# Fought v. City of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · September 27, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667824

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 27, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667824

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the “crime[ ] of disorderly conduct” is not “particularly severe”
- finding correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where “a dispute of material fact” existed regarding the alleged excessive force because “the critical event was controverted”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSHUA FOUGHT, et al.,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-01825

v.
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
CITY OF WILKES-BARRE,
PENNSYLVANIA, et al.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment filed by Defendant Joseph
Homza (“Officer Homza”) (Doc. 104) and Defendant City of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
(“Wilkes Barre”) and Defendant Marcella Lendacky (“Chief Lendacky”) (collectively, “City
Defendants”) (Doc. 108) challenging Plaintiffs Joshua Fought (“Fought”), Anthony Falcone
(“Officer Falcone”), and Kaitlyn Falcone’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) second amended
complaint. (Doc. 36). The Court heard oral argument on the pending motions on April 1,
2024. (Doc. 104; Doc. 108). For the reasons provided herein, Officer Homza’s motion for
summary judgment will be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part and City Defendants’
motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED. (Doc. 104; Doc. 108).
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following background is taken from the parties’ statements of material facts and
responses thereto.1 (Doc. 106; Doc. 109; Doc. 112-1; Doc. 112-3; Doc. 118). This case arises

1 Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the Court accepts as true all undisputed material facts
supported by the record. Where the record evinces a disputed fact, the Court will take notice.
from two separate incidents during which police K-9 Chase bit each Plaintiff. The first
incident involves Fought and occurred on July 18, 2017, in the Wilkes Barre Public Square.2
(Doc. 106, ¶ 10; Doc. 105-2, at 8). At approximately 4:35 PM, Officer Homza noticed a group
of people unlawfully consuming alcohol and smoking cigarettes on the Square.3 (Doc. 106, ¶
21; Doc. 105-7, at 4-5). Officer Homza and his K-9 partner, Chase, approached the group and

requested identification. (Doc. 106, ¶ 25; Doc. 105-5, at 44; Doc. 105-7, at 6). When asked if
he had any outstanding warrants, Fought responded that he would not be standing there if he
did. (106, ¶ 26; Doc. 105-2, at 11; Doc. 105-7, at 6). This remark raised Officer Homza’s
suspicion that Fought may flee. (Doc. 106, ¶ 27; Doc. 105-7, at 6). Another member of the
group, Patricia Slusser, approached Officer Homza and his canine partner, causing the K-9
Chase to react by barking. (Doc. 105-2, at 14-15; Doc. 105-7, at 7; Doc. 106, ¶ 28). Fought

In addition, the facts have been taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with
respect to each motion.
2 The Court notes that the way Plaintiffs have cited to the record in their statement of
facts (and lack of citations in their briefing) has made analyzing the instant motions difficult.
(Doc. 112-3). The citations used throughout Plaintiffs’ statements of fact are not clearly
correlated to entries on the docket, and the exhibits are not properly labeled. Plaintiffs even
seem to have forgotten to add some of the citations, including lines such as “Cite expert report
that training was deficient.” (Doc. 112-1, ¶ 4). Further, the naming provisions used by
Plaintiffs for documents make it unclear to the Court to which motion they relate to, Officer
Homza’s or the City Defendants’. (Doc. 112-1). For example, “Plaintiff’s Response In
Opposition To Defendants’ Statement Of Material Facts.” (Doc. 112-1). Based on the Court’s
review of the docket, there are also exhibits missing, including the Deposition Transcript for
Marcela Lendacky, allegedly Plaintiff’s Exhibit A. (Doc. 112-4). While the Court will do its
best to analyze the record before it as to ensure the parties are justly heard, the Court will not
go above and beyond to interpret unclear documents and missing exhibits, and thus
arguments based thereon may be forfeited. Plaintiffs’ materials were not filed on the docket
in accordance with the Local Rules. Plaintiffs are advised to take care to abide by the Local
Rules when filing future papers in this Court.
3 Without citing to the record, Plaintiffs dispute the fact that Fought was gathered with
others drinking while on Public Square. (Doc. 112-1, ¶ 17).
2
responded to this reaction by yelling at Officer Homza “[d]on't let that dog lunge at my girl
like that,” escalating the interaction. (Doc. 106, ¶ 29; Doc. 105-2, at 14-15; Doc. 105-7, at 6-
7; Doc. 112-8, at 41). Officer Homza attempted to de-escalate the situation by removing
Fought. (Doc. 106, ¶ 30; Doc. 105-7, at 7). When this failed, Officer Homza attempted to
place Fought under arrest for disorderly conduct and public drunkenness, however, Fought

would not comply with his demands. (Doc. 106, ¶ 31; Doc. 105-5, at 47; Doc. 105-7, at 7).
As Fought struggled against Officer Homza while he attempted to place Fought in handcuffs,
K-9 Chase, without being commanded but allegedly consistent with his training as it relates
to an arrestee resisting arrest or attempting to flee, bit Fought on the lower right side of his
back, above his hip. (Doc. 106, ¶ 38; Doc. 105-7, at 8, Doc. 105-7, at 29; Doc. 105-5, at 18,
43). Video footage shows K-9 Chase engaging with Fought for an extended amount of time,
as on-lookers watched. (6-29-21 -Exhibit H -7-18-2017 Video of Arrest). Eventually, Officer
Homa commanded K-9 Case to let go and Fought was released. (Doc. 106, ¶ 44). As a result
of these events, Fought was hospitalized and needed multiple surgeries. (Doc. 106, ¶ 46; Doc.

112-8, at 127-29). Fought was also charged with disorderly conduct, public drunkenness, and
resisting arrest (Doc. 106, ¶ 48; Doc. 105-7). Fought has little to no recollection of this incident.
(Doc. 112-8, at 30, 35, 38- 40, 58, 62).
The second incident involves Officer Falcone and occurred on December 17, 2017.
(Doc. 106, ¶ 50; Doc. 112-3, at 4). During this time, Officer Falcone was working as a Wilkes-
Barre police officer and was involved in an attempt to locate a suspect at large. (Doc. 106, ¶
51; Doc. 105-4, at 14; Doc. 112-3, ¶ 28). Officer Falcone was assigned to search and monitor
the “outside perimeter” as other members of the department searched for the suspect. (Doc.
106, ¶ 52; Doc. 105-4, at 14). The suspect was located hiding under a vehicle. (Doc. 106, ¶ 54;
3
Doc. 105-5, at 32). In an attempt to apprehend him, Officer Homza commanded K-9 Chase
to engage the suspect. (Doc. 106, ¶ 53; Doc. 105-5, at 32; Doc. 112-3, ¶ 31). Around this time,
Officer Falcone approached the other side of the vehicle to assist. (Doc. 106, ¶ 56; Doc. 105-
6, at 16; Doc. 112-3, ¶ 31). Officer Falcone was subsequently engaged by K-9 Chase on the
right leg. (Doc. 106, ¶ 57; Doc. 105-4, at 16; Doc. 105-5, at 36; Doc. 105-6, at 11). Officer

