# Burt v. DoubleDown Interactive, LLC

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · September 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669549

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT WINCHESTER

GINA V. BURT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 4:23-cv-55
v. )
) Judge Curtis L. Collier
PLAYTIKA, LTD. and PLAYTIKA )
HOLDING CORP., )
) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
Defendants. )
)
)
SANDRA TUCKER DUCKWORTH, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 4:23-cv-56
)
v. ) Judge Curtis L. Collier
)
PLAYSTUDIOS US, LLC, ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
)
Defendant. )
)
)
SANDRA TUCKER DUCKWORTH, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 4:23-cv-58
)
v. ) Judge Curtis L. Collier
)
YELLOW SOCIAL INTERACTIVE, LTD., ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
)
Defendant. )
)
)
LAUREN EWING, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 4:23-cv-60
v. )
) Judge Curtis L. Collier
SCIPLAY CORP. and SCIPLAY )
GAMES, LLC, ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
)
Defendants. )
)
)
JENNIFER LYNN BEAN )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 4:23-cv-61
)
v. ) Judge Curtis L. Collier
)
ARISTOCRAT LEISURE, LLC, ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
ARISTOCRAT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., )
and PRODUCT MADNESS, INC., )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
LAUREN EWING, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 4:23-cv-62
)
v. ) Judge Curtis L. Collier
)
VGW LTD., VGW HOLDINGS US, ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
INC., VGW US INC., and VGW )
LUCKYLAND INC., )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
KAREN S. PLESS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 4:23-cv-64
)
v. ) Judge Curtis L. Collier
)
HUUUGE, INC. and HUUUGE ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
GLOBAL LTD., )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
GINA V. BURT, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 4:24-cv-5
)
v. ) Judge Curtis L. Collier
)
DOUBLEDOWN INTERACTIVE, LLC, ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
)
Defendant. )
)
)
JENNIFER LYNN BEAN, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 4:24-cv-7
)
v. ) Judge Curtis L. Collier
)
SPINX GAMES, LTD., ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
)
Defendant. )
)

M E M O R A N D U M
Before the Court are motions filed by the sole Plaintiff in each of these nine related cases
to remand these actions to the Circuit Court for Coffee County, Tennessee (the “State Court”).1

1 Given the strong similarities between the cases and the overlap of the parties’ arguments,
the Court addresses the cases together. For clarity, “Plaintiffs” and “Defendants” refer to parties
(Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 18; Case No. 4:23-cv-56, Doc. 31; Case No. 4:23-cv-58, Doc. 22;
Case No. 4:23-cv-60, Doc. 20; Case No. 4:23-cv-61, Doc. 19; Case No. 4:23-cv-62, Doc. 18; Case
No. 4:23-cv-64, Doc. 17; Case No. 4:24-cv-5, Doc. 19; Case No. 4:24-cv-7, Doc. 27.) Plaintiffs
argue this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the cases. (Id.) Defendants in seven of the
cases filed a joint response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motions to remand (Case No. 4:23-cv-55,

Doc. 26; Case No. 4:23-cv-56, Doc. 44; Case No. 4:23-cv-58, Doc. 31; Case No. 4:23-cv-60, Doc.
32; Case No. 4:23-cv-61, Doc. 28; Case No. 4:23-cv-62, Doc. 26; and Case No. 4:23-cv-64, Doc.
23) and one Defendant who was not party to the joint filing expressly stated in its own response
that it joined the joint filing (Case No. 4:24-cv-5, Doc. 21 at 1). The ninth Defendant responded
in opposition separately. (Case No. 4:24-cv-7, Doc. 34.) Plaintiffs in eight of the cases replied.
(Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 28; Case No. 4:23-cv-56, Doc. 46; Case No. 4:23-cv-58, Doc. 34;
Case No. 4:23-cv-60, Doc. 35; Case No. 4:23-cv-61, Doc. 30; Case No. 4:23-cv-62, Doc. 28; Case
No. 4:23-cv-64, Doc. 25; and Case No. 4:24-cv-5, Doc. 22.)
Plaintiffs brought actions in Tennessee state court seeking to recover gambling losses of

