# WHEELER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · September 11, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10668164

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 11, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10668164

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming an ALJ’s decision to credit the opinion of the non-examining state agency reviewing psychologist because his opinion was more supported by the record than the opinions of the treating physician and the consultative examiner

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMANTHA ANN WHEELER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-148-E
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for child’s disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and her claim
for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et
seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and,
accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54
(2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir.
1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan,
738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the
Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence,
nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris,
642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to find that
her mental impairments met or equaled Listings 12.04 and 12.06, in formulating her residual
functional capacity (“RFC”), and in ultimately finding that she is is not disabled. The Court
disagrees, finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, and therefore will affirm.

While Plaintiff’s brief is comprehensive, it primarily sets forth evidence on which she
purports to rely in support of her position that she is disabled, apparently inviting the Court to
draw its own conclusions from the record evidence. However, if supported by substantial
evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh
the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim differently. See
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Monsour Med.
Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). Plaintiff highlights evidence that she argues leads to a contrary
conclusion, but “[t]he presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does
not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record provides substantial support for that
decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). Here,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determinations as to the listings and Plaintiff’s RFC, as
he himself discussed at length.

The ALJ’s decision was thorough, and he adequately explained his findings in light of
Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s treatment history, her
activities of daily living, including her significant volunteer work, and the various medical
opinions. He emphasized, for instance, that Plaintiff’s treatment had been conservative and that
her symptoms had been typically controlled with medication management. He also noted that her
mental status examinations had been largely unremarkable. Plaintiff takes issue with this
characterization, arguing that the ALJ disregarded parts of the record, including abnormal results in
the mental status examinations, showing issues with concentration, irritability, motivation, insight,
judgment, and impulse control. However, the ALJ specifically acknowledged that the objective
medical evidence contained such findings but found that this evidence was outweighed by findings
showing normal functioning. (R. 18-19, 21, 23-26, 29). Likewise, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
downplayed blended case manager Wendy Ewing’s observations that Plaintiff struggled to
function independently, but again, the ALJ clearly acknowledged Ms. Ewing’s statements, as well
as the assistance and encouragement Plaintiff received from others. (R. 18-19, 21, 26, 28, 29).

Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ should have assigned more weight to the opinions
of consultative examiners Cynthia Wright, D.Ed., and Tammy Connell, M.A., and of Paul
Bensur, Jr., Ph.D., one of her treating mental health providers. She also suggests that, “[d]espite
his comments to the contrary,” the ALJ failed to evaluate the medical opinion evidence under 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927. By way of background, in 2017, the SSA amended its
regulations in regard to how an ALJ is to evaluate medical opinion evidence, most notably
eliminating the “treating physician rule.” Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) and
416.927(c)(2) (applying to cases prior to the amendment of the regulations) with 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(a) and 416.920c(a) (applying to later cases). See also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5853
(Jan. 18, 2017). Plaintiff is correct that for claims, such as this one, filed before March 27, 2017,
the older versions apply, and a treating physician’s opinion is to be given “controlling weight” so
long as the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001); Plummer
v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). However, contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the ALJ
did in fact apply Sections 404.1527 and 416.927 when considering the medical opinion evidence
here.

Not only did the ALJ expressly cite to Sections 404.1527 and 416.927, he also assigned
the various opinions “weight,” which was the operative term under the old regulations rather
than determining their “persuasiveness” as the new regulations demand. (R. 20, 27-30). As for
consultative examiners’ opinions, the ALJ clearly identified them as consultative examiners and
discussed their examination findings at length. (R. 28-29). As for Dr. Bensur, the ALJ
acknowledged and discussed his treating relationship with Plaintiff. (R. 30). Indeed, he
specially discussed that Dr. Bensur had seen Plaintiff only five times over five months and that
Dr. Bensur himself admitted that this limited treatment made it difficult to offer an assessment.
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s refence to Plaintiff having been referred to Dr. Bensur by her
attorney, which she argues is not impermissible. The Court agrees that there is generally nothing
untoward about an attorney referring a client to a health care provider, but that does not mean
that the ALJ (or the Court) should have to close their eyes to the reality that findings by doctors
referred by attorneys must be scrutinized somewhat more closely. Regardless, as Defendant
points out, that was just one of a number of factors considered by the ALJ in evaluating Dr.
Bensur’s opinion, including the factors discussed above, as well as the fact that Plaintiff had
taken herself off of her medication during the majority of her time treating with Dr. Bensur, the
inconsistency of the opinion with other treatment records, and the fact that the opinion relied in
part on information that was irrelevant or outside of his treating relationship with Plaintiff. (Id.).

Further, while the ALJ did give more weight to the opinions of the state agency
consultants than to those of the consultative examiners and Plaintiff’s treating physician, such a
determination was permissible even pursuant to the old regulations. Under Sections 404.1527
and 416.927, an ALJ must consider the treating relationship between a claimant and an opining
doctor, but when the medical opinion of a treating source conflicts with that of a non-treating, or
even a non-examining physician, “the ALJ may choose whom to credit.” Morales v. Apfel, 225
F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Dula v. Barnhart, 129 Fed. Appx. 715, 718-19 (3d Cir.
2005). In certain cases, the ALJ is justified in giving more weight to the non-examining
professional’s opinion. See Salerno v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 152 Fed. Appx. 208 (3d Cir. 2005)
(affirming an ALJ’s decision to credit the opinion of the non-examining state agency reviewing
psychologist because his opinion was more supported by the record than the opinions of the
treating physician and the consultative examiner). That is the case here, and substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision to weigh the medical opinions as he did. As to Plaintiff’s contention
that the ALJ failed to indicate the weight given to “opinions” from Stairways Behavior Health
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 5) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 8) is GRANTED as set forth herein.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

and Meadville Behavioral Health, the Court notes that the records at issue do not contain opinions
as to Plaintiff’s functional capacity that would invoke Sections 404.1527 and 416.927.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s definition of the term “superficial,” as used in the
RFC, was neither appropriate nor clear. Specifically, the RFC as crafted by the ALJ limited
Plaintiff to “no more than superficial interaction with supervisors or co-workers (no more than
32% of the work day).” (R. 20). Citing a District of New Jersey decision, Matthew F. v.
Kijakazi, 3:20-cv-15564, 2022 WL 1442243 (D. N.J. May 6, 2022), Plaintiff states that his
definition was more akin to the proper definition for the term “occasional,” and that there is not
just a quantitative but a qualitative difference between those terms. However, Plaintiff overlooks
the fact that, regardless of whether the ALJ’s definition of “superficial” was a good one, it was
one commonly understood by the parties and the vocational expert (“VE”) because the ALJ
expressly defined what he meant in using the term. This is not like in Matthew F., where the
ALJ defined superficial in a way arguably different than would be understood by the medical
provider who had opined to that limitation and whose opinion the ALJ had found to be
persuasive. Instead, the ALJ here himself chose the term “superficial” and defined it as “no
more than 32% of the workday.” (R. 20). He defined the term the same way in questioning the
VE. (R. 120). Plaintiff herself admits that this is how the VE would have understood the term.
(Doc. No. 6, p. 27). Therefore, it does not matter whether the term “occasional” more accurately
fits the definition given by the ALJ – all understood “superficial,” in this particular case, to mean
contact no more than 32 percent of the work day.

The United States Supreme Court has reminded us that the threshold for meeting the
substantial evidence standard “is not high.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. The Court finds that
the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supports his decision.
It will therefore affirm.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10668164. Public record. Not legal advice.