# Cross v. Tell

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · June 6, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669784

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** June 6, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669784

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a district court evaluating whether a complaint fails to state a claim may consider “any exhibits attached” to the complaint
- finding that “RLUIPA doesn’t permit money-damages claims against state prison officials in their individual capacities,” and claims to injunctive relief are subject to dismissal as moot if “a present or future injury” is not alleged
- describing the plaintiff’s burden to establish these two components, before the burden shifts to the government to show that its decision furthers a compelling interest and uses the least restrictive means to do so

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DWAYNE X. CROSS, #282574, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-01051
) Judge Trauger
WARDEN VAN TELL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Dwayne Cross, an inmate of the Trousdale Turner Correctional Complex (TTCC), filed a
pro se civil rights complaint (Doc. No. 1, “the Complaint”) and––after twice having checks
returned because they were drawn in incorrect amounts––ultimately succeeded in paying the full
filing fee. (Doc. No. 7.)
The Complaint is now before the court for an initial review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
In cases filed by prisoners against government officials, the court must review and dismiss
the Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
court reviews for whether it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although pro se pleadings must be liberally
construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the plaintiff must still “plead[] factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, upon “view[ing] the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir.
2009).
The plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes a federal suit
against any person who, “under color of state law, deprives [another] person of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. Jones-
Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the
Complaint must plausibly allege: (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and
(2) that the deprivation was caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595
(6th Cir. 2014).

B. Allegations and Claims
The plaintiff alleges that, on two dates in 2023, “the nation of Islam was denied the right
to have a religious feast” at TTCC. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) The feasts denied were the “Eid Feast” and
the “Saviours’ Day Feast.” (Id.; Doc. No. 1-1 at 3.) The plaintiff alleges that the denial of these
celebratory meals was not based on safety or security concerns (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2–5); that it
deprived the plaintiff of an “opportunity afforded other fellow prisoners who adhere to
conventional religious precepts” (id. at 4); and that it therefore violated his rights under the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, as well as the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). (Id. at 2–5.)
The plaintiff also alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when Job Coordinator
Blackwell acted with deliberate indifference to his “job needs” by denying him a prison job and,
therefore, the money he needs “to function.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 6–8.)
The Complaint names as defendants the TTCC Warden, Assistant Warden Norman,

Chaplains Fletcher and Beaver, and Job Coordinator Blackwell. (Doc. No. 1 at 1–2.) It seeks
injunctive relief and damages. (Id. at 4.)
C. Analysis
First, with respect to the claimed denial of a prison job by Job Coordinator Blackwell, this
claim is mis-joined to the plaintiff’s religious-freedom claims and, in any event, fails to establish
any plausible grounds for finding a constitutional violation. Put simply, the rules governing joinder
of claims and parties, Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 20, dictate that “[u]nrelated claims against different
defendants belong in different suits.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); Tolbert
v. Tennessee, No. 2:17-cv-2137-STA-egb, 2017 WL 4324541, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2017)
(collecting circuit court cases and explaining that the “impulse toward entertaining the broadest

scope of action” does not “provide a plaintiff a free license to join multiple defendants into a single
lawsuit where the claims against the defendants are unrelated”). While the court would not
typically dismiss a mis-joined claim upon first identifying it as such, in this case the plaintiff’s job-
related claim is not simply mis-joined––it also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Section 1983.
The plaintiff asserts his right to a prison job under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, claiming “a fundamental right to liberty, which includes the right to be free from
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” that results from an inability to work and earn a
wage. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 6.) But “[t]he Sixth Circuit consistently has found that prisoners have no
constitutionally protected liberty interest in prison employment under the Fourteenth
Amendment,” Perry v. Horton, No. 2:18-cv-200, 2019 WL 311796, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 24,
2019) (citing, e.g., Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001)), nor any
property right to a job or to wages for work they perform. Carter v. Tucker, 69 F. App’x 678, 680

(6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “Rather, prison administrators may assign inmates jobs and
wages at their discretion.” Vick v. Core Civic, 329 F. Supp. 3d 426, 451 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (citing
cases). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim against defendant Blackwell concerning deprivation of
prison employment will be dismissed.
The court now turns to the claims against the remaining defendants based on the plaintiff’s
religious freedoms. Prisoners have a First Amendment right to practice their religious beliefs and
must be provided “reasonable opportunities” to do so. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523
(1984). The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause protects an inmate’s pursuit of “sincerely
held” religious beliefs and practices from infringement by prison authorities, Maye v. Klee, 915
F.3d 1076, 1083 (6th Cir. 2019), and its Establishment Clause prevents prison policies or officials

from favoring one religious denomination (or one sect within a religious denomination) over
another. Id. at 1084–85. Nevertheless, these First Amendment rights may be subjected to
reasonable restrictions and limitations attendant to the prison setting, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
549–51 (1979); in particular, a deprivation alleged to offend the Free Exercise Clause will prove
valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987); Maye, 915 F.3d at 1083.1 Similarly, RLUIPA “prohibits state and local governments2
from placing a ‘substantial burden’ on the ‘religious exercise’ of any inmate unless they establish
that the burden furthers a ‘compelling governmental interest’ and does so in the ‘least restrictive’
way.” Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).