Homza immediately commanded K-9 Chase to release Officer Falcone. (Doc. 106, ¶ 58; Doc.
105-5, at 36). K-9 Chase complied with the command. (Doc. 106, ¶ 59; Doc. 105-5, at 36). As
a result of the bite, Office Falcone suffered injuries to his leg. (Doc. 112-3, ¶ 32). Officer
Falcone received “Heart and Lung Benefits” as a result of this incident. (Doc. 106, ¶ 60; Doc.
105-4, at 4).
Plaintiffs filed the operative second amended complaint on October 23, 2018. (Doc.
36). Therein, Plaintiffs assert fourteen Claims: Count I: Fourth Amendment seizure against
Officer Homza; Count II: Failure to Properly Train and Supervise against Wilkes Barre;
Counts III and IV: Assault and Battery against Officer Homza; Count V: Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) against Officer Homza; Counts VI and VII: abuse of process
and malicious prosecution against Officer Homza; Count VIII: Negligence against Officer
Homza and Chief Lendacky; Count IX: Loss of consortium; Count X: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 state-
created danger; Count XI: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 custom and policy against City Defendants and
Officer Homza; Count XII: Negligent Hiring against City Defendants; Count XIII: Negligent
Hiring against City Defendants; Count XIV: Negligent Retention against Wilkes Barre and
Chief Lendacky. (Doc. 36).
On June 29, 2021, Officer Homza filed a motion for summary judgment, as well as a
statement of facts and corresponding exhibits, and a brief in support. (Doc. 104; Doc. 105;
4
Doc. 106; Doc. 107). On June 29, 2021, City Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, statement of facts, appendix, and brief in support. (Doc. 108; Doc. 109; Doc. 110;
Doc. 111). On July 20, 2021, Fought filed a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment with corresponding memorandum, supplements, and exhibits.4 (Doc.
112-1; Doc. 112-2; Doc. 112-3; Doc. 112-4; Doc. 112-5; Doc. 112-6; Doc. 112-7; Doc. 112-8;

Doc. 112-9; Doc. 112-10; Doc. 112-11; Doc. 112-12; Doc. 112-13; Doc. 112-14; Doc. 112-15;
Doc. 112-16; Doc. 112-17; Doc. 112-18). On July 29, 2021, Officer Homza filed a reply brief.
(Doc. 115). On August 3, 2021, City Defendants filed a reply brief. (Doc. 117). The motions
are now ripe and ready for disposition. (Doc. 104; Doc. 105; Doc. 106; Doc. 107; Doc. 108;
Doc. 109; Doc. 110; Doc. 111; Doc. 112; Doc. 115; Doc. 117). On February 12, 2024, this
matter was reassigned to the undersigned District Judge.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be
granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might
affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary
judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the

4 As noted supra, Plaintiffs filed a counter-statement of undisputed facts. (Doc. 112-3,
at 1-4). On August 3, 2021, Officer Homza filed a response to Plaintiffs’ statement of
undisputed facts. (Doc. 118; Doc. 119).
5
nonmovant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir.
1994).
A federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to make credibility
determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Rather, the court must simply “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249.
The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute
of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes

such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations,
answers to interrogatories, or the like to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a
genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must produce
evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case which it bears the burden
of proving at trial, because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in
the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment
when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife

6
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ., 626 F. App’x 384, 389
n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential).
III. DISCUSSION
Two motions for summary judgment are currently before the Court, each requesting
summary judgment on different basis.5 (Doc. 104; Doc. 108). Officer Homza avers he is

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment, assault, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligence claims and on qualified immunity grounds.
(Doc. 107, at 2). City Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ failure to train and
supervise claims, state-created danger claims, and Officer Falcone’s negligent hiring claim, as
well as on qualified immunity grounds. (Doc. 111, at 2). The Court will address each motion
in turn.
A. OFFICER HOMZA’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. Fought’s Fourth Amendment Unlawful Search and Seizure Claims
In Count I of the second amended complaint, Fought asserts an excessive use of force
claim against Officer Homza. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 163-77). Officer Homza argues he is entitled to

summary judgment on Fought’s Fourth Amendment claim because no reasonable juror could
conclude that K-9 Chase’s uncommanded engagement with Fought constitutes a use of
excessive force under the circumstances of Fought’s arrest. (Doc. 107, at 23). Fought responds

5 Fought does not oppose the dismissal of his malicious prosecution and abuse of
process claims. (Doc. 112-17, at 8). Accordingly, Counts VI and VII of the second amended
complaint will be DISMISSED. (Doc. 26, ¶¶ 207-14, 215-22). Plaintiffs also do not oppose
the dismissal of their negligence, loss of consortium, and negligent retention claims against
City Defendants. (Doc. 112-16, at 10). Accordingly, Counts VIII, IX, and XIII as to City
Defendants will be DISMISSED. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 223-27, 228-31, 275-86).
7
that the record contains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Homza used
excessive force in effectuating his arrest. (Doc. 112-17, at 11-13).
When an “excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop
of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Police violate the Fourth

Amendment if their use of force “is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness."
Green v. New Jersey State Police, 246 F. App'x 158, 161 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). When
determining whether a police officer’s use of force was reasonable, Courts consider the
perspective of a reasonable officer, keeping in mind that circumstances are often “tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Green, 246 F. App'x at 161. “How much force is reasonable
in effectuating an arrest is based on the ‘totality of the circumstances[.]’” Geist v. Ammary, 40
F. Supp. 3d 467, 476 (E.D. Pa. 2014). “While this inquiry is highly individualized and fact
specific, the Supreme Court has provided three factors to guide us through it: (1) the severity

of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an imminent threat to the safety of the
police or others in the vicinity, and (3) whether the suspect attempts to resist arrest or flee the
scene.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
These factors are known as the Graham factors. Additional considerations are as follows:
1) the severity of the crime at issue, 2) the immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others that the suspect poses, 3) whether the suspect is resisting or
evading arrest, 4) how “violent or dangerous” the suspect is, 5) the “duration”
of the force, 6) whether the force was used in making an arrest, and 7) whether
the suspect might be armed, and 8) the number of people with whom the police
must contend.

