# Johnson v. Dallas County Hospital District

> District Court, N.D. Texas · October 3, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10672538

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** October 3, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

ALVAH JOHNSON, MICHAEL PIERCE, and §
THEODORE BRAMBLE, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§ Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-01574-E
v. §
§
DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT §
d/b/a PARKLAND HEALTH & HOSPITAL §
SYSTEM, and MICHAEL WOOD, in his §
individual capacity, §

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Dallas County Hospital District d/b/a Parkland Health &
Hospital System’s (“Parkland”) and Michael Wood’s (“Wood”) (collectively referred as
“Defendants”) Motion for Partial Dismissal for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiffs
Alvah Johnson (“Johnson”), Michael Pierce (“Pierce”), and Theodore Bramble (“Bramble”)
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) allege various claims of intentional race discrimination against Parkland
and Wood. Having considered the motion, briefing, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS
Parkland’s motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7). This
lawsuit arises from purportedly racially discriminatory employment actions concerning three
Black individuals employed by Parkland. Defendant Parkland is a statutorily-created hospital
district located in Dallas, Texas. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 281.002. At the time of
this lawsuit and its underlying events, Defendant Wood was an employee of Parkland, and in a
management position over Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 7 at 3). All three Plaintiffs allege various charges
of race-based discrimination during their employ by Parkland. Further, all Plaintiffs assert that
“Defendant’s custom or policy of discriminating against Black employees with regard to

promotional opportunities was the moving force” behind each of their alleged constructive
discharges. (ECF No. 7 at 5, 8, 11).
A. Johnson’s Employment

From March 2013 until November 26, 2021, Johnson worked at Parkland as a Stationary
Engineer Supervisor. (ECF No. 7 at 3). In May 2021, Johnson applied for the Central Utility Plant
(“CUP”) Manager, which Johnson asserts was a position that he was qualified for—having
previously served as interim CUP Manager on four different occasions. (ECF No. 7 at 3). Johnson
states that he was promised an interview with Senior Director of Facilities Support Services Wood
and CUP Director Angelica Flores because he was an internal candidate. (ECF No. 7 at 4). After
interviewing with Wood, Johnson was told he would have to complete a supplemental interview
prior to being considered for the position. (ECF No. 7 at 4). However, Johnson’s supplemental
interview never occurred as he was informed that Defendants had already decided to hire a non-
Black individual—a hiring decision Plaintiffs allege Wood played a key role in. (ECF No. 7 at 4).1
On July 22, 2021, Johnson wrote a letter to the Parkland Board of Managers—the
governing body which makes policy for Parkland—and to Human Resources, to express “his
concerns regarding a custom or policy of racial disparity in promotion selections within the

1 Plaintiffs do not plead a date upon which Johnson was not selected for Central Utility Plant Manager position. (See
generally ECF No. 7).
company.” (ECF No. 7 at 4). As alleged, Johnson never received a response from any Parkland
officials regarding his race-based concerns. (ECF No. 7 at 4).
On November 26, 2021, Johnson alleges that his working conditions “were so intolerable
as to compel him to resign based on Defendants failure to promote him to management level

positions based on his race, Black; his observation that other Black employees were also subjected
to a custom or policy of race-based promotion practices; and since Parkland never took any
measures to remedy the deprivation of his rights, specifically, its unlawful promotion practices
based on race.” (ECF No. 7 at 5).
B. Pierce’s Employment

Pierce worked as a Director of Environmental Safety and Hospital Safety Officer at
Parkland for forty-five years, ending in July 2021. (ECF No. 7 at 5). Pierce asserts he “experienced
discrimination based on race in 2015 when he was initially passed over for the Director role” and
the position was given to a White employee with less experience. (ECF No. 7 at 5). Eventually,
Parkland promoted Pierce to the Director role. (ECF No. 7 at 6).2
During his employment, Pierce voiced his concerns about the “custom or policy of racial
discrimination in promotions” to both Human Resources and the Parkland Board of Managers.
(ECF No. 7 at 5). Pierce had telephone conferences with Parkland’s Chief Operating Officer
(“COO”) and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) regarding the alleged discrimination policies and
practices in Parkland’s promotions decisions. (ECF No. 7 at 6). These conferences included reports
that Black employees had to wait longer to be selected for promotions, while unqualified White
candidates were selected instead. (ECF No. 7 at 7). Subsequently, Parkland’s CEO set up a panel
to address such policies and procedures. (ECF No. 7 at 6). During the panel, one Black employee—

2 Pierce does not allege the dates upon which he was passed over for promotion nor promoted to the Director role.
Vivian Johnson—stated that it took her to ten to fifteen years to receive her Senior Vice President
position, as opposed to a White employee who was promoted in less than two years from Director
to Senior Vice President. (ECF No. 7 at 6).
Pierce also reported to human resources that Wood was calling him and Bramble “boy”

and requested that they make him stop. (ECF No. 7 at 7). Pierce eventually felt his working
conditions were so intolerable as to compel him to resign, with a final date of employment of July
31, 2021. (ECF No. 7 at 8).
C. Bramble’s Employment

From 2016 to May 2023, Bramble worked at Parkland as a Senior Environmental Safety
Coordinator. (ECF No. 7 at 8). Bramble applied for the Director of Environmental Safety position
around July 28, 2021. (ECF No. 7 at 8). Bramble asserts Human Resources told him that he was
qualified for the position because he held a Certified Healthcare Safety Professional (“CHSP”),
and he had previously served as the interim Director. (ECF No. 7 at 8). Bramble alleges that his
supervisor—Wood—informed him that the position required eight- or nine-years’ experience, but
this requirement was not posted on any job listing. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Bramble alleges that he met
this purported job requirement, as he had previously worked in healthcare safety and as a hazmat
tech and hazmat foreman. (ECF No. 7 at 8–9).
As alleged, Wood chose the panelists for interviews for the Director of Environmental
Safety position and had the authority to veto the panelists’ decisions. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Only one
of the panelists chosen to conduct Bramble’s interview was in a Director role. (ECF No. 7 at 9).
Two members of the panel were co-workers on the same level as Bramble and were allegedly in
competition with Bramble for this position. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Parkland selected a non-Black
induvial with allegedly less qualifications and tenure than Bramble for this Director position. (ECF
No. 7 at 10).3
Bramble also alleges that two positions were created in two departments within the facility
in which he worked, the Sustainability Department and the Emergency Management Department,

and as he was never made aware of these positions, he was denied the opportunity to apply for
them. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Bramble asserts both positions were filled by white individuals with less
tenure than Bramble. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Bramble asserts that he was misled by Wood, who had
stated that new positions could not be created. (ECF No. 7 at 10).
In or around September 2021, Bramble asserts he reported disparate treatment based on his
race to Parkland’s Human Resources department, alleging that Black employees in his department
were not given management positions. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Shortly thereafter, Bramble had two
phone calls with John Proctor, who sits on Parkland’s Board of Managers, to discuss “Parkland’s
race-based customs and policies with regard to promotions.” (ECF No. 7 at 10–11). Bramble
pleads his concerns were never addressed, nor were any remedial measures taken. (ECF No. 7 at

11).
Bramble asserts he received an unwarranted written warning on January 20, 2022. (ECF
No. 7 at 11). That same day, Bramble asserts he contacted Human Resources to express that he
was experiencing retaliation for lodging his discrimination complaint. (ECF No. 7 at 11). Bramble
was subsequently required to attend weekly meetings regarding his performance, and his work was
subject to close supervision. (ECF No. 7 at 11).
In May 2023, Bramble asserts that—after “having experienced being called ‘boy,’ having
received an unwarranted and retaliatory disciplinary warning and monitoring of his work, having

3 Bramble does not provide a date upon which he was not selected for Director of Environmental Safety position.
been denied promotions and promotional opportunities based on his race, and due to being
subjected to and observing Defendant Parkland’s discriminatory customs or policies with regard
to the promotion of Black employees,”—he felt compelled to resign from employment. (ECF No.
7 at 11).

