# Alvarado v. Director, TDCJ-CID

> District Court, N.D. Texas · June 20, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10672099

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** June 20, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10672099

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding unexhausted claim, which would be barred by the Texas abuse-of-the-writ doctrine if raised in a successive state habeas petition, to be procedurally barred
- holding there is a rebuttable presumption that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits when the state court addresses some claims, but not others, in its opinion

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

TRINIDAD ALVARADO,

Petitioner,

v. Civil No. 4:23-cv-01018-P

BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director,
TDCJ- CID,

Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Trinidad Alvarado, a state
prisoner confined in the Ney State Jail Unit of the Correctional
Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(“TDCJ-CID”). After considering the pleadings and relief sought, the
Court concludes that Alvarado’s § 2254 petition should be and hereby
is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Alvarado is in custody pursuant to the judgment and sentence of
the 297th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, in cause number
1542459D, styled The State of Texas v. Trinidad Alvarado. SHCR at 5–
6, ECF No. 22-19.1 Alvarado was indicted for the second-degree felony
offense of possession of more than four grams of methamphetamine,
enhanced by prior felony convictions for assault and possession with
intent to deliver. Id. at 4. He pleaded not guilty, but a jury found him
guilty as charged and, on October 24, 2019, assessed his sentence at
forty years of incarceration. Id. at 5–6.

1“SHCR” refers to the State Habeas Clerk’s Record of Alvarado’s state
habeas proceedings in Ex parte Alvarado, No. WR-94,615-01, followed by the
applicable pages. This record is on the docket at ECF No. 22, 19–22.
1
The Second Court of Appeals affirmed Alvarado’s conviction on
November 4, 2021. See Alvarado v. State, No. 02-19-00401-CR, 2021
WL 5132530, slip op. (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d). The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) refused Alvarado’s petition for
discretionary review on June 29, 2022. Alvarado v. State, PDR No.
0933-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
On January 8, 2023, Alvarado filed a state habeas application
challenging his conviction and sentence. See SHCR at 11-26, ECF No.
22-19. The state habeas court issued findings of fact and conclusions of
law to recommend denying relief. Id, at 100-111. Based on those
findings and its independent review, the TCCA denied relief on April
19, 2023. SHCR at “Action Taken,” ECF No. 22-20.
Alvarado constructively filed the instant petition for federal habeas
relief on September 24, 2023. Pet. 15, ECF No. 1. Although the petition
was originally filed in the Western District of Texas, the case was
transferred here on October 3, 2023. ECF No. 4. Because Alvarado
initially failed to pay the filing fee, this Court dismissed his petition for
want of prosecution on November 21, 2023. Order, ECF No. 8. Upon
Alvarado’s payment of the fee and filing of a motion to reinstate the
case, the Court reinstated the case. Order, ECF No. 13. The case is
now ripe for resolution.
The state appellate court summarized the facts from Alvarado’s
trial as follows:
On March 5, 2018, Officers Jentry Cotten and Mark
Stokes stopped a driver—later identified as Alvarado—
who did not timely activate his turn signal and made an
improper wide turn at an intersection. When Cotten
approached the truck, Alvarado was “fidgeting [and] . . .
shifting around in the car.” Cotten saw a black case
between the seats and asked Alvarado to get out of the
truck. Alvarado said there was nothing illegal in the truck
and consented to a search of the truck. The case Cotten
had seen contained a small amount of crystal-like
substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. Cotten
gave the case and its contents to Stokes, arrested and
2
handcuffed Alvarado, and placed Alvarado in the back of
the patrol car. Cotten then noticed a plastic bag on the
ground where Alvarado had been standing during the
search of the truck. The bag contained a larger amount of
crystal-like substance that appeared to be
methamphetamine. Later testing confirmed that the
substance in the plastic bag was more than 4 grams of
methamphetamine. After Alvarado was taken to the
police station and formally read his rights, he admitted
that he knew there was methamphetamine in the black
case in the truck, that the plastic bag of
methamphetamine on the ground was his, and that he
had intended to deliver the plastic bag of
methamphetamine to someone. He also stated that he
“got caught with seven grams of ice”—methamphetamine.

