# Williams v. Warden Low Allenwood

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · September 16, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667954

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 16, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667954

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, “[iJt is well settled, and the parties agree, that the Bureau has nearly exclusive jurisdiction to classify and transfer prisoners.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EVERETT DONNOVAN WILLIAMS, Civil No. 3:24-cv-1321
Petitioner (Judge Mariani)
v .
WARDEN, ALLENWOOD-LOW, .
Respondent .
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Everett Donnovan Williams (“Williams”) initiated the above-captioned
action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) incorrectly calculated and applied his earned
time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”). (Doc. 1). For the reasons that follow, the
Court will deny the habeas petition.
I. Background
Williams is serving a 324-month term of imprisonment imposed by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida for his conviction of conspiracy to import
five kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States and conspiracy to possess with
intent to deliver five kilograms or more of cocaine. (Doc. 5-3). His current projected release
date is April 15, 2026, via First Step Act release. (/d.).

The Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval reveals that, while in BOP
custody, Williams filed a total of twelve administrative remedies. (Doc. 5-4). None of those
remedies relate to the claims in the habeas petition. (/d.).
In his § 2241 petition, Williams alleges that he is entitled to additional earned time
credits under the FSA towards his release date, or placement in a Residential Reentry
Center (“RRC”) or halfway house until the Court resolves his FSA earned time credit
dispute. (Doc. 1). Respondent counters that the § 2241 petition must be dismissed based

on Williams’ failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding to federal
court. (Doc. 5). Alternatively, Respondent seeks dismissal on the following grounds: (1) the
BOP properly calculated and applied Williams’ FSA time credits; and (2) Williams has no
right to prerelease custody and the BOP did not abuse its discretion by denying him
placement in an RRC. (/d.). The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Il. Discussion
A. — Exhaustion of Administrative Review
Although there is no explicit statutory exhaustion requirement for § 2241 habeas
petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has consistently held that
exhaustion applies to such claims. See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986)); Moscato v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion allows the relevant agency
to develop a factual record and apply its expertise, conserves judicial resources, and

provides agencies the opportunity to “correct their own errors” thereby fostering
“administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citations omitted). The Bureau of
Prisons has a specific internal system through which federal prisoners can request review of
nearly any aspect of their imprisonment. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.19. That

process begins with an informal request to staff and progresses to formal review by the
warden, appeal with the Regional Director, and—ultimately—final appeal to the General
Counsel. See id. §§ 542.13-.15. No administrative remedy appeal is considered fully
exhausted until reviewed by the General Counsel. /d. § 542.15(a).
Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will generally preclude
federal habeas review. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761. Only in rare circumstances Is
exhaustion of administrative remedies not required. For example, exhaustion is

unnecessary if the issue presented is one that consists purely of statutory construction. See
Vasquez Vv. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682
F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). Exhaustion is likewise not required when it would be futile.
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982).
Williams’ Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval report demonstrates that he
did not file any administrative remedies concerning FSA time credits or placement in a
Residential Reentry Center or halfway house. (Doc. 5-4).
Williams concedes that he did not exhaust administrative remedies regarding his
present claims. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-5). He suggests that exhaustion should be excused as futile

because he is “in custody illegally” and because the statutory construction exception to
administrative exhaustion applies. (/d.). Even if Williams thought pursuit of his
administrative remedies would be futile, “[c]ourts in the Middle District of Pennsylvania have
consistently held that ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies is not rendered futile simply
because a prisoner anticipates he will be unsuccessful in his administrative appeals.” See
Ross v. Martinez, No. 4:09-cv-1770, 2009 WL 4573686, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009)
(quoting Malvestuto v. Martinez, No. 1:09-cv-1339, 2009 WL 2876883, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
1, 2009)).
First, Williams appears to argue that he should not have to exhaust his
administrative remedies due to time restraints and he should be released before the

process is completed. The Court is unaware of any decision from the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals holding that a federal prisoner may be excused from the exhaustion requirement on
that ground. Additionally, district courts within the Third Circuit have repeatedly rejected the
argument that an inmate can be excused from the exhaustion requirement simply because
his projected release date is approaching, and he may not complete his administrative
appeal before the release date. See, e.g., Brown v. Sage, No. 22-cv-325, 2022 WL
1295414, at *1-2 (M.D. Pa. April 29, 2022); Malvestuto v. Martinez, No. 09-cv-1339, 2009
WL 2876883, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2009); Bartolotti v. Knight, No. 22-cv-6137, 2022
WL 17959577, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2022); Rosales v. Hollingsworth, No. 15-cv-3840,
2015 WL 4314572, at *2 (D.N.J. July 14, 2015).