D. Procedural History

Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on July 13, 2023. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs filed their
Amended Complaint—the operative complaint on which they proceed—on November 20, 2023.
(ECF No. 7). In their complaint, they allege twenty-two causes of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Texas Employment Discrimination Act.:
(i) employment discrimination – promotions & constructive discharge against Parkland;
(ii) employment discrimination – promotion as to Johnson against Wood;
(iii) race discrimination – promotion as to Bramble against Wood;
(iv) employment discrimination – retaliation as to Bramble against Wood;
(v) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Pierce against Wood;
(vi) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Bramble against Wood;
(vii) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Johnson against Wood;
(viii) employment discrimination – failure to adopt policies against Parkland;
(ix) employment discrimination – failure to discipline against Parkland;
(x) employment discrimination on the basis of race against Parkland;
(xi) employment discrimination – promotion as to Johnson against Parkland;
(xii) employment discrimination – promotion as to Bramble against Parkland;
(xiii) employment discrimination – retaliation against Parkland;
(xiv) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Bramble against Parkland;
(xv) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Pierce against Parkland;
(xvi) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Johnson against Parkland;
(xvii) employment discrimination on the basis of race as to Johnson against Parkland;
(xviii) employment discrimination on the basis of race as to Bramble against Parkland;
(xix) employment discrimination – retaliation against Parkland;
(xx) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Pierce against Parkland;
(xxi) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Johnson against Parkland;
and
(xxii) employment discrimination – constructive discharge as to Bramble against Parkland.

Defendants filed their original Motion to Dismiss on October 30, 2023. (ECF No. 4). In
response, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7). Defendants filed the instant
Partial Motion to Dismiss on January 2, 2024, seeking dismissal of sixteen causes of action: counts
i–x, xiv–xvi, and xx–xxii. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiffs responded to the Motion, (ECF No. 16), and
Defendants replied, (ECF No. 22). Thus, the motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). If a
plaintiff fails to satisfy Rule 8(a), the defendant may file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the courts to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But a
plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “the court must accept all well-pleaded
facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.” Walker v.
Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Campbell v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986). “The court’s review is limited to the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays
Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
III. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS, GENERALLY
Plaintiffs’ complaint appears to state that their § 1983 claims are brought to remedy
Defendants’ violations of § 1981. “The express cause of action for damages created by § 1983
constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state

governmental units.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989). To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (i) “some person has deprived him of a federal right”
guaranteed by the United States Constitution or federal law; and (ii) “the person who deprived him
of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980). The existence of a constitutional violation is a “threshold” requirement in any § 1983
claim. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 2009). “[W]ithout an underlying
constitutional violation, there can be no § 1983 liability.” Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1047
(5th. Cir. 1997).
IV. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST PARKLAND
Plaintiffs raise three municipal liability claims—also known as Monell4 claims—against

Parkland, arguing that Parkland’s customs or policies (or lack of policies) were a “moving force
behind the deprivations of Plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. §1981.” (See ECF No. 7 at 14, 20,
22). Thus, to prevail on their claims against Parkland, Plaintiffs must show that the violation of
their rights to be free from employment discrimination on the basis of race protected by § 1981
was caused by a custom or policy within the meaning of Monell and subsequent cases.
“Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of 1) a policymaker; 2) an
official policy; 3) and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or
custom.” Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Piotrowski

4 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). “To sustain liability under § 1983, the
[Plaintiff] must point to more than the actions of an employee, [Plaintiff] must identify a
policymaker with final policymaking authority and a policy that is the ‘moving force’ behind the
alleged constitutional violation.” Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. The Supreme Court has explained that

a governmental entity may not be held liable under § 1983 “unless action pursuant to official
municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
“Municipalities are not liable on the theory of respondeat superior and are almost never liable for
an isolated unconstitutional act on the part of an employee.” Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Texas,
994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021).
“The first requirement for imposing municipal liability is proof that an official policymaker
with actual or constructive knowledge of the constitutional violation acted on behalf of the
municipality.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010). “The
policymaker must have final policymaking authority.” Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. The identity of the
policymaker is a question of state law. Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2016).

Once a policymaker has been established, Plaintiffs must prove the existence of an official
policy. A municipal “policy” must be a deliberate and conscious choice by a municipality’s policy-
maker. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality)). Upon consideration whether the “allegedly
unconstitutional action constitutes a custom or policy of the municipality,” two forms must be
considered. Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168. “First, a plaintiff may point to a policy statement formally
announced by an official policymaker.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168. Alternatively, “the plaintiff may
demonstrate a persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not
authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169. “The
Supreme Court has explained that a custom may give rise to liability under Monell if the practice
is so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt.
Co., 41 F.4th 493, 509 (5th Cir. 2022); see Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (“Official

municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking
officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”). “The
description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation,
moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police
Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997).
Last, regarding the third element that the policy alleged be the “moving force” behind the
constitutional violation, a plaintiff must establish that “the municipal action was taken with the
requisite degree of culpability and . . . demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal
action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Plaintiffs assert the following Monell claims against Parkland: (a) count

1—failure to promote and constructive discharge; (b) count 8—failure to adopt policies; and (c)
count 9—failure to discipline.
A. Municipal Liability Claims Against Parkland Under § 1981 through § 1983 (Counts i,
viii, ix)

1. Section 1983 Statute of Limitations
The parties appear to have contested the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to the
§ 1981 through § 1983 claims asserted. Plaintiffs argue that that this Court should apply a four-
year statute of limitations—referring to cases from the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit in which they
determined “the four-year statute of limitations provided by § 1658 applies to a § 1981 claim
brought through § 1983.” (ECF No. 16 at 9) (citing Chambers v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Just., 66
F.4th 139 (4th Cir. 2023).5 However, the Chambers court acknowledges that only the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits decided the four-year statute applies to § 1981 claim brought through § 1983.
Chambers, 66 F.4th at 142. Plaintiffs refer the Court to no Fifth Circuit precedent that has decided
four-year statute applies to § 1981 claim brought through § 1983, and the Court has found no such

Fifth Circuit precedent. The Court declines to adopt Plaintiff’s interpretation and elects to follow
well-settled precedent in this circuit that “[f]ederal civil rights actions brought under section 1981,
which lack an express statute of limitations, are governed by the most closely analogous limitations
period provided under state law.” Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 2004),
(abrogated by Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023) on other grounds)). “Since
Texas has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims . . . [a Plaintiff] ha[s] two
years to file suit from the date her claim accrued.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (citing Burrell v.
Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989)); accord Hatchet v. Nettles, 201 F.3d 651, 653 (5th
Cir. 2000); Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). “The time
at which a § 1983 claim accrues is a question of federal law.” McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109,