Alvarado v. State, 2021 WL 5132530, at *1.
The Court understands Alvarado to claim:
1. The record establishes no legal justification for his
detention, search, and arrest;
2. The police had neither probable cause nor consent to
conduct a warrantless search;
3. His statement was illegally obtained through coercion;
4. The trial court’s abuse of discretion deprived him of a
fair proceeding; and,
5. He was deprived of constitutionally effective assistance
of counsel.
Pet. 5-16, Brief 25-46, ECF No. 1.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard
against extreme malfunctions in state criminal justice systems, not a
substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. For claims that
were adjudicated in state court, § 2254(d) imposes a highly deferential
3
standard that demands a federal court grant habeas relief only where
one of two conditions are present in the state court judgment. A federal
court may grant relief if the state court adjudicated a constitutional
claim contrary to, or unreasonably applied clearly established federal
law as determined by the Supreme Court. Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 100–01 (2011) (citing (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412 (2002)). Or the court may grant relief if the state court decision
was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the
record. Id. Section 2254(d)’s standard is necessarily difficult to meet
because it was so designed.
A state court’s decision can be “contrary” to established federal law
in two ways. (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06. First, if the state
court applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court precedent. Id. at
405. Second, if the state court confronts facts that are “materially
indistinguishable” from relevant Supreme Court precedent, but the
court reaches an opposite result. Id. at 406.
A state court decision applying the correct Supreme Court rule to
the facts of a particular case is to be reviewed under the “unreasonable
application” clause. (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. A state court
unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent only if it correctly
identifies the governing precedent but unreasonably applies it to the
facts of a particular case. Id. at 407–09. The focus of this test is not on
the state court’s method of reasoning, but rather on its ultimate legal
conclusion. Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(“It seems clear to us that a federal habeas court is authorized by
Section 2254(d) to review only a state court’s ‘decision,’ and not the
written opinion explaining that decision.”).
To determine if the state court made an unreasonable application, a
federal court “must determine what arguments or theories supported
or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must
ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those
arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior
4
decision of this Court.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 87. Thus, “a state
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’” on the correctness
of the state court’s decision. Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Further, in reviewing a state court’s merits
adjudication for reasonableness, a federal court is limited to the record
that was before the state court. § 2254(d)(2); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
The question for federal review is not whether the state court
decision was incorrect, but whether it was unreasonable, which is a
substantially higher threshold. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,
473 (2007). Federal courts look to the “last reasoned opinion” as the
state court’s “decision.” Salts v. Epps, 676 F.3d 468, 479 (5th Cir.
2012). If a higher state court offered different grounds for its ruling
than a lower court, then only the higher court’s decision is reviewed.
Id. “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an
explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by
showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny
relief.” Harrington, 526 U.S. at 98; see Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S.
289, 293 (2013) (holding there is a rebuttable presumption that the
federal claim was adjudicated on the merits when the state court
addresses some claims, but not others, in its opinion).
This Court must accept as correct any factual determinations made
by the state courts unless Petitioner rebuts the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e); see
Ford v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2018) (“a state court’s factual
findings are presumed to be correct, and the applicant bears the
burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing
evidence.”). The presumption of correctness applies to both implicit and
explicit factual findings. Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir.
2004); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The
presumption of correctness not only applies to explicit findings of fact,
5
but it also applies to those unarticulated findings which are necessary
to the state court’s conclusions of mixed law and fact.”); see also
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981) (holding that state
appellate courts’ findings are entitled to the same respect that trial
judges’ findings receive). Deference to the factual findings of a state
court is not dependent upon the quality of the state court’s evidentiary
hearing. See Valdez, 274 F.3d at 951 (holding that “a full and fair
hearing is not a precondition to according § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of
correctness to state habeas court findings of fact nor to applying §
2254(d)’s standards of review.”). Further, the district court can “infer
the state court’s factual findings” so long as “some indication of the
legal basis for the state court’s denial of relief” exists. Ford, 910 F.3d at
235 (citing Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 184 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Moreover, where the state’s highest court’s decision lacks any
reasoning, “the federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a
relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained
decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct.
1188, 1192 (2018).
Furthermore, an evidentiary hearing is precluded unless: (1) a
petitioner’s claims rely on a new rule of constitutional law or a factual
predicate previously undiscoverable through the exercise of due
