# Gifford v. Hamilton County Government

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · September 13, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669510

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 13, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669510

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding a failure to supervise and train claim based on a supervisory official’s “adherence to or continuation of a policy . . . improperly conflate[d] a § 1983 claim of individual supervisory liability with one of municipal liability”
- holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

BRADFORD ANTHONY GIFFORD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:22-cv-245
)
HAMILTON COUNTY, HAMILTON ) Judge Curtis L. Collier
COUNTY SHERIFF JIM HAMMOND, )
and JOHN DOES 1-15, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants Hamilton County and Hamilton County Sheriff Jim Hammond (collectively
“Defendants”) have filed separate motions for summary judgment in this civil rights action in
which Plaintiff, a former prisoner, asserts violations of his rights under the United States
Constitution and Tennessee law. (See Docs. 35, 37.) Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, has
filed a response opposing the motions. (Doc. 43.) After consideration of the parties’ pleadings,
the competent summary judgment evidence, and the applicable law, Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment (Doc. 35, 37) will be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court
will DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims, and this
action will be DISMISSED.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings and evidence, viewed in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, illustrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is deemed “material” if resolving that fact in favor
of one party “might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To establish an entitlement to summary judgment, the
moving party must demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential element of
his case for which he bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Moore
v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993).
Once the motion is properly supported, the nonmovant must show that summary judgment

is inappropriate by setting forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. If the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” then there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If no proof is presented, however, the Court does not presume that the
nonmovant “could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n., 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). That is, to
successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, “the non-moving party . . . must present
sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for him.” Jones v. Muskegon Cnty.,
625 F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 2010).

The very purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in
order to see whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Advisory Committee Note to the 1963
Amendments to Rule 56. Indeed, “(t)he amendment is not intended to derogate from the solemnity
of the pleadings[;] [r]ather, it recognizes that despite the best efforts of counsel to make his
pleadings accurate, they may be overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof available to his
adversary.” Id. The non-moving party (Plaintiff in this case), must come forward with proof to
support each element of his claim. Plaintiff cannot meet this burden with “some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986), “conclusory allegations,” Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888, or by a mere “scintilla” of
evidence, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. It would undermine the purposes of summary judgment if a
party could defeat such a motion simply by “replac[ing] conclusory allegations of the complaint
or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.” Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, once the court has “determined the
relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent

supportable by the record, . . . [the ultimate decision becomes]. . . a pure question of law.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007).
II. THE PARTIES’ EVIDENCE
A. Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff was arrested on October 2, 2021, and booked into the Hamilton County Jail around
10:00 p.m. on charges of public intoxication and criminal trespass. (Doc. 39 A.¶ 1; Doc. 43-1
A.¶ 1.) A “Booking Pre-Classification Checklist” was prepared as to Plaintiff. (Doc. 39 B.¶ 5;
Doc. 43-1 B.¶ 5.) On that Checklist, Plaintiff’s “Pre-Classification Recommended Security Level”
was checked “Maximum” in accordance with the Hamilton County Jail’s “Initial Intake
Screening” policy, which requires a maximum-security placement for detainees in holding areas

for security reasons. (Doc. 39 B.¶¶ 6, 7, 21; Doc. 43-1 B.¶¶ 6, 7, 21.) All corrections deputies are
trained Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”) Policy 90.05.09(J)(1), which states: “During
intake and booking, the Booking officers determine the initial cell assignment and initially classify
all inmates as maximum security.” (Doc. 39 B.¶¶ 22, 23; Doc. 43-1 B.¶¶ 22, 23; Doc. 39-2 p. 28.)
Detainees are not segregated from other detainees during the intake process based only on the
charges alleged against them; detainees are segregated only if they fail to “behave[] appropriately
during the initial intake process.” (Doc. 39 B.¶¶ 2; Doc. 43-1 B.¶ 2.)
Plaintiff was initially housed with approximately twelve other detainees in Foxtrot 2, a
temporary holding cell for detainees going through the intake and booking process. (Doc. 39
A.¶ 2, B.¶ 1; Doc. 43-1 A.¶ 2, B.¶ 1). At around 2:30 a.m. on October 3, 2021, Cyrion Brown was
placed in the same cell. (Doc. 39 A.¶ 3; Doc. 43-1 A.¶ 3.) Mr. Brown had been arrested earlier
that morning by the Red Bank Police Department and brought to the Hamilton County Jail for
booking. (Doc. 39 B.¶ 8; Doc. 43-1 B.¶ 8.) Before this date, Mr. Brown had never been detained
in the Hamilton County Jail. (Doc. 39 B.¶ 9; Doc. 43-1 B.¶ 9.) Soon after Mr. Brown was placed