115 (2019) (internal quotation omitted). “Under federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run
the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that [s]he has suffered an injury or has sufficient
information to know that [s]he has been injured.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (internal quotation
omitted).
Here, the operative date in this case is July 13, 2023—the date on which Plaintiffs filed
their Original Complaint in this Court. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff Pierce alleges that he experienced
discrimination when he was passed over for a director role in 2015, nearly eight years before the

5 The Eleventh Circuit also held that a four-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims asserting violations of
§ 1981 rights. See Baker v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 531 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008).
operative date. (ECF No. 7 at 5). This allegation and any adverse employment actions which
occurred prior to July 13, 2021, are not timely filed “within two years of the[ir] adverse
employment action” and therefore, not actionable. Byers, 209 F.3d at 424.
2. Section 1983 Failure to Promote and Constructive Discharge Claim (Count i)

In Count 1, Plaintiffs allege that Parkland established a discriminatory practice of denying
upper-level promotions based on race, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of rights and privileges secured
by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (ECF No. 7 at 12). Plaintiffs contend that Parkland’s practice of denying
promotional opportunities to Black employees was so “widespread” as to constitute “a custom that
fairly represents municipal policy,” thereby rendering Parkland liable under § 1983. (ECF No. 7
at 12). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege:
Evidence of such a widespread practice or custom includes the following: (i) The
six (6) specific incidents where a more-qualified Black employee was passed over
for a promotion that was ultimately given to a non-Black employee, highlighted
above; (ii) the fact that the Plaintiffs observed a pattern of such discriminatory
conduct in promotions over numerous years; (iii) the three (3) specific incidents
where additional requirements for promotions were imposed only on Black
employees, highlighted above; (iv) the numerous incidents where Defendant
Parkland’s hiring managers used racial epithets; and (v) that Plaintiffs and other
Black employees made at least five (5) specific reports directly to either Defendant
Parkland’s Board of Directors or Defendant Parkland’s Human Resource
Department about this custom or practice, including letters sent directly to the
Board of Directors discussing a long pattern of discrimination towards promotions
and a phone call from County Commissioner John Price regarding this custom or
practice.

(ECF No. 7 at 13). Parkland argues that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead the existence of
an official policy or custom that was the moving force behind the underlying violations. (ECF No.
11 at 8–12). Relevant to a failure to promote claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs contend that there are
“six (6) specific incidents where a more qualified Black employee was passed over for a promotion
that was ultimately given to a non-Black employee”. (ECF No. 7 at 13; ECF No. 16 at 10-11). The
specific allegations are:
(i) Johnson applied for Central Utility Plant Manager
(ii) Pierce applied for a director role
(iii) Vivian Johnson took ten years to get her Senior Vice President position
(iv) Bramble applied for Director of Environmental Safety
(v) Bramble was unaware of a position within the Sustainability Department
(vi) Bramble was unaware of a position within the Emergency Management Department

(ECF No. 16 at 10-11) (cleaned up).

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ have failed to plead specific, nonconclusory facts
identifying an official policy or custom within Parkland resulting in the denial of promotional
opportunities to Black employees. See Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. An employee presents a prima
facie case of discrimination by failure to promote by demonstrating that: “(1) he was not promoted;
(2) he was qualified for the position he sought; (3) he fell within a protected class at the time of
the failure to promoted; and (4) the defendant either gave the promotion to someone outside of that
protected class or otherwise failed to promoted the plaintiff because of his race.” Autry v. Fort
Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir. 2013).
In four of the alleged incidents, Plaintiffs fail to allege the prima facie elements of a
discriminatory failure to promote claim. (See ECF No. 16 at 10–11). Taking the incidents in turn,
incidents two and three—involving Pierce and Vivian Johnson—both proclaim that the parties
subsequently received the promotions each sought. Pierce was “initially passed over for the
Director role” but that “eventually, the Director role was given to Plaintiff Pierce.” (ECF No. 7 at
5-6). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ pleadings contain no sufficient factual allegation to the fourth element
of their prima facie burden. Pierce’s allegations of his promotion show Parkland accepted—not
rejected—him for the Director role of which he sought. Therefore, these allegations do not
establish a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to promote. Autry, 704 F.3d at 347.
Likewise, Plaintiffs’ third example of Vivian Johnson’s “delayed” promotion suffers from
similar deficiencies. (See ECF No. 7 at 6; ECF No. 16 at 10–11). That Vivian Johnson was
promoted to Senior Vice President after ten to fifteen years while a similarly situated White
employee received the same promotion in less than two years, even taken as true, fails to present
a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to promote. See Autry, 704 F.3d at 347. Absent
from Plaintiffs’ Complaint are any allegations that Vivian Johnson applied and was qualified for

a prior promotion for which she was rejected. See Autry, 704 F.3d at 347. (discussing the second
and fourth elements for a failure to promote discrimination claim). Consequently, the vague and
conclusory nature of these alleged instances are insufficient to establish a plausible policy-or-
custom claim under Monell. See Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167.
Plaintiffs fail to allege the prima facie elements of a discretionary failure to promote claim
in incidents five and six. (ECF No. 16 at 11). Plaintiffs allege that Bramble was “denied the
opportunity to apply” to two positions: one within the Sustainability Department and the other
within the Emergency Management Department. (ECF No. 16 at 11). Plaintiffs admit that Bramble
did not apply to either of these positions, an admission which bars a failure to promote claim,
“absent a showing that such an application would have been a futile gesture.” Irons v. Aircraft

Serv. Int’l, Inc., 392 F. App’x 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Grice v. FMC Techs. Inc., 216 F.
App’x 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2007). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, the “futile gesture” exception
applies only where “the applicant for the promotion was deterred by a known and consistently
enforced policy of discrimination.” Irons, 392 F. App’x at 312 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ argument that Bramble “was never made aware of these newly created positions,” and
was therefore “denied the opportunity to apply to them”, without more, does not suggest a “known
and consistently enforced policy of discrimination” in Parkland’s promotion system. See Irons,
392 F. App’x at 312 (plaintiff failed to establish “futile gesture exception” where the employer
“approached who they wanted” to fill the positions without giving plaintiff an opportunity to
apply); Spears v. Louisiana, 767 F.Supp. 2d 629, 640 (M.D. La. 2011) (plaintiff’s failure to apply
for a position because her supervisor told her it was already taken was insufficient, without more,
to establish a known and consistently enforced policy of discrimination). Thus, without pleaded
allegation(s) to substantiate the second element of a discrimination by failure to promote claim,

