# Does 1-5 v. Obiano

> District Court, S.D. Texas · January 17, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10677296

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** January 17, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10677296

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the TVPA does not expressly or impliedly abrogate foreign official immunity

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT January 17, 2024
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
JANE DOES 1–5, §
§
Plaintiffs. §
§
V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-cv-00813
§
WILLIE OBIANO, §
§
Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before me is Defendant’s Opposed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Complaint. Dkt. 21. Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the applicable
law, I recommend that the motion be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a long-running conflict between the Nigerian
government and the Biafran people, who occupy Southeast Nigeria. In 1967, the
Biafrans declared independence from Nigeria, forming the Republic of Biafra. The
Nigerian military immediately attempted to reclaim the territory of Biafra,
sparking the Nigerian Civil War. The brutal conflict resulted in the deaths of
between 500,000 and 2 million people, most from starvation. In 1970, the war
ended with the surrender of the Biafrans. The broader conflict, however, has
continued to simmer.
Formed in 2012, the Indigenous People of Biafra (“IPOB”) is a pro-Biafran
organization that aims to establish the independent state of Biafra. According to
the Complaint, the IPOB held rallies supporting the restoration of Biafran
sovereignty in Nnewi, Anambra State, Nigeria on August 9, 2020 and October 23,
2020. Both events reportedly turned bloody when Nigerian military forces
indiscriminately shot at peaceful demonstrators. Plaintiffs allege that the Nigerian
military forces who actively participated in this campaign of violence were acting
under the command and control of Willie Obiano (“Obiano”), the then-Governor
of Anambra State, Nigeria.
Jane Does 1–51 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are the surviving wives of five men
who were purportedly killed at the August and October 2020 protests. Plaintiffs
have sued Obiano—who now lives in Spring, Texas—under the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”) “for the extrajudicial killings [of their husbands]
under color of Nigerian law by Nigerian military forces under [Obiano]’s command
and control.” Dkt. 1 at 1. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, punitive damages,
and attorney’s fees.
Obiano has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Obiano advances
four independent reasons this case should be dismissed: (1) lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based on the foreign
official immunity doctrine; (2) lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) based on the
political question doctrine; (3) Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative
remedies under the TVPA; and (4) Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). Because I must consider any jurisdictional attack first, I begin by
analyzing Obiano’s assertion that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based
on foreign official immunity. Because I conclude that Obiano is entitled to foreign
official immunity, I need not address the other reasons Obiano offers for dismissal.
RULE 12(b)(1) LEGAL STANDARD
“Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to
hear a case.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). When
a party challenges subject matter jurisdiction and simultaneously seeks dismissal
with other Rule 12 motions, the court must consider the jurisdictional attack first.
See id. “This requirement prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely
dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id. “[F]oreign-official immunity is a question of

1 In the Complaint, Plaintiffs are first referred to as “Jane Does” in the style of the case,
then later referred to as “Jane Roes.” I will refer to them as “Jane Does.”
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Doe 1 v. Buratai, 318 F. Supp. 3d 218, 226 (D.D.C.
2018). As United States District Judge Dabney L. Friedrich explained in a virtually
identical case:
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must treat the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and afford the plaintiff the benefit
of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Those
factual allegations, however, receive closer scrutiny than they would
in a Rule 12(b)(6) context, and particularly because immunity
provides protection from suit and not merely a defense to liability, the
court must engage in sufficient pretrial factual and legal
determinations to satisfy itself of its authority to hear the case. Also,
unlike when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider
materials outside the pleadings to evaluate whether it has jurisdiction,
such as the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the
record. Without subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.

Id. (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
A. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR TVPA CLAIMS AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY

1. The TVPA
The TVPA provides a civil cause of action to torture victims and
representatives of victims of extrajudicial killings. It states:
(a) LIABILITY.—An individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation—

(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual; or

(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an
action for wrongful death.

Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73 (Mar. 12, 1992) (codified as a note to 28
U.S.C. § 1350). The TVPA defines an “extrajudicial killing” as
a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under
international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a
foreign nation.

