# Lindsey v. American Airlines Inc

> District Court, N.D. Texas · September 7, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10671123

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** September 7, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10671123

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “Title VII does not protect against age . . . discrimination”
- finding no Title VII liability where plaintiff “made no argument that his [gender non-conformity] provided the basis for the harassment he experienced”
- noting summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter…

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

KIMBERLEY LINDSEY,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00502-P
d
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF
No. 20. Having considered the briefing and evidence of record, the Court
concludes the Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Kimberley Lindsey wanted a better job. In particular, Lindsey
applied for a coveted spot with the “Onboard Service” team at American
Airlines. American chose other candidates for the gig; Lindsey says
American did so for discriminatory reasons. To understand how the
parties got here, it helps to examine Lindsey’s work chronology. With
American’s multi-tiered “Department–Sub-Department–Team”
organization,1 Lindsey’s intradepartmental history gets confusing.
Relevant highlights are below.

1Be warned: the corporate nomenclature in this case is abstruse. To prime
the reader, this case concerns subdepartments under American’s Customer
Experience/Flight Service Department (“Flight Service”). Employees in Flight
Service fall into two groups: Flight Attendants and Corporate. On the
corporate side, Flight Service has multiple subdepartments, including
Customer Delivery, Food & Beverage, and Safety. These subdepartments are
organized into Teams. Relevant here is the Policies & Procedures Team (which
falls under Customer Delivery, which falls under Flight Service). The parties
also discuss various “levels” assigned to corporate employees which correspond
to the employees’ responsibilities and pay scales. The Court signposts wherever
these taxonomies are salient.
American hired Lindsey in 2013 as a flight attendant in Flight
Service. In 2018, Lindsey switched positions within Flight Service,
taking a new role as an analyst with the Policies & Procedures Team.2
That’s where turbulence hit. During her time with Policies &
Procedures, Lindsey joined other American employees in filing a
complaint against her supervisor, Jeffrey Painter. As part of the
grievance against Painter, Lindsey suggested her coworker, Robert
Aderman, added “fuel to the fire” of Painter’s workplace hostilities.
American fired Painter but took no formal action against Aderman.
Complaints regarding Aderman continued for the duration of Lindsey’s
time with Policies & Procedures, culminating in internal disciplinary
action against Aderman in 2020.
In early 2020, COVID-19 hit, prompting reorganization at American.
As part of that reorganization, American reduced its Flight Service
workforce by 37% and reassigned the OSM to a new two-person Onboard
Service team under the umbrella of Food & Beverage, rather than
Customer Delivery. Neither Lindsey nor Aderman were selected for one
of the new Onboard Service positions. Lindsey says this was age-
discriminatory, as both candidates selected for Onboard Service—Kati
Conti and Carolina Londono—were younger women. With the OSM
reassigned, American nixed Lindsey’s position with Policies &
Procedures on June 30, 2020. The next week, Lindsey filed a complaint
alleging her position was eliminated in retaliation for her 2019
grievance against Painter. American investigated Lindsey’s complaint
but found no evidence to substantiate her allegations. Rather, American
insisted Lindsey’s position was eliminated as part of American’s
department-wide belt-tightening in response to the COVID-induced glut
in air travel.
With their roles eliminated, the next destination for Aderman was
the Safety subdepartment, while Lindsey landed back where she began,
resuming work as a flight attendant. After flight-attendant furloughs

2At Policies & Procedures, Lindsey primarily worked on the Onboard
Service Manual (“OSM”) used by flight attendants and cabin crews in
American’s worldwide fleet.
for the remainder of 2020, Lindsey returned to work in early 2021. She
has continued in that position to date.
Around the time she returned to work, Lindsey filed a discrimination
charge with the EEOC. After exhausting her administrative remedies,
Lindsey sued American on June 8, 2022. She filed an Amended
Complaint on February 21, 2023, alleging counts of retaliation and sex-
and age-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. Consistent with the approach adopted in American’s summary
judgment briefing, the Court assumes Lindsey intended to bring her age
discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence
presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of
the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43
(1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect a case’s outcome. Id. at 248.
Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material,”
and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Id. In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate,
the Court views evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Servs., LLC, 64 F.4th 597, 600 (5th Cir.
2023). The Court may rely on any evidence of record but need only
consider those materials cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)–(3);
see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting
summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). But the
Court need not mine the record for evidence supporting the nonmovant;
the burden falls on the moving party to simply show a lack of evidence
supporting the nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393,
404–05 (5th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
American seeks summary judgment on each of Lindsey’s claims: sex-
and age- based discrimination and retaliation. The Court addresses the
discrimination claims first and then proceeds to the retaliation claim.
A. Title VII Sex Discrimination.
Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination based on sex. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). This can manifest in different ways, including
direct discrimination (where an employee suffers adverse employment
actions because of their sex) or discrimination-by-sexual-harassment
(where pervasive workplace harassment constitutes sex-based
discrimination). See Wallace v. Performance Contractors, Inc., 57 F.4th
209, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2023). The Court analyzes Lindsey’s claim through
both lenses.
1. Direct Sex Discrimination.
To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under Title VII,
Lindsey must show “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was
qualified for the position she sought; (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) others similarly situated but outside the
protected class were treated more favorably.” Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers,
492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by
Hamilton v. Dall. Cnty., ___ F.4th ___, 2023 WL 5316716 (5th Cir. 2023).
“Adverse employment action” doesn’t always mean the plaintiff was
fired; Title VII prohibits employers from taking any unfavorable action
based on an employee’s membership in a protected class. Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77 (1984); see also Hamilton, 2023 WL
5316716, at *8 (noting any hypothetical adverse action may support a
Title VII discrimination claim if it represents a “tangible, objective, and
material instance of sex discrimination in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment”). In such “disparate treatment” cases, the
plaintiff must also show their employer “had a discriminatory intent or
motive for taking a job-related action.” Saketkoo v. Admins. of Tulane
Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 997 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).
Plaintiffs can demonstrate discriminatory intent circumstantially by
showing a colleague outside their protected class (in this case, Aderman)
was treated more favorably. Id. At that point, the burden shifts to the
employer to provide a non-discriminatory counter-explanation as
outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
While the McDonnell Douglas analysis comes into play for Lindsey’s
ADEA claim, the Court need not progress that far for the instant claim
because Lindsey fails to establish a prima facie claim of sex
discrimination.
Lindsey is a member of a protected class (a female) and suffered an
adverse employment action (she wasn’t selected for Onboard Service).
See ECF No. 16 at 2–5. The parties extensively brief the second
element—whether Lindsey was qualified for the position sought—but
succeed only in proving a genuine dispute exists over that material fact.
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242–43. Lindsey thus survives summary
judgment for the first, second, and third elements under Alvarado. See
492 F.3d at 611. But her claim unravels at the fourth element, as
Lindsey fails to show Aderman was treated more favorably because of
his sex.
The crux of Lindsey’s direct-discrimination claim is that, after
Aderman’s and Lindsey’s positions were eliminated, Aderman landed in
favorable position with Safety while Lindsey “was presented with two
options: (1) leave AA; or (2) accept a demotion to Flight Attendant and
an approximately 49% reduction in pay.” ECF No. 16 at 4. In moving to
Safety, Aderman was bumped from a Level 3 analyst to a Level 4 senior
analyst, which pays better. ECF No. 21 at 15. But Lindsey admits
having no personal knowledge of who placed Aderman in Safety or why,
and she furnishes no evidence suggesting sex was a factor. ECF No. 22
at 109. Moreover, Aderman affirmatively sought his role with Safety by
contacting a former supervisor to discuss the opening. ECF No. 21 at 22.
Aderman’s qualifications aside, it is not discriminatory for Aderman to
capitalize upon professional connections to land in a position superior to
Lindsey’s.
