# Escolona v. TDCJ

> District Court, S.D. Texas · March 4, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10675177

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** March 4, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10675177

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that plaintiff's transfer to a different prison facility 2 / 6 rendered his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot
- holding that prisoners who were no longer in Retrieve Unit could not seek injunctive relief against conditions of confinement there
- holding that inmate’s transfer from county jail to state prison rendered moot his claims for injunctive relief

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

JULIO ESCOLONA, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-00290
§
RYAN COLLIER, et al., §
§
Defendants. §

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Julie Hampton’s Memorandum and
Recommendation (“M&R”). (D.E. 28). The M&R recommends that Defendants Bryan
Collier and C.F. Hazlewood’s motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (D.E. 25), be granted in part and denied in part. (D.E. 28,
p. 12). Defendants filed timely objections to the M&R. (D.E. 29). When a party objects to
the findings and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district judge “shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 72(b)(3).
I. Defendants’ objections to the M&R
(1) Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief are rendered moot by his transfer to a different
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) unit and subsequent change of his
faith designation. (D.E. 29, p. 5).

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(2) Because Plaintiff seeks only punitive damages, dismissal of that claim requires
dismissal of all his personal capacity claims. Id. at 6.

(3) If the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim for “mental anguish” separately from his
claim for punitive damages, those claims are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act. Id.

(4) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because Plaintiff has not
alleged any violation of clearly established law. Id. at 7.

A. Mootness of Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief
Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to cases and controversies.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. “A claim is moot when the parties are no longer ‘adverse parties
with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation.’” DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145,
150 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316,
324 (5th Cir. 2009)). “If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,’ at any point during litigation, the action can no longer
proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153,
160–61 (2016) (quoting Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)).
Defendants object that Plaintiff’s equitable claims must be dismissed as moot due to his
transfer to a different prison unit. (D.E. 29, p. 5).
The Court disagrees based on the alleged facts and claims of this case. Generally,
where an inmate challenges conditions of confinement at a particular prison facility, the
transfer of the inmate out of that facility renders moot any claims for injunctive or
declaratory relief moot against defendants at that unit. See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d
660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff's transfer to a different prison facility
2 / 6
rendered his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock
Cnty., Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that inmate’s transfer from
county jail to state prison rendered moot his claims for injunctive relief); Hernandez v.

Garrison, 916 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment claims, including allegations of overcrowding and denial of adequate medical
treatment, were moot after he was transferred to another correctional facility and only
remedy he sought was a transfer); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that prisoners who were no longer in Retrieve Unit could not seek injunctive relief

against conditions of confinement there); Sias v. Jacobs, No. 6:17cv413, 2017 WL
8229544, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2017) (finding that a prisoner’s transfer from a prison
unit renders moot his claims of deliberate indifference to his health when seeking injunctive
relief against the defendants at that unit).
Despite the general rule illustrated above, an exception to the mootness doctrine lies

in controversies that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” United States v.
Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018). The exception is available where “‘(1) the
challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or
expiration,’ and (2) ‘there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
[will] be subject to the same action again.’” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,

579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,
17 (1998)).

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Here, Plaintiff asserts that the failure to provide reasonable accommodation for the
Santisima Muerte faith is “a custom, practice & unofficial policy” of the TCDJ. (D.E. 16,
p. 4). Plaintiff describes that Santisima Muerte may be worshipped both individually and

collectively. See (D.E. 16). Plaintiff indicates that personal devotion varies from person to
person and may include prayer, alter veneration, and meditation. See id. Collective
devotion may include group medication, group alter veneration of Santisima Muerte
statues, and the lighting of candles and/or incense. See id. Group assembly for services is
strongly recommended as the power of Santisima Muerte is apparently much more

effective. See id.
After reviewing the complaint (D.E. 16), the Court finds that it is sufficient at this
motion to dismiss stage to allege that there is a reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will
again be subject to the same alleged acts or omissions that form the basis of his religious
accommodation request, regardless of whether he transfers to a new prison within TDCJ,

and regardless of whether he was able to successfully change his faith designation. See
Kingdomware Techs., Inc, 579 U.S. at 170; see also (D.E. 17) (change of address);
(D.E. 27) (letter explaining that Plaintiff was able to change his designated religion “when
[he] got to this unit”). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief
are not rendered moot by his transfer to a different prison unit, and Defendants’ objections

on this point are overruled. See (D.E. p. 5).

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B. Plaintiff’s personal capacity claims
i. Whether dismissal of Plaintiff’s punitive damages requires dismissal of all
personal capacity claims
The M&R recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages with
prejudice. (D.E. 28, p. 7). Defendants contend that because Plaintiff seeks only punitive
damages, dismissing Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims results in dismissing all personal

capacity claims against the individual Defendants Collier and Hazlewood. (D.E. 29, p. 6).
The Court agrees. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their personal (i.e.,
individual) capacities are dismissed in toto.
ii. Plaintiff’s claim for mental anguish damages
Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered mental anguish sufficient to warrant punitive

damages. (D.E. 16, p. 4). The M&R recommends that all Plaintiff’s punitive damage claims
be dismissed. (D.E. 28, p. 7). As discussed above, the Court agrees and adopts the portion
of the M&R dismissing all of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims. See supra section I.B.i.
Further, like the M&R, the Court does not construe Plaintiff’s claim as separate from
Plaintiff’s other punitive damages claims. As such, Plaintiff’s claim for mental anguish is
included in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims, and the Court need not

reach Defendants’ objections on this issue. See (D.E. 29, p. 6).
iii. Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity
Lastly, Defendants argue that even if the Court interpreted Plaintiff’s amended
complaint as seeking monetary (i.e., compensatory) rather than punitive damages, they are
entitled to qualified immunity with respect to these personal capacity claims. (D.E. 29,

5 / 6
p. 7). However, as only equitable claims against Defendants in their official capacities
remain, the Court need not decide this issue, and Defendants’ objections on this issue are
moot. See (D.E. 29, p. 7).
II. Conclusion
After reviewing the facts, law, and recommendations set forth in the M&R, as well
as Defendants’ objections and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made
a de novo disposition of the portions of the M&R to which the objections were directed,
see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court adopts the M&R as modified below:
(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 25) is GRANTED in part with respect
to:
a. Plaintiff's claims for money damages against Defendants Bryan Collier
and C.F. Hazlewood, which are hereby DISMISSED.
b. Plaintiffs claims seeking punitive damages (including damages for
mental anguish) against Defendants Bryan Collier and C.F. Hazlewood,
which are hereby DISMISSED.
(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 25) is DENIED in part with respect to
Plaintiff's First Amendment claims against Defendants Collier and Hazlewood
in their official capacities.

SO ORDERED.

DAVID’S MORALES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: Corpus Christi, Texas
March 4 _, 2022
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10675177. Public record. Not legal advice.