Id. § 3(a).
2. Foreign Official Immunity
Foreign official immunity is a common law doctrine, first discussed in The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). In Schooner
Exchange, the Supreme Court applied the long-standing principle that ministers
of foreign sovereigns are exempt from the jurisdiction of another nation to hold
“that the courts of the United States lack jurisdiction over an armed ship of a
foreign state found in our port.” Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 486 (1983). The “narrow holding of The Schooner Exchange . . . came to be
regarded as extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns,” albeit
“as a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a
restriction imposed by the Constitution.” Id.
Under the common law,2 foreign officials may be entitled to two types of
immunity: status-based immunity or conduct-based immunity. See Doe 1, 318 F.
Supp. 3d at 230.
Status-based immunity is available to diplomats and head of state and
shields them from legal proceedings by virtue of [their] current official
position, regardless of the substance of the claim. Conduct-based
immunity, at issue in this case, is available to any public minister,
official, or agent of the foreign state with respect to acts performed in
his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to
enforce a rule of law against the state.

2 After the 1976 enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330, 1602 et seq., courts began to analyze immunity for foreign officials under that
statute. That practice ended when the Supreme Court decided Samantar v. Yousuf, 560
U.S. 305 (2010), which held that determinations of sovereign immunity for foreign
officials are governed by the common law, not the FSIA. See id. at 320–26.
Id. (cleaned up).3 In other words, “conduct-based immunities shield individuals
from legal consequences for acts performed on behalf of the state during their
tenure in office.” Sikhs for Just. v. Singh, 64 F. Supp. 3d 190, 193 (D.D.C. 2014)
(cleaned up).
Determination of foreign official immunity is a two-step process:
First, the foreign-official defendant can request a suggestion of
immunity from the State Department. If the request is granted, the
district court surrenders its jurisdiction. But in the absence of
recognition of the immunity by the [State Department], the district
court moves to the second step, in which a district court has authority
to decide for itself whether all the requisites for such immunity
existed. In making that decision, a district court inquires whether the
ground of immunity is one which it is the established policy of the
State Department to recognize.

See Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (cleaned up). My inquiry during the second step
will result in a finding of immunity if (1) Obiano was a public minister, official, or
agent of Nigeria; (2) he acted in his official capacity; and (3) “exercising
jurisdiction would ‘enforce a rule of law against the state.’” Id. at 231 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66(f) (1965)).
B. OBIANO IS ENTITLED TO FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs acknowledge that Obiano served as Governor of Anambra State
from March 17, 2014 to March 17, 2022. Because Obiano’s allegedly illegal conduct
occurred while he was in office, I must determine whether Obiano is entitled to
conduct-based immunity.4