The record reflects no work history that would uniquely qualify
Lindsey for a position in Safety. Aderman, on the other hand, “was a
lower-level analyst and received a higher performance rating.” Id. It also
didn’t hurt that Aderman had an established relationship with Safety
leadership. Even if Lindsey was qualified for a Safety position, Aderman
and Lindsey experienced the same adverse employment action when
their positions with Policies & Procedures were eliminated—and there
is no evidence Lindsey inquired about the Safety position. Aderman
wasn’t automatically chosen for Safety; he sought the position on his
own initiative. ECF No. 21 at 22. Thus, Aderman’s hiring by Safety
cannot serve as the adverse employment action for Lindsey’s claim
unless Lindsey shows that she did not apply for Safety because she
believed doing so would be a “futile gesture” considering American’s
systemic discrimination. Shackleford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190
F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 1999). Because Lindsey furnishes no such
evidence, the only relevant adverse action was the elimination of her job
with Policies & Procedures (which affected Aderman equally). In this
sense, Aderman was not “retained” so much as he pivoted, though Safety
falls under Flight Service. That someone outside of Lindsey’s protected
class leaned on his professional network to find a better job does not give
rise to Title VII liability for American. Id. Lindsey thus fails to establish
a prima facie case of direct discrimination.
2. Discriminatory Sexual Harassment.
As mentioned above, “Title VII also prohibits sexual harassment as
a form of employment discrimination.” Wallace, 57 F.4th at 220. “There
are two types of sexual harassment under Title VII: quid-pro-quo and
hostile-environment harassment.” EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., LLC,
731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013). For the latter, relevant here, the
plaintiff must show: “(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was
subjected to harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and
(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take remedial action.” Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 1003.
Lindsey satisfies the first element and the record suggests Lindsey
was subjected to harassment from Aderman, satisfying the second.3 The
parties go back and forth on the fourth and fifth elements, disputing the
degree to which Aderman created a “hostile work environment” and the
propriety of American’s response to Lindsey’s complaints. This genuine
dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment on either of those
elements. Summary judgment is nonetheless warranted because there
is no evidence Aderman’s harassment was sex-based.
Unfortunately for workers in Lindsey’s position, being a jerk isn’t
illegal. True, “Title VII [ ] makes it unlawful for employers to require
‘people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abuse environment.’”
West v. City of Houston, Tex., 960 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, LLC, 915 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2019)).
But courts have consistently held that Title VII requires some objective
indicia that a coworker’s animus was based on an employee’s
membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 1004
(affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment, reasoning that
“even if we assume Dr. Lasky’s treatment of [Plaintiff] was severe
enough to constitute harassment, her claim still fails. Although she
presented evidence of his tendency to degrade her, [Plaintiff] did not
demonstrate that his actions were based on her gender”); La Day v.
Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[H]arassment
that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment
might be excluded from the coverage of Title VII because it was not
discriminatory on the basis of sex.”) (cleaned up); Vickers v. Fairfield
Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding no Title VII liability
where plaintiff “made no argument that his [gender non-conformity]
provided the basis for the harassment he experienced”) (cleaned up).

3See, e.g., ECF Nos. 16 at 3 (recounting Aderman’s history of hostilities,
including instances where he “yelled and became highly aggressive and
verbally abusive with his attacks over a period of 45 minutes”); 24 at 5 (again
recounting Aderman becoming “highly aggressive and verbally abusive” and
noting that “[d]espite Plaintiff’s reports, Aderman, who had only been
employed by Defendant for four years, was promoted to a level 4 Senior
Analyst”); see also ECF No. 22 at 35–52 (the human resources complaint
detailing Aderman’s misconduct).
Thus, without any evidence that Aderman’s workplace hostilities were
sexually motivated, Lindsey cannot maintain a discrimination-by-
sexual-harassment claim.
* * *
For the above reasons, summary judgment is warranted for
Lindsey’s sex-discrimination claim. The fatal flaw for her direct-
discrimination theory is that she suffered the same adverse employment
action as her male counterpart (though he landed in a favorable position
afterward). The flaw for her discrimination-by-harassment theory is
that no evidence shows the harassment she experienced was sex-based.