Second, Williams argues that the statutory construction exception applies. The
Court recognizes that “exhaustion is not required with regard to claims which turn only on
statutory construction.” Coleman v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 644 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir.
2016). In support of his argument, Williams cites to Goodman v. Ortiz, No. 20-7582, 2020
WL 5015613 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2020). In Goodman, the parties did not dispute that the
inmate-petitioner had successfully participated in several programming activities that met
the requirements of the FSA or had earned a specific number of earned time credits. See
Goodman, 2020 WL 5015613, at *2. Instead, the court considered whether the FSA
required that the earned time credits earned by the petitioner be applied before a certain
date. See id. The court concluded that the inmate-petitioner was exempt from the
administrative exhaustion requirement because the matter “present[ed] a narrow dispute of
statutory construction” and because “habeas relief should be granted.” See id. at *3. The
instant case, however, not only involves when Williams is eligible for the application of
earned time credits, but also a dispute as to whether the BOP properly applied its agency
calculations. The latter issue is unrelated to statutory construction and, therefore, the
exhaustion requirement cannot be excused. See Kurti v. White, No. 1:19-cv-2109, 2020 WL
2063871, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2020) (noting that the petitioner “has clearly failed to
exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the time credit he requests’).
Williams’ claim is the type of FSA time credit dispute that must first be presented to
BOP officials and fully exhausted. Because Williams did not exhaust his administrative

remedies, and no exception applies, his § 2241 petition is subject to dismissal. Erring on
the side of caution, the Court will alternatively address the merits of Williams’ habeas
petition.
B. — Williams has Received the Maximum Allowable First Step Act Time
Credits towards Supervised Release
Williams contends that the BOP refused to provide him with 600 days of First Step
Act time credits towards early transfer to supervised release. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-8). He seeks
placement in a halfway house or, in the alternative, immediate release. (/d.). In his answer,
Respondent states that the BOP already applied the maximum 365 days towards early
transfer to supervised release. (Doc. 5, pp. 9-10).
Under the First Step Act, federal prisoners who meet certain criteria, including
engaging in recidivism reduction programs, are entitled to earn a number of good conduct
credits, to a maximum of 365 days’ worth, to be applied towards early supervised release.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). Specifically, the First Step Act provides that “[a] prisoner shall

earn 10 days of time credits for every 30 days of successful participation in evidence-based
recidivism reduction programming or productive activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i); 28
C.F.R. § 523.42(c)(1). “A prisoner determined by the [BOP] to be at a minimum or low risk
for recidivating, who, over 2 consecutive assessments, has not increased their risk of
recidivism, shall earn an additional 5 days of time credits for every 30 days of successful
participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities.”
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(c)(2). The BOP may apply these time

credits “toward[s] time in prerelease custody,” such as RRC or home confinement, or early
transfer to supervised release, i.e., early satisfaction of an inmate’s term of imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3632(d)(4)(C), 3624(g); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(a)(1).
More specifically, if a prisoner's sentence included a term of supervised release, the
BOP “may transfer the prisoner to begin any such term of supervised release at an earlier
date, not to exceed 12 months, based on the application of time credits under [18 U.S.C. §]
3632.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3) (emphasis added). In essence, applying time credits in this

manner will reduce an inmate’s time spent in BOP custody. On the other hand, as to
prerelease custody, federal law allows the BOP to place inmates in a RRC for up to 12
months, or home confinement for up to 6 months, prior to their date of transfer to supervised
release. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1), (2).
Respondent has submitted the declaration of Keith Ball, a Unit Manager at LSCI-
Allenwood, along with Williams’ FSA time credit assessment. (Doc. 5-2; Doc. 5-6). These
documents confirm that Williams has already received the maximum amount of time credits,
365 days, towards early supervised release. (/d.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3)). As a result,
the BOP refused to provide Williams with additional days towards early supervised release
because he had already received the statutory maximum. (Doc. 5-2; Doc. 5-6). Because
Williams has received the statutory maximum number of credits towards early supervised
release, the Court must deny the habeas petition. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3).

C. Williams does not have a Liberty Interest in Eligibility for Pre-
Release Custody & the BOP Referred Williams for Pre-Release
Placement
Williams claims that the BOP improperly denied his placement in an RRC. (Doc. 1).
Respondent argues that Williams does not have a liberty interest in eligibility for pre-release
custody and, further, that the BOP has fulfilled its statutory duty and referred Williams for
RRC placement. (Doc. 5, pp. 10-15).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a prisoner has no constitutional right
to be confined in a particular place. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well
settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators’
expertise.”); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (“the Due Process Clause did not
itself create a liberty interest in prisoners to be free from intrastate prison transfers.”);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (‘The conviction has sufficiently extinguished
the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons.”).
The Attorney General—and by delegation the BOP—has exclusive authority and discretion
to designate the place of an inmate’s confinement. See Woodall v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 251 (3d Cir. 2005).