3 Doe 1 involved claims by Nigerian nationals under the TVPA against officials in the
Nigerian government, including Obiano, stemming from alleged torture and extrajudicial
killings of protesters in Nigeria. In a well-reasoned opinion, Judge Friedrich held that
(1) the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the Nigerian officials as they
had no connection to the District of Columbia; and (2) the Nigerian officials were entitled
to conduct-based foreign official immunity. See id. Because the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed Judge Friedrich’s dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction, it did not address the foreign official immunity issue. See Doe 1 v.
Buratai, 792 F. App’x 6, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
4 Status-based immunity is not available to Obiano because he is not a current diplomat
or head of state. See Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 230.
At step one, I ask whether Obiano has requested a suggestion of immunity
from the State Department. He has not. Moving to step two, I ask whether such a
grant of immunity is something the State Department would recognize under
established policy. The three aforementioned factors indicate such a grant of
immunity is appropriate.
First, it is undisputed that Obiano was Governor of Anambra State at the
time of the events at issue, meaning he was a public minister, official, or agent of
Nigeria.
Second, it is also undisputed that Obiano’s alleged actions were taken in his
official capacity. Indeed, Plaintiffs admit that “Obiano possessed command
responsibility and effective control over the Nigerian soldiers complicit in the
extrajudicial killing of John Does 1-5 under color of Nigerian law acting in concert
with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari or his agents.” Dkt. 1 at 4. Plaintiffs
further allege that Obiano “approved all federal military operations” in Anambra
State. Id. at 8. Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Obiano clearly acted in his
official capacity.
Third, I ask whether “exercising jurisdiction would have the effect of
enforcing a rule of law against Nigeria.” Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 233. This element
allows for immunity when “a judgment against the official would bind (or be
enforceable against) the foreign state.” Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 146 (D.C.
Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs are not suing Obiano in his individual capacity. On the
contrary, the Complaint repeatedly connects Obiano’s alleged actions to his official
capacity as Governor of a Nigerian state and the Nigerian government’s decades-
long persecution of the Biafrans. Plaintiffs assert that Obiano acted in concert with
the President of Nigeria or his agents. Further, Plaintiffs allege that “[p]ublicly
disclosing the true names of [Plaintiffs] or [their deceased husbands] or the
granular details of the extrajudicial killing[s] . . . would expose [Plaintiffs] to the
risk of immediate assassination by the Federal Government of Nigeria.” Dkt 1. at
2–3. These alleged facts indicate that my exercise of jurisdiction “would affect how
Nigeria’s government, military, and police function, regardless [of] whether the
damages come from [Obiano’s] own wallet[] or Nigeria’s coffers. By interfering
with Nigeria’s government, a decision would effectively enforce a rule of law
against Nigeria.” Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 233. Put another way, “a decision by this
Court on the legality of [Obiano’s] actions would amount to a decision on the
legality of Nigeria’s actions.” Id. As such, I find that the State Department would
recognize a grant of immunity in this situation. Thus, Obiano is entitled to conduct-
based foreign official immunity.
Some commentators have suggested that the TVPA abrogates common law
foreign official immunity. See Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of
Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2704 (2011) (“A blanket
grant of immunity to foreign officials who act under color of law would contradict
the [TVPA].”). I respectfully disagree. “The text of the TVPA does not mention
immunity, and statutes are normally assumed not to displace the common law by
implication.” Curtis A. Bradley, Conflicting Approaches to the U.S. Common Law
of Foreign Official Immunity, 115 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (2021); see also Samantar,
560 U.S. at 320 (“The canon of construction that statutes should be interpreted
consistently with the common law helps us interpret a statute that clearly covers a
field formerly governed by common law.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967) (holding that Congress must give “clear indication that [it] meant to abolish
wholesale all common-law immunities” in a statute). Because “the TVPA is silent
as to whether any common law immunities are abrogated,” I must assume that
common law principles of immunity are incorporated into the TVPA. Dogan v.
Barak, 932 F.3d 888, 895 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the TVPA does not
expressly or impliedly abrogate foreign official immunity).
C. AJuUS COGENS EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO OBIANO’S FOREIGN
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
“(T]he term ‘jus cogens’ (literally, ‘compelling law’) refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom.”

Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J.
INTL L. 331, 331 (2009). Jus cogens norms “include, at a minimum, the
prohibitions against genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of
individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,” and other heinous acts. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmts. d—-i, § 102 cmt. k (1987)).
Plaintiffs argue that “violations of jus cogens norms of international law are
never shielded from accountability” and constitute an exception to foreign official
immunity. Dkt. 23 at 8. Plaintiffs rely heavily on Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d
763 (4th Cir. 2012), an appellate decision holding that “under international and
domestic law, officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign official
immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the
defendant’s official capacity.” Id. at 777. Although the Fourth Circuit in Yousuf
carved out a jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity, that decision
appears to be an outlier; other jurisdictions—including the Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits—have expressly rejected such an exception.) See, e.g., Dogan, 932
F.3d at 896 (declining “to hold that foreign officials are not immune from suit for
violations of jus cogens norms”); Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“[T]here is no general jus cogens exception to [foreign official] immunity.”); Ye v.
Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The Executive Branch’s determination
that a foreign leader should be immune from suit even when the leader is accused
of acts that violate jus cogens norms is established by a suggestion of immunity.”);
see also Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 234 (“Although the D.C. Circuit has not directly