To reiterate, the Court sympathizes with Lindsey’s position, as her time
with Policies & Procedures was marred by a nasty coworker. But what
was true in Saketkoo is true here: “The consistency of [Aderman’s]
workplace demeanor is lamentable, but that circumstance does not
supplant [Lindsey’s] burden to satisfy each element of a Title VII cause
of action.” 31 F.4th at 1004. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
American’s motion vis-à-vis Lindsey’s sex-discrimination claim.
B. ADEA Age Discrimination.
As noted above, the Court shares American’s intuition that Lindsey
meant to bring her age-discrimination claim under the ADEA (which
prohibits age discrimination), rather than Title VII (which doesn’t). See
generally ECF No. 21 at 19; Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434,
439 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting “Title VII does not protect against age . . .
discrimination”). The analysis is three-part. First, Lindsey must
establish a prima facie claim by showing:“(1) [s]he was discharged; (2)
[s]he was qualified for the position; (3) [s]he was within the protected
class at the time of discharge; and (4) [s]he was either (i) replaced by
someone outside the protected class, (ii) replaced by someone younger,
or (iii) otherwise discharged because of [her] age.” Rachid v. Jack in the
Box, 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). Second, if Lindsey
does so, the McDonnell Douglas rubric kicks in, meaning American has
the burden to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for its
employment decision. Harris v. City of Schertz, 27 F.4th 1120, 1123 (5th
Cir. 2022). Third, if American does so, the ball is back in Lindsey’s court
to show American’s explanation is pretextual. As explained below,
Lindsey establishes a prima facie claim, but American carries its burden
in showing nondiscriminatory reasons for the relevant employment
decision. As Lindsey provides no evidence that American’s explanation
is pretextual, summary judgment is warranted.
1. Lindsey establishes a prima facie claim.
Lindsey establishes a prima facie age-discrimination claim.
Summary judgment evidence shows American passed up Lindsey (who
was approaching sixty at the time) for two younger females: Mses. Conti
and Londono. See ECF No. 22 at 60. This satisfies the first, third, and
fourth elements under Rachid. 376 F.3d at 309. A genuine dispute exists
for the second element, as the parties brief diverging evidence of
Lindsey’s qualifications for Onboard Service.4 For present purposes,
Lindsey has established at least sufficient qualifications to support a
prima facie claim. This triggers the McDonnell Douglas shift, meaning
the burden falls on American to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802; Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007)
(applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting to ADEA claim). As
explained below, American carries its burden.
2. American provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the employment decision.
American says it hired Ms. Conti for the first Onboard Service
position for her relevant work experience and soft skills. Like Lindsey,
Conti worked her way up through the corporate side of Flight Service
from her initial role as a flight attendant. ECF No. 22 at 60. Although

4Compare ECF No. 21 at 11 (“Ms. Proctor found Plaintiff to be an average-
to-good performer, and she noted some concerns about her ‘soft skills.’ For
example, at Plaintiff’s annual performance review in February 2020, Ms.
Proctor encouraged her to continue working on her team-building skills and to
collaborate effectively with others. Ms. Proctor shared the importance of being
a team player and communicating as ‘one voice’ for the Policies and Procedures
team.”) (record citations omitted) with ECF No. 24 at 9 (“While occupying the
[Senior Analyst] position, Plaintiff obtained positive performance reviews all
along the way. Plaintiff’s own direct supervisor at the time, Kirstin Perkins,
testified that Plaintiff was ‘highly qualified.’”).
younger than Lindsey, Conti had worked for American longer. Id. Conti
also had extensive experience in food service, making her an ideal
candidate for the new Onboard Service team, which was organized
under the Food & Beverage subdepartment. Id. Finally, Conti was
known to have great “soft skills” and was particularly adept at
“soliciting feedback from flight attendants in a nonconfrontational way
and explaining to flight attendants why the galley was packed the way
it is.” ECF No. 21 at 14. As this would be a big part of the job with
Onboard Service, American chose Conti for the first position. American
chose Ms. Londono for the second position because she came “strongly
recommended” from other leaders within Flight Service, while Lindsey
was not recommended for the position at all. ECF No. 22 at 60.