Plaintiffs have not met their burden.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege the prima facie elements of a discriminatory failure to
promote claim in incidents one and four: (i) Johnson’s application to the Central Utility Plant
Manager and (ii) Bramble’s application to the Director of Environmental Services. Johnson pleads
that he is a Black man and had “served as interim CUP Manger on four (4) separate occasions[,]”
the position for which he applied. (ECF No. 7 at 3). After his initial interview with Defendant
Wood and before he had a second interview, he was notified that Mr. Alvarez was hired for the
position. (ECF No. 7 at 4). Johnson alleges that that the candidate who was ultimately hired for
the position “had no prior engineering experience and no certifications that were applicable to
Central Utility Plan operations.” (ECR No. 7 at 4). The actions, as alleged by the defendant indicate

sufficient pleadings of the prima facie elements of a discriminatory failure to promote claim. See
Autry, 704 F.3d at 346-47.
Next, Bramble’s application to the Director of Environmental indicates that he is a Black
man and had “served as interim Director” and “met the qualifications” for the position he applied.
(ECF No. 7 at 8). Bramble plead additional qualifications, including, that he had worked in
“Healthcare Safety since 2011”, had his “Certified Health[care] Safety Professional (CHSP)
certificate”, and had been informed by Defendant Parkland’s Human Resources Department that
he “was qualified to fill the vacancy.” (ECF No. 7 at 9). After his initial panel interview, a non-
Black individual was selected for the position. (ECF No. 7 at 9-10). To bolster this assertion,
Bramble states that the selected party did not have “OSHA training”, which Bramble asserts he
had. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Additionally, the selected individual had a “Certified Safety Professional
(CSP) Certificate, rather than the [Certified Healthcare Safety Professional] CHSP certificate.”
ECF No. 7 at 10). Like with Johnson’s allegations in incident one, Bramble has alleged sufficient

pleadings of the prima facie elements of a discriminatory failure to promote claim. Autry, 704 F.3d
at 346-47.
However, this Court determines that Plaintiffs have failed to plead specific, nonconclusory
facts identifying an official policy or custom within Parkland resulting in the denial of promotional
opportunities to Black employees. See Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. Here, Plaintiffs have pled in their
complaint that “Defendant Parkland had a custom or policy of denying promotions and
promotional opportunities to Black employees” while only pleading two incidents of such
promotional denials that occurred in the same year. (ECF No. 7 at 12). Plaintiffs’ pleadings do not
establish a customary policy consisting of “actions that have occurred for so long and with such
frequency that the course of conduct demonstrates the governing body’s knowledge and
acceptance of the disputed conduct.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169.6

This Court concludes that Plaintiffs failed to plead constructive discharge under Count 1
because a bare conclusion that Defendant Parkland had a “policy of constructive discharge” is not
sufficient. Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000) (“To establish a constructive
discharge claim, an employee must offer evidence that the employer made the employee’s working

6 The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly required more than two isolated incidents in a single year. See Davidson v. City of
Stafford, 848 F.3d 397, 396 (5th Cir. 2017) (three arrests over three and a half years to form the basis of the alleged
pattern of unconstitutional violations was “insufficient” to establish a pattern of constitutional violations); Peterson,
588 F.3d at 852 (“[T]he 27 [complaints of excessive force from 2002 to 2005], in the context of this record, do not
suggest a pattern “so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.”); see
generally Hernandez v. Dallas County et al., No. 3:23-CV-01583-E, 2024 WL 4202381, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16,
2024) (collecting cases).
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.”). Therefore,
this Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count i.
3. Section 1983 Failure to Adopt Policies Claim (Count viii)
In Count 8, Plaintiffs allege that Parkland’s official policymakers failed to adopt policies

that effectively banned discrimination against Black employees in the making of decisions
regarding promotion to management-level positions. (ECF No. 7 at 19). Specifically, Plaintiffs
assert that Parkland’s official policymakers were “deliberately indifferent to the need to ban race
discrimination in promotion decisions to management positions, despite notice that such failures
would lead to deprivations of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” (ECF No. 7 at 20).
“Supervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 for their failure to adopt policies if that
failure causally results in a constitutional injury.” Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 186 (5th
Cir. 2022). Liability only arises when the officials act, or fail to act, with “deliberate indifference.”
See Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011). To establish a failure-to-enact policy theory,
plaintiffs must allege the official had “actual or constructive notice” that their failure to adopt

policies would result in constitutional violations. See generally Porter, 659 F.3d 440. Actual or
constructive knowledge “typically requires showing notice of ‘a pattern of similar constitutional
violations.’” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 447). “While the municipal
policy-maker’s failure to adopt a precaution can be the basis for § 1983 liability, such omission
must amount to an intentional choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” Rhyne
v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387).
“[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring [allegations] that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at
61. Plaintiff “must show that ‘in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the
need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 547 (5th Cir.
2010) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). In Connick, the Supreme Court summarized this

standard as follows:
Thus, when city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular
omission in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’
constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the
policymakers choose to retain that program. The city’s “‘policy of inaction’” in
light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations “is the functional
equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.” A less
stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim would result in de facto
respondeat superior liability on municipalities .... see also Pembaur [v. City of
Cincinnati], supra, [475 U.S.] at 483, 106 S. Ct. 1292 [89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)]
(opinion of Brennan, J.) (“[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and
only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among
various alternatives by [the relevant] officials ...”).

Connick, 563 U.S. at 61–62 (citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Parkland’s policymakers failed to adopt policies that
“effectively banned discrimination against Black employees in the making of decisions regarding
promotion to management-level positions.” (ECF No. 7 at 19). Plaintiffs allege that policymakers
“had notice” through “direct complaints” to “management officials, Defendant Parkland Human
Resource officials, Defendant Parkland’s Board of Managers, and a County Court Commissioner,
who brought this violation to Defendant Parkland’s attention.” (ECF No. 7 at 19). Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege that (i) Johnson “wrote a letter to John Proctor of the Parkland Board of Managers
and to Human Resources”; (ii) Pierce conducted phone meetings with Mr. Proctor, human
resources, and the CEO of Parkland hospital; and (iii) Bramble spoke with Mr. Proctor on two
separate occasions and reported his concerns to human resources. (ECF No. 7 at 4, 6-7, 10).
A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference in either of two ways, “First, a plaintiff may
demonstrate ‘that a municipality had notice of a pattern of similar violations.’” Doe 1 v. Rockwall
Indep. Sch. Dist., No, 3:23-CV-01243-E, 2024 WL 1837967, *13 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2024) (citing
Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 397 (5th Cir. 2017). “‘Second, a plaintiff may

demonstrate liability based on a single incident if the constitutional violation was the highly
predictable consequence of a particular failure [to promulgate a policy].’” Doe 1, 2024 WL
1837967 at *13 (citing Davidson, 848 F.3d at 397) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
discussed above, Plaintiffs have only pled two instances of discriminatory failure to promote
claims and instead, rely primarily on broad conclusions that Defendant Parkland was aware of
“direct complaints of capable and tenured employees.” (ECF No. 7 at 19). However, Plaintiffs’
conclusory, unsupported statements that lack specific factual allegations fail to demonstrate a
pattern of similar constitutional violations as Plaintiffs only plead two instances of their personal
experiences occurring during the same calendar year and under the direction of a singular
supervisor at Parkland. Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege factual