Geist, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
8
Considering this totality of the circumstances approach, the Court’s reasonableness inquiry is
to be “highly individualized and fact specific,” and “requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Santini, 795 F.3d at 417;

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Whether the use of force was reasonable is typically a question for
the jury. Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 79 (3d Cir. 2021); see also Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279,
290 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Since we lack a clearly defined rule for declaring when conduct is
unreasonable in a specific context, we rely on the consensus by a jury decision to help ensure
that the ultimate legal judgment of ‘reasonableness’ is itself reasonable and widely shared.”)
In this case, part of the alleged use of force involved a K-9 partner. (Doc. 36, ¶ 171).
As this Court has previously stated, “a police dog can inflict severe harm” and the use of a
police dog on a suspect constitutes serious use of force. Fought v. City of Wilkes-Barre,

Pennsylvania, 466 F. Supp. 3d 477, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2020). The Third Circuit has held, however,
that the “[u]se of a police dog to bite and hold a suspect is not per se unreasonable.” Moore v.
Vangelo, 222 F. App'x 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362 (9th
Cir. 1994)). In this Circuit, K-9 bites are typically not found to constitute an excessive use of
force in instances where the K-9 took action without being commanded. See Foskey v. Little,
2011 WL 3438415, at *5 (D. Del. 2011) (officer did not use excessive force where the K-9
took action without command); see also Neeley v. Samis, 183 F. Supp. 2d 672, 681 (D. Del.
2002) (finding officers did not use excessive force where the K-9 responded to the plaintiff's
struggling by biting without being commanded).

9
There remain questions of material fact as to whether excessive force was used to
effectuate Fought’s arrest. Fought alleges that Officer Homza used excessive force by
restraining Fought using an arm bar, taking Fought to the ground using force while Fought
was handcuffed, holding Fought down as K-9 Chase bit him, “allowing his K-9 to jump up
and down and thrash its head back and forth while biting Fought,” and refusing to issue a

command to K-9 Chase to release Fought. (Doc. 36, ¶ 171). The record is inconclusive as to
whether such force was lawful under the circumstances and whether a reasonable juror could
conclude the evidence supports these allegations. In making this determination, the Court
looks to the Graham factors and the totality of the circumstances. Geist, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 476.
First, Fought was not suspected of committing any severe or violent crime, as he was arrested
for disorderly conduct. (Doc. 106, ¶ 31; Doc. 105-5, at 47; Doc. 105-7, at 7); see Groman v.
Township of Manalapon, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that the “crime[ ] of
disorderly conduct” is not “particularly severe”). Moreover, “even if an individual is engaged

in disorderly conduct, there still could be a level of responsive force that is ... ‘excessive and
unreasonable.’” El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 339 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Second, the record is inconclusive as to whether Fought posed an immediate threat to those
around him, particularly Officer Homza. While the record supports that Fought had been
drinking before his arrest, there is no evidence that Fought had a gun or was making violent
threats. (Doc. 105-2, at 9; Doc. 106, ¶ 18). Third, the record is inconclusive as to whether
Fought resisted arrest. There is some evidence in the record, including transcripts from
Fought’s trial in Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas and deposition testimony, that
suggests he was resisting arrest. (Doc. 105-5, at 47Doc. 105-7, at 8). There is also video footage
of the arrest that commences when Fought is already on the ground which shows Fought
10
struggling against K-9 Chase for a substantial amount of time. (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 37, 38; Doc. 112-
1, ¶¶ 37, 38; 6-29-21 -Exhibit H -7-18-2017 Video of Arrest). It is unclear whether Fought was
struggling against being arrested or against K-9 Chase’s engagement, and reasonable jurors
could disagree as to whether the duration of force used by Officer Homza was reasonable. (6-
29-21 -Exhibit H -7-18-2017 Video of Arrest). Even if he were demonstrating some non-

compliance with Officer Homza’s orders, a reasonable juror could conclude that Fought’s
noncompliance was not indicative of Fought posing an immediate threat to anyone’s safety,
especially in light of the undisputed fact that Fought was not suspected of any violent crimes.
(Doc. 112-8, at 54); see Santini, 795 F.3d at 420 (finding the third Graham factor inconclusive
where the plaintiff admitted to resisting arrest but did so nonviolently). Moreover, reasonable
minds could disagree as to whether Fought’s remark that he “wouldn't still be standing there”
if he had an active arrest warrant would raise a reasonable suspicion in Officer Homza's mind
that Fought might flee. (Doc. 105-2, at 11; Doc. 105-7, at 6). All this considered, the Court
cannot find in favor of Officer Homza at this time.

To the extent Fought premises his excessive force claim on K-9 Chase’s
uncommanded bite, Officer Homza cites District of Delaware case Neeley v. Samis to argue
“officers should not be held to have used excessive force for uncommanded bites by police K-
9s.” (Doc. 107, at 27-28); 183 F. Supp. 2d 672, 680 (D. Del. 2002). Neely is distinguishable
from the case at bar because in Neely the Court found “[u]ndisputed evidence on the record
supports the officers' belief that plaintiff had already committed serious crimes, that plaintiff
posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and the public, and that plaintiff was
actively evading arrest by flight.” 183 F. Supp. 2d at 679. Here, the record supports that
Fought had not committed any serious crimes, and there remain questions of material fact as
11
to whether he was dangerous or in flight. Courts beyond this Circuit have determined that use
of a police dog on a suspect who is neither dangerous nor fleeing may constitute a use of
excessive use of force. See e.g., Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding ordering a police dog to apprehend, for a period of two minutes, a compliant,

non-threatening, burglary suspect, who was on the ground and neither resisting arrest nor
attempting to flee, was a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation); see also e.g., Mullins v.
City of Colorado Springs, 575 F. Supp. 3d 1360 (D. Colo. 2021) (finding the use of a police dog
engaging with a suspect that is not dangerous or fleeing to be a use of excessive force). This
rings especially true in this case, where video footage shows K-9 Chase engaging with Fought
for a significant amount of time, and the record supports Fought sustained serious injuries as
a result. (6-29-21 -Exhibit H -7-18-2017 Video of Arrest).
Because reasonable minds could differ as to whether Officer Homza used excessive
force in arresting Fought, summary judgment is inappropriate as to Fought’s Fourth

