# Kern v. DAS Companies, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · July 12, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667556

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 12, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667556

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[u]nsubstantiated and subjective beliefs and opinions are not competent summary judgment evidence”
- stating that courts “will not second-guess a business entity’s managerial determination that a reduction-in-force was an economic reality”
- holding that a party trying to defeat summary judgment cannot “rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions”
- holding that “speculation and conjecture” are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAMELA L. KERN, :
Plaintiff : No. 1:22-cv-01128
:
v. : (Judge Kane)
:
DAS COMPANIES, INC., :
Defendant :

MEMORANDUM
This case arises from allegations of retaliation and discrimination by Plaintiff Pamela L.
Kern (“Plaintiff”) against her former employer Defendant DAS Companies, Inc. (“Defendant”).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant first fired and then retaliated against her in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 951 et seq. Before the Court is Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 35.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant
Defendant’s motion in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
Defendant is a full-service marketing and global supply chain portfolio company which
designs, imports, and distributes “travel related products,” such as truck and automobile supplies,
travel gear, and mobile electronics. (Doc. No. 36 ¶¶ 1–2.) In 2020, Defendant’s President was
Michael Z. Abel (“Mr. Abel”), a fifty-six (56) year old man. (Id. ¶¶ 3–4.)2 On February 27,

1 The following relevant facts of record are taken from Defendant’s Concise Statement of
Material Facts (Doc. No. 36) and Plaintiff’s Responsive Statement of Material Facts (Doc. No.
48) and are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Both statements contain specific citations to the
record at each numbered paragraph.

2 Plaintiff states that Mr. Abel was actually fifty-four (54) years old in the spring of 2020. (Doc.
No. 48 at 2.) Upon review of the record, it appears that Plaintiff is correct. In his deposition,
2020, Mr. Abel e-mailed department heads to announce that he would be reviewing and cutting
budgets, and likely dismissing personnel as well. (Id. ¶ 5.) In March of 2020, the coronavirus
pandemic shuttered the travel industry, decreasing demand for Defendant’s products. (Id. ¶ 6.)3
Accordingly, Mr. Abel initiated phased layoffs, trusting his department heads to decide whom to

layoff and consulting them during the process of trimming payroll. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.)
In the spring of 2020, Charles White (“Mr. White”) served as Defendant’s Vice President
of Brands and Marketing. (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant maintains that Mr. White was fifty-three (53)
years old in the spring of 2023, while Plaintiff cites Mr. White’s deposition, wherein he states
that he was born in August 1967, which would make him fifty-two (52) in the spring of 2020.
(Id. ¶ 10; Doc. No. 48 ¶ 10.) In considering whom to layoff, Mr. White considered “critical
business functions and roles that ‘would have the least immediate financial impact on the
business.’” (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff disputes this fact, claiming that: (1) Mr. White failed to
consult with Plaintiff’s supervisor, Gina Bonafede (“Ms. Bonafede”) about the implications of
laying Plaintiff off; (2) Mr. White failed to consult the proper figures, namely Tim Luce (“Mr.

Luce”), the Information Technology (“IT”) Director, with whom Plaintiff was working on a
project; and (3) Mr. White did not actually consider roles and business functions during the
layoff process. (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 11 (citing several depositions).) During Phase One (1) layoffs,
Mr. White decided to layoff Plaintiff, Marketing Analysis Manager Christopher Vang (“Mr.
Vang”), and Customer Service Representative Danielle Crockett (“Ms. Crockett”). (Id. ¶ 12.)

Mr. Abel stated that he was born in 1965, and further noted that he was fifty-seven (57) years old
at the time of the deposition, which was taken in May of 2023. (Doc. No. 37-1 at 5.)

3 Plaintiff denies this assertion in part, stating that the trucking industry, one of Defendant’s
customers, continued to demand Defendant’s products. (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 7.) Further, Plaintiff
maintains that Defendant “had reached the highest net operation income in company history” by
August of 2020. (Id.)
During Phase Two (2) layoffs, Mr. White decided to layoff Director of Channel & Shopper
Derek Lehman (“Mr. Lehman.”) (Id.) When the Phase One (1) layoffs were actually
implemented, Defendant terminated Plaintiff, Mr. Vang, Ms. Crockett, as well as two other
employees effective April 6, 2020. (Id. ¶ 13.)