in Foxtrot 2, Brown got into an altercation with another detainee, and Plaintiff told them, “[K]nock
it off, it’s 3 a.m.” (Doc. 39 A.¶ 4; Doc. 43-1 A.¶ 4.) “That was all it took for Cyrion Brown to
attack” Plaintiff. (Doc. 39 A.¶ 5; Doc. 43-1 A.¶ 5.) After the event, Plaintiff told Deputy Fuller
that “the assaul[t] on him was completely unprompted.” (Doc. 39 B.¶ 15; Doc. 43-1 B.¶ 15.)
Plaintiff was injured during the attack and taken for medical treatment. (Doc. 39 A.¶ 6; Doc. 43-
1 A.¶ 6.) Plaintiff was released on bond later October 3, 2021. (Doc. 39 B.¶ 16; Doc. 43-1
B.¶ 16.)
The Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office brought assault charges on Mr. Brown because of
the incident involving Plaintiff, and an indictment was returned against Mr. Brown. (Doc. 39 B.¶¶

17, 18; Doc. 43-1 B.¶¶ 17, 18; see also Docs. 39-11, 39-12.) That charge was still pending at the
time Defendants moved for summary judgment in this action. (Doc. 39 B.¶ 19; Doc. 43-1 ¶ 19;
see also Docs. 39-11, 39-12.)
B. Plaintiff’s Proof1
When Plaintiff was arrested for public intoxication on October 2, 2021, and placed in a
“maximum security” “drunk tank” with about a dozen other prisoners, he had no prior criminal

1 Plaintiff’s declaration (Doc. 43-2) signed under the penalty of perjury is the only proof
he has presented in this action. Therefore, Plaintiff’s declaration is the only evidence from Plaintiff
the Court may consider for purposes of summary judgment. See, e.g., M.J. v. Akron City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 1 F.4th 436, 445 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[O]nce a party moves for summary judgment and
identifies record materials showing no genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party “must
history. (Doc. 43-2 ¶¶ 1, 2.) Later, Mr. Brown, “a stocky 19-year-old with a history of violence
arrested on an assault charge and appearing to be high on cocaine” was placed in the same cell.
(Id. ¶ 2.) During Mr. Brown’s subsequent assault on Plaintiff, he “split [Plaintiff’s] chin wide
open, caused a severe conclusion, two black eyes, hurt [Plaintiff’s] back, and tore [Plaintiff’s] lip
away from his jaw.” (Id. ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff was taken to the emergency room for x-rays and stitches. (Id. ¶ 3.) When Plaintiff
returned from the hospital, “the jail demanded to put [him] right back into the same cell with
Brown, saying their policy is to put everyone in the same holding cell, with no segregation from
violent, intoxicated, or dangerous inmates,” even though Mr. Brown had just assaulted Plaintiff
that night.” (Id. ¶ 4.)
As a result of the assault, Plaintiff has an asymmetrical smile from permanent nerve
damage to his face and “intense knee pain and a herniated disc in [his] lower back” that limits his
ability to engage in his passions—golf and tennis. (Id. ¶ 3.)
All the charges against Plaintiff were found to lack probable cause and were dismissed.