1 Williams is not challenging the execution of his sentence within the exception provided for in
Woodall. In Woodall, the Third Circuit held that a prisoner could bring a § 2241 petition challenging a BOP
regulation that limited placement in a Community Corrections Center because the BOP was not “carrying
out” Woodall’s sentence as directed. The Court found that Woodall’s claims “cross[ed] the line beyond a
challenge to, for example, a garden variety prison transfer.” Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243. “[T]o challenge the
execution of his sentence under § 2241, [an inmate] would need to allege that BOP’s conduct was
somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment.” Cardona v.

On April 9, 2008, the Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub.L. No. 110-199, Title Il, §
251, 122 Stat. 657, 697, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621, 3624, went into effect. The Second
Chance Act provides:
(c) Prerelease custody. —

(1) In general. —The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent
practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a
portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12 months), under
conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to
and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such
conditions may include a community correctional facility.
(2) Home confinement authority. —The authority under this subsection may
be used to place a prisoner in home confinement for the shorter of 10 percent
of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). The Act requires the BOP “to make an individual determination that

ensures that the placement is ‘of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of
successful reintegration into the community.” Wilson v. Strada, 474 F. App’x 46, 46-47 (3d
Cir. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6)(C)). In doing so, the BOP must consider: “(1) the

resources of the facility contemplated; (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3)
the history and characteristics of the prisoner; (4) any statement by the court that imposed
the sentence [ ] recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and (5)
any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. §
3621(b); see also Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 433.

Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012). Here, Williams does not allege that his FSA time credit
calculation and eligibility for pre-release custody conflicts with his sentence.

Likewise, the First Step Act does not mandate that the BOP place prisoners in a
halfway house for six months or any other period. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), the BOP is
authorized to consider placing an inmate in a community correctional facility for up to twelve
months. However, a prisoner is neither entitled nor guaranteed such placement for any
minimum amount of time. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). See Woodall, 432 F.3d 235 at 240. Such
placement decisions are solely within the discretion of the BOP. The First Step Act did not
alter this rule.?
In a nutshell, when considering an individual's eligibility for pre-release placement in

an RRC, the BOP is required to ensure that decisions are made: (A) consistent with the five
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); (B) on an individualized basis; and (C) so that the duration of
the placement period gives the inmate the greatest likelihood of successful community
reintegration. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6).
The record in this case clearly establishes that Williams’ Unit Team gave him
individualized consideration consistent with the five factors of section 3621(b). (Doc. 5-7).
They found there was available bed space near Miami, Florida, they considered the nature
of his offense, his institutional disciplinary history and noted that he had several incident
reports issued against him, they considered his judgment and commitment order, and noted

2 The First Step Act expands the Second Chance Act. The First Step Act allows eligible inmates
to earn additional time credits for successfully participating in evidence-based recidivism reduction
programming or productive activities. See The First Step Act of 2018, available at
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45558 (last visited September 16, 2024). Nothing in the
Second Chance Act or the First Step Act entitles an inmate to guaranteed placement in an RRC.
10

that the Sentencing Commission has no policy concerning RRC placement. (/d.). The Unit
Team also noted that Immigration and Customs Enforcement lodged a detainer against
Williams. (Id.).
After reviewing Williams’ petition and the applicable statutes, the Court finds that the
BOP has the discretion to determine if, and when, to transfer Williams to RRC. Consistent
with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the BOP individually considered Williams under the factors
relevant to RRC placement and, indeed, referred him for placement in an RRC, with a
placement date of September 8, 2024. The referral date remains pending. (Doc. 5-2, p. 3]
8). Williams’ purported disagreement with the BOP’s RRC placement recommendation
does not establish a constitutional violation, as nothing in the Second Chance Act, First
Step Act, or § 3621(b) entitles an inmate to any guaranteed placement in an RRC. See
Woodall, 432 F.3d at 244-51 (holding, in exercising its discretion to make halfway house
placement decisions, the Bureau must consider the factors set forth in § 3621(b);
“[hlowever, that the [Bureau] may assign a prisoner to a halfway house does not mean that
it must.”); see also Beckley v. Miner, 125 F. App’x 385, 389 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding, “[iJt is
well settled, and the parties agree, that the Bureau has nearly exclusive jurisdiction to
classify and transfer prisoners.”).

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Ill. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). A separate Order shall issue.

ee

(Ath Mice Lt
bert D. Mariani
United States District Judge
Dated: September ly, 2024

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667954. Public record. Not legal advice.