# Oliver v. Major Brumley

> District Court, S.D. Texas · September 14, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10676930

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** September 14, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 14, 2023
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION

TAAMITI SAMBA OLIVER, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. § Civil Case No. 4:22-CV-01381
§
CALEB BRUMLEY, J. RICHARDSON, §
JAMARCUS GOODALL, KORI §
BECHAM and RONALD WEAVER, §
§
Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
At all times relevant to this case, plaintiff Taamiti Samba Oliver was an inmate in
the Estelle Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). He filed suit under
42 U.S.C. ' 1983 alleging that the Defendants failed to protect him from serious harm.
The Defendants have now moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 16). Oliver
responded to the Motion, (Dkt. No. 25), and the Defendants replied, (Dkt. No. 26). For
the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No.
16), is GRANTED, and this case is dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND1
The following facts are not in dispute. On October 30, 2020, Oliver filed a Step 1
grievance in which he expressed fear for his life, alleging threats from members of the
Tango Blast prison gang. (Dkt. No. 16 at 9). Oliver alleged that Tango Blast members

1 For purposes of addressing this Motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
operative complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See
White v. U.S. Corrections, L.L.C., 996 F.3d 302, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2021).
Heriberto Eddie Rivera and Joshua Rene Davila told him that they were going to jump
him and stab him. (Dkt. No. 16-2 at 59). TDCJ authorities investigated and concluded

that there was no meaningful threat, though Oliver disputes that the investigation was
thorough or adequate. (Dkt. No. 16 at 10). On November 17, 2020, Defendant
Richardson—the Estelle Unit Warden—denied Oliver’s grievance, stating that there was
insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations. (Id.).
On November 17, 2020, Oliver filed another Step 1 grievance, again expressing fear
for his life. (Id.). Two days later, he filed a Step 2 grievance appealing the denial of his

first grievance, again expressing his fear that his life would be in danger if he was
returned to general population at the Estelle Unit. (Id.). On December 7, 2020, Richardson
responded to the second Step 1 grievance, noting that the allegations were previously
investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. On December 17, 2020, Oliver filed a Step
2 grievance. TDCJ denied the second Step 2 grievance on December 17, 2020, and denied

the first Step 2 grievance on December 22, 2020.
In July 2021, Oliver was stabbed by another inmate who had no known gang
affiliation. (Id. at 7). Oliver’s wounds were closed with staples and sutures, and he did
not require surgery or hospitalization. (Dkt. No. 16-3 at 11).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law,” and “a fact issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Renwick v. PNK Lake Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d
605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). The moving party “always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and identifying
the record evidence “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2253, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion [for summary
judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.” Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam).

If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must then come forward with
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d
538 (1986). The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the nonmovant’s]
own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Nola Spice Designs,
LLC v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015). “If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative,” summary judgment is appropriate. Parrish v.
Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019). The nonmovant’s
burden “will not be satisfied by ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by

conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.’”
Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at
1075). But the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
III. DISCUSSION
A. MOTION TO STRIKE
As a preliminary matter, Oliver asks the Court to strike the affidavit of Lorena
McClintick, arguing that she attests to matters about which she has no personal

knowledge and draws unjustified inferences from relevant documents. McClintick is a
Program Supervisor V for TDCJ’s Correctional Institutions Division. (Dkt. No. 16-1 at 2).
Her affidavit explains certain TDCJ policies and summarizes relevant reports and other
evidence. To the extent that her affidavit draws inferences rather than engages in
summary, this Court is perfectly capable of reading the relevant documents, and is aware

of its obligation to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Oliver. There is no need to
strike the affidavit.
B. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
Defendants Becham and Richardson argue that Oliver failed to exhaust his
available administrative remedies against them. Before bringing a federal lawsuit
challenging prison conditions, a prisoner must first exhaust available administrative