Amendment claims. Accordingly, summary judgment is DENIED at to Count I of the second
amended complaint. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 163-77; Doc. 104).
2. Officer Homza’s Qualified Immunity Claim
Officer Homza argues that “[r]egardless of whether a jury were to find a Fourth
Amendment excessive force violation, Officer Homza would be entitled to qualified
immunity.” (Doc. 107, at 29). Officer Homza continues, “[s]pecifically, Officer Homza is
entitled to qualified immunity because an uncommanded police K-9 bite does not violate
clearly established law.” (Doc. 107, at 29). Fought responds that “Defendant Homza’s actions
in violating Plaintiff Fought’s constitutional right to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures are not protected by Qualified Immunity.” (Doc. 112-17, at 10).
12
Qualified Immunity is not merely a “defense to liability,” but rather “immunity from
suit.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Specifically, “[q]ualified immunity shields
federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735
(2011). An official who reasonably believes his conduct to be lawful is thus protected, as
qualified immunity provides "ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d
248, 254 (3d Cir. 2010). At the time of the violation, there must be a clear legal principle that
“prohibit[s] the officer's conduct in the particular circumstances before him. The rule's
contours must be so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63
(2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court “repeatedly ha[s]

stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Here, the parties dispute whether Officer Homza’s conduct violated a clearly
established right. (Doc. 107, at 30; Doc. 112-2, at 11). “A right is [clearly] established if a
reasonable actor under the circumstances would have known that his or her conduct impinged
upon constitutional mandates.” Broadwater v. Fow, 945 F. Supp. 2d 574, 585 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
A right may be clearly established without “a case directly on point, but existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011). “In determining whether a right has been clearly established, the court must

define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669
13
F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012); see also al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (“We have repeatedly told
courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. The general
proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct

is clearly established.”) (citations omitted). Because the line between acceptable force and
excessive force can be difficult to discern, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity absent
existing precedent which “‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue” and adequately
notifies the officer that a specific use of force is unlawful. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148,
1153 (2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 15 (2015)). The case law does not have to
be “directly on point,” but existing precedent must have placed the question of unlawfulness
“beyond debate.” Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting al-Kidd,
563 U.S. at 741).
Because there are still questions of material fact surrounding whether Officer Homza

violated Fought’s Fourth Amendment rights, Officer Homza is not entitled to qualified
immunity at this time. See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding
correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where “a dispute of material fact”
existed regarding the alleged excessive force because “the critical event was controverted”).
The right to be free from excessive force while being arrested, specifically while being
handcuffed, was clearly established at the time of Fought’s arrest. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d
772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Therefore, we hold that the right of an arrestee to be free from the
use of excessive force in the course of his handcuffing clearly was established when Officer []
acted in this case, and that a reasonable officer would have known that employing excessive

force in the course of handcuffing would violate the Fourth Amendment.”). As discussed
14
supra, the record is inconclusive as to whether Officer Homza used excessive force when
effectuating Fought’s arrest and thus violated his constitutional rights. “In light of a clearly
established right, district courts tend to deny qualified immunity when the reasonableness of
the force used is factually disputed.” Guthrie v. Guthrie, 216 F. Supp. 3d 590, 596 (W.D. Pa.

2016); see also Dimoff v. Amarose, No. 1:22-CV-00072, 2024 WL 3330566, at *12 (M.D. Pa.
July 8, 2024) (in the context of an excessive force claim and considering genuine disputes of
material fact, stating “the Court finds that this is not the appropriate time in the proceedings
to resolve the issue of qualified immunity, especially because of the broad protection qualified
immunity affords a government official.”). Furthermore, several courts beyond this Circuit
have specifically recognized that once an arrestee stops resisting or attempting to flee, and
ceases to pose a safety threat, using a police dog to apprehend the arrestee constitutes
objectively unreasonable excessive force.6 See e.g., Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir.
2016) (finding that it was clearly established, at the time of the officer's conduct, that

“subjecting a compliant and non-threatening arrestee to a lengthy dog attack was objectively
unreasonable.”); see also e.g., Edwards v. Shanley, 666 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.
2012) (“[T]he Graham factors compel the conclusion that [the police officer] used
unreasonable force when he subjected [plaintiff] to five to seven minutes of dog attack, while
[plaintiff] was pleading to surrender and [the police officer] was in a position to immediately

6 It is unclear from the record as to whether Officer Homza ordered K-9 Chase to
release Fought after he stopped resisting arrest. (6-29-21 -Exhibit H -7-18-2017 Video of
Arrest; Doc. 105-5, at 18, 43 Doc. 106, ¶ 44). When Officer Homza was asked why he didn’t
command K-9 Chase to release Fought, he responded: “I did, once Mr. Fought removed his
hand from underneath his body and backup officers arrived and I was able to safely place
Plaintiff Fought in custody.” (Doc. 105-5, at 43).
15
effect [the plaintiff's] arrest.”); see also e.g., LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961
(9th Cir. 2000) (“in a situation in which an arrestee surrenders and is rendered helpless, any
reasonable officer would know that a continued use of [police dogs] or a refusal without cause
to alleviate its harmful effects constitutes excessive force”); see also e.g., Campbell v. City of

Springboro, Ohio, 788 F. Supp. 2d 637, 671 (S.D. Ohio 2011) aff'd, 700 F.3d 779, 787 (6th Cir.
2012) (denying summary judgment on excessive force claim because “[t]here is evidence
suggesting that [officer] allowed [the canine] to continue to bite [suspect] for an extended
period of time, up to forty-five seconds”). Officer Homza’s motion for summary judgment on
this basis is therefore DENIED. (Doc. 104); see Younger v. Gross, No. 20-878, 2023 WL
2433363, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2023) (denying summary judgment because there were
questions of material fact surrounding the alleged use of force that prevented a finding of
qualified immunity); see Horninger v. Gupko, No. 3:10-CV-02559, 2013 WL 226887, at *8 (M.D.
Pa. Jan. 18, 2013) (finding defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity where “there

still remains questions of material fact surrounding whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights
were violated”).
3. Fought’s Negligence, Battery, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
and Assault Claims
In Count III, Count IV, Count V, and Count VIII, Fought asserts claims for assault,
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence against Officer Homza.
(Doc. 36, ¶¶ 196-99, 200-03, 204-06, 223-27). “A police officer may be held liable for assault
and battery when the force used in making an arrest is unnecessary or excessive.” Minor v.
Cumberland Twp., 258 F. Supp. 3d 518, 531-32 (W.D. Pa. 2017). Here, Fought’s negligence
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are also directly tied to his excessive
16
force claims. (Doc. 36, at 30, 33). When questions of material fact remain regarding the
underlying excessive force claim, questions of material fact likewise exist as to these related
claims. See Boroff v. Lynn, No. CIV.A. 11-6849 ES, 2014 WL 7148918, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 12,
2014), aff'd, 643 F. App'x 130 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Because the remaining claims before the Court-