diligence; and (2) the petitioner establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found him guilty. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). A failure to meet
this standard of “diligence” will bar a federal evidentiary hearing in
the absence of a convincing claim of actual innocence that can only be
established by newly discovered evidence. (Michael) Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). For example, a petitioner’s failure to
present controverted, previously unresolved factual issues to the state
court can qualify as a “failure” under the plain meaning of § 2254(e)(2).
Id. at 433. However, Section 2254(e)(2) has “force [only] where §
6
2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at
185. Accordingly, even if a petitioner can leap the § 2254(e)(2) hurdle,
“evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1)
review.” Id. And whatever discretion remains after Pinholster to hold
an evidentiary hearing, it is still appropriate to deny such a hearing if
sufficient facts exist to make an informed decision on the merits.
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2007). Petitioner has not
met this standard for a hearing.
Also, pre-AEDPA precedent forecloses habeas relief if a claim (1) is
procedurally barred as a consequence of a failure to comply with state
procedural rules, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991); (2)
seeks retroactive application of a new rule of law to a conviction that
was final before the rule was announced, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989); or (3) asserts trial error that, although of constitutional
magnitude, did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,
637 (1993) (citation omitted).
B. Ineffective Assistance Claim is Unexhausted and
Barred (Ground 5)
Taking his last claim first, Alvarado claims he was deprived of
constitutionally effective assistance when trial counsel (1) failed to
object to Officer Cotten’s testimony describing what he found in the
truck and the methamphetamine in the black bag found on the ground;
(2) failed to obtain Alvarado’s mental health records and argue his
diminished capacity when he provided his statement to police; (3)
failed to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument; and (4) played
blackjack and solitaire on his personal laptop. Pet. at 16, Brief at 43-
46, ECF No. 1. Because these ineffective assistance claims in Ground 5
were never presented to the TCCA, such claims are unexhausted and
procedurally barred.
The exhaustion doctrine requires that state courts be given the
initial opportunity to address and, if necessary, correct alleged
7
deprivations of federal constitutional rights. Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). To
satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a claim must be presented to the
highest court of the state for review—here, the TCCA. Richardson v.
Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d
427, 443 (5th Cir. 1982). To proceed before that court, a petitioner
must either file a petition for discretionary review (after his conviction
is affirmed by an intermediate appellate court), Tex. R. App. P. 68.1, or
an application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07.
All grounds raised in a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus
must have been “fairly presented” to the state courts prior to being
presented to the federal courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971). In other words, for a claim to be exhausted, the state court
system must have been presented with the same facts and legal theory
upon which the petitioner bases his assertions. Id. at 275-77. “[I]t is
not enough . . . that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.”
Wilder v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). Where a “petitioner advances in federal
court an argument based on a legal theory distinct from that relied
upon in the state court, he fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.”
Id. at 259 (citing Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954, 958 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983)).
“Exhaustion ‘requires a state prisoner to present the state courts with
the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.’” Id. at 261 (citing
Picard, 404 U.S. at 276).
Additionally, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner
must have not only presented his claims to the highest state court, but
he must have presented them in a procedurally correct manner.
Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. When a petitioner raises a claim in a
procedural context in which its merits will not be considered, he has
not “fairly presented” the claim to the state courts, and, therefore, has
not satisfied the statutory exhaustion doctrine. Id.; Satterwhite v.
8
Lynaugh, 886 F.2d 90, 92-93 (5th Cir. 1989).
Alvarado has not exhausted Claim 5 because he did not raise it in
his PDR or state writ application. See Alvarado, PDR No. 0933-21;
SHCR at 11–48, ECF No. 22-19. Instead, he bypassed the TCCA to
present the instant claim in federal court, depriving the TCCA of the
opportunity to review and, if necessary, correct any constitutional
deprivation that might have occurred with respect to his counsel’s
assistance. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 349; Picard, 404 U.S. at 275.
Notwithstanding Alvarado’s failure to exhaust his state court
remedies, however, Claim 5 is procedurally barred from federal habeas
corpus review.2 Even though this claim has not been reviewed by the
TCCA, this Court may find it procedurally barred. Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). The normal rule that a state
court must explicitly apply a procedural bar to preclude federal review
does not apply to those cases where a petitioner has failed to exhaust
his state court remedies and the state court to which he would be
required to present his supporting facts would now find them to be
procedurally barred. Id. In such cases, the federal procedural default
doctrine precludes federal habeas corpus review. Id.; see Nobles v.
Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding unexhausted claim,
which would be barred by the Texas abuse-of-the-writ doctrine if raised
in a successive state habeas petition, to be procedurally barred); see
also Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1997) (same).
Again, Alvarado has failed to exhaust Claim 5 because he did not
raise it in a PDR or in his state writ application. Were this Court to

