages

are barred in either case.
— Judicial Immunity
English’s claims against Judges Stewart and Hafley in their individual capacities
are barred by judicial immunity. See Davis v. Tarrant County, Texas, 565 F.3d 214, 221
(5th Cir. 2009). “A judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Id.
(citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991)); see, e.g., Carter v. Duggan, 455 F.2d

1156, 1158 (5th Cir. 1972) (“We agree with the trial court that the two state judges are
cloaked with judicial immunity and may not be subjected to a demand for damages for
judicial action or inaction whether the right to damages is asserted to arise under Title 42,
U.S.C., Section 1983 or under any other theory of liability.”).
“Judges are afforded absolute immunity when they perform a normal judicial

function unless they are acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Duke v. Wallace,
No. 4:19-CV-3353, 2020 WL 1650768, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2020); see also Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56, 360 (1978). Even “if a judge of a criminal court
should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of
his jurisdiction and would be immune.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7; see also Harry v.

Lauderdale Cnty., 212 F. App’x 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that even where
state appellate court held that judge acted without subject matter jurisdiction that holding
was “not coterminous with the conclusion that [the judge] acted in ‘complete absence of
all subject matter jurisdiction’ “ because if “this were the case, each and every time a
judge decided an issue where an appellate court later found subject matter jurisdiction

lacking, that judge would have no judicial immunity,” and that “proposition seems
antithetical to the concerns underlying absolute judicial immunity”); Wood v. Parker
Cnty., 463 F. App’x 360, 361 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he judges of the county court at law
are entitled to immunity because they did not act in clear absence of all jurisdiction,
despite the state appellate court later determining the county court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the testamentary trust issues presented.”).
”This circuit has adopted a four-factor test for determining whether a judge’s
actions were judicial in nature: (1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal
judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct
spaces such as the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case
pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge
in his official capacity.” Davis, 565 F.3d at 222. “These factors are broadly construed in

favor of immunity.” Id. at 223.
“Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from
suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991). Judicial immunity “is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the
existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and

eventual trial.” Id.; see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (“This immunity
applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly[.]”). “The
alleged magnitude of the judge’s errors or the mendacity of his acts is irrelevant.” Boyd v.
Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994).
Here, English’s complaint and response are filled with allegations demonstrating

that his concerns with Judges Hafley and Stewart arose from actions judges allegedly
took in their judicial capacities. The actions English complains about are judicial in
nature. English’s allegations as to the judges center around the problems he perceives
with the way the judges carried out their normal judicial functions in English’s criminal
proceedings before their courts. For example, he complains that “[t]he judge’s actions

during the proceedings raised concerns about the protection of [his] First Amendment
rights,” that the “judge’s failure to acknowledge and respect [his] right to remain silent,
protected under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights, represents a serious breach of
due process,” about the “judge’s inability or unwillingness to provide clear answers
regarding jurisdiction,” that “the judge failed to dismiss the case or rectify the
prosecutor’s use of codes and statutes designed for corporations,” that the court “fail[ed]
to ensure that the charges were clearly explained,” that the “court proceeded without due

consideration for the plaintiff’s legal standing,” and that “the judge presiding over the
case continued proceedings with the knowledge that the Plaintiff is not a U.S. citizen.”
(Dkt. 1). He similarly states in his response that he is asserting claims against the judges
for, e.g., “disregarding jurisdictional rights and violating due process,” “ignoring legal
notices, including affidavits and proof of claims,” “lack of jurisdiction and violation of

fundamental legal principles,” and “engaging in fraudulent actions and violating his
sovereignty by coercing his participation in legal proceedings without his voluntary
consent.” (Dkt. 34).
All these allegations concern actions or inactions that fall squarely within Judge
Andrews’s normal judicial functions (i.e., evaluating jurisdiction and standing,

conducting legal proceedings, addressing the parties, reviewing documents in the case,
determining whether a matter should continue or be dismissed, etc.). See Carter, 455 F.2d
at 1158. That English complains that the judges’ actions were serious errors does not
affect the judges’ judicial immunity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12–13 (“If judicial
immunity means anything, it means that a judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity

because the action he took was in error ... or was in excess of his authority.’”); Boyd, 31
F.3d at 284.
English appears to assert that judges function “as an administrative officer and not
in a judicial capacity” when they “enforce statutes and their subsequent amendments.”
(Dkt. 1 at 7). However, the legal authority he cites, Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367
(1930) does not support this proposition. That case states that a “judge of the municipal
court” is acting as an administrative officer “[w]hen acting upon an application for the