On April 3, 2020, Defendant’s Vice President of Human Resources Wendy Stoviak (“Ms.
Stoviak”) emailed Plaintiff, informing her that Defendant would be laying her off effective April
6, 2020. (Id. ¶ 14.) As of April 3, 2020, Plaintiff had been a full-time salaried employee earning
$50,458 annually. (Id. ¶ 15.) At the time she was laid off, Plaintiff had sixteen (16) coworkers
in the Marketing Department, she was the third oldest employee, and the other two employees in
the Phase One (1) layoffs were among the youngest employees working in the department. (Id. ¶
16.)4 Defendant maintains that, prior to the Phase One (1) layoff on April 6, 2020, the average
age of Marketing Department employees was 43.19, although Plaintiff disputes the ages of
multiple employees and asserts that the average age was actually 43.06. (Id. ¶ 17; Doc. No. 48 ¶
17.) It is undisputed that the average age of employees in the Marketing Department after Phase

One (1) layoffs was forty-four (44). (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 18; Doc. No. 48 ¶ 18.)
On April 20, 2020, Defendant instituted Phase Two (2) layoffs, resulting in the
termination of eleven (11) employees. (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 19.) Mr. Lehman was not terminated,
because Mr. White took a leave of absence and Mr. Lehman and Ms. Bonafede assumed his
duties. (Id. ¶ 20.) On May 8, 2020, Defendant instituted Phase Three (3) layoffs, terminating
eighteen (18) employees. (Id. ¶ 21.) Defendant maintains that it hoped the layoffs would be
temporary, and it continued to provide healthcare benefits to those individuals through May 31,

4 Defendant’s Concise Statement of Material Facts contains a table with the aforementioned
information. See (Doc. No. 36 at 4). Plaintiff disputes one job title noted in the table, as well as
the ages of two employees. See (Doc. No. 48 at 10).
2020. (Id. ¶ 22.) On May 28, 2020, Ms. Stoviak informed Plaintiff that Defendant would not be
recalling her and accordingly her health benefits would end on May 31, 2020. (Id. ¶ 23.) Ms.
Crockett was also not recalled. (Id. ¶ 24.) Defendant offered Mr. Vang an interview for another
position, and after he rejected the interview, Defendant elected not to recall him as well. (Id. ¶

25.) Ultimately, twelve (12) of the thirty-four (34) employees laid off during the spring of 2020
were never recalled. (Id. ¶ 26.)
Ross Sachs (“Mr. Sachs”) served as Defendant’s Director of Marketing Communications
from 2011 through 2016. (Id. ¶ 27.) While in that role, Mr. Sachs directly supervised Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 28.) Mr. Sachs created a spreadsheet to evaluate employee skillsets, whereby a score of
4.9 and under indicated that an employee was weak regarding that skill. (Id. ¶ 29.) Mr. Sachs
awarded Plaintiff the following scores: 2.0 for communications, 3.0 for coachability, 2.0 for
attitude, and 3.0 for learning. (Id. ¶ 30.) In the comments section, Mr. Sachs noted that Plaintiff
had an “inconsistent” attitude while on the job and “prefers things done [her] way, otherwise
things may not be done” according to established procedures, while also critiquing her overall

professionalism. (Id. ¶ 31.) Defendant maintains that Plaintiff “intermittently exhibited negative
and self-focused behavior during the time Mr. Sachs supervised her in the Marketing
Department,” (id. ¶ 32), while Plaintiff denies this assertion, citing Mr. Sachs’ deposition in
which he states that “some days [Plaintiff] was a peach, meaning good, great” to supervise (Doc.
No. 48 ¶ 32).
After Mr. Sachs left the Marketing Department, Mr. Kevin Willi (“Mr. Willi”) supervised
Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 33.) On June 10, 2015, Mr. Willi gave Plaintiff a verbal warning,
highlighting her inconsistent performance, unprofessional communication methods, and
describing her behavior as “not conducive to a professional, team oriented environment.” (Id. ¶
34.) The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was placed on a “Performance Improvement Plan.”
Defendant asserts that in June 2015, Mr. Willi placed Plaintiff on a Performance Improvement
Plan. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff denies this assertion, citing to her paper and electronic personnel file
and noting that there is no Performance Improvement Plan in said file, while also citing Ms.