5 Some courts analyzing foreign official immunity under the FSIA—pre-Samantar—
declined to apply a jus cogens exception. See, e.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he FSIA contains no unenumerated exception for violations of jus
cogens norms.”); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 718—719 (oth Cir.
1992) (finding no jus cogens exception within the text or legislative history of the FSIA).
“[A]s the Supreme Court noted in Samantar, rules that appellate courts developed for
foreign official immunity under the FSIA ‘may be correct as a matter of common-law
principles.” Giraldo v. Drummond Co., 808 F. Supp. 2d 247, 250 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting
Samantar, 560 U.S. at 322 n.17)).

addressed the issue, the circuit’s caselaw indicates that jus cogens allegations do
not defeat foreign-official immunity under the common law.”).
The Fifth Circuit has yet to address whether a jus cogens exception to foreign
official immunity exists. The Fifth Circuit has, however, discussed a possible jus
cogens exception to sovereign immunity under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). In
Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), Judge
Catherina Haynes, joined by two other judges, issued a concurrence endorsing the
idea of a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity under the ATS. See id. at 139–
42 (Haynes, J., concurring). Favorably citing the Fourth Circuit’s Yousuf decision,
Judge Haynes reasoned that because jus cogens violations are so heinous that a
sovereign nation cannot authorize them, the sovereign would lack immunity for
those violations. See id. at 140. In response, Judge Edith Jones, joined by three
judges, wrote that such an exception would “create a breathtaking expansion of
federal court authority” and “abrogate federal sovereign immunity contrary to
clearly established law.” Id. at 128–29 (Jones, J., concurring). Judge Jones also
wrote—quite persuasively—that Judge Haynes’s comparisons to foreign official
immunity were inapposite to the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of American sovereign
immunity. The Supreme Court, however, vacated the Fifth Circuit’s en banc
opinion on separate grounds in Hernandez v. Mesa, 582 U.S. 548 (2017).
With no binding Fifth Circuit precedent to guide me, I must determine
whether to follow the Fourth Circuit’s approach and find that a jus cogens
exception to foreign official immunity exists, or to side with the majority of courts
that have refused to recognize a jus cogens exception. After carefully reviewing the
case law and academic literature, I decline to adopt a jus cogens exception. I am
persuaded by the reasoning set forth by those courts that have adopted the
majority approach that there is no jus cogens exception to foreign official
immunity. As United States District Judge Otis D. Wright II observed:
The Court certainly agrees in principle that immunity doctrines
should not shield persons who violate jus cogens norms. However,
allowing such an exception would effectively eviscerate the immunity
for all foreign officials. The question whether there was actually a jus
cogens violation is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the
underlying claim; thus, having a jus cogens exception would merge
the merits inquiry with the immunity inquiry. This causes two
problems. First, foreign official immunity is not just a defense to
liability, but an immunity from suit—i.e., an immunity from trial and
the attendant burdens of litigation. If a court had to reach the merits
to resolve the immunity question, there would effectively be no
immunity. This would be particularly problematic in lawsuits arising
from military operations, as any death resulting from such operations
could give rise to a plausible allegation that jus cogens norms were
violated. Second, merging the question of immunity with the merits
also undermines the original purpose of foreign official immunity: to
avoid affronting the sovereignty of a foreign nation by passing
judgment on their official government acts, which would inevitably
happen if courts had to reach the merits to resolve immunity.
Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15-cv-08130, 2016 WL 6024416, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13,
2016) (cleaned up), aff'd, Dogan, 932 F.3d 888; see also Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at
234 (“[A] jus cogens exception would eviscerate any protection that foreign official
immunity affords because an exception merges the merits of the underlying claim
with the issue of immunity.” (quotations omitted)); Bradley, supra, at 11 (“[SJuch
an exception would unduly infuse questions about the merits of the plaintiffs claim
into the issue of immunity and thereby undercut immunity’s protective function.”).
Notably, the Executive Branch has not recognized a jus cogens exception to
immunity. See Matar, 563 F.3d at 14; Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 235. This is
important because the common law immunity inquiry focuses on what conduct the
Executive Branch has determined should be immunized. See Republic of Mex. v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945). As the Seventh Circuit explained, pre-Samantar:
Just as the FSIA is the Legislative Branch’s determination that a
nation should be immune from suit in the courts of this country, the
immunity of foreign leaders remains the province of the Executive
Branch. The Executive Branch’s determination that a foreign leader
should be immune from suit even when the leader is accused of acts
that violate jus cogens norms is established by a suggestion of
immunity.

