# Allen v. Eller

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · August 15, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669464

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 15, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669464

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of a § 2241 petition for “failure to exhaust state court remedies”
- finding that regardless of whether a petition is brought under § 2254 or § 2241, a petitioner “is required first to exhaust his state court remedies”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE

JOHNATHAN ALLEN, )
) Case No. 2:23-cv-158
Petitioner, )
) Judge Travis R. McDonough
v. )
)
BRIAN ELLER, )
)
Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner, a Tennessee Department of Correction prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 asserting that the Tennessee Board of Parole
improperly denied him parole (Doc. 1) that is now before the Court. In support of his petition,
Petitioner filed exhibits (Doc. 1-1) and a memorandum (Doc. 2). Respondent filed an answer to
the petition (Doc. 14), and the state court record from Petitioner’s underlying criminal
proceedings (Doc. 13). After considering the parties’ arguments, the state court record, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2241 for the reasons
set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner pleaded guilty to an arson committed in Lincoln County, Tennessee, and
received a sentence of four years and six months in confinement. State v. Allen, No. M2022-
01400-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 5817286, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2023). On appeal,
Petitioner argued, among other things, that “the State’s negligent handling of certain sentencing
documents caused an unreasonable delay in his transfer from the jail to the prison thereby
delaying the date of his parole hearing.” Id.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) determined that Petitioner waived
review of his claim that the prosecution negligently handled documents. Id. at *1, *6–7. It also
found that, notwithstanding Petitioner’s waiver, “there [was] no proof in the record to support”

that claim. Id. at *7. Petitioner applied for discretionary review by the Tennessee Supreme
Court (“TSC”) (Doc. 13-12), and the TSC declined review (Doc. 13-14).
II. ANALYSIS
This Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who “is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because
Petitioner attacks the execution of his sentence in this action, § 2241 is the appropriate vehicle
for his claim. See Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998) (“In general, a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 is reserved for a challenge to the manner in
which a sentence is executed, rather than the validity of the sentence itself.” (citing United States

v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991))).
However, a petitioner is required to exhaust his state court remedies before pursuing
federal habeas corpus relief. See Collins v. Million, 121 F. App’x 628, 630 (6th Cir. 2005)
(finding that regardless of whether a petition is brought under § 2254 or § 2241, a petitioner “is
required first to exhaust his state court remedies”); Seaton v. Kentucky, 92 F. App’x 174, 175
(6th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of a § 2241 petition for “failure to exhaust state court
remedies”). Exhaustion is a “strictly enforced doctrine designed to promote comity between the
states and federal government by giving the state an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct
alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Rayner v. Lee, No. 3:18-CV-01103, 2020 WL
58610, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2020) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999)). Therefore, each claim—and the substance of each claim—must have been presented to
the state courts as a federal constitutional claim before it is presented in a federal habeas petition.
See, e.g., Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1996). Under Tennessee law, inmates may
challenge parole decisions through a petition for a writ of certiorari. Stewart v. Schofield, 368

S.W.3d 457, 465 (Tenn. 2012) (providing that inmates challenging a parole decision “have only
the limited right of review afforded by the common law writ of certiorari”).
As the record establishes that Petitioner has not exhausted his available state court
remedies for the parole claims he seeks to bring herein, the Court will not address the merits of
those claims. As set forth above, in his direct appeal of his conviction, Petitioner pursued a
claim asserting that the prosecution’s mishandling of certain documents delayed his parole
hearing. (Doc. 13-9, at 32, 35.) But that claim is substantively different from Petitioner’s claims
in his § 2241 petition, which assert that the denial of parole to him was improper for various
reasons. (Doc. 1, at 6–7.) And the record demonstrates that Petitioner did not file a petition for a

writ of certiorari regarding the parole claims he seeks to bring in this action. (See generally Doc.
13.)
Moreover, while Petitioner states that any further attempts to exhaust his parole claims
would be futile in an exhibit to his petition (Doc. 1-1, at 2) and his memorandum (Doc. 2, at 3),
he does not support this conclusory assertion with any facts. Nor does Petitioner acknowledge or
address his failure to file a petition of writ of certiorari regarding these claims, despite Tennessee
law allowing him to do so.
Accordingly, the Court will not address the merits of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims,1
and the instant petition will be DISMISSED.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability (“COA”) before he may appeal this
Court’s decision denying federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); see also Greene v. Tenn.

Dep’t of Corr., 265 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 2001) (requiring prisoner to obtain a COA to appeal
resolution of a § 2241 petition rejecting his challenge to his sentencing credit because his
custody arose out of a state conviction). A COA will not issue unless a petitioner makes “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” of any claim rejected on its merits,
which a petitioner may do by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2);
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). To obtain a COA on a claim that has been
rejected on procedural grounds, a petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and

that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

1 Petitioner does not request that the Court stay this action and hold it in abeyance while he
exhausts his state court remedies, and this Court is not required to raise or address this option on
its own. McBride v. Skipper, 76 F.4th 509, 514 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e do not require district
courts to make arguments that petitioners—even pro se petitioners—fail to make. Federal
district court judges have ‘no obligation’ to warn a pro se petitioner about such a procedure . . .
(citing Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004))). But even if Petitioner had requested that the
Court stay this action and hold it in abeyance to allow him to exhaust his claims, the Court would
not do so, because Petitioner has not shown good cause for his failure to exhaust his unexhausted
claims before filing this action.  Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273, 277–78 (2005) (providing
that “because granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner’s failure to present his claims first
to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there
was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court[,]” and where
the “unexhausted claims are [not] plainly meritless”).
procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Because reasonable jurists would not debate that
Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted, a COA will not issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be
DENIED, this action will be DISMISSED, and a certificate of appealability SHALL NOT

ISSUE. Further, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in
good faith and would be totally frivolous. Fed. R. App. P. 24.
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT SHALL ENTER.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10669464. Public record. Not legal advice.