Bonafede’s deposition in which she stated that she had not observed a Performance Improvement
Plan when reviewing Plaintiff’s personnel file. (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 35.) On July 2, 2018, Mr.
Lehman complained about Plaintiff to Mr. Willi and Ms. Bonafede, calling her a “toxic team
member” and concluding that although she is “a very capable team member, unfortunately she
does not play well with others. She is negative, condescending, rude and miserable to work
with.” (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 36.) On July 18, 2018, Mr. Willi gave Plaintiff a written warning for
“negative, condescending, rude, combative, and disruptive behavior,” noting that Defendant had
addressed these issues with her on prior occasions. (Id. ¶ 37.) The parties agree that Plaintiff’s
2018 performance evaluation noted that she “[n]eeds [i]mprovement,” but Plaintiff argues that
only Mr. Willi, and not Ms. Bonafede, authored said evaluation. (Id. ¶ 38; Doc. No. 48 ¶ 38.)

Mr. Willi eventually stopped working for Defendant sometime in 2018, and Plaintiff began
reporting directly to Ms. Bonafede. (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 39.)
During 2019 and 2020, Ms. Bonafede worked as Defendant’s Director of Marketing
Communications. (Id. ¶ 40.) On June 25, 2019, Ms. Bonafede informed Ms. Stoviak that two
Marketing Department employees complained about Plaintiff’s behavior and attitude. (Id. ¶ 41.)
Ms. Bonafede summarized Plaintiff’s performance evaluations from 2012 to 2018 relating to
teamwork and communication, rating her as fully satisfactory overall, while noting that in the
area of teamwork, Plaintiff “[n]eeds improvement.” (Id. ¶¶ 42–43.) Ms. Bonafede testified that
Plaintiff:
had a very negative attitude that traveled through the whole department. People
did not like interacting with [Plaintiff]. And in a lot of cases[,] they would rather
do something themselves that was outside of their job scope than ask her to do it
because they didn’t, they didn’t want to deal with the reaction that was inevitable
when dealing with [Plaintiff].
(Id. ¶ 44.)
In 2017, Defendant hired Mr. Luce as Head of IT. (Id. ¶ 45.) In April of 2020, Mr. Luce
was fifty-three (53) years old. (Id. ¶ 46.)5 Mr. Luce testified that Plaintiff’s attitude at work was
problematic, and further explained that he told Ms. Bonafede she “needed the type of resources
who would work together instead of creating a difficult working environment.” (Id. ¶ 47.)
Defendant maintains that Mr. Luce believed Plaintiff had engaged in secretive conduct during
earlier projects, and this secretive behavior justified her termination. (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff denies
this assertion, stating that Mr. Luce failed to specify the projects during which she allegedly
engaged in secretive behavior, and further noting that Mr. Luce once lauded Plaintiff’s ability to
explain workplace processes to others. (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 48.) Defendant further asserts that, prior
to Plaintiff’s layoff in 2020, Mr. Luce recommended her termination to Mr. White, Ms.
Bonafede, and Human Resources (“HR”). (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 49.)
From August 20, 2015 through December 4, 2019, Plaintiff applied to fourteen (14)
positions with Defendant. (Id. ¶ 50.) Defendant maintains that it did not hire Plaintiff for any of
these positions because they “were not compatible with her prior work experience, or the
positions were inconsistent with her poor employment record,” (id. ¶ 51), while Plaintiff asserts
that she had performed the duties described in the job postings, namely the eCommerce
positions, and was never given explanations as to why Defendant chose not to hire her for these

5 Plaintiff denies this assertion, noting that because Mr. Luce was born in November 1967, he
was fifty-two (52) in April of 2020. (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 46.)
jobs (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 51). Beginning on July 22, 2020, after she had been laid off, Plaintiff
applied for several positions posted by Defendant on CareerBuilder and Indeed.6 (Doc. No. 36 ¶
52.) Defendant again maintains that it chose not to hire Plaintiff for any of these positions
because she did not meet the qualifications, her prior experience did not match the job

descriptions, and the positions required a minimum level of co-worker interaction for which
Plaintiff was not equipped. (Id