Tennessee residents pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-19-105. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-
cv-55, Doc. 1-1 at 2–13.) Defendants timely removed the actions from the State Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), stating the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and this Court has traditional
diversity jurisdiction. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1); see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Defendants
in six of the cases also rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) as a basis for removal, arguing this Court has
subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4 (2005) (“CAFA”). (Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1 ¶ 10; Case No. 4:23-cv-58, Doc. 1 ¶ 11;

in more than one, but not necessarily all, of the nine related case. Relevant differences between
cases are noted.
Case No. 4:23-cv-60, Doc. 1 ¶ 14; Case No. 4:23-cv-61, Doc. 1 ¶ 26; Case No. 4:23-cv-62, Doc.
1 ¶ 10; Case No. 4:24-cv-7, Doc. 1 ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs now move to remand the actions to the State
Court. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 18.)
For the reasons below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiffs’ motions (Case No. 4:23-cv-55,
Doc. 18; Case No. 4:23-cv-56, Doc. 31; Case No. 4:23-cv-58, Doc. 22; Case No. 4:23-cv-60, Doc.

20; Case No. 4:23-cv-61, Doc. 19; Case No. 4:23-cv-62, Doc. 18; Case No. 4:23-cv-64, Doc. 17;
Case No. 4:24-cv-5, Doc. 19; Case No. 4:24-cv-7, Doc. 27) and REMAND the actions to the
State Court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework
In Tennessee, there exists a civil cause of action to recover money paid and lost in gambling
endeavors. “Any person who has paid any money, or delivered anything of value, lost upon any
game or wager, may recover such money, thing, or its value, by action commenced within ninety
(90) days from the time of such payment or delivery.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-19-104.

Additionally,
Any other person may, after the expiration of the ninety (90) days, and within
twelve (12) months thereafter, recover the amount of such money, thing, or its
value, by action for the use of the spouse; or, if no spouse, the child or children;
and, if no child or children, the next of kin of the loser.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-19-105 (the “Gambling Statute”).
B. Factual and Procedural History
The parties represent that all Plaintiffs and none of the Defendants are Tennessee citizens.
(E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1 ¶ 25.) Defendants are companies in the social gaming industry
and make available games that can be played online or on cellphone applications. (E.g., Case No.
4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1-1 ¶ 13.) The games include those involving virtual slot machines, casino-style
games, card games, and other games of chance. (E.g., id. ¶ 14.) In such games of chance, a
customer initially receives free virtual coins that he can spend to play the game. (E.g., id. ¶ 15.)
If the player wins, he receives more coins; if he loses, he loses the coins wagered. (E.g., id.) When
the player runs out of coins entirely, he can either stop playing the game or spend real money to
purchase coins and continue playing. (E.g., id.) The games at issue in two of the cases also offer

“sweepstakes coins,” which are awarded based on frequency of play, and can be exchanged for
real money. (Case No. 4:23-cv-58, Doc. 1-1 ¶ 15; Case No. 4:23-cv-62, Doc. 1-1 ¶ 16.) Many
Tennessee residents play Defendants’ games of chance and have purchased additional playing
time. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1-1 ¶ 16, Doc. 1-2 ¶ 5.)
Plaintiffs filed actions under the Gambling Statute seeking to recover the money up to, but
not including, $75,000 lost by each Tennessee resident on Defendants’ games of chance beginning
the date one year before the case was filed on behalf of the families of those individuals. (E.g.,
Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1-1 at 13.) Plaintiffs do not seek punitive damages. (E.g., id. at 12–
13.) Defendants removed the actions on the grounds that this Court has original jurisdiction based
on traditional diversity of citizenship, and in some cases alternatively under CAFA,2 pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1332(d), respectively. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9–10.)
Among the six cases in which Defendants argue there is jurisdiction under CAFA,
Defendants in all but one filed declarations stating that over the relevant time period more than
one hundred Tennessee residents spent money on Defendants’ games of chance and their collective
spending exceeded five million dollars. (Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc 1-2 ¶ 5; Case No. 4:23-cv-58,
Doc.1-2 ¶¶ 7–8; Case No. 4:23-cv-60, Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 5–6; Case No. 4:23-cv-62, Doc. 1-2 ¶ 6; Case