allegations that any official had actual or constructive knowledge that a failure to adopt policies
would result in constitutional violations. See generally Porter, 659 F.3d 440. This Court concludes
Plaintiffs have failed show deliberate indifference and have failed to meet their burden under
Monell. Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186. Therefore, this Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as
to Count viii.
4. Section 1983 Failure to Discipline Claim (Count ix)
In Count 9, Plaintiffs allege that Parkland’s “pattern of failing to discipline deprivations of
individual rights by employees can be inferred from the failure to discipline any of the six (6)
specific incidents of discrimination for promotion to management.” (ECF No. 7 at 22). Defendant
Parkland challenges Plaintiff’s failure to discipline claim on the basis that Plaintiffs fail to plead
sufficient facts to support an inference of deliberate indifference on behalf of Parkland
policymakers. (ECF No. 11 at 15).
“[T]here are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a ‘failure to train’ [or failure

to discipline] can be the basis for liability under § 1983. City of Canton, 486 U.S. at 387. For a
failure-to-discipline claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead
“that (1) the [governmental entity] failed to [discipline] the officers involved; (2) there is a causal
connection between the alleged failure to [discipline] and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s
rights; and (3) the failure to [discipline] constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482.7
“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by [undisciplined] employees is ‘ordinarily
necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train [or discipline].”
Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl., 520 U.S. at 409.
However, “in certain extreme circumstances, a single act by a municipal employee [may] form the

basis of municipal liability apart from a pattern of unconstitutional activity.” Roberts v. City of
Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2005). But “[t]he ‘single incident exception’ is extremely
narrow,” Valle, 613 F.3d at 549, and “is generally reserved for those cases in which the government
actor was provided no training whatsoever.” Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624
(5th Cir. 2018).

7 Hutcheson concerns a failure to train claim rather than failure to discipline, however, the elements required to prove
both claims are identical. See E.G. v. Bond, No. 1:16-CV-068-C, 2017 WL 129019, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2017);
Snow v. City of El Paso, Tex., 501 F. Supp. 2d 826, 833 n.5 (W.D. Tex. 2006); see Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336
F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiffs fail to assert any factual allegations regarding their failure to discipline
claim that are not conclusory. Plaintiffs do not allege any specific employees that Parkland failed
to discipline, and it is not apparent from the pleadings whether all six of the “specific incidents of
discrimination for promotion to management” were a result of the same employees’ actions.

Further, Plaintiffs do not plead—other than in conclusory statements—that any disciplinary failure
occurred with the deliberate indifference of a policymaker as to the allegedly racially
discriminatory promotional practices. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count
ix. Combined, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims
against Parkland.
B. § 1983 Claims Against Wood in His Individual Capacity (Counts ii–iv)
Plaintiffs assert six § 1983 claims against Wood in his individual capacity: (i) count ii—
promotion as to Johnson; (ii) count iii—promotion as to Bramble; (iii) count iv—retaliation as to
Bramble; (iv) count v—constructive discharge as to Pierce; (v) count vi—constructive discharge
as to Bramble; and (vi) count vii—constructive discharge as to Johnson.8 (ECF No. 7 at 14–19).

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, private citizens may sue public officials for violations of their
federal statutory or constitutional rights. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). However,
public officials are shielded from civil liability under § 1983 under the doctrine of qualified
immunity “so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)
(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “Qualified immunity gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable[,] but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the

8 All constructive discharge claims will be analyzed under Section “C”, to include counts 5, 6, and 7.
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5 (2013)
(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The affirmative defense of qualified immunity has two prongs: (i) whether an official’s
conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right of the plaintiff, and (ii) whether the right was

“clearly established” at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001),
overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223. The two steps of the qualified immunity inquiry
may be performed in any order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. “A court may rest its analysis on either
prong[.]” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The “clearly
establish[ed]” prong of the qualified immunity analysis “‘is better understood as two separate
inquiries: [(1)] whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the
time of the incident; and, if so, [(2)] whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively
unreasonable in light of that then clearly established law.’” Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745,
750 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2002)).
To state a claim in an individual capacity suit brought under § 1983, a claimant must allege

a violation of the Constitution or federal law by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. In the context of § 1983 claims against supervisors, “[f]or there to be liability under section
1983, a defendant must have been personally involved in the conduct causing a deprivation of
constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the actions of that person and
the constitutional right sought to be redressed.” King v. Louisiana, 294 F. App’x. 77, 83 (5th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (citing Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983)) (affirming dismissal
of claims against individual defendants, based on qualified immunity, where the allegations against
these defendants failed to set forth any constitutional violation); see also Anderson v. Pasadena
Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999) (“In order to state a cause of action under
§ 1983, [plaintiff] must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the
constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation
alleged.”).
A plaintiff is not required to “fully anticipate the [qualified immunity] defense in his

complaint at the risk of dismissal under Rule 12.” Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir.
1995). Although “[t]he generic pleading requirements of [Rule 8] govern suits against individual
defendants in their official capacity,” “[p]laintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual
capacities . . . must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation.” Oliver v. Scott,
276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson, 184 F.3d at 443). “This standard requires more
than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to a constitutional
violation.” Oliver, 276 F.3d at 741 (citing Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1996); see
also Babinski v. Sosnowsky, 79 F.4th 515, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2023)(“A plaintiff attempting to
overcome qualified immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage must plead facts that allow this court to
reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the harm alleged.”).

Defendant Wood moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against him in his individual
capacity asserting that Plaintiffs’ pleadings do not overcome his qualified immunity—specifically
the first prong as Plaintiffs fail to allege a deprivation of any constitutional right. (ECF No. 11 at
17–18). Wood argues that to avoid dismissal, the complaint must contain facts that Wood was
personally involved in the civil rights violation. Wood argues the Complaint fails to allege such
facts.
1. Section 1983 Failure to Promote Claims (Counts ii and iii)
Plaintiffs assert identical failure to promote claims against Wood regarding Plaintiffs
Johnson and Bramble. (ECF No. 7 at 14-15). Defendants move to dismiss Johnson and Bramble’s
claims of failure to promote against Wood arguing that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege Wood’s
involvement in such alleged constitutional violation. (ECF No. 11 at 19).
A plaintiff asserting failure to promote because of racial discrimination must show: (i) the
employee is a member of the protected class; (ii) he sought and was qualified for the position; (iii)

he was rejected for the position; and (iv) the employer continued to seek applicants with the
plaintiff’s qualifications or hired a person outside of the plaintiff’s protected class. McMullin v.
Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 782 F.3d 251, 258 (5th Cir. 2015); see Williams-Boldware v. Denton
Cty., 741 F.3d 635, 643 (5th Cir. 2014).
(i) Failure to Promote – Johnson (Count ii)
Here, Johnson alleged that he (i) is Black; (ii) he applied for and was qualified for the CUP
Manager position; (iii) he was not promoted to CUP Manager; and (iv) a non-Black individual was
hired for the position. (See ECF No. 7 at 3–4). Johnson alleges that after applying for the CUP
Manager position, he was promised an interview with Defendant Wood and Angela Flores, who

was serving as the Central Utility Plant Director because he was an internal candidate. (ECF No.
7 at 3-4). Plaintiff then alleges that he interviewed with Defendant Wood and was informed that
he would need a supplemental interview. (ECF No. 7 at 3-4). However, before the supplemental
interview could occur, Johnson was informed that another individual had been chosen for the
position. (ECF No. 7 at 4). Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because, though
Wood interviewed Johnson that the decision to hire someone else was made by others at Parkland.
In addressing Defendant’s argument, this Court turns to the first prong of the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity–whether an official’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional
right of the plaintiff. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant Wood personally conducted the interview with Johnson and that Johnson was
notified that he had not been selected for the position, though the complaint was silent on who
notified Johnson. (ECF No. 7 at 4). It is sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when a
plaintiff pleads an affirmative causal link between the individual’s conduct and the
decisionmaker’s decision. Normore v. Dallas. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:18-CV-02506-E, 2021 WL