American’s explanation is legitimate on its face and should not be
judicially second-guessed absent a showing of pretext. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citation omitted)
(“[The employer’s] burden is one of production, not persuasion; it can
involve no credibility assessment.”). Numerous considerations go into
any employment decision, especially in cases like this where the team
was new and only two spots were available. See ECF No. 21 at 12. As a
matter of simple math, there are typically more applicants than
positions for any job. In the case of Onboard Service, there were
significantly fewer positions (two) than interested candidates. American
has provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring Conti
and Londono; namely, their work experience, high performance reviews,
and stellar recommendations. ECF Nos. 21 at 14; 22 at 60.
Discrimination laws are not “vehicles for judicial second-guessing of
business decisions,” Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th
Cir. 1997), so the Court will not probe American’s reasons further absent
a showing of pretext.
3. Lindsey presents no evidence of pretext.
While courts are loath to second-guess a company’s hiring decisions,
employers cannot escape ADEA liability by furnishing post hoc
rationalizations for discriminatory employment practices. Thus, “[i]f the
employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
employment decision, the plaintiff must then be afforded an opportunity
to rebut the employer’s purported explanation to show that the reason
given is merely pretextual.” See Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d
917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp.,
602 F.3d 374, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2010)). In this context, “merely
pretextual” is legal-speak for hogwash, baloney, balderdash, or just
plain untrue. To show American’s explanation is “merely pretextual” is
no easy feat; Lindsey must do more than nit-pick the resumes of Conti
and Londono. Rather, she must furnish evidence that reasonably
indicates Conti’s and Londono’s relative youth played a bigger role in
the decision than did their qualifications. As discussed below, Lindsey
points the Court to no such evidence, warranting summary judgment on
her ADEA claim.
With no evidence indicating Lindsey was discouraged from applying
or disparaged for her age, Lindsey’s best bet to show pretext is the
“clearly more qualified” test. This is essentially a rule of thumb that says
if an employer passes up on an older employee that is “clearly more
qualified” for a position, it’s a safe bet age was a factor. See Moss, 610
F.3d at 927. Like all rules of thumb, the “clearly more qualified” test has
its limitations and can lead to a morass of subjective considerations the
judiciary is ill-equipped to traverse. See EEOC v. La. Off. of Cmty.
Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting pretext can be inferred
where “the employee was ‘clearly better qualified’ (as opposed to merely
better or as qualified) than the employee[ ] who [was] selected”). There
is no bright line between “as qualified” and “merely better” or between
“merely better” and “much better.” As evidenced by the dizzying array
of considerations found probative in similar cases, courts effectively
define “clearly more qualified” as “you know it when you see it.” See, e.g.,
id. at 1446 (collecting cases).
Pointing to no evidence of age-related animus, Lindsey instead
stacks her credentials against Conti’s and Londono’s. See ECF No. 16 at
4 (noting neither Conti nor Londono “had experience with the job
functions for which Plaintiff had been responsible, which included
onboard service procedures, policies, technical writing, manual editing,
and working with Adobe Framemaker software”). Though Lindsey’s
skillset seems transferable, it is not obvious a priori that such
experience made her a better candidate for Onboard Service than Conti
or Londono (with their own unique skillsets). Cf. ECF No. 22 at 60.
Regardless, the question is not whether American’s “decision was the
correct one, or the fair one, or the best one.” Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot.
& Reg. Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1999). Rather, the question is
whether Lindsey was passed up for Onboard Service “because of [her]
age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). And Lindsey identifies no evidence
suggesting American’s explanation is pretextual.