2 As noted above, Defendants in three cases did not remove on CAFA grounds and argue
for removal only based on traditional diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
No. 4:24-cv-7, Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 5–6.) The declarations in all those cases except one, Ewing v. SciPlay
Corporation, Case No. 4:23-cv-60, specify that the figures exclude players who spent $75,000 or
more over the relevant time period. (Id.) Defendants in Ewing v. SciPlay Corporation, state they
received more than six million dollars in gross revenue from the over twenty thousand Tennessee
players who played their games over the relevant time period. (Case No. 4:23-cv-60, Doc. 1-3 ¶¶

5–6.)
Defendants in the three cases that do not cite CAFA as a basis for jurisdiction represent
that Tennessee residents spent more than $75,000 on their games of chance over the relevant time
period. (Case No. 4:23-cv-56, Doc. 1-2 ¶ 6 (declaration states collective spending exceeded five
hundred million dollars, but does not specify whether this excludes those who spent more than
$75,000); Case No. 4:23-cv-61, Doc. 1 ¶ 19 (notice of removal states spending exceeded five
million dollars, excluding players who spent more than $75,000); Case No. 4:23-cv-64, Doc. 1-2
¶ 4 (declaration states collective spending exceeded five hundred million dollars, excluding players
who spent more than $75,000)).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
As the parties seeking removal, Defendants bear the burden of establishing the existence of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Shupe v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 566
F. App’x 476, 478 (6th Cir. 2014).
Federal courts have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) where (1) there is
complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and the defendants and (2) the amount in
controversy is greater than $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Under CAFA, federal courts
have original jurisdiction over class actions where the parties are minimally diverse, the amount
in controversy exceeds five million dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, and the proposed class
is at least one hundred members. Id. § 1332(d); Miss. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571
U.S. 161, 165 (2014). “Normally, ‘the sum claimed by the plaintiff[s] controls,’ . . . but where

plaintiffs seek ‘to recover some unspecified amount that is not self-evidently greater or less than
the federal amount-in-controversy requirement,’ the defendant satisfies its burden when it proves”
by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy fulfills the jurisdictional
requirement. Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gafford
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 156, 158 (6th Cir. 1993) (abrogated on other grounds). “[C]ourts
may use their judicial experience and common sense” to determine whether the removing
defendants have met their burden. Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1062 (11th Cir.
2010); see Naji v. Lincoln, 665 F. App’x 397, 402 n.2 (6th Cir. 2016) .
“Generally, ‘statutory procedures for removal are to be strictly construed,’ . . . such that

‘[a]ll doubts as to the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand.’” Nessel ex rel. Mich.
v. Amerigas Partners, L.P., 954 F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Syngenta Crop Prot., nc.
v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999)).
“However, ‘no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted
to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.’” Id. (quoting Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)).
III. DISCUSSION
The parties in each case agree there is complete diversity between the parties. (See, e.g.,
Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 10–12, Doc. 26 at 10.) Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendants’
factual assertions regarding the amount Tennessee residents collectively spent playing Defendants’
games of chance during the relevant timeframes. (See generally, e.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Docs.
18, 28.) Defendants do not argue the cases against them are mass actions. (See generally, e.g.,
Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Docs. 1, 26); see also 28 U.S.C. 1332(11)(B)(i) (“‘mass action’ means any
civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of [one hundred] or more persons are proposed to

be tried jointly . . .”).
There are thus two issues before the Court: (1) whether the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); and (2) whether the actions are class actions under CAFA in
which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and the proposed class includes more than
one hundred plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The Court addresses each in turn.
A. Traditional Diversity Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs argue the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000 because the claims
they assert for the benefit of the family of each Tennessee resident who lost money playing
Defendants’ games cannot be aggregated. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 18 at 4–5, 19–20.)