5824864 *1, *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2021). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Wood personally
conducted the interview and that “[d]efendants” hired someone other than Johnson for the position.
(ECF No. 7 at 4). However, there is nothing in the pleadings that indicate whether Wood ultimately
decided to not hire Johnson. The Plaintiffs do not plead that Wood interviewed other applicants
nor that he was involved in the final hiring decision. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiffs
have failed to sufficiently plead facts to overcome Defendant Wood’s defense of qualified
immunity. The Court concludes Wood is entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. The Court
grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on Count ii.
Assuming arguendo that Johnson had met the first prong. This Court will now analyze the
second prong–whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. Saucier, 533

U.S. at 200-01. Under the clearly established prong the right “must be particularized to the facts
of the case establishing the right.” Harris v. Clay Cnty., Miss., 47 F.4th 271, 277 (5th Cir. 2022).
Plaintiffs rely on Felton to argue that “… since 2002, this Circuit recognized that failing to promote
based on race is an act of disparate treatment and is a clearly established violation of § 1981.” 315
F.3d at 487. In Felton, the district court denied defendant’s claim for qualified immunity on a
motion for summary judgment. Felton, 315 F.3d at 479. On interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit
determined that that the Defendant’s were entitled to qualified immunity on the only two claims
on the appeal: racial harassment and disparate treatment. Felton, 315 F.3d at 483. The Fifth Circuit
addresses failure to promote in the context of their disparate treatment analysis but upheld the
district court’s ruling that the plaintiff did not demonstrate any involvement by the defendant.
Felton, 315 F.3d at 487. The promotion at dispute in Felton included both an interview and a “State
Personnel Board score … [and included] factors such as an applicant’s education level or military
service”. Felton, 315 F.3d at 477. These facts contrast with the instant facts of Johnson’s complaint

because here the interview process included a single in-person interview before notification of
another party’s hiring. (ECF No. 7 at 4). Therefore, this Court finds that Felton does not
demonstrate a clearly established right particularized to the facts of our case. No other precedent
demonstrates a clearly established right particularized to the facts of this case as to Johnson’s
failure to promote allegations. Therefore, the Court concludes Wood is entitled to qualified
immunity as to this claim. The Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count ii.
(ii) Failure to Promote – Bramble (Count iii)
Here, Bramble alleged that he (i) is Black; (ii) he applied for and was qualified for the
Director of Environmental Safety position; (iii) he was not promoted to Director of Environmental

Safety; and (iv) a non-Black individual was hired for the position. (See ECF No. 7 at 8-10).
Bramble applied for the Director of Environmental Safety position and was scheduled for a panel
interview. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wood chose the panelists for the
interview and that Defendant Wood “had the authority to veto the panelists’ decisions.” (ECF No.
7 at 9). After Bramble’s interview with the panel, he was notified that another individual had been
selected for the promotion. (ECF No. 7 at 9-10). Defendants move to dismiss this claim because
Bramble fails to plead that Wood was personally involved in the denial of promotion. (ECF No.
11 at 19-20). This Court agrees.
The first prong of the affirmative defense of qualified immunity–whether an official’s
conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right of the plaintiff. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01. In
their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Wood “chose the panelists for
interviews” and “had the authority to veto the panelists’ decision.” (ECF No. 7 at 9). However, to
survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. Here, the Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant Wood participated in the interview
of Johnson, nor do they allege that he did veto the panel’s decision to hire Johnson.
Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead facts to
overcome Defendant Wood’s defense of qualified immunity. The Court concludes Wood is
entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. The Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
as to Count iii.
2. Section 1983 Retaliation Claim – Bramble (Count iv)
In Count 4, Bramble asserts a retaliation claim against Defendant Wood under § 1981.
(ECF No. 7 at 16). Defendants move to dismiss this claim arguing that Plaintiffs fail to allege
Defendant Wood’s involvement. (ECF No. 11 at 21). “We examine retaliation claims under

Section 1981 using the “same rubric of analysis” as Title VII.” Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16
F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021), as revised (Nov. 26, 2021) (citing Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc.,
7 F.4th 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2021)). A prima facie case of retaliation under § 1981 requires a showing
that (i) the employee engaged in a protected activity, (ii) he was subjected to an adverse
employment action, and (iii) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2004).
Here, Bramble asserts that (i) he reported “disparate treatment based on his race” to human
resources around September 2021; (ii) he received an “unwarranted written warning” in January
2022 and was required to attend weekly meetings; and (iii) he “believed he was experiencing
retaliation for lodging the complaint of discrimination.” (ECF No. 7 at 10-11). Bramble alleges in
his petition that he was discriminatorily passed over for promotion in the summer of 2021, and
was not subsequently notified of two specific open positions. (ECF No. 7 at 10). As a result of
these actions, Bramble made a report to Parkland’s Human Resources Department in September

2021 and subsequently had two phone calls with a member of the Board of Managers in the Fall
of 2021. (ECF No. 7 at 10). As alleged, Bramble received, through Defendant Wood’s supervisee,
an “unwarranted written warning” on January 20, 2022. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Bramble asserts he
promptly notified human resources that he believed he was experiencing retaliation for lodging his
complaint of discrimination. (ECF No. 7 at 16). After this report, it is alleged that he was required
to attend weekly meetings regarding his performance, meetings he alleges were not warranted nor
tied to the subject of the written warning. (ECF No. 7 at 10).
Assuming arguendo that Bramble has established the prima facie case for retaliation,
Defendants move to dismiss this count on the grounds that “Bramble does not assert any facts
showing Wood’s involvement in the write-up or any other alleged retaliatory act.” (ECF No. 11 at

21). Defendant’s argument addresses the affirmative defense of qualified immunity as it pertains
to claims by Plaintiffs against Defendant Wood. (ECF No. 11 at 16-18). Under the first prong of a
qualified immunity defense, the inquiry is whether “an official’s conduct violated a statutory or
constitutional right of the plaintiff.” Saucier, 533 U.S. 194 at 200-01. Inherent in that inquiry is
that a defendant must have been personally involved in the conduct causing a deprivation of
constitutional rights.” King, 294 F. App’x. at 83. Here, Plaintiff made the conclusory claim that
“Defendant Wood, through his supervisee, issued Bramble an unwarranted disciplinary warning
and unwarranted monitoring of his work performance in retaliation for complaining of
discrimination.” (ECF No. 7 at 16). However, this alone is not satisfactory because a plaintiff must
provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff does nothing further to allege Defendant
Wood’s involvement in the write up or required weekly meetings in their pleadings, instead merely
stating that, nearly four months after his initial discrimination report to human resources, he