(Id. ¶ 5.)
C. Defendants’ Proof
For security purposes, all detainees are classified as maximum security for placement in
holding areas during the intake process at the Hamilton County Jail, because classification is a
process that requires retrieving information from a variety of sources. (Doc. 39-1 ¶¶ 11, 16.) The
process of classification takes into account numerous factors, including the detainee’s “age,
gender, special needs or problems, current charge(s), behavior, incompatible inmates, detainer(s),

make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion.” (quoting
Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009))).
whether the inmate is charged with a violent or non-violent offense;” prior arrests; known criminal
history; gang affiliations; history of institutional violence; history of prior behavior in the facility;
“specific information provided by the detainee, or other information that would indicate a specific
threat;” and a search of the databases for the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) and
Tennessee Offender Management Information System (“TOMIS”) to obtain any relevant

information. (Doc. 39-1 ¶¶ 12–14, 39; Doc. 39-2 at 29–31; Doc. 39-6 ¶ 27.) A detainee’s
placement in the holding area during this period not only allows officers time to determine the
detainee’s appropriate classification, but also permits detainees the opportunity to attempt to make
bond by contacting bondsmen, family, or friends, as there is no charge for phone calls in the
holding area. (Doc. 39-1 ¶ 17.)
When Plaintiff was booked into the Hamilton County Jail and pre-classified for maximum
security in accordance with the HCSO’s policy, he was placed in Foxtrot 2 with no incompatibles
identified. (Doc. 39-1 ¶¶ 18–23; see also Docs. 39-3; 39-4.) Cyrion Brown, then aged 19, was
arrested for simple assault on October 3, 2021, and placed into Foxtrot 2 with no incompatibles

identified. (Doc. 39-1 ¶¶ 26–29; Doc. 39-5 at 2.) There is no record indicating that Mr. Brown’s
behavior during the booking process would have required him to be placed in segregation or
otherwise separated from the other pretrial detainees. (Doc. 39-1 ¶¶ 30, 32.) There is also no
record indicating that anyone, including Plaintiff, informed jail personnel that they had been
threatened by, or anticipated an assault by, Mr. Brown. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.)
HCSO deputies receive training regarding booking and intake procedures, along with the
training “that is required by The Tennessee Corrections Institute, the American Correctional
Association, the Prison Rape Elimination Act, Peace Officer Standards and Training, and the
National Commission on Correctional Health Care.” (Doc. 39-1 ¶¶ 36, 37; see also Docs. 39-6
¶ 28; 39-7; 39-8; 39-9; and 39-10.)
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts the following claims against Defendants:
1. A violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right be protected
from violence committed by other inmates;

2. A claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for
failure to train, supervise, discipline; for condoning or ratifying
unconstitutional policies; and failure to establish and maintain policies
to mitigate risks to inmates; and

3. Various claims under Tennessee law.

(Doc. 28 at 12–19)2. To support his Monell claim, Plaintiff alleges facts regarding other incidents
at the Hamilton County Jail. (Id. at 4–10), which he maintains establish that it “is notorious for its
failure to provide adequate medical care to inmates, inhumane living conditions, and failure to
protect inmates from violence.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Many of the incidents are dissimilar to those in
Plaintiff’s amended complaint, such as allegations of excessive force by officers, drug overdoses,
escapes, illegal detention, malnutrition, and inadequate medical treatment (See id. at 4–10.) But
seven of the incidents set forth by Plaintiff involve inmate-on-inmate violence at the Hamilton
County Jail. (See id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 25, 31.) However, Plaintiff has not presented any
competent proof about any of these incidents.

2 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is not sworn (Doc. 28 at 20), and accordingly, the Court
does not consider it evidence for summary judgment purposes. Cf. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407,
414 (6th Cir. 2008) (providing a sworn complaint “carries the same weight” as an affidavit for
purposes of summary judgment).
1. Failure to Protect
Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant Sheriff Jim
Hammond in his individual capacity for his failure to protect Plaintiff against assault by Mr.
Brown. (Doc. 28 ¶¶ 10, 50–56.)
Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence by other inmates and must

take reasonable measures to protect their safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33
(1994). Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the relevant time, liability attaches to a
prison official’s failure to protect him only where he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, to which the prison official “acted (or
failed to act) deliberately and recklessly.” Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., Ky., 29 F.4th 721, 728
(6th Cir. 2022) (citing Brawner v. Scott Cnty., Tenn., 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021)).
Specifically, liability attaches where the official “(1) act[ed] intentionally in a manner that (2) put[]
the plaintiff at a substantial risk of harm, (3) without taking reasonable steps to abate that risk, and
(4) by failing to do so actually cause[d] the plaintiff’s injuries.” Stein v. Gunkel, 43 F.4th 633, 639