They maintain the Gambling Statute creates a type of private attorney-general action which
precludes aggregation of claims to calculate the amount in controversy. (Id. at 5.) Defendants
argue Plaintiffs assert first-party rather than third-party legal rights, and because each case is
brought by a single Plaintiff with a single, undivided claim for recovery, their claims can be
aggregated. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 26 at 11–18.)
The nature of the pending claims is unusual in that in each case a sole Plaintiff appears in
a representative capacity to recover for the family of numerous, and currently unknown, Tennessee
residents. Plaintiffs’ motions to remand turn on whether, for the purposes of determining whether
the amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied, the Court can aggregate the individual
monies lost by each gambler during the relevant time period, up to, but not including, $75,000.
1. Non-Aggregation Doctrine
“Under the non-aggregation doctrine, ‘separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs
cannot be aggregated in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement’ for the purposes of

diversity jurisdiction.” Rice v. Aristocrat Leisure, Ltd., No. 3:23-cv-00480-LCB, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 140373, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 2023) (quoting Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335
(1969) (superseded by statute on other grounds)). The doctrine is based on the “Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘matter in controversy.’” Snyder, 394 U.S. at
336. “Aggregation has been permitted only (1) in cases in which a single plaintiff seeks to
aggregate two or more of his own claims against a single defendant and (2) in cases in which two
or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and
undivided interest.” Id. at 335. With regard to the latter, federal courts may rely on the aggregated
amount only when “two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have

a common and undivided interest.” Id.; see also Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. 143 (1832)
(disallowing aggregation of claims to establish federal jurisdiction by plaintiffs with separate and
distinct claims under the same contract). Even when plaintiffs share a common interest in a
constructive trust, their interest is not undivided and does not establish that their claims stem from
a single title or right. Everett, 460 F.3d at 824. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
non-aggregation doctrine even since the creation of the modern class action. See id. at 823; Snyder,
394 U.S. at 335.
A district court in Alabama recently addressed an amount-in-controversy issue nearly
identical to the one before the Court. See Rice, No. 3:23-cv-00480-LCB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140373. There, like here, the statute at issue allowed “[a]ny person” to recover money “for the
use of” the wife or children or the next of kin of an individual who had lost money gambling. See
Rice, No. 3:23-cv-00480-LCB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140373 at *2–3; compare Ala. Code § 8-
1-15(a)–(b) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-19-105. The plaintiff sued on behalf of the families of all
Alabama citizens who had lost money playing the defendant’s games of chance. Id. at 4. The

district court relied on cases from the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit where a single plaintiff sought to recover for numerous individuals
in a representative capacity in a private attorney-general action. Id. at *7. In those opinions, the
courts relied upon the non-aggregation doctrine to determine whether the amount-in-controversy
threshold was satisfied. Id. at *7–8; Breakman v. AOL LLC, 545 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2008)
(claim remanded because separate and distinct claims asserted on behalf of a number of individuals
cannot be aggregated); Nat’l Consumers League v. Flowers Bakeries, LLC, 36 F. Supp. 3d 26
(D.D.C. 2014) (“so long as individual consumers are eligible to recover individual damages, the
consumers do not have a ‘common and undivided interest’ that may be aggregated under the non-

aggregation principal announced in Snyder”); Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 726 F.3d 1118
(9th Cir. 2013) (non-aggregation doctrine applied to private attorney-general action because the
defendant’s legal obligations to the parties plaintiff represented were several, not joint); contra, In
re Folgers Coffee, No. 21-2984-MD-W-BP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214917 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 19,
2021) (in private attorney-general action, court applied the damages payable directly to plaintiff,
attorney fees, and cost of injunction to amount-in-controversy calculation rather than allocating
fees and costs equally to the plaintiff and all represented parties).
While the court in Rice found the Alabama statute did not create a private attorney-general
action, it held that “at the macro level, the framework of the actions is identical: there is a single
plaintiff acting in a representative capacity to recover damages that would be payable to non-
parties.” Rice, No. 3:23-cv-00480-LCB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140373 at *12. Accordingly, the
court held the doctrine of non-aggregation applied, and that in seeking to recover on behalf of the
family members of those who lost money gambling, the plaintiff asserted “numerous individual
claims” that did “not share a common and undivided interest.” Id. at *14. The court held the

amount-in-controversy threshold was not met because the non-aggregation doctrine precluded
aggregation of the plaintiff’s claims for calculation of the amount in controversy. Id. at *7–8, 14.
The Gambling Statute, like the Alabama statute at issue in Rice, allows a single plaintiff
“to recover damages that would be payable to non-parties” for the use of those parties. Rice, No.
3:23-cv-00480-LCB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140373 at *12. The Tennessee statute creates a
representative action, even though it does not create a typical private attorney-general action in
that the statute does not expressly authorize an action on behalf of the general public. Unlike the
statute at issue in Folgers, which provided for attorney fees and equitable relief, the Gambling
Statute allows for only compensatory damages. See In re Folgers Coffee, Mktg. Litig., No. 21-