In order to state a claim for a RLUIPA violation, an inmate must allege that his “request for an
accommodation [is] sincerely based on a religious belief” and that the defendant’s “policy
substantially burdened that exercise of religion.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360–61 (2015);
Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., 927 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2019).
In the Complaint and attached documents,3 the plaintiff states that he was denied the right
to participate in the Eid feast on April 22, 2023, and that he and his fellow Nation of Islam
adherents were denied permission to have a Saviour’s Day Feast on February 27, 2023. (Doc. No.
1 at 4; Doc. No. 1-2 at 1–2.) As a result, while “[t]he Muslims are allowed two relig[i]ous feast[s]
a year,” “[t]he Nation of Islam [was] denied both” in 2023. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 2.) The plaintiff alleges
that these denials infringed upon his sincerely held religious beliefs, defined as his “view of his

relations to his creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence of His being and character,
and of obedience to His will.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 4.) The plaintiff also alleges that the denial of these

1 The Sixth Circuit in Maye noted that it had not yet resolved the question of whether Turner’s test for
relation to legitimate penological interests applies to an Establishment Clause claim, or whether official
policies or decisions claimed to infringe rights under that clause must survive the higher bar of strict
scrutiny. Maye, 915 F.3d at 1085.

2 RLUIPA’s prohibitions also apply to “any other person acting under color of State law,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii), a category that includes private companies performing the traditional state function
of operating a prison. Pleasant-Bey v. Tennessee, No. 3:19-cv-00486, 2020 WL 707584, at *6 (M.D. Tenn.
Feb. 12, 2020).

3 In screening a complaint under the PLRA, the court may consider grievances and other items attached to
the complaint. Hardy v. Sizer, No. 16-1979, 2018 WL 3244002, at *2 (6th Cir. May 23, 2018) (citing Bassett
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a district court
evaluating whether a complaint fails to state a claim may consider “any exhibits attached” to the
complaint)).
feasts did not appear to have anything to do with “legitimate goals of maintaining prison order,
discipline, safety or security threats,” and that TTCC officials did not provide a reason for denying
them. (Id. at 3–4.)
Under Maye v. Klee, supra, and for purposes of initial review, these allegations are

sufficient to plausibly claim relief under the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit in Maye
considered allegations that are not materially distinguishable from those before this court and
determined (1) that a Muslim inmate prevented from participating in Eid without any valid
penological justification stated a Free Exercise Clause claim, and (2) that the denial of such
participation to a Nation of Islam member––while members of the majority sect of Islam were
permitted to feast––stated an Establishment Clause claim. Maye, 915 F.3d at 1083–85. Relying on
precedent related to the denial of inmates’ requests to participate in a Passover Seder, Whitney v.
Brown, 882 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit determined that Eid is to Muslim inmates
as Passover is to Jewish inmates––“an especially critical and very special” occasion for a
ceremonial meal, “even though the ceremony only lasts ‘a few hours once a year.’” Maye, 915

F.3d at 1083 (quoting Whitney, 882 F.2d at 1073). The denial of an inmate’s ability to participate
in such ceremonial feasts without justification, or while allowing other inmates in a different sect
to do so, therefore runs afoul of the First Amendment. In light of this controlling authority, the
plaintiff’s First Amendment claims will proceed for further development.
The plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim will also survive initial review, as his allegations are
sufficient at this early stage to plausibly establish the two components of that claim: that his
requests to hold a Saviour’s Day Feast and attend the Eid feast were (1) based on his sincerely held
religious beliefs, which were (2) substantially burdened when those requests were denied. See
Cavin, 927 F.3d at 458 (describing the plaintiff’s burden to establish these two components, before
the burden shifts to the government to show that its decision furthers a compelling interest and
uses the least restrictive means to do so). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief
pertaining to policies around religious feasts at TTCC (Doc. No. 1 at 4) will proceed for further
development, pending the determination of whether the deprivations he alleges are ongoing. See

Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648, 656 (6th Cir. 2023) (finding that “RLUIPA doesn’t permit
money-damages claims against state prison officials in their individual capacities,” and claims to
injunctive relief are subject to dismissal as moot if “a present or future injury” is not alleged).
II. CONCLUSION
As explained above, the Complaint states nonfrivolous claims against the TTCC Warden,
Assistant Warden Norman, and Chaplains Fletcher and Beaver.4 The docket shows that the
plaintiff has presented appropriate summonses to the Clerk for signature and seal. (Doc. No. 3-1
at 1–2, 4–5, 7–8, 10–11.) Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b),
PROCESS SHALL ISSUE to the plaintiff for service on the defendants.
It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to ensure that each defendant is served with a summons

and a copy of the Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). Under Rule 4(m), the plaintiff generally has
90 days to complete such service, but he may request additional time if he shows “good cause.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The plaintiff may also request that service be made by the United States
Marshal, upon payment of a fee. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
Defendant Blackwell is DISMISSED from this action.
In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff’s recent motion to ascertain status (Doc. No. 8) is
GRANTED.

4 The court’s determination that the Complaint states colorable claims for purposes of this initial screening
does not preclude any defendant from filing a motion to dismiss any claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.
This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for the
management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28
U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary, under Rule 72(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.
It is so ORDERED. j ;
Aleta K. Trauger
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669784. Public record. Not legal advice.