# Gitwaza v. Garland

> District Court, N.D. Texas · July 8, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10672163

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** July 8, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

PAUL MUHIRWA GITWAZA,

Gitwaza,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00434-P

MERRICK B GARLAND, ET AL.,

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Paul Muhirwa Gitwaza’s Complaint
seeking a de novo review of his Form N-400 Naturalization Application,
which was filed on September 16, 2020, and denied initially by
Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”). ECF No. 1. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS
Gitwaza’s Application for naturalization.
BACKGROUND
Gitwaza is a pastor and the founder of Authentic Word Ministry,
which has established churches worldwide, including in several U.S.
states. Gitwaza has resided continuously in Dallas, Texas, since 2013,
and has filed tax returns regularly. In September 2020, Gitwaza filed
his naturalization application to become an official United States
citizen. Gitwaza demonstrated his ability to read, write, and speak
English, as well as his knowledge of U.S. history and government during
his naturalization interview in January 2022.
However, USCIS denied Gitwaza’s application, citing a March 2019
conviction for disorderly conduct in New York. This conviction stemmed
from a June 2017 arrest where Gitwaza was initially charged with
Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree and Forcible Touching. The charges
were later reduced, and Gitwaza pleaded guilty only to disorderly
conduct, a minor violation under New York law. Gitwaza was required
to attend a sexual offender counseling program as part of his plea
agreement, which was terminated after three months following a
polygraph test in Texas. Mr. Bruce Cameron, the program
administrator, concluded that Gitwaza was not a sex offender and could
not be treated as such.
In May 2022, Gitwaza filed a Complaint seeking de novo review of
his denial and requested a hearing by this Court on his Form N-400
Naturalization Application. During a trial before this Court in February
2024, Gitwaza emphasized that he only agreed to plead to disorderly
conduct because he believed it would not impact his immigration status
as it qualified as a “petty crime” under the immigration statute. The
Court is now prepared to rule on Mr. Gitwaza’s Application.
LEGAL STANDARD
When an applicant’s naturalization is denied, they may seek review
in the United States District Court where they reside, as per 8 U.S.C. §
1421(c). This statute mandates a de novo review by the court, which
means the Court will independently assess the facts and legal
conclusions without deference to the previous administrative decision.
Unlike many administrative reviews which apply a deferential
“arbitrary and capricious” standard, the court’s de novo review here
requires a fresh, comprehensive evaluation of the evidence presented at
trial. See Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2013). If the
court finds that the denial was improper and that the applicant qualifies
for naturalization, it will typically grant the naturalization application
and instruct USCIS to schedule the applicant’s oath ceremony. See
Vahid-Dastjerdi v. Mueller, No. CV M-09-84, 2011 WL 13135580, at *3–
4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2011) (Crane, J.) (finding that the plaintiff satisfied
all requirements for naturalization and directing the plaintiff to file a
proposed final judgment reflecting the court’s findings).
Regarding the criteria for naturalization, Congress holds the
authority to establish rules for the process. See Kariuki, 709 F.3d at 503.
In reviewing a denial, the court ensures that all statutory requirements
for naturalization are strictly met. Id. at 504. The burden of proof lies
with the applicant to demonstrate eligibility for citizenship in all
respects. See Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 385
U.S. 630, 637 (1967). The government maintains a vested interest in
ensuring that only qualified individuals are granted citizenship, with
any doubts being resolved in favor of the United States. Id.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an applicant
must meet specific requirements, including:
1. Continuous residence in the United States for at least
five years immediately preceding the application;
2. Continued residence in the U.S. from the application
date until citizenship is granted;
3. Demonstration of good moral character, adherence to
the principles of the Constitution, and a disposition
toward the good order and happiness of the United States
throughout the relevant period.
8 U.S.C. § 1427(a); 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a). Applicants must prove their
eligibility for naturalization by a preponderance of the evidence. See 8
C.F.R. § 316.2(a). While some cases have suggested a higher burden of
proof, the Fifth Circuit has maintained that the statutory standard of a
preponderance of the evidence is applicable. See Oropeza v. Napolitano,
No. CIV.A. H-09-2604, 2010 WL 4878837, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2010)
(Werlein, Jr., J); see also Morales v. Limon, No. CIV.A. 7:19-CV-319,
2020 WL 4463094, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2020) (Alvarez, J.). This
means the applicant must show that it is more likely than not that they
meet all the requirements for naturalization.
ANALYSIS
Gitwaza argues that his conviction for disorderly conduct is a “petty
crime” that should not bar him from establishing good moral character.
See ECF No. 1 at 5. The “petty offense” exception exempts “an alien who
committed only one crime,” which interrupts the period, if “the
maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was
convicted . . . did not exceed imprisonment for one year and . . . the alien
was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii). Disorderly conduct under New York law is a
violation, not a crime, and carries a maximum sentence of fifteen days.