reinstatement of a permit revoked by the chief of police.” Smith, 155 Va. at 376. He also
asserts that Judge Stewart “was not acting judicially but rather was functioning as a debt
collector” (Dkt. 34 at 7) but later concedes that the judges were “tasked with enforcing
financial obligations owed to the United States government” “in their official capacity as
judges” and that their actions as debt collectors “exceeded the traditional scope of judicial

duties” (Dkt. 34 at 9). Judicial immunity, however, applies even when an action is taken
in “excess” of a judge’s authority. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12–13
English has also not averred facts showing that Judge Andrews’s actions—all
judicial in nature—were taken in “the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See Duke, 2020
WL 1650768, at *1. English’s repeated assertions that there was a lack of jurisdiction are

far too vague and conclusory to overcome the judges’ judicial immunity. See Stump, 435
U.S. at 357 n.7; Harry, 212 F. App’x at 347; Wood, 463 F. App’x at 361. And to the
extent that English asserts that he is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts because he is a
sovereign (“I stand as a sovereign individual within a republic,” Dkt. 34 at 26), that
argument is without merit. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir.

2011) (“Regardless of an individual's claimed status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign
citizen,’ a ‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood human being,’ that person is not
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.”); Weigel v. Gray, No. CV H-24-128, 2024 WL
289027, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2024) (“Weigel's claims that Judge Gray and Judge Cox
do not have jurisdiction over him because he is a sovereign citizen are based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory.”); Basey v. Trump, No. 4:18-CV-0532, 2019 WL
11658787, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2019) (“To the extent that Basey's petition may be

construed as a challenge to his current confinement based on a ‘sovereign citizen’
defense to jurisdiction, such a theory has ‘no conceivable validity in American law.’”)
Accordingly, Judges Stewart and Hafley are entitled to judicial immunity, and
English’s claims for money damages against Judges Stewart and Hafley in their
individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under Rule 12(b)(6). See

Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 517 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that district court’s grant of
motion to dismiss in favor of state-court judge under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper);
Morrison v. Walker, 704 F. App’x 369, 372 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining, in a case
involving judicial immunity and qualified immunity, that although defendants moved to
dismiss under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), the court analyzed defendants’

motions under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard “because the arguments for immunity are
attacks on the existence of a federal cause of action”).
— Sovereign Immunity
English’s federal claims for monetary damages against Judges Stewart and Hafley
in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity. “Texas judges are entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted against them in their official
capacities as state actors.” Davis, 565 F.3d at 228; see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 345 (1979) (holding that Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity). Accordingly, English’s federal claims against Judges Stewart
and Hafley in their official capacities for monetary damages are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE under Rule 12(b)(1) as barred by sovereign immunity. See
United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of Am. Acct. Ending in 2653,

942 F.3d 655, 666 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Claims barred by sovereign immunity are dismissed
without prejudice.”); Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“[C]laims barred by sovereign immunity can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and
not with prejudice.”).
VII. Montgomery County Jail

—Non Sui Juris
Montgomery County Jail is not a proper party to this lawsuit because it is non sui
juris, meaning it lacks the legal capacity to sue or be sued as a matter of law. A department
must have a separate legal existence to be sued. Parker v. Fort Worth Police Dep’t, 980
F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1993); Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th

Cir. 1991); Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F. Supp. 2d 759, 768 (S.D. Tex. 2007). A
political subdivision cannot sue or be sued unless it is a separate and distinct corporate
entity. See Kirby Lumber Corp. v. State of La. through Anacoco-Prairie State Game &
Fish Comm’n, 293 F.2d 82, 83 (5th Cir. 1961). The capacity of an entity to sue or be sued

is determined by the law of the state where the court is held. Darby, 939 F.2d at 313. An
unincorporated department of the government is not a legal entity and cannot be sued. See
Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981).
Montgomery County Jail is a department of Montgomery County, Texas. It is not a
separate entity capable of independent legal action. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Montgomery County Jail cannot be sued and is entitled to dismissal from the action.

— Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Even if English sued the proper defendant, Montgomery County, his claims would

still fail because a governmental entity can be held liable for civil rights violations only
under Section 1983, and English has not stated a claim under Section 1983. “Section 1983
provides a remedy against ‘any person’ who, under color of state law, deprives another of
rights protected by the Constitution.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115,
120 (1992). A local government may not be sued under Section 1983 for the deprivation

of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal law inflicted solely by its employees or
agents. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a respondeat superior theory.”). However, “when execution of a government’s policy
or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury,” the government agency is liable under

Section 1983. Id.
To state a claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy
(2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the
violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th
Cir. 2009).