2984-MD-W-BP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214917, at *5, 16; compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-19-
105 with D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2). Regardless of whether the Gambling Statute creates what
can be characterized as a private attorney-general action, the non-aggregation doctrine applies in
all cases unless a single plaintiff seeks to aggregate claims against a single defendant, or two or
more plaintiffs seek recovery in which they have a common and undivided interest. See Snyder,
394 U.S. at 335. Accordingly, the Court turns next to consider Plaintiffs’ personal pecuniary
interest in the pending actions, and whether their claims can be aggregated.
2. Representative-Capacity Actions
The Court notes the dearth of case law specifically interpreting the Gambling Statute, but
finds Tennessee law governing the right of action in a wrongful-death case instructive, as there too
a personal representative may bring a claim for the use of statutory beneficiaries. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 20-5-106. Under Tennessee law, a decedent’s right of action in a wrongful-death case

passes “to the person’s surviving spouse . . . to the person’s children or next of kin; [or] to the
person’s personal representative, for the benefit of the person’s surviving spouse or next of
kin . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106. Where a personal representative brings the wrongful
death action, “[t]he one who sues as administrator and recovers damages for the wrongful death of
the decedent holds this recovery as a trustee for the real beneficiaries under the statute, and must
account to them, whoever they may be, for the proceeds of the judgment.” Memphis S. R. Co. v.
Cooper, 313 S.W.2d 444, 448 (1958) (citations omitted). Such representative “is without any
pecuniary interest and the recovery, if any, passes to the statutory beneficiary free from the claims
of creditors of the estate.” Memphis St. Ry. Co., 313 S.W.2d at 448. “The statutory beneficiary is

the real party in interest.” Id. (citing Whitson v. Tenn. Cent. Ry. Co., 40 S.W.2d 396, 398 (1931)).
The legal framework of the Gambling Statute is similar to Tennessee’s wrongful-death
statutes in that it provides a single plaintiff a cause of action in a representative capacity to recover
damages on behalf of statutory beneficiaries. The Gambling Statute is silent on the mechanism by
which recovered money is provided “for the use of” the spouse, child, or next of kin of the person
who lost money gambling. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-19-105. But applying the principles of
representative recovery from the wrongful-death statutes, the Court finds that regardless of
whether a plaintiff becomes a trustee of funds for the benefit of others, the Gambling Statute does
not give Plaintiffs a pecuniary interest in the recovery. See Memphis St. Ry. Co., 313 S.W.2d at
448.
The statute also does not, as Defendants argue, create a two-step process in which Plaintiffs
first recover funds, then must make the funds available to the correct family members such that
Plaintiffs have an independent pecuniary interest in the funds recovered. (See, e.g., Case No. 4:23-

cv-55, Doc. 26 at 15.) Rather, like actions under the wrongful-death statutes, the recovered funds
belong only to the statutory beneficiaries. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-5-106, 29-19-105; Memphis
St. Ry. Co., 313 S.W.2d at 448. Each family member entitled to recovery holds an individual
interest in the money recovered on his or her behalf. That interest is not an undivided, common
interest with the Plaintiff or any other family member of a Tennessee resident who lost money
playing Defendants’ games. See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335; Everett, 460 F.3d at 822. Accordingly,
applying the non-aggregation doctrine, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ numerous individual claims
cannot be aggregated to determine the amount in controversy.
3. Other State Gambling Statutes