2The amended version of § 2254(b) provides that a federal court may deny
a petitioner’s application for habeas relief on the merits, notwithstanding his
failure to exhaust state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2007). As the
Supreme Court explained, the exhaustion requirement “is satisfied ‘if it is
clear that [the habeas petitioner’s] claims are now procedurally barred under
[state] law.’” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) (quoting Castille v.
Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)).
9
require Alvarado to present this claim to the TCCA to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement, however, it would be procedurally barred
under the Texas abuse of the writ doctrine, codified at Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art 11.07 § 4. The Fifth Circuit has found that the TCCA
applies its abuse of the writ rules regularly and strictly. Fearance v.
Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 642 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, since the 1995
amendment of the Texas habeas corpus statute, the TCCA has applied
abuse of the writ even more regularly and strictly. Now, the statute
prohibits a Texas court from considering the merits of, or granting
relief based on, a subsequent writ application filed after the final
disposition of an inmate’s first application unless he demonstrates the
statutory equivalent of cause or actual innocence. Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 § 4(1)–(2).
For this Court to reach the merits of Alvarado’s unexhausted and
defaulted claim, he must demonstrate cause and prejudice or that the
Court’s failure to address the claim will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750–51. As Alvarado
fails to allege—much less establish—either, this Court must dismiss
his ineffective assistance claims listed in ground 5 with prejudice as
unexhausted and procedurally barred.
C. Alvarado’s Fourth Amendment Claims are Not
Cognizable (Grounds 1 and 2)
Alvarado claims he was subjected to an unlawful search and seizure
when he was detained and his truck searched. Pet. 5-7, Brief 29-35.
Fourth Amendment claims, however, are not cognizable in federal
habeas.
Where a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494
(1976). The Fifth Circuit has interpreted an “opportunity for full and
fair litigation” to mean just that: “an opportunity.” Janecka v. Cockrell,
301 F.3d 316, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Caver v. Alabama, 577
10
F.2d 1188, 1192 (5th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1196 (2003). “If
a state provides the processes whereby a defendant can obtain full and
fair litigation of a [F]ourth [A]mendment claim, Stone v. Powell bars
federal habeas corpus consideration of that claim whether or not the
defendant employs those processes.” Id. Texas provides such an
opportunity; indeed, Alvarado employed it on direct appeal. See
Appellant’s Pro se Brief at 4–7, 11–14, Alvarado v. State, No. 02-19-
00401-CR. Accordingly, this Court may not entertain Alvarado’s
Fourth Amendment grounds on federal habeas review. Thus, these
claims must be denied.
D. The TCCA Reasonably Rejected Claims of Trial-
Court-Error (Grounds 3 and 4)
In his third ground, Alvarado alleges his statement to police officers
was coerced. Pet. 8, Brief 35–37, ECF No. 1. The Court interprets this
claim to challenge the state trial court’s admission of this statement.
See SHCR at 20–21, 40–42, ECF No. 22-19. In his fourth ground,
Alvarado alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it made
findings on his motion to suppress evidence, depriving him of a fair
trial. Brief 37–43, ECF No. 1. As explained below, because the TCCA
dismissed both claims pursuant to an independent procedural rule,
this Court is precluded from reaching the merits of these claims.
Moreover, even if the Court were to reach the merits, Alvarado is not
entitled to relief.
1. Procedural default precludes review of Grounds 3
and 4.
Procedural default of a petitioner’s federal habeas claim occurs
where the last state court to consider a claim “clearly and expressly”
dismisses it based upon a state procedural rule that provides an
adequate basis for denial of relief, independent of the merits. Maples v.
Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731–32;
Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2001). The
“independent” and “adequate” requirements are satisfied where the
11
court clearly indicates that its dismissal of a particular claim rests
upon a state ground that bars relief, and that bar is strictly and
regularly followed by the state courts. Finley, 243 F.3d at 218. This
doctrine ensures that federal courts give proper respect to state
procedural rules. Glover v. Cain, 446, 451 (2000). The application of an
independent and adequate state procedural bar must be honored even
if that state court has, in the alternative, reached the merits of the
claim. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 264, 269 n.10 (1989).
Alvarado did not raise Grounds 3 and 4 in his PDR after direct
appeal, but instead asserted them in his state habeas application. In
finding both claims procedurally barred, the state court applied the
“well-settled” rule that “the [habeas] writ . . . should not be used to
litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.” State
Trial Court’s Conclusions of Law, SHCR at 104, ECF No. 22-19
(quoting Ex parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d 189, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
(internal quotations omitted)). The requirement that record-based
claims be raised on direct appeal is an independent bar to federal
habeas review. Dorsey v. Quarterman, 494 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir.
2007); Scheanette v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 815, 827 (5th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, Alvarado is precluded from federal habeas relief,
absent a showing of cause and prejudice or that this Court’s failure to
consider these claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. 750; Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 718 (5th
Cir. 2004). Again, Alvarado makes no such argument, which means
Ground 3 and 4 are also procedurally barred from review in this
federal proceeding.
E. Alternatively, Grounds 3 and 4 Must be Denied on
the Merits
1. The trial court’s ruling and related findings
At trial, the State proffered Alvarado’s recorded oral statement
from his custodial interrogation. The Defense objected, asserting that
the statement should be excluded on Fifth Amendment grounds and as
12
involuntary. 4 RR 17, ECF No. 22-6.3 The trial court overruled the
objection to admit Alvarado’s statement into evidence. Id. Outside the
presence of the jury, the trial court made findings of fact and
conclusions of law on its denial of the defense’s motion to suppress:
Inregards to the Defense’s motion to suppress, Court
makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law,
certified Fort Worth police Officer Jentry Cotten testified
truthfully. He was on routine patrol with certified police
officer Mark Stokes on or about March 5th, 2018. He
observed the defendant operating a vehicle. He observed
the defendant commit two traffic violations, one under
545.104 and one under 545.101. He conducted a legal
traffic stop of the defendant.
State’s Exhibit 3. The traffic stop was made initially for
the purposes of potential traffic violations by this
defendant.