negligence and assault and battery- “go hand in hand” with Plaintiff's excessive force claim,
[Police Officer] is entitled to summary judgment on them as well.”); see also Minor, 258 F.
Supp. 3d at 531-32 (“As the Court has found that genuine questions of fact and credibility
exist as to [the plaintiff's] excessive force claims, similar questions of fact and credibility exist
as to her assault and battery claims”). Because the Court finds that Officer Homza is not
entitled to summary judgment on Fought’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, Officer
Homza’s motion for summary is also DENIED as to Fought’s negligence, assault, battery,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against him. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 196-99, 200-
03, 223-27 at 30, 33; Doc. 104); see El v. City of Pittsburgh, No. CV 15-834, 2018 WL 3707420

(W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, dismissed in part, 975 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“For the reasons set forth supra, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the force used
by [Police Officers] with respect to the [Plaintiffs] was excessive. Accordingly, the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs' assault and battery claims against [Police
Officers] shall be denied.”).
4. Officer Falcone’s Negligence Claim
In Count VIII of the second amended complaint, Officer Falcone also alleges a
negligence claim against Officer Homza. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 223-27). Moving for summary
judgment, Officer Homza argues that Officer Falcone’s negligence claim is barred by the co-
employee immunity provision of the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Law (“WCA”),
17
77 P.S. § 72. (Doc. 107, at 41). In opposition, Officer Falcone argues his claim is not barred
because Officer Homza’s conduct was “knowing, intentional, and foreseeable.” (Doc. 112-2,
at 16).
Typically, a plaintiff “cannot recover from his co-worker because Pennsylvania law
provides that the Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for recovering loss due

to work related injuries, including injuries caused by the negligence of a co-worker.” Shaw v.
State Farm Ins. Co., CIV. A. 07-1553, 2008 WL 2756507, at * 1 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2008), aff'd,
331 Fed. Appx. 946 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 77 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 72, 481(a)). The WCA provides:
If disability or death is compensable under this act, a person shall not be liable
to anyone at common law or otherwise on accounts of such disability or death
for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as
the person disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong.

77 P.S. § 72 (emphasis added).
This language considered, an individual co-worker may only be held liable under the WCA
only for intentional wrongs. 77 P.S. § 72. Further, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has found
that the type of intentional wrongs that give rise to a cause of action under the WCA are those
that one would not normally expect to be subjected to while at the workplace. See Baum v.
NGK Metals Corp., 155 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“[a] plaintiff has a cause of
action under the WCA, where the intentional wrong is not normally expected to be present
in the workplace) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
It is undisputed that Officer Falcone and Officer Homza were working in their official
capacities as Wilkes-Barre police officers at the time Officer Falcone was bitten by K-9 Chase.
(Doc. 105-5, at 30; Doc. 110-3, at 14). There is nothing in the record suggesting that Officer
Homza acted intentionally when K-9 Chase bit Officer Falcone. While Officer Falcone argues
18
that “Defendant Homza’s conduct was knowing, intentional, and foreseeable,” and therefore
constitutes a “intentional tort,” the claim at issue is negligence, which is not an intentional tort.
(Doc. 112-17, at 16). The Court therefore agrees with Officer Homza’s assertion that Officer
Falcone cannot recast his negligence claim into an intentional tort through his briefing. (Doc.
115, at 24). Accordingly, Officer Falcone' s negligence claim is barred by the co-worker

exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act as it fails to trigger the “intentional
wrong” exception as a matter of law. 7 (Doc. 115, at 25); 77 P.S. § 72; see Wakshul v. City of
Phila., 998 F. Supp. 585, 589 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Officer Homza’s motion for summary judgment
as to Count VIII is therefore GRANTED. (Doc. 104). Officer Falcone’s negligence claim
brought under Count VIII is thus DISMISSED. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 223-27).
B. CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. Fought’s Failure to Train and Supervise Claim8
City Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Count II of the
second amended complaint, Fought’s failure to properly train and supervise claim. (Doc. 111,
at 14-15). City Defendants argue that Fought cannot establish that they acted with deliberate

indifference in training Officer Homza or that an alleged failure to train him was a direct
cause of Fought’s injuries. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 178-95; Doc. 111, at 14-15). In opposition, Fought

7 Because the Court will grant summary judgment on Count VIII, it is likewise
appropriate to grant summary judgment on Count IX, Kaitlyn Falcone’s loss of consortium
claim. Murray v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 432, 438 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Little v. Jarvis, 219
Pa. Super. 156, 280 A.2d 617, 620 (1971) (one cannot recover for loss of consortium in
absence of defendant's liability to spouse). Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal of this claim.
(Doc. 112-16, at 10). Count VIII is therefore DISMISSED.
8 Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal of their negligence, loss of consortium, and
negligent retention claims against City Defendants. (Doc. 112-16, at 10). Accordingly, Counts
VIII, XI, and XIV as to City Defendants will be DISMISSED.
19
argues that City Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on his failure to train and
failure to supervise claims. (Doc. 112-16, at 7-10).
Fought brings his failure to train and supervise claims under Section 1983. (Doc. 36,
¶¶ 178-95). While municipalities and other local governments are considered “persons” for
purposes of Section 1983 liability, they cannot be held responsible for every constitutional tort

inflicted by their employees. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). Municipalities are responsible only for “their own illegal
acts” and are not subject to respondeat superior liability. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting
Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). To bring a Section 1983 claim against a
municipality, the plaintiff must show that “the alleged constitutional transgression
implements or executes a policy, regulation[,] or decision officially adopted by the governing
body or informally adopted by custom.” Mulholland v. Gov't Cty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237
(3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In other words, a plaintiff can establish Section

1983 municipal liability in two ways: policy or custom. Watson v. Abington Township, 478 F.3d
144, 155 (3d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit has explained that to prove liability, the plaintiff
must establish that the municipal policy or custom was itself unconstitutional or was the
"moving force" behind the constitutional deprivation. Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d
217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Thus, to prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must
identify the challenged policy or custom, demonstrate proper attribution to the public entity,
and show a causal link between the execution of the policy or custom and the injury
suffered. See Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. The facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003).