10

Ye, 383 F.3d at 627. One reason the Executive Branch opposes a jus cogens
exception is a genuine concern that such an exception could threaten immunity for
United States officials in foreign courts. See John B. Bellinger III, The Dog that
Caught the Car: Observations on the Past, Present, and Future Approaches of the
Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
819, 833 (2011) (“Once the United States agrees to lift immunity for foreign
government officials, it begins to craft state practice that could expose U.S. officials
to suits abroad. Plaintiffs [in foreign nations] would certainly allege that certain
actions by U.S. officials violate jus cogens norms, and would argue that, as a result,
such U.S. officials are not entitled to immunity.”). Regardless of its underlying
policy reasons, “[t]he executive branch’s position [opposing] a jus cogens
exception . . . weighs heavily against the Court adopting an exception on its own.”
Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 236.
For these reasons, I conclude there is no jus cogens exception to foreign
official immunity. Because Obiano is entitled to foreign official immunity, this case
should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
* * *
Make no mistake: Plaintiffs allege truly appalling conduct. The murder of
innocent people for their political or religious beliefs is never acceptable anywhere,
in any form or fashion. Put more eloquently, “torture, extrajudicial killings and
other forms of deliberate brutality, anytime, anywhere, pierce the inner core of
human baseness and cross the outer crusts of infamy.” Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169
F. Supp. 2d 259, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The TVPA is a legislative decision to
“impose[] liability on officials who torture or kill under ‘actual’ authority,
‘apparent’ authority, or ‘color of law’ of a foreign nation and are unable to invoke
foreign-official immunity.” Doe 1, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 237. Practically speaking, the
TVPA “imposes liability on true outlaws, i.e., individuals who commit acts for
which no foreign sovereign is willing to accept responsibility—but not individuals
whose conduct is authorized.” Id. at 238. One court succinctly explained the policy
reason for allowing such a framework:
The purpose of diplomatic and head-of-state immunity is not to cover
up heinous deeds from coming to the light of day, or to protect a
nation’s leaders from accountability for their acts and, by shielding
them from reprisals, tacitly condone their wrongs. If there is a larger
end here to be served, for which accusations of grave misconduct as
between particular individuals may be momentarily set aside, it is in
the interest of comity among nations—to safeguard friendly relations
among sovereign states.

Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 317. I understand, and appreciate, why some might
fundamentally disagree with the policy choice made by Congress to allow foreign
officials who engage in torture and indiscriminate killings to escape civil liability
so long as a foreign nation has authorized the conduct. But it is not my role to usurp
the legislative function. If Congress wants to set aside common law foreign official
immunity, it certainly can do so. I will not legislate from the bench.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, I recommend that Defendant’s Opposed
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Dkt. 21) be GRANTED.
Plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Exclude Matters Outside the Pleadings in
Regards to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Permit
Plaintiffs Discovery According to the Docket Control Order (“Motion to Exclude”).
Dkt. 28. Because I recommend this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), I do not reach the Rule 12(b)(6) arguments raised
by Obiano. As such, the Motion to Exclude is DENIED AS MOOT.
The parties have 14 days from service of this Memorandum and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R.
CIV. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 17th day of January 2024.

______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10677296. Public record. Not legal advice.