State’s Exhibit 3 does not show anything in the parking
lot on the video.

Officer Mark Stokes -- Certified Police Officer Mark
Stokes also testified truthfully. He observed the same
traffic violations that Officer Cotton saw.

The defendant appeared to be moving and seeming
fidgety to Officer Cotten. Officer Cotten upon approaching
the vehicle had -- the vehicle had one occupant, it was the
defendant. Officer Cotten observed a small black pouch
next to the driver's seat within arm's reach of the
defendant. It appeared from the testimony the black
pouch has appeared to be consistent with small black
pouches Officer Cotten has seen before containing illegal
narcotics.

The defendant, Trinidad Alvarado, voluntarily gave

3“RR” is the Reporter’s Record of transcripts of the underlying trial
proceedings. The several volumes of the reporter’s record are on the docket of
this case at ECF Nos, 22-3 through 22-9.
13
Officer Cotten consent to search the vehicle. Upon
searching the vehicle, Officer Cotton located the black
pouch. Inside the black pouch, Officer Cotten found a
white crystal substance consistent, in his training and
experience, with methamphetamine.

Before conducting the search, the defendant was detained
outside of the -- of his vehicle in front of Officer Cotten
and Stokes' patrol unit. The defendant was arrested at
the scene for possession of methamphetamine.

The defendant expressed a willingness to talk to a
narcotics officer to Officer Cotten. Officer Cotten
contacted a narcotics officer, Ralph Stevenson. Ralph
Stevenson testified truthfully. Ralph Stevenson met with
the defendant. He read the defendant the defendant’s
Miranda4 rights. The defendant was not promised
anything at that time for his statement. Defendant was
not threatened or coerced in exchange for his statement.
The defendant was not denied any basic needs. He was
not held for an extended period of time. The defendant
never asked for a lawyer or made a request to stop the
interview.