20
a. Failure to Train
A Monell claim premised on the alleged failure to train employees requires the plaintiff
to show that the alleged training deficiency amounts to “deliberate indifference” to the
constitutional rights of individuals who will come into contact with those employees. Thomas,
749 F.3d at 222 (quoting Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)); see

also Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[F]ailure to train can serve as
the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference
to the rights of persons with whom [a municipal employee] come[s] into contact.”). This
demanding standard requires evidence that the municipality “disregarded a known or obvious
consequence” of its action. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. The alleged training deficiency must be
closely related to the constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61.
Ordinarily, a pattern of constitutional violations will give notice to a municipal actor
that new or different training is necessary, and continued adherence to the original training
program will demonstrate the “conscious disregard” required to establish deliberate

indifference. Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223 (citation omitted). Allegations focused on one
particular officer’s training “will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer's
[alleged] shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program.”
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91, (1989). This considered, there are certain
situations where the need for training is “so obvious” that, even without a pattern of previous
constitutional violations, failing to provide such training could rise to the level of deliberate
indifference. Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10). Such
“single-incident” failure-to-train liability turns on “[t]he likelihood that the situation will recur
and the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle the situation will violate
21
citizens' rights.” Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223 (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs.
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). Here, Fought does not allege a pattern of constitutional
violations by City Defendants. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 178-95). Thus, the Court construes Fought’s
Monell claim as a single incident failure-to-train liability.9 (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 178-95).

The record reflects that Officer Homza received eight weeks of extensive K-9 training
and around sixteen hours of in-service training monthly. (Doc. 112-5; Doc. 112-16, at 35); see
Williams v. Ponik, 822 F. App'x 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2020) (looking to evidence of training when
determining whether the record reflects a defendant-city acted with deliberate indifference by
failing to train officers). Meanwhile, Fought has failed to present evidence regarding the
deliberate indifference of any Wilkes Barre decision makers. See Cannarozzo v. Borough of W.
Hazleton, 575 F. Supp. 3d 510, 530-32 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (granting summary judgment on city-
defendant’s failure to train claim where plaintiff failed to produce evidence of deliberate
indifference), aff'd sub nom. Cannarozzo v. Borough of W. Hazelton, No. 22-1079, 2022 WL

17261785 (3d Cir. Nov. 29, 2022). In fact, in his brief in opposition to City Defendants’
motion, Fought fails to cite to the record at all on this claim, with the exception of citations
to deposition testimony contained Exhibit A, which Plaintiffs failed to attach to their motion
and therefore is not on the docket or in the record.10 (Doc. 112-16, at 8-9). Regardless, the

9 On June 12, 2020, the Honorable Judge Mariani dismissed without prejudice two
counts of Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, Count IX and XII, Custom and Policy under
Section 1983 against the Wilkes Barre, Officer Homza and Chief Lendacky, and Negligent
Hiring against Wilkes Barre and Chief Lendacky. (Doc. 61).
10 Although Plaintiffs have listed “Exhibit A: Deposition Transcript for Marcela
Lendacky dated December 8, 2020” in their “Appendix to Plaintiff’s Response Concise
Statement,” it does not appear as though Plaintiffs have attached this exhibit to this appendix.
(Doc. 112-4, at 1; Doc. 112-1, - Doc. 112-18). However, the Court takes notice of the

22
proposition that this deposition testimony apparently stands for, that Chief Lendacky believed
there needed to be additional K-9 training, does not amount to the deliberate indifference
needed to satisfy Fought’s claim. There is no indication that this testimony, or any other
evidence in the record, would reveal a “conscious” or “deliberate” disregard for the
consequences of the municipality’s choice. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. “The scant

testimony cited is not evidence that the risk of a Fourth Amendment violation was a ‘highly
predictable consequence’ of [Wilkes Barre’s] failure to provide training.” Cannarozzo, 575 F.
Supp. 3d at 532.
Furthermore, the Fought has failed to introduce any evidence of what type of training
would have made a difference in this case or expert testimony attributing Fought’s injuries to
lack of training. Cf. Evans v. Columbia Cnty., No. 1:20-CV-00722, 2024 WL 115202, at *39
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2024), dismissed, No. 24-1227, 2024 WL 3676934 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2024)
(looking at expert testimony and specific training deficiencies when finding there existed

questions of material fact as to whether defendant-municipal failed to adequately train staff).
Considering the lack of record evidence related to this claim, the Court finds that no
reasonable juror could conclude Fought has met his burden as to his failure to train claim.
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in City Defendants’ favor as to this claim. 11
(Doc. 108). Fought’s failure to train claim is hereby DISMISSED. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 178-95).

deposition of Defendant Lendacky dated October 8, 2020, in City Defendants’ appendix of
exhibits (Doc. 110-4).
11 In Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition, Fought also argues that City Defendants’ failures
are closely related to Officer Falcone’s injuries. (Doc. 112-16, at 8). However, in Plaintiffs’
second amended complaint, only Fought asserts a failure to train and super claim against City
Defendants. (Doc. 36, at 24).
23
b. Failure to Supervise
Section 1983 claims based upon a theory of respondeat superior are barred under
Monell. Dotterer v. Pinto, No. CV 13-06903, 2016 WL 336870, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2016).
To establish a claim for failure to supervise under Section 1983, Fought must:
(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor
failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without
the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the
ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed,
(4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk, and (5) the underling's violation
resulted from the supervisor's failure to employ that supervisory practice or
procedure.

Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Dotter 2016 WL
336870, at *9; Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).
In asserting a failure to supervise claim, Fought must “identify specific acts or omissions of
the supervisor that evidence deliberate indifference and persuade the court that there is a
relationship between the identified deficiency and the ultimate injury.” Sample, 885 F.2d at
118.
According to City Defendants, Fought has not presented any evidence to establish the
above-listed elements. (Doc. 111, at 16). Fought responds that the record reflects City
Defendants failed to discipline Officer Homza or take any corrective measures following his
missed K-9 training. (Doc. 112-16, at 9-10). In support of this response, Fought cites both the
declaration of Andre Jimenez in which she states that “regular training (weekly and monthly)
is necessary to identify any issues that may need to be addressed,” as well as the missing
deposition testimony of Chief Lendacky. (Doc. 112-16, at 9-10). Even considering this
evidence, the Court finds Fought’s claims to be unsupported. In Sample v. Diecks, the Third
Circuit emphasized that “it is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the constitutionally
24
cognizable injury would not have occurred if the superior had done more than he or she
did.” 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). “Rather, the plaintiff must identify specific acts or
omissions of the supervisor that evidence deliberate indifference and persuade the court that
there is a relationship between the identified deficiency and the ultimate injury.” Brown, F.3d

at 216 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, Fought has failed to do so. Aside
from deposition testimony that Chief Lendacky “knew that proper training of the canine team
and the officers they would be working with was critical to ensure that the officers could safely
perform their job,” Fought has failed to identify specific omissions or deliberate indifference
on her part. In fact, the deposition testimony of Chief Lendacky provides the opposite,
supporting that she asked that proper policies be used to train officers because it “felt
important for them to safely do their job.” (Doc. 110-4, at 17). As Fought has failed to produce
any evidence otherwise, no reasonable fact finder could conclude Chief Lendacky acted with
deliberate indifference while conducting her supervisory duties. Accordingly, summary
judgment is GRANTED as to Fought’s failure to supervise claims. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 178-95; Doc.

