# STEEVES v. O'MALLEY

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · August 16, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10668110

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 16, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10668110

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating “[c]ourts are not permitted to reweigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations[.]”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TONI LYNN STEEVES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-732
)
MARTIN O’ MALLEY,1 )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 16th day of August, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.
Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former
Acting Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)
and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
1
decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,
merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the Administrative
Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) non-disability determination. (Doc. No. 10). Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) was formulated in error as
the ALJ favored non-treating, non-examining sources over the opinions of her treating and
examining sources. (Id. at 18-22). Further, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ
inappropriately relied on evidence that she was able to foster children. (Id. at 22-23).
Plaintiff also argues that the RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence
as the ALJ relied on an incorrect reading of the underlying evidence and improperly
discounted Plaintiff’s consistent and supported symptoms. (Id. at 23-25). Lastly,
Plaintiff posits that the testimony from the vocational expert (“VE”) is not supported by
substantial evidence because it relies on an inaccurate RFC. (Id. at 25-26). After
conducting its own careful and independent review of the record, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s contentions are without merit.

The Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial
evidence. The ALJ here was tasked with analyzing a variety of opinions, including those of
state agency physicians Drs. David Bristow, M.D., and Kevin Hollick, D.O., of consultative
examiner Dr. Anthony Elisco, M.D., and of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, Michelle Rathgeb,
M.D., Mary Wasko, M.D., and Gina Laginya, PA-C. (As Plaintiff points out, Dr. Rathgeb is
referred to in the ALJ’s decision as Dr. Bathgen, but both Plaintiff and Defendant refer to this
doctor as Dr. Rathgeb and do not contest that the ALJ is referencing the same doctor). The
state agency physicians opined that Plaintiff had fewer limitations while Plaintiff’s treating
sources found her to be more limited. (R. 25-32). Plaintiff’s argument on this point seems
to invoke the inapplicable “treating physician rule,” which is applied only in cases where the
application is filed before March 27, 2017. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (applying
to cases prior to the amendment of the regulations) with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (applying to
later cases). See also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017). While the medical
source’s treating relationship with the claimant is still a valid consideration, “the two most
important factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and
supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c). As Plaintiff’s
application was filed on July 5, 2020 (R. 15), the “treating physician rule” does not apply to
her claim and the ALJ was under no obligation to find the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating
physicians persuasive just by virtue of the physicians’ relationship with Plaintiff.

Further, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the opinions of Drs. Rathgeb,
Wasko, and Elisco should have been found persuasive because their findings are consistent
2
with and supported by the record. (Doc. No. 10 at 21-22). As explained above,
consistency and supportability are indeed the two most important factors used to determine
the persuasiveness of medical opinions. Here, though, the ALJ appropriately analyzed
the consistency and supportability of Drs. Rathgeb, Wasko, and Elisco’s opinions based on
all the evidence. As to Dr. Rathgeb’s opinion containing many limitations, the ALJ found
this opinion unpersuasive because it was not consistent with the record, which showed that
Plaintiff’s physical examinations were generally unremarkable, and was not supported by
Dr. Rathgeb’s own examinations, which noted that Plaintiff’s prognosis was “good.” (R.
25). Further, the ALJ found Dr. Wasko’s very limiting opinion to be unpersuasive
because it was not consistent with the record, which showed no motor or neurologic deficit
and normal gait, and was not supported by Dr. Wasko’s own examinations, which showed
he assessed Plaintiff’s prognosis as “fair.” (R. 26-27). As to Dr. Elisco’s less limiting
opinion, the ALJ found this opinion only partially persuasive because it was mostly
consistent with the record, but his opined manipulative limitations were not consistent with
the Plaintiff’s normal extremities with no muscle atrophy and intact hand and finger
dexterity. (R. 28). Further, Dr. Elisco’s opinion was supported by his physical
examinations, which were generally unremarkable. (R. 27-28). Plaintiff points to
evidence within the record she believes to be more in line with these opinions in an effort
to have this Court reweigh the evidence, but the Court rejects her request to do so.
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating “[c]ourts are
not permitted to reweigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations[.]”).

The Court also finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ inappropriately
relied on evidence that she was able to foster children as a factor pointing to her ability to
work. (Doc. No. 10 at 22-23). Plaintiff contends the ALJ acted improperly by relying on
her ability to foster children and questioning her on becoming a foster parent, subpoenaing
records from the Department of Human Services, and citing medical records noting Plaintiff
and her husband were fostering children in support of the decision that Plaintiff was not
disabled. (Id.). The Court disagrees. The ALJ is permitted to, and in fact required to,
evaluate a claimant’s activities of daily living as a factor in determining the credibility of his
or her claimed limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). More specifically, this
Court has previously affirmed decisions where the ALJ considered the Plaintiff’s regular care
for children in deciding that the claimant was not disabled. See Wilson v. Kijakazi, No. 22-
773, 2023 WL 6382544, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2023) (affirming the ALJ’s finding of
non-disability when he considered the plaintiff’s regular care for two children as a factor in
determining the credibility of the claimant’s alleged limitations); Hall v. Colvin, No. 15-150-
E, 2016 WL 5528230, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2016) (noting it was proper for the ALJ
to consider that plaintiff was raising a young autistic child in evaluating her credibility).
Similar to these cases, here, the ALJ properly considered evidence that Plaintiff was able to
foster children, in addition to other evidence showing her activities of daily life, in deciding
that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not fully credible. Accordingly, the ALJ
appropriately included this evidence in his analysis.
3
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 17) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC assessment
is in error because it relies on an incorrect reading of the underlying evidence and discounts
Plaintiff’s consistent and supported symptoms. Plaintiff points out that the evidence
shows that she has difficulty standing, walking, and sitting, requires rest breaks, and has
difficulty lifting, pulling, and holding. (Doc. No. 10 at 24-25). She contends that the
ALJ’s crafted RFC, stating she can perform light work with occasional climbing of ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds and without any manipulative limitations, is inconsistent with this
evidence. (Id.). However, the ALJ’s decision shows that he considered the evidence
documenting Plaintiff’s difficulties in these areas and appropriately rejected these
limitations. This was shown most clearly when the ALJ considered and analyzed Dr.
Rathgeb’s and Dr. Wasko’s opinions, which opined that Plaintiff’s impairments dictated
standing, sitting, resting, and manipulative limitations. (R. 25-26). As discussed above,
the ALJ appropriately found these opinions unpersuasive and explained why. (Id.).
Accordingly, the record shows that the ALJ considered evidence of these limitations and
appropriately rejected them.

Lastly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the testimony from the VE was
not supported by substantial evidence. The Court notes that “objections to the adequacy
of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert often boil down to attacks on the
RFC assessment itself.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005).
Hypotheticals posed to VEs need not reflect every impairment alleged by a claimant. See
id. at 544. Instead, hypotheticals “must accurately convey to the vocational expert all of
a claimant’s credibly established limitations.” Id. Substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s RFC assessment, and because the operative hypothetical accurately conveyed
Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ appropriately relied upon the vocational expert’s response.

The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

4

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10668110. Public record. Not legal advice.