“received an unwarranted written warning”. (ECF No. 7 at 11). Plaintiff does not allege that
Defendant Wood was the individual who wrote him up or that he was involved in the process in
any manner. Nor does Plaintiff allege that Defendant Wood became involved after the written
warning, when he was required to attend meetings with, again an unnamed individual. (ECF No.
7 at 11). Plaintiff has alleged no sufficient factual allegations that Wood was personally involved
in a deprivation of rights as to this claim. Therefore, the Court concludes Wood is entitled to
qualified immunity as to this claim. Consequently, this Court grants Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss as to Count iv.
C. Constructive Discharge (Counts v-vii, xiv-xvi, and xx-xxii)
Plaintiffs assert identical constructive discharge claims under both Title VII and Texas
Labor Code9 § 21.055 against Parkland. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert the following claims under

Title VII: (i) count xiv—as to Bramble; (ii) count xv—as to Pierce; and (iii) count xvi—as to
Johnson. Plaintiffs bring the same claims under § 21.055: (i) count xx—as to Pierce; (ii) count
xxi—as to Johnson; and (iii) count xxii—as to Bramble. Plaintiffs’ assert an additional three
constructive discharge claims under § 1983 against Defendant Wood: (i) count v—as to Pierce;
(ii) count vi—as to Bramble; (iii) count vii—as to Johnson. Defendants move to dismiss each of
the enumerated claims alleging constructive discharge.

9 The Court recognizes that the Commission on Human Rights (TCHRA) has been replaced with the Texas Workforce
Commission’s civil rights division. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 798 n.1 (Tex. 2010) (citing Tex.
Lab. Code Ann. § 21.0015). Throughout this memorandum opinion and order, the Court refers to Texas Labor Code
Chapter 21 as the Texas Labor Code.
The same substantive legal standards and evidentiary framework apply to discrimination
and harassment claims under Title VII, Chapter 21, and Section 1983. See Culwell v. City of Fort
Worth, 468 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 2006).10 Thus, the Court considers identical claims under Title
VII, Section 1983, and the Texas Labor Code together. “A resignation is actionable under Title

VII, allowing the plaintiff to seek compensatory damages for events after the resignation, only if
the resignation qualifies as a constructive discharge.” Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556,
566 (5th Cir. 2001). “To prove a constructive discharge, a plaintiff must establish that working
conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.” Kinney
Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566 (citation omitted).11 Whether that standard is met depends on the facts
of each case, but the following factors are relevant:
(1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities;
(4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a
younger [or less experienced/qualified] supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or
humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation;
or (7) offers of early retirement on terms that would make the employee worse off
whether the offer was accepted or not.

Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). According to Fifth Circuit
precedent, “[d]iscrimination alone, without aggravating factors, is insufficient for a claim of
constructive discharge” Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566.

10 See Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Section 21.051 is effectively identical to Title
VII, its federal equivalent, except that Title VII does not protect against age and disability discrimination . . . Because
one of the purposes of [the Texas Labor Code] is to provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII . . . we have
consistently held that those analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of the [Texas
Labor Code].”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also, Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566 (applying
constructive discharge elements from Title VII to Section 1981 claims).
11 See also, Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (“The inquiry [for constructive discharge] is objective:
Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt
compelled to resign?”).
In all six claims of constructive discharge against Parkland under Title VII and § 21.055 of
the Texas Labor Code, Plaintiffs allege in conclusory fashion that: “Defendant Parkland’s actions
in denying Plaintiff [] promotions to management-level positions based upon race, thereby
affecting his compensation, made the work conditions so intolerable that Plaintiff [] was compelled

to resign.” (See ECF No. 7 at 25–26, 28–29). A failure to promote—on its own—does not prove
constructive discharge. See Barrow, 10 F.3d at 297 (not including failure to promote as a factor
for meeting the standard for constructive discharge); Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Wood called Plaintiffs Pierce and Bramble,
“boy” on “numerous occasions.” (ECF No. 7 at 7). Only one instance of this language is
specifically pled— as alleged, “Defendant Wood said, ‘Hey, boys, how’re you doing?’ to Plaintiff
Pierce and Plaintiff Bramble. Plaintiff Pierce said, ‘I’m older than you, so why’re you calling me
that?’” (ECF No. 7 at 7). In response to the use of “boy” by Wood, Pierce reported the incident to
Human Resources; Pierce does not allege that this conduct or language continued after he reported
it. (ECF No. 7 at 7). Bramble pled, regarding the same language, only that “Defendant Michael

Wood, referred to Plaintiff Bramble and Plaintiff Pierce as ‘boys’ on numerous occasions.” (ECF
No. 7 at 8). In light of the above, Plaintiffs fail to plead any factual allegations of how these
instances are “so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.” Kinney
Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566. And, Plaintiffs direct the Court to no law as to the same.
As pleaded, Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements cannot support a finding of a constructive
discharge as to Bramble, Johnson, or Pierce. At this stage, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have
failed to allege factual allegations that establish that working conditions were so intolerable that a
reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566. The
Court grants Defendants’ corresponding motion to dismiss—all Plaintiffs’ claims of constructive
discharge under Title VII and the Texas Labor Code (counts 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, and 22) are
dismissed.
In turn, each Plaintiff brought identical constructive discharge claims under § 1983 against
Defendant Wood in his individual capacity. (ECF No. 7 at 16-19). Defendants move to dismiss

these claims because they are insufficiently pled, and as such Defendant Wood is entitled to
qualified immunity. (ECF No. 11 at 21-22).
Plaintiffs each plead, in conclusory fashion: “Defendant Wood’s actions in denying
promotions to management-level positions based upon race, in violation of his rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, made the work conditions so intolerable that Plaintiff… was compelled to resign.”
(ECF No. 7 at 17-18). As with Plaintiffs’ claims of constructive discharge against Parkland, these
too fail. The bald conclusion that a failure to promote alone caused an employee to resign is not
enough to allege conditions “so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to
resign.” Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566.
Plaintiffs’ have not sufficiently pled constructive discharge, their claims also fail on the

first prong of qualified immunity— “whether the plaintiff[‘s] allegations, if true, establish a
violation of a clearly established right.” Wallace v. Cnty. of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir.
2005). Thus, the Court concludes that all Plaintiffs’ claims of constructive discharge under Section
1981—counts 5, 6, and 7—are dismissed.
In summary, the Court grants Defendants’ motion as to all of Plaintiffs’ constructive
discharge claims, thus, such claims are dismissed.
D. Employment Discrimination Claim under Title VII (Count x)

Finally, Plaintiffs bring a claim of employment discrimination, count x, on the basis of race
under Title VII against Parkland. Defendants move to dismiss this claim alleging that Plaintiffs
fail to state a claim for relief for Title VII discrimination based on a custom or practice. (ECF No.
11 at 24).
To analyze the merits of a plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim, we use the McDonnell
Douglas framework, which first requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.12 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36