(6th Cir. 2022) (citing Westmoreland, 29 F.4th at 729).
But any individual liability against Sheriff Hammond must be based on his “own
unconstitutional behavior.” Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff has not alleged that Sheriff Hammond was even aware of Plaintiff’s placement in the
Hamilton County Jail during the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit, much less that he was aware
of a risk to Plaintiff that he ignored. And plaintiff must show that Sheriff Hammond “at least
implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the
offending subordinate” to hold Sheriff Hammond liable in a supervisory role for a subordinate’s
acts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Troutman v. Louisville Metro. Dep’t of Corrs., 979 F.3d 472, 487–
88 (6th Cir. 2020). That is, he must have done “more than play a passive role in the alleged
violation . . . [as] [s]upervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the allegation of liability
is based on a mere failure to act.” Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999.) Here,
Plaintiff does not advance any facts of “active unconstitutional behavior” by Sheriff Hammond
that would state an actionable claim. See Sheehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).3

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to set forth any proof that anyone, including Sheriff Hammond,
violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from the attack by Mr. Brown, as Plaintiff
has not presented any proof that any HCSO official failed to take reasonable steps to abate a serious
risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff places emphasis on the fact that Mr. Brown was arrested and
booked into the Hamilton County Jail on an assault charge. But this fact alone is insufficient to
show Mr. Brown posed a substantial risk to any other detainee in Foxtrot 2. See Davis v. Chorak,
e.g., No. 22-1839, 2023 WL 2487339, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2023) (finding that merely alleging
that another inmate had a violent history is not enough to show substantial risk of harm).
The competent proof before the Court is that Mr. Brown had never been in the Hamilton

County Jail before October 3, 2021; both Mr. Brown and Plaintiff were placed in a temporary
holding cell pending the classification process in accordance with HCSO policy; both Plaintiff and
Mr. Brown were arrested for misdemeanor offenses; Mr. Brown had no record of incompatible
inmates; and that the attack on Plaintiff was unprompted and occurred moments after Mr. Brown’s
verbal altercation with another inmate. There is no proof in the record that Mr. Brown displayed

3 The Court notes that Sheriff Hammond cannot be found individually liable merely for
creating or maintaining the pre-classification booking policy challenged by Plaintiff. See
Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding a failure to supervise
and train claim based on a supervisory official’s “adherence to or continuation of a policy . . .
improperly conflate[d] a § 1983 claim of individual supervisory liability with one of municipal
liability”) (citation omitted).
any aggressive behavior at all until moments before Plaintiff was attacked.4 Therefore, Plaintiff
has not demonstrated that Sheriff Hammond (or any other Hamilton County Jail officer) was aware
of facts from which it could be inferred that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm by being
placed in Foxtrot 2 with Mr. Brown, or that any such risk was recklessly disregarded. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has not set forth any proof from which a jury could reasonably find that Sheriff Hammond

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and he is entitled to summary judgment.
2. Monell

Plaintiff also sues Defendants Hamilton County and Sheriff Hammond in his official
capacity under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) based on allegations that they
“established, condoned, ratified, and encouraged” policies that created “conditions of confinement
that failed to mitigate serious risks of harm and violations of constitutional rights” and failed to
properly train, supervise, and/or discipline Hamilton County Jail officers regarding the protection
and segregation of inmates. (See Doc. 28 at 13–16.)
Plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Hammond in his official capacity is the equivalent to suit
against Hamilton County itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”);
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55 (“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”). And for a municipality to
be liable under Monell, the plaintiff must establish that a custom or policy of that entity caused a