See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.20, 70.15. He asserts that his plea to
disorderly conduct, which he argues falls under this “petty offense
exception,” should not adversely reflect upon his moral character. See
ECF No. 1 at 5.
The Government, however, argues that Gitwaza’s conduct leading to
his conviction constitutes an unlawful act that adversely reflects upon
his moral character, citing the “catch-all” provision in 8 C.F.R. §
316.10(b)(3)(iii). The “catch-all” provision in the statutory scheme
provides that non-enumerated acts or characteristics can, in the absence
of extenuating circumstances, demonstrate that an applicant lacks good
moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (“The fact that any person is not
within one of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for
other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character.”); 8
C.F.R § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) (explaining that in the absence of extenuating
circumstances an “applicant shall be found to lack good moral character
if, during the statutory period, the applicant: . . . (iii) [c]ommitted
unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicant’s moral
character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts, although the
acts” are not specifically enumerated in the statute or regulations).
Defendants contend that Gitwaza’s story regarding the events that
led to his arrest lacks credibility, further undermining his claim of good
moral character. See ECF No. 48 at 5–6. Therefore, the Court must
determine whether Gitwaza’s story is credible and, even if credible, if
the incident that occurred in New York, and his plea, reflect poor moral
character to preclude him from being eligible for United Sates
citizenship. The Court does so below.
A. March 2017 Arrest
The Court finds that while disorderly conduct is a minor offense, the
circumstances surrounding Gitwaza’s arrest and subsequent plea do
raise questions concerning his moral character that must be addressed.
Moreover, the requirement to attend a sexual offender counseling
program, albeit terminated early, is no small thing.
During the trial, Gitwaza testified that the charges against him were
the result of a misunderstanding and that he never engaged in any
inappropriate conduct with the alleged victim. See ECF No. 50 at 17–24.
He maintained that his actions were misinterpreted and that he agreed
to the plea deal to avoid the stress and uncertainty of a trial. Id. at 24.
Gitwaza’s testimony was supported by Mr. Bruce Cameron, his sex
offender program administrator, who stated that Gitwaza did not
exhibit any behavior consistent with that of a sex offender and that the
polygraph test supported the notion that Gitwaza did not require more
counseling. Id. at 39.
The Government presented evidence to the contrary, including the
affidavit of Detective Shields who conducted the initial investigation.
See ECF No. 27 at 4. Detective Shields’ affidavit detailed the alleged
victim’s account of the incident, in which she claimed that Gitwaza
forcibly touched her breasts during a prayer session. Id.
The Court must, however, scrutinize the reliability of the evidence
presented. It is significant to note that the alleged victim did not testify,
either during the investigation or at trial. The only statements from the
victim were unsworn statements made to Detective Shields, and
Gitwaza was never presented the opportunity to confront his accuser in
an adversarial proceeding. The absence of direct testimony from the
alleged victim casts doubt on the robustness of the claims against
Gitwaza. The Court is left to rely solely on Detective Shields’ recounting
of the alleged victim’s statements, which lacks the corroborative
strength of direct testimony under oath. Gitwaza has given multiple
statements under penalty of perjury that the alleged incidents
stemming from his arrest were a misunderstanding and he only took the
plea deal to avoid disrupting his citizenship chances. The Court
concludes that Gitwaza has satisfied his burden by a preponderance of
the evidence and does not discern any evidence from the government
that properly challenges the veracity of those sworn statements. For
these reasons, the Court views his plea to disorderly conduct a “petty
offense” and must now determine whether pleading guilty to a petty
offense precludes Gitwaza from having good moral character. It does so
below.
B. Moral Character
To determine whether Gitwaza meets the good moral character
requirement, the Court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances.
The statutory period for which the applicant must show good moral
character begins five years prior to the date the applicant filed the
application for naturalization and continues through the date the
applicant takes the oath of citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (3); 8
C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1). The determination of good moral character,
however, is not limited to the statutory five-year period. Rather, USCIS
“may take into consideration, as a basis for its determination, the
applicant’s conduct and acts at any time prior to” the five-year period.
See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2). Whether an applicant exhibits the requisite
good moral character is evaluated “on a case-by-case basis taking into
account the elements enumerated in this section and the standards of
the average citizen in the community of residence.” Id.
The regulations provide general guidelines as well as specific
examples of acts that demonstrate a lack of good moral character. For
example, an applicant will be considered as lacking good moral
character if he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude or
engaged in other specified conduct. Id. at (b)(1)-(2). In a type of “catch-
all” provision, the regulations also provide that, absent a showing by the
applicant of extenuating circumstances, the applicant shall be found to
lack good moral character if, during the statutory period, the applicant:
(iii) Committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the
applicant’s moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned
for such acts, although the acts do not fall within the purview
of § 316.10(b)(1) or (2).
Id. at (b)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Mwalumba, 688 F. Supp. 2d 565,
570 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (Fish, J.) (Recognizing 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii)
is a “catch-all” provision).
Here, it is clear from Gitwaza’s background that he has been actively
involved in his community, as a spiritual leader in his community
through his ministry. With respect to his alleged conduct, the Court
must determine whether (1) his conviction of disorderly conduct charge
itself precludes citizenship and (2) whether the underlying allegations
immune his character.
First, while disorderly conduct is a violation under New York law and
not a crime, the context of the conviction must be considered. Gitwaza
testified under oath that his plea deal was a strategic decision to avoid
the uncertainty of a trial, a common legal tactic. See ECF No. 50 at 24.
The requirement to attend a counseling program, which was later
terminated, does not necessarily reflect negatively on his character,
especially given Mr. Cameron’s testimony that the program was
discontinued because Gitwaza was not a sex offender. See id. at 39.
Gitwaza has maintained a clean record before and since his plea, with
no further incidents of legal trouble. His continuous residence, regular
tax filings, and active participation in the community demonstrate a
commitment to upholding the principles of good moral character
required for naturalization.
Second, while the Government argues that his disorderly conduct
plea is a crime involving moral turpitude, the Court once again notes
that the only direct evidence of the alleged incident comes from
Detective Shields’ affidavit based on his interview with the alleged
victim. See ECF Nos. 48 at 5; 27 at 4. The alleged victim did not testify,
and there was no corroborative evidence presented to substantiate her
claims. This lack of direct testimony from the alleged victim raises
questions about the reliability and completeness of the account provided
by the Defendants. Gitwaza was not convicted of the initial charges of
Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree and Forcible Touching. These charges
were reduced to disorderly conduct, a minor violation. Importantly, the
plea to disorderly conduct does not equate to an admission of the far
more serious charges initially brought against him. The absence of a
plea or conviction for a sexual crime significantly undermines the
Governments’ argument that Gitwaza conduct should bar his
naturalization.
The termination of the sexual offender counseling program and the
results of the polygraph test also weigh in favor of Gitwaza. Mr.
Cameron, who administered the counseling program, testified that
Gitwaza did not exhibit any behavior consistent with a sex offender, and
the program was terminated early because Gitwaza passed a polygraph
test, supporting his recollection of the incident. See ECF No. 50 at 39.
While the Court acknowledges that polygraphs tests can be unreliable,
and the Court does not rely on the results here for their own sake, the
test combined with the professional opinion of Mr. Cameron support
Gitwaza’s argument. In particular, the testimony of Mr. Cameron most
strongly supports Gitwaza’s argument that the disorderly conduct plea
was not indicative of poor moral character. See id. at 24.
Furthermore, Gitwaza’s consistent involvement in his ministry and
community highlights his dedication to living a life of integrity and
service. This along with all the testimony presented by Mr. Gitwaza and
Mr. Cameron reinforces the Court’s assessment of Gitwaza’s good moral
character and that he has made a showing beyond a preponderance of
the evidence that he possesses moral character becoming of United
States citizenship.
Given the denial of his application was predicated on this 2017
arrest, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr.
Gitwaza has met and satisfied all of the requirements to achieve his
American citizenship. Accordingly, Mr. Gitwaza is eligible for
naturalization and his application for that benefit is hereby approved.
The Court REMANDS the case to USCIS solely for the purpose of
naturalizing Mr. Gitwaza. USCIS shall schedule an oath ceremony for
him as soon as possible and shall issue a Certificate of Naturalization to
Mr. Gitwaza that same day.
C. Attorney’s Fees
The Court notes that Gitwaza seeks an award of his attorneys’ fees
incurred in prosecuting this action. See ECF No. 44 at 9; see generally
28 U.S.C. § 2412. Accordingly, to facilitate a Final Judgment
incorporating the appropriate fees and costs, the Court ORDERS
Gitwaza to submit appropriate evidence of the relevant fees and costs,
along with briefing regarding the reasonableness of same, on or before
July 22, 2024. Thereafter, should Defendants wish to contest Plaintiff’s
requested fees or costs, they shall file responsive briefing on or before
July 29, 2024.
CONCLUSION
After considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds
that Mr. Gitwaza has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that he possesses the requisite good moral character for naturalization.
This Country has been principled on the idea that every man, woman,
and child is innocent until proven guilty. The Government wants to hold
Mr. Gitwaza legally responsible for actions that were never proven in a
court of law and never supported by concrete evidence. The incident
leading to his plea for disorderly conduct and the dearth of corroborative
evidence cannot and will not be used to prevent Mr. Gitwaza from
earning citizenship. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Gitwaza’s
application for naturalization.
SO ORDERED on this 8th day of July 2024.

Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATED DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10672163. Public record. Not legal advice.