L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). “However, the McDonnell Douglas framework is an evidentiary standard, not
a rigid pleading requirement.” Puente v. Ridge, 324 F. App’x 423, 427–28 (5th Cir. 2009); see
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 506–07 (2002). Thus, for purposes of surviving a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie
case of discrimination.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503,
531 (5th Cir. 2004). Still, this court may consider the McDonnell Douglas framework, and no
plaintiff is exempt from her obligation to “allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of her
claim.” Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 265 F. App’x 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2008).
Northern District of Texas Local Civil Rule 7.1(e) instructs that “[a] response and brief to

an opposed motion must be filed within 21 days from the date the motion is filed.” N.D. Tex. Loc.
Civ. R. 7.1(e). A party who fails to pursue a claim beyond its initial pleading may waive or abandon
the claim. Black v. N. Panola School Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[Plaintiff]
further failed to defend her retaliatory abandonment claim in both responses to the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.”). Thus, a party’s failure to defend a claim in her response to a motion to dismiss

12 A prima facie case requires the plaintiff to show that: “(1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] was
qualified for her position; (3) [she] was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) . . . in the case of disparate
treatment, . . . that others similarly situated were treated more favorably.” Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci.
Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512–13 (5th Cir. 2001).
constitutes abandonment. See Matter of Dallas Roadster, Ltd., 846 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2017)
(concluding plaintiff’s failure to respond to defendant’s argument in a motion to dismiss
constituted abandonment) (citing Black, 461 F.3d at 588 n.1); see, e.g., Vela v. City of Houston,
276 F.3d 659, 678-79 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing abandonment of theories of recovery and

defenses when such theories were not presented to the trial court).
Here, Plaintiffs failed to defend their Title VII employment discrimination on the basis of
race claim in their response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 16). Because Plaintiffs
failed to address—much less defend—Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiffs’ Title VII employment
discrimination on the basis of race claim, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have abandoned this claim.
See Black, 461 F.3d at 588 n.1; Matter of Dallas Roadster, Ltd., 846 F.3d at 126; Vela, 276 F.3d
at 678-79.13 Thus, the Court dismisses count x with prejudice. In summary, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion as to all of Plaintiffs’ Title VII and Texas Labor Code claims against Parkland,
thus, such claims are dismissed. 14

13 See also, e.g., JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Com. & Indus., 336 F. Supp. 3d 620, 634 (M.D. La. 2018) (“[F]ailure to brief
an argument in the district court waives that argument in that court.”) (quoting Magee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 261
F. Supp. 2d 738, 748 n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2003)) (citations omitted); Kellam v. Servs., No. 12-352, 2013 WL 12093753,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kellam v. Metrocare Servs., 560 F. App’x 360 (5th Cir.
2014) (“Generally, the failure to respond to arguments constitutes abandonment or waiver of the issue.”) (citations
omitted); Mayo v. Halliburton Co., No. 10-1951, 2010 WL 4366908, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2010) (granting motion
to dismiss breach of contract claim because plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’ motion to dismiss on this issue
and thus waived the argument).
14 An employee must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the Texas Workforce Commission within 300
days (for federal law claims brought under Title VII) or 180 days (for state law claims under the Texas Labor Code).
See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002). And he or she must file a separate charge for
each discrete discriminatory or adverse employment action. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110. The Court has concerns
about whether Plaintiffs sufficiently exhausted their administrative remedies to proceed on Title VII or Texas Labor
Code claims. Plaintiffs fail to attach their charges to the EEOC—in fact, Plaintiffs only reference to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a single paragraph in the complaint stating:
Plaintiffs have each timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which constitutes cross-
filing with the Texas Commission on Human Rights. Plaintiffs received their Notices of Right to
Sue from the EEOC within 90 days prior to the filing of this First Amended Complaint.
(ECF No. 7 at 2). However, Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs’ exhaustion of administrative remedies.
E. Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend their complaint. (ECF No. 16 at 33).
Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s failure to plead sufficient facts, “district courts often afford plaintiffs
at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear

that the defects are incurable, or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are willing or unable to
amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal.” In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F.
Supp.2d 552, 567–68 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Witter
& Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)). Nevertheless, courts may appropriately dismiss an
action with prejudice if a court finds that the plaintiff has alleged his or her best case. Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). “A plaintiff has pleaded her best case after she is
apprised of the insufficiency of her complaint.” Wiggins v. Louisiana State Univ.-Health Care
Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768
(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (internal
quotation and citation omitted))). As explained by the Fifth Circuit:

A plaintiff may indicate she has not pleaded her best case by stating material
facts that she would include in an amended complaint to overcome the
deficiencies identified by the court. See Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767–68. Similarly,
a district court need not grant a futile motion to amend. Legate, 822 F.3d at 211
(citing Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872–73 (5th Cir. 2000)).
“Futility is determined under Rule 12(b)(6) standards, meaning an amendment is
considered futile if it would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”
Id.

Wiggins, 710 F. App’x at 627 (emphasis added in bold). The Fifth Circuit has affirmed denials of
leave to amend where it determined that the proposed amendment would be futile after analyzing
the claims. See Edoinwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2017) (where the proposed amended
complaint failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “[A] bare request in an opposition to a
motion to dismiss—without any indication of the particular grounds on which the amendment is
sought, cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)—does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule
15(a).” Confederate Mem’l Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993). If the plaintiff
does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a
district court may deny leave. Scott, 16F.4th at 1209, (citing McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist.,

309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs “failed to
amend their complaint as a matter of right, failed to furnish the district court with a proposed
amended complaint, and failed to alert both the court and the defendants to the substance of their
proposed amendment”)).
Here, Plaintiffs did not expressly request, with particularity, the request to amend their
complaint. U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir.
2003). Plaintiff’s request for leave states:
In the event this Court determines that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim [,]
Plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend
should be freely given when justice so requires and should be granted absent some
substantial justification for refusal. Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 183 (1962).
Allowing Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint would serve justice and promote
judicial efficiency. Further, there would be no substantial or undue hardship,
prejudice, bad faith, undue delay, or futility by granting Plaintiffs leave to amend.

(ECF No. 16 at 25). This “does not provide any indication of the grounds on which such an
amendment should be permitted.” Willard, 336 F.3d at 387. Northern District of Texas Local Rules
15.1(a) requires a party seeking leave to file an amended pleading to “attach a copy of the proposed
amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion[.]” N.D. Tex. Loc. Civ. R. 15.1(a). Plaintiffs attached
no amended pleadings to their request for leave. Further, the Court determines Plaintiffs’
amendment would be futile. Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint in response to Defendant’s
original Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 4 and No. 7). However, in Plaintiffs’ request for leave to
amend they do not state, “material facts that [they] would include in an amended complaint to
overcome the deficiencies.” Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767–68. For those reasons, the Court concludes
permitting Plaintiffs “any [further] attempts at amendment would be futile.” See Wiggins, 710 F.
App’x at 627 (discussing the same); Harris v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. of Texas, No. 3:23-CV-
02486-E; 2024 WL 2734974 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2024) (denying motion for leave to amend

complaint). For those reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Request for Leave to Amend.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons enumerated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
(ECF No. 11). The Motion is granted as to counts i, ii–x, xiv–xvi, and xx–xxii, and thus, these
claims are dismissed. Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend their complaint is DENIED. (ECF No.
16 at 25). Additionally, Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 4), is DENIED AS MOOT.

SO ORDERED this 3rd day of October, 2024.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10672538. Public record. Not legal advice.