4 The only proof in the record concerning Mr. Brown’s demeanor or behavior prior to his
attack on Plaintiff is Plaintiff’s own statement that Mr. Brown “appear[ed] to be high on cocaine”
and exhibited “geeked up behavior.” (Doc. 43-2 ¶ 2.) But this conclusory opinion, based solely
on Plaintiff’s own subjective beliefs, does not create a question of fact. See Mayberry v.
Endocrinology-Diabetes Assocs., 926 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (citing Robinson v.
Union Carbide Corp., 805 F.Supp.2d 514, 523 (E.D. Tenn. 1991)).
violation of his constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (holding that a governmental entity
may be liable under § 1983 only where its official custom or policy causes a constitutional rights
violation). This policy or custom must be the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Id.
There are four theories under which a municipality may be held liable:
(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an
official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the
existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a
custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff maintains that
Defendants bear liability under each of these four theories. (See Doc. 43 at 6–7.)
To establish a Monell claim based on an illegal policy, Plaintiff must identify a policy or
custom, connect it to Hamilton County, and show that his particular injury was “incurred due to
the execution of that policy.” Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 402 (6th Cir.
2010). Here, Plaintiff argues that Hamilton County has a policy of failing to segregate inmates
based on risk. But it is undisputed that, “if a detainee behaves appropriately during the initial
intake process, the detainee is not segregated from other detainees.” (See Doc. 43-1 B.¶ 2.) And
there is no proof in the record that Mr. Brown’s conduct at the time of booking would have alerted
anyone that he should be segregated from Plaintiff or any other detainee. Accordingly, the Court
finds Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff was
assaulted due to a policy of Hamilton County.
Second, to establish a ratification theory of liability, Plaintiff “may prove that the
municipality has a pattern of inadequately investigating similar claims.” Stewart v. City of
Memphis, Tenn., 788 F. App’x 341, 344 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). To do this, Plaintiff
must identify “multiple earlier inadequate investigations and they must concern comparable
claims.” Id. at 344–45. But, as explained above, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the
County failed to investigate multiple, comparable incidents of inmate-on-inmate assault in its
temporary holding areas. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the applicability of this theory.
Third, as to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants failed to train, supervise, or discipline, the
Court notes that failure to provide adequate training can constitute a policy or custom if the
deficiency evidences a “‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.” Bd.

of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (citation omitted). To
establish such a claim, Plaintiff must prove either (1) a “pattern of similar constitutional violations
by untrained employees” or (2) “a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing
that (the municipality) has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting
an obvious potential for a constitutional violation.” Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty., 805 F.3d 724, 738–
39 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendants have
presented proof that Hamilton County requires its officers receive initial training and annual
training in accordance with relevant law enforcement requirements, and that HCSO policy was
followed when both Plaintiff and Mr. Brown were initially placed in Foxtrot 2. Plaintiff has not
presented any evidence from which the Court could find that the training received by any officer
in this case was in any way inadequate. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is
a genuine dispute of material fact that the training, supervision, or discipline of the HCSO staff
caused the assault on Plaintiff.
Finally, in order to prove that the County’s “custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal

rights violations” caused his constitutional violation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the incident
in which he was assaulted is representative of “(1) a clear and persistent pattern of illegal activity,
(2) which the [County] knew or should have known about, (3) yet remained deliberately indifferent
about, and (4) that the [County’s] custom was the cause of the (constitutional violation).” Thomas
v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., Tenn.,
103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996)). And in his amended complaint, Plaintiff cites other cases and
news articles in alleging his Monell claim. But the amended complaint is not evidence. Further,
Plaintiff has not presented any facts to suggest that the incidents alleged in other lawsuits or
referred to in news articles are sufficiently comparable to the facts of this case. In fact, Plaintiff
has not presented any evidence of previous inmate-on-inmate assaults in a holding cell that resulted

from a constitutional violation at the Hamilton County Jail. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact that there was a custom of tolerance to
federal constitutional violations that caused the assault on Plaintiff.
Where no violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights occurred, a municipality cannot be
liable under Monell. Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F.4th 1092, 1101–02 (6th Cir. 2023) (“There can
be no liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.” (quoting Robertson
v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014))). And, as addressed above, Plaintiff has not set forth
any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the unprompted attack by Mr. Brown
resulted from a constitutional violation. Therefore, his Monell claim also fails, and Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.
3. State-Law Claims
Because the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants as to Plaintiff’s federal claims,
the Court will exercise its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any

remaining state-law claims by dismissing these claims without prejudice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966) (“[I]f the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Doc. 35, 37) will be GRANTED as to
Plaintiff’s federal claims;

2. The Court will DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-
law claims; and

3. This action will be DISMISSED.
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.

/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669510. Public record. Not legal advice.