remedies. 42 U.S.C. ' 1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798
(2007).
The Texas prison system has developed a two-step formal
grievance process. The Step 1 grievance, which must be filed
within fifteen days of the complained-of incident, is handled
within the prisoner's facility. After an adverse decision at Step
1, the prisoner has ten days to file a Step 2 grievance, which is
handled at the state level. This court has previously held that
a prisoner must pursue a grievance through both steps for it
to be considered exhausted.
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 515 (5th Cir. 2004).
Becham and Richardson contend that Oliver did not mention Becham in any of his
grievances, and only mentioned Richardson in one of his Step 2 grievances. Oliver

responds that he referenced the UCC Committee in his grievances and that these
Defendants were on that committee.
Oliver does not direct the Court to anything in the record showing that Becham
and Richardson were on the committee, but the Defendants do not dispute Oliver’s
argument in their reply. It is therefore at least a disputed issue of fact whether Oliver
provided sufficient notice that his failure to protect complaint was addressed to Becham

and Richardson. See, e.g., Johnson, 385 F.3d at 517 (“as a practical matter, the amount of
information necessary will likely depend to some degree on the type of problem about
which the inmate is complaining”). Summary judgment is therefore not appropriate on
exhaustion grounds at this time.
C. PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
To prevail, Oliver must demonstrate that each Defendant was personally involved

in the alleged constitutional violation, or that the Defendant committed wrongful acts
that were causally connected to a constitutional deprivation. See Jones v. Lowndes County,
Mississippi, 678 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2012). In this case, it is undisputed that TDCJ
officials placed Oliver in protective custody and launched an investigation after Oliver
complained that his life was in danger. While Oliver disputes the thoroughness of the

investigation, he does not contend that there was no investigation. His Complaint
therefore hinges on the decision to return him to general population. The Defendants
argue that none of them was personally involved in making that decision.
Oliver in turn alleges that the Defendants all served on the UCC Committee that
made the decision to return him to general population. None of the parties direct the

Court to any evidence showing who served on that committee. It is therefore a disputed
issue of material fact whether the Defendants were personally involved in the decision to
return Oliver to general population.
D. FAILURE TO PROTECT
Prison officials have a well-established constitutional duty “to protect prisoners
from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114

S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the
hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for
prison officials responsible for the victim's safety. Our cases
have held that a prison official violates the Eighth
Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the
deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious
. . . a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial
of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. For a
claim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent harm,
the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.
Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While Oliver
cites to evidence about generally dangerous conditions throughout TDCJ and complains
that the investigation into his complaint was inadequate, “prison officials who actually
knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if
they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id.
at 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1982–83.
The undisputed facts show that: Oliver complained that he was being targeted by
a prison gang; he was placed in protective custody; TDCJ launched an investigation; the

investigation concluded that there was nothing to substantiate Oliver’s claims; Oliver
was returned to general population; and, some months later, Oliver was stabbed by an
inmate who had no known gang affiliations. The Defendants present evidence that none
of them conducted the investigation. (See Dkt. No. 16-2 at 58, 76). Accepting as true
Oliver’s assertion that the Defendants served on the UCC committee, it was reasonable
for them to rely on the results of the investigation to conclude that Oliver could safely be

returned to general population. That he ultimately suffered injury from another source
does not change this conclusion. The Defendants did not violate their Eighth
Amendment duty to protect Oliver from harm.
E. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Finally, the Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. “The
doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials . . . from damages actions unless

their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Elder v. Holloway, 510
U.S. 510, 512, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1021, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). The Fifth Circuit has held that,
to overcome qualified immunity, “pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not
just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated,
reasonable government agent that what the defendant is doing violates federal law in the

circumstances.” Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 882 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).
As discussed above, assuming that the Defendants served on the committee that
decided to return Oliver to general population, their actions were reasonable under the
circumstances. An investigation concluded that Oliver’s claim that he was being targeted
was unfounded. The decision to return Oliver to general population was reasonable
under the Eighth Amendment in light of these investigative findings. The Defendants
are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 16), is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is SO ORDERED.
Signed on September 14, 2023.
R J

DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10676930. Public record. Not legal advice.