There was no coercion of the defendant. The -- the
defendant understood his Miranda rights. Based upon the
totality of the testimony from Officer Cotten, Stokes, and
Officer Stevenson, and based upon the recording of the
defendant's conversation with Ralph Stevenson as
admitted in State's Exhibit 5, defendant intentionally and
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and
voluntarily spoke with Officer Stevenson.

Therefore, based upon the totality of the testimony so far,
the defendant's motion to suppress evidence is denied.

4 RR 61-63, ECF No. 22-6.

4Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14
2. Supreme Court precedent on Voluntary Pleas and Trial
Court Error
A habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that his confession
was involuntary. See Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1103 (5th Cir.
1987). To do so, he must show that it was induced by governmental
coercion. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986); Self v.
Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir. 1992). And where a state court’s
fact and credibility findings support its ruling on voluntariness, the
petitioner must rebut those findings with clear and convincing
evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,
433–41 (1983); Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1002) (en
banc). “Cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument
that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact
that law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda
are rare.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984).
And even if a petitioner establishes trial court error, to prevail on
his claim, he must also establish that “the error ‘had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht,
507 U.S. at 637 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)). In other words, relief is contingent upon a showing of “actual
prejudice.” Id. (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).
3. The Rejection of Ground 3 is Consistent with Supreme
Court Precedent
The record contains no evidence of official coercion. It includes
testimony from two officers that Alvarado was read his Miranda rights
prior to providing his statement. After indicating that he understood
his rights, Alvarado voluntarily waived them, to admit that the bag
found on the ground was his, that he had methamphetamine and that
he was on his way to deliver it to someone. 4 RR 14–19, ECF No. 22-6.
During the conversation, he never indicated that he did not want to
talk or that he would like to have an attorney present. Id. at 15.
Petitioner’s basic needs were provided for during the interrogation. Id.
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But Alvarado claims he could not have invoked his Miranda rights
for fear of forfeiting the confidential-informant deal he was offered.
Brief 36, ECF No. 1. Officer Stephenson did not, however, offer to
dismiss Alvarado’s charges for admitting his guilt. For dismissal,
Alvarado had to act as a confidential informant; that is, he had to lead
the police to three other people with the same or more
methamphetamine. While it appears Alvarado did not fulfill his end of
the deal, he still tries to collect his reward by arguing the deal was too
good to pass up. No matter the deal, however, Alvarado does not claim
that it undermined his understanding of the rights he was waiving.
Alvarado also fails to identify any case where the Supreme Court
has held that a potential confidential-informant deal negates a
Miranda waiver. In fact, many courts have held similar inducements
are insufficiently coercive to violate the Fifth Amendment. See e.g.,
United States v. Ornelas-Rodriguez, 12 F.3d 1339, 1347 (5th Cir. 1994)
(confession voluntary even though police explained advantages of
cooperation); United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 265–66 (2d Cir.
1995) (confession voluntary despite promise of leniency if defendant
cooperated with law enforcement); United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d
927, 933 (7th Cir. 1990) (confession voluntary even though police
solicited the confession by offering to reduce charges); United States v.
Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir. 1990) (confession voluntary even
though police told defendant they would recommend leniency and
cooperation would be known to the U.,S. Attorney).
As Alvarado fails to demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of
Ground 3 was unreasonable or inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent, § 2254(d) precludes relief. Thus, to the extent the Court
considers the merits of Ground 3, it must be denied.
4. Supreme Court Precedent Also Requires Rejection of
Ground 4.
In Ground 4, it appears Alvarado takes issue with the trial court’s
findings as set out above. But he fails to provide any evidence—beyond
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his own provocations—refuting the trial judge’s findings. Brief 36–37,
ECF No. 1. Moreover, as the trial court issued the above findings
outside the presence of the jury, Alvarado cannot show that they had
any impact on the jury’s verdict, much less the “substantial and
injurious” one required for relief. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The state
court’s denial of relief was reasonable. Accordingly, relief is not
available on Ground 4.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, it is ORDERED that Trinidad Alvarado’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is
DENIED. Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), for the reasons
discussed herein, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 20th day of June 2024.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10672099. Public record. Not legal advice.