Defendants cite several cases for the proposition that courts apply the typical amount-in-
controversy analysis rather than the non-aggregation doctrine to actions under anti-gambling
statutes, even when a plaintiff seeks recovery of funds lost by others. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55,
Doc. 26 at 17.) But the statutes at issue in the cases Defendants cite expressly allow a plaintiff to
recover a portion of the funds recovered for another party, or to recover on the plaintiff’s own
behalf. See, e.g., Ky. ex rel. Brown v. Pocket Kings, Ltd., No. 14-27-GFVT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41465, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2015) (amount in controversy was not in dispute where the
plaintiff sued under a statute that created cause of action for any person to personally recover treble
damages for gambling losses of another person); Vinson v. Casino Queen, 123 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.
1997) (court did not question jurisdiction where plaintiff sued under a statute creating a civil cause
of action for any person to recover treble damages for gambling losses of another person);
Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DMC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44679, at *5, 17–18
(D.N.J. June 19, 2007) (court did not question amount in controversy where plaintiff sought
recovery under the qui tam laws of eight states allowing a plaintiff to personally recover the

gambling losses of another person).
The Gambling Statute, by contrast, creates a cause of action that may be asserted by “any
other person” “by action for the use of” the spouse, children, or next of kin of the person who lost
money gambling. The Court does not find persuasive Defendants’ argument that traditional
amount-in-controversy analysis applies to the pending claims under the Gambling Statute because
the statute does not expressly create a cause of action for Plaintiffs to personally recover.
4. Recovery of Unclaimed Funds
The Court turns finally to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs will personally recover
more than $75,000 because the statute is silent on who receives the money for a player’s family

who cannot be identified or does not claim their funds. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 1 at 5–
6.) The Plaintiff in each case will almost certainly assert an interest in unclaimed recovered funds.
But there is no reliable way to determine the amount of such hypothetical unclaimed funds. It is
also unclear that the amount of unclaimed funds is relevant to the amount in controversy analysis,
as a suit “for the use of” the beneficiary does not itself necessarily grant Plaintiff a personal
pecuniary interest in the recovered funds. The Court declines to assert jurisdiction based on
speculation that the unrecovered funds may, in aggregate, total more than $75,000, and could
ultimately accrue to Plaintiffs.
In the context of traditional diversity jurisdiction “[a]ll doubts as to the propriety of
removal are resolved in favor of remand.” Coyne, 183 F.3d at 493. Accordingly, the Court
declines to assert traditional diversity jurisdiction in this case.
B. Class Action Fairness Act
Plaintiffs also move for remand to State Court on the ground that the cases are not class

actions under CAFA. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 18 at 9–18.) Plaintiffs argue that the
Gambling Statute fails to meet the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequate representation for a claim under the statute to constitute a class action. (Id. at 3.) The
Defendants that cite CAFA as a basis for removal argue that because the action is a class action in
substance it fulfills the statutory requirements of CAFA, and litigating this case in federal court
promotes CAFA’s overall purpose. (E.g., Case No. 4:23-cv-55, Doc. 26 at 10–11.)
“Congress through CAFA sought to relax the requirements of diversity jurisdiction in order
to make it easier for plaintiffs to bring certain interstate class actions and mass actions in federal
court.” Nessel ex rel. Mich., 954 F.3d at 834 (citations omitted). Under CAFA, a federal court

has original jurisdiction over a class action in which (1) there is minimal diversity of citizenship
between the parties; (2) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars; and (3)
the proposed class is at least one hundred members. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1), (2), and (5).
CAFA defines a “class action” as “any civil action filed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be
brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). “Rule
23 specifies four prerequisites that must be satisfied before a member of a class may sue or be sued
as a representative party.” Nessel ex rel. Mich. 954 F.3d at 835. First, the class must be “so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Second, there
must be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Third, the claims
or defenses of the representative party must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Last, the representative party must be able to “fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “These four requirements—numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequate representation—are the defining characteristics of Rule 23.”