108). Count II of the second amended complaint is thus DISMISSED. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 178-95).
2. Plaintiffs’ State-Created Danger Claims
Plaintiffs assert a state-created danger claim against Chief Lendacky in Count X of
their second amended complaint. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 232-38). The gist of this claim is that Chief
Lendacky failed to take preventative measures to protect Plaintiffs from the danger presented
by Officer Homza. (Doc. 36, ¶ 237). The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs have met their
burden as to their state-created danger claims. (Doc. 111, at 19; Doc. 112-16, at 10-13). The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “Generally, the Due
25
Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty on the state to protect its citizens from
harms caused by other private citizens or themselves.” LEONARD HROMEK, KIMBERLY
HROMEK, & MICHAELLA PACK, Administrators of the Est. of Nicholas P. Hromek; Plaintiffs v.
BOROUGH OF EXETER & CHIEF SCHLAGEL, Exeter Borough Police Dep't, Defendants, No.

3:23CV549, 2024 WL 4217031, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2024). However, when it is the state
who places a person in a danger it created, the state has a duty to protect against that danger.
Mears v. Connolly, 24 F.4th 880, 883 (3d Cir. 2022) (“when it affirmatively places a person in
a position of danger that the person would not otherwise have faced .... Then, the government
must protect people from the dangers it created.”). Under a theory of “state-created danger,”
a plaintiff may sue under Section 1983 to recover from state actors who “affirmatively acted
to create plaintiffs danger, or to render him or her more vulnerable to it.” D.R. by L.R. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vo. Tech. School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1374 (3d Cir. 1992). To establish a state-created
danger claim, a plaintiff must show:

(1) The harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct (2) a state actor
acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship
between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a
foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of
persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions, as
opposed to a member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively
used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that
rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at
all.

Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir.
2017) (quoting Bright, 443 F.3d at 281 (brackets omitted).

“Liability under the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the states' affirmative acts
which work to the plaintiffs' detriments in terms of exposure to danger.” Middle Bucks Area Vo.
Tech. School, 972 F.2d at 1374; see also Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir.
26
2006). To succeed on a state-created danger claim, all four elements be satisfied. See Phillips v.
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008).
Under the fourth element of the state-created danger test, the Third Circuit has found
that liability "is predicated upon the states' affirmative acts which work to the plaintiffs'

detriments in terms of exposure to danger. It is a misuse of state authority, rather than a failure
to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause." Bright, 443 F.3d at 282 (internal citations
and quotation omitted). As such, in order to establish the fourth element of a state-created
danger claim, the plaintiffs must identify “an affirmative action, rather than inaction or
omission.” Phillips, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir.2008) (citations omitted). While “the line
between action and inaction is not always easily drawn,” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, at
178 (3d Cir.2013), as amended (June 14, 2013) the Third Circuit has “never found state-created
danger claim to be meritorious without an allegation and subsequent showing that state
authority was affirmatively exercised.” Bright, 443 F.3d at 282. The requirement of an

affirmative act serves to distinguish cases where officials might have done more from cases
where officials created or increased the risk itself. Morrow, 719 F.3d at 179 (alterations and
citation omitted).
City Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to introduce evidence in support of
any of the four necessary elements to prevail on this claim.12 (Doc. 111, at 20). In opposition,

12 Chief Lendacky also relies on Pahler v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 207 F. Supp. 2d 341, 351
(M.D. Pa. 2001), aff'd, 31 F. App'x 69 (3d Cir. 2002) to argue Officer Falcone’s state-created
danger claim is precluded. (Doc. 111, at 21). The Pahler court found that “the ‘state-created
danger’ theory, arising out of the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is inapplicable to law enforcement personnel who are injured during their
employment.” 207 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
27
Plaintiffs contend that summary judgment would be inappropriate as to their state-created
danger claims because Chief Lendacky was aware of the dangers caused by her failure to
enforce proper training and thus, as a result, Plaintiffs were foreseeably injured. (Doc. 112-16,
at 10-13). However, Plaintiffs again fail to cite to the record in their brief as it related to their
state-created danger claim. (Doc. 112-16, at 10-13).

The record reflects that the Wilkes-Barre City Police Department canine unit was
reactivated when Chief Lendacky was the Chief of Wilkes-Barre City Police Department, that
she participated in the review and selection of the officers who were assigned to the canine
unit, including Officer Homza, and that she knew that the training of the officers who were
not canine handlers was necessary to ensure that the officers could safely perform their duties.
(Doc. 110-4, at 8-9; 10, 15; Doc. 112-3, ¶¶ 3-7). However, the record fails to support any of
the elements necessary to establish a state-created danger claim. Bright, 443 F.3d at 282.
Plaintiffs refute this conclusion by arguing that Chief Lendacky selected Officer Homza to be
a canine handler despite failing to meet the training requirements under Special Order 1.3.9

and continued to allow Officer Homza to serve as a canine handler despite his failures to
attend canine training. (Doc. 112-16, at 11). As Plaintiffs see it, their injuries were foreseeable
and a direct consequence of Officer Homza’s appointment and lack of training, which Chief
Lendacky effectuated with conscious disregard for the serious risk posed. (Doc. 112-16, at 11-
12). However, this arguments fails not only for lack of record support, but also because courts
have concluded that failure to train and supervise officers are distinct claims. See Nawuoh v.
Venice Ashby Cmty. Ctr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 633, 642 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (finding failure to train is
not an affirmative act that satisfies the fourth element); see also Estate of Pendelton ex rel.
Pendelton v. Davis, 2007 WL 1300743, at *11 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2007) (finding failures of
28
supervision or training do not meet the affirmative act requirement of the state-created danger
test). Also, the record is devoid of evidence that Chief Lendacky’s behavior was “conscious
shocking.” See L. H. v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 666 F. App'x 213 (3d Cir. 2016) (upholding the
district court’s dismissal of state-created danger claim where the behavior at issue was not