Lindsey’s case seems stronger vis-à-vis Londono than Conti, as
American references Conti’s skillset and experience but only references
Londono’s stellar recommendation from departmental leadership. ECF
No. 22 at 60. Further, Lindsey notes that “Londono’s prior position was
working on the uniform in Flight Service,” which does not seem
immediately relevant to her new position with Onboard Service. ECF
No. 16 at 4. But that’s a call for American to make, not the Court. “To
establish a fact question as to relative qualifications, a plaintiff must
provide sufficiently specific reasons for h[er] opinion; mere subjective
speculation will not suffice.” Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d
38, 42 (5th Cir. 1996). The evidence does not reflect (and Lindsey does
not explain) why Londono’s prior position made her less qualified for
Onboard Service, much less why Lindsey was “clearly more qualified”
for the position. This proves fatal for Lindsey’s claim.
* * *
While Lindsey established a prima facie discrimination claim under
the ADEA, American provided non-discriminatory reasons for the
relevant employment decision. The record contains no evidence that
American’s decision was based upon age-related animus and Lindsey
identified no evidence that she was “clearly more qualified” for an
Onboard Service position. The Court GRANTS summary judgment on
Lindsey’s ADEA claim accordingly.
C. Title VII Retaliation.
Having addressed Lindsey’s discrimination claims, the Court now
turns to her retaliation claim. The dearth of supporting evidence for this
claim is conspicuous. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a
plaintiff must show that ‘(1) [s]he participated in an activity protected
by Title VII; (2) [her] employer took an adverse employment action
against [her]; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.’” Newbury v. City of
Windcrest, Tex., 991 F.3d 672, 678 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting McCoy v. City
of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556–57 (5th Cir. 2007)). Lindsey satisfies
the first element because filing grievances with human resources is
protected activity under Title VII. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).
Lindsey satisfies the second element because she suffered an adverse
employment action, as previously established. But Lindsey fails to
establish the third element—that the elimination of her role with
Policies & Procedures was related to her complaints against Painter and
Aderman. See Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 969 F.3d 571, 577
(5th Cir. 2020) (“Ultimately, in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment, a plaintiff must show a conflict in substantial evidence on the
question of whether the employer would not have taken the adverse
employment action but for the protected activity.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Lindsey alleges that “she was demoted because of her prior hostile
work environment reports.” ECF No. 16 at 4. As an act of double-
retaliation, she further suggests her 2020 furlough was brought about
because she took her retaliation concerns to American’s HR department.
Id. But without any evidence—even circumstantial or inferential
evidence—Lindsey appears to conflate correlation with its more relevant
sibling, causation. Lindsey’s job was eliminated seven months after she
took her concerns regarding Painter and Aderman to human resources.
Cf. Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471–72 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding a five-month period did not support a causality
inference). But two things happened in the interim. First, American
fired Painter and hired Ms. Proctor as Lindsey’s new manager, meaning
Lindsey was under entirely new leadership when she was eliminated as
compared to when she filed her initial grievance. See ECF Nos. 21 at 28;
22 at 55. Second, and more relevant, a global pandemic hit that caused
massive layoffs and reorganizations in the airline industry. See ECF No.
22 at 56. Lindsey and Aderman were not alone when they lost their jobs
with Policies & Procedures. Rather, more than a third of the Flight
Service workforce faced the same unfortunate circumstance. ECF Nos.
21 at 12; 22 at 55–57. Lindsey’s most recent manager gave her a low
rating for upper management potential and questioned her ability to
work as a team player, increasing the odds that Lindsey’s job would be
nixed when American had to cut costs. ECF No. 22 at 56. That Lindsey
filed a grievance more than half a year earlier does not, without a
scintilla of evidence showing causality, support a Title VII retaliation
claim. Brown, 969 F.3d at 577. The Court GRANTS summary judgment
on Lindsey’s retaliation claim accordingly.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) and ENTERS summary
judgment in favor of Defendant American Airlines, Inc.
Accordingly, Plaintiff Kimberley Lindsey’s claims in this action are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 7th day of September 2023.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10671123. Public record. Not legal advice.