Nessel ex rel. Mich. 954 F.3d at 835. “[U]nder CAFA, removal jurisdiction exists only when a
class action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 itself or a ‘similar’ state statute. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(1)(B)).
With regard to numerosity, “[t]here is no strict numerical test for determining
impracticability of joinder.” In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted). “Rather, ‘the numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific facts of each
case.’” Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)). “The commonality
requirement is interdependent with the impracticability of joinder requirement.” Id. at 1080. “The
commonality test “is qualitative rather than quantitative, that is, there need be only a single issue

common to all members of the class.” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated
that “it is unclear how the requirements of numerosity and commonality could ever be satisfied”
in a lawsuit in which a single plaintiff brings suit on behalf of others when the plaintiff is not a
representative member of the class. Nessel ex rel. Mich., 954 F.3d at 836.
Typicality requires that “a class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the
same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc.
v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 216; citations omitted). In the context of a state attorney-general representative
action, the Court of Appeals has held that a statute that does not require the attorney-general to
have suffered the same harm as proposed class members fails to meet the typicality requirement.
Nessel ex rel. Mich., 954 F.3d at 835.
Adequate representation requires two criteria: (1) the representative has common interests
with unnamed members of the class; and (2) “it must appear that the representatives will vigorously
prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.” Senter v. GMC, 532 F.2d 511, 524–

25 (6th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). “The adequate representation requirement overlaps with
the typicality requirement because in the absence of typical claims, the class representative has no
incentives to pursue the claims of the other class members.” In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1083.
In the context of a state attorney-general action, the Court of Appeals has found that just because
the statute at issue authorizes an attorney-general to seek damages on behalf of others allegedly
harmed does not mean the requirement of adequate representation is fulfilled where the attorney-
general was not a member of the class, did not assert claims typical of the class, and had not
suffered harm by the defendants. Nessel ex rel. Mich., 954 F.3d at 835.
Here, because Plaintiffs brought cases under state law, the Court considers whether they

are class actions brought under a state statute similar to Rule 23. See Nessel ex rel. Mich. 954 F.3d
at 835. The Gambling Statute creates a cause of action by a plaintiff on behalf of another party.
The statute does not require plaintiffs to “be part of the class and possess the same interest and
suffer the same injury as the class members.” See, E.g., Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 431 at 403.
To the contrary, it expressly authorizes “any person” to make a claim on behalf of the family of a
person who lost money gambling. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-19-105. The requirement of typicality
is therefore not satisfied. For the same reasons, and because none of the Plaintiffs in the nine
pending cases alleges they have a claim to recover money lost by a family member who spent
money on Defendants’ games of chance, the requirement of adequate representation is also not
met. See In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1083; Senter v. GMC, 532 F.2d 511, 524–25 (6th Cir.
1976). Finally, because there is only one Plaintiff in each case and that Plaintiff is not a
representative member of the class, the requirements of numerosity and commonality are not
fulfilled. See Nessel ex rel. Mich., 954 F.3d at 836.
Because the Court finds the pending cases do not meet the four prerequisites of Rule 23,

the Court does not consider whether the elements of class size and amount in controversy are met
in the cases in which Defendants argued CAFA as a basis for removal. (See Case No. 4:23-cv-60,
Doc. 1-3 at 2 (Defendants do not specify whether the revenue and number-of-player figures
exclude players who spent $75,000 or more over the relevant time period.)). Plaintiffs’ claims are
not class actions, and this Court does not have jurisdiction under CAFA.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the non-aggregation doctrine, and resolving all doubts in favor of remand,
aggregation of individual claims in these matters would be improper. See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335;
Nessel el rel. Mich, 954 F.3d at 834. As such, the amount in controversy threshold has not been

met, and this Court does not have traditional diversity jurisdiction over the actions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). Plaintiffs’ claims are not class actions, and this Court does not have jurisdiction over
these cases under CAFA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Plaintiffs’ motions to remand (Case No. 4:23-cv-55,
Doc. 18; Case No. 4:23-cv-56, Doc. 31; Case No. 4:23-cv-58, Doc. 22; Case No. 4:23-cv-60, Doc.
20; Case No. 4:23-cv-61, Doc. 19; Case No. 4:23-cv-62, Doc. 18; Case No. 4:23-cv-64, Doc. 17;
Case No. 4:24-cv-5, Doc. 19; Case No. 4:24-cv-7, Doc. 27). The cases will be REMANDED to
the State Court.
APPROPRIATE ORDERS WILL ENTER.
/s/___________________________
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669549. Public record. Not legal advice.