“An official policy is either (1) a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s
lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated
policy-making authority; or (2) a persistent, widespread practice of officials
or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and
promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents the municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge
of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality
or to an official to whom that body has delegated policy-making authority.”

McIntosh v. Smith, 690 F. Supp. 2d 515, 530 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2010) (citing
Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
Though English has alleged that his constitutional rights were violated (e.g., through
his arrest and during his time at the jail), he does not plead any facts that describe an official
policy promulgated by the municipal policymaker that was the moving force behind the
violation of any constitutional right so Montgomery County, even if properly sued, cannot
be held liable under Section 1983.
VIII. Montgomery County Courthouse
—Non Sui Juris
The Montgomery County Courthouse is non sui juris (i.e., a non-jural entity) and
thus not a proper party to this lawsuit. “Federal courts in Texas have uniformly held that
courts are non-jural entities that are not subject to suit.” Craaybeek v. Bristow, No. 7:20-
CV-031-O, 2021 WL 2274889, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 19, 2021) (collecting cases), appeal
dismissed, No. 21-10564, 2022 WL 2113619 (5th Cir. June 13, 2022); Fleming v. Sixth
Dist. Ct. of Lamar Cnty., No. 420CV00025RWSCAN, 2020 WL 8299710, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 23, 2020) (same), report and recommendation adopted, No. 420CV00025RWSCAN,
2021 WL 274444 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2021); see, e.g., Howell v. Just. Ct. 3-1 of Collin
Cnty., No. 3:22-CV-1632-X-BH, 2022 WL 4125262, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2022)
(“State courts are not jural entities that may be sued.”), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3:22-CV-1632-X (BH), 2022 WL 4125089 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2022). As
with Montgomery County Jail, the Montgomery County Courthouse is a non-jural entity

and therefore not subject to suit. Thus, the Montgomery County Courthouse is entitled to
dismissal from the action.
—Sovereign Immunity
To the extent English was attempting to sue the Montgomery County Courts at Law
when he named the “Montgomery County Courthouse,” those claims are also barred by

sovereign immunity.3 Absent a State’s consent, “a suit in which the State or one of its
agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The
“State of Texas and its courts are protected by sovereign immunity,” and “sovereign
immunity . . . cloaks state courts with immunity from suit.” Florance v. Bush, No. 3:09-

CV-1470-B-BH, 2010 WL 2730615, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2010), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:09-CV-1470-B-BH, 2010 WL 2730648 (N.D. Tex. July
8, 2010) (dismissing claims against, inter alia, the Fifth Court of Appeals); see, e.g., Cain
v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2742374, at *1 (E.D. La. May 11,
2016) (“Courts in this and other circuits routinely hold that state courts are immune from

suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”) (collecting cases).

3 To the extent English was attempting to sue Montgomery County when he named
“Montgomery County Courthouse,” he fails to state a claim under Section 1983, as discussed
above.
IX. Supplemental Jurisdiction
English appears to assert claims under state law. For example, he appears to allege
“illegal impoundment,” false arrest and assault, theft, negligence and recklessness, and

emotional distress. (Dkt. 1 at 4–5, 9; Dkt. 34 at 51–52). Having dismissed all federal causes
of action in this case, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
English’s state-law claims. Federal district courts have the discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims; that discretion is guided by the statutory
factors set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the common-law factors of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity. Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
The factors listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) are:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law;
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction;

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction; or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
“These interests are to be considered on a case-by-case basis, and no single factor
is dispositive.” Mendoza, 532 F.3d at 346. The general rule is that a court should decline

to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial. Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Products, Inc., 554 F.3d
595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009).
Having considered the statutory and common-law factors, the Court will follow the
general rule, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over English’s state-law claims,
and dismiss those claims without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above the Court finds that the Montgomery
County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 32) should be GRANTED. In addition,
Plaintiff was ordered to serve all Defendants and file proof of such service with the Court
on or before June 20, 2024. Plaintiff has not filed proof of service. Accordingly, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), because 90 days have elapsed since the Complaint
was filed and U Garcia, Rodney Minger, the State of Texas, and the United States of
America have not been served, Plaintiffs claims against them are hereby DISMISSED for
want of prosecution. All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on August 27, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10677947. Public record. Not legal advice.