“conscious shocking”). Accordingly, no reasonable fact finder could conclude Plaintiffs have
met their burden as it relates to their state create danger claims. City Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED as it relates to Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claims. (Doc.
36, ¶¶ 232-38; Doc. 108). Count X of the second amended complaint is to be DISMISSED.
(Doc. 36, ¶¶ 232-38).
3. Officer Falcone’s Negligent Hiring Claim
In Count XII and Count XIII of the second amended complaint, Fought and Officer
Falcone each allege a negligent hiring claim against Wilkes Barre and Chief Lendacky. (Doc.
36, ¶¶ 255-64, 265-74). Fought’s negligent hiring claim has previously been dismissed by this
Court. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 255-64; Doc. 61). An employer may be held responsible for the intentional

acts of employees where a reasonable investigation into an employee’s background would
have revealed prior criminal or violent propensities related to the employee’s position.
Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 572, 246 A.2d 418, 423 (1968). To sustain a claim
for negligent hiring under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must allege the elements of common
law negligence, duty, breach, causation, and damages, as well as that employer was on notice
of the employee’s propensity for violence and such employment might create a situation
where violence would harm a third person. Miller v. Schmid, No. 22-CV-00958, 2024 WL
922757, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2024) (Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 488 (3d
Cir. 2013) (citing Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 246 A.2d 418, 420 (Pa. 1968)); Heller v. Patwil
29
Homes, Inc., 713 A.2d 105, 107-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)). The notice requirement relates to
the usual elements of negligence in two ways, demanding proof that but for the defendant’s
breach of the duty of reasonable care, the defendant would have known about the employee’s
dangerousness, and the failure to know and act on the dangerousness of the employee caused

the plaintiff’s injury. Belmont, 708 F.3d at 488 (citing Dempsey, 246 A.2d at 420 (Pa.
1968)); Heller, 713 A.2d at 107-08.
City Defendants argue Officer Falcone’s negligent hiring must fail because “nothing
on the record indicates Officer Homza was violent, or had a propensity to violence, nor that
his employment could cause harm . . .” (Doc. 111, at 23). Officer Falcone avers otherwise,
submitting testimony from Detective Ronald Foy, who investigated the incident in which
Officer Falcone was injured. (Doc. 112-16, at 13-14; Doc. 112-7). Therein, Detective Foy
testified that during an arrest at the Wilkes Barre Motor Lodge, Officer Homza “repeatedly
kicked a man who was handcuffed and in control of other officers during the course of an

arrest.” (Doc. 112-16, at 13-14; Doc. 112-7, at 15). As Officer Falcone sees it this “propensity
for violence should have prompted a thorough investigation by Lendacky into the
circumstances of [Officer Homza’s violent arrest]. Instead, Lendacky stuck her head in the
sand and failed to investigate any instances of alleged misconduct prior to appointing Officer
Homza as a canine officer, let alone investigating a sustained allegation of excessive for
against a handcuffed person in custody of her police officers.” (Doc. 112-16, at 14). In their
reply brief, City Defendants dispute this characterization of events, asserting “Plaintiffs
completely missed the mark on this argument, because Chase accompanied Officer Homza
to the arrest which occurred at the Wilkes-Barre Lodge, so this incident obviously occurred
after Officer Homza became an active canine officer.” (Doc. 117, at 12; Doc. 112-7, at 49-50,
30
59). Furthermore, that the in the deposition testimony cited by Plaintiffs, Detective Foy
provides that “Officer Homza used poor judgment when he did not release the canine during the
arrest at the Wilkes-Barre Lodge.” (Doc. 117, at 12; Doc. 112-7).
Detective Foy’s testimony does create some dispute as to whether or Officer Homza

had a demonstrable propensity towards violence. (Doc. 112-7, at 15). However, Officer
Falcone has failed to point to any record evidence that Chief Lendacky was on notice of this
behavior when she hired Officer Homza, especially given the violent incident cited by
Plaintiffs occurred after Officer Homza was already on the force and working with the canine
unit. (Doc. 112-7). While Officer Falcone boldly asserts that Chief “Lendacky stuck her head
in the sand and failed to investigate any instances of alleged misconduct prior to appointing
Officer Homza as a canine officer,” he cites to no evidence in support of this proposition.
(Doc. 112-16, at 14). Accordingly, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Officer
Falcone has met his burden as to his negligent hiring claim against City Defendants. For that
reason, City Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Officer

Falcone’s negligent hiring claim. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 255-64, 265-74; Doc. 108). Count XIII of the
second amended complaint is DISMISSED.13 (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 265-74); see Wilson v. Borough of
Bellmawr, No. CV 13-5437, 2016 WL 7377114, at *15 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2016) (granting
summary judgment on a negligent hiring claim for lack of evidence).

13 Chief Lendacky asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity because there is no
evidence on the record demonstrating that she violated a constitutional right. (Doc. 111, at
24-25). As the Court finds that Chief Lendacky is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
claims, the Court declines to address Chief Lendacky’s argument concerning qualified
immunity.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Officer Homza’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED
in part and GRANTED in part. (Doc. 104). Officer Homza’s motion is DENIED as to
Fought’s Fourth Amendment, battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and negligence claims and on the basis of qualified immunity. (Doc. 104). Officer Homza’s

motion is GRANTED as to Officer Falcone’s negligence claim and Kaitlyn Falcone’s loss of
consortium claims. (Doc. 104). City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. (Doc. 108). Fought’s failure to train and supervise claim asserted in Count II;
Fought’s abuse of process claim asserted against Officer Homza in Count VI; Fought’s
malicious prosecution claim asserted against Officer Homza in Count VII; Plaintiffs
negligence claim asserted in Count VIII against City Defendants; Officer Falcone’s negligence
claim against Officer Homza in Count VIII; Kaitlyn Falcone’s loss of consortium claim
asserted in Count IX; Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claims asserted in Count X; and Officer

Falcone’s negligent hiring claims and negligent retention claims both asserted in two counts
each titled Count XIII are hereby DISMISSED. (Doc. 36; Doc. 104; Doc. 108).
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: September 27, 2024 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667824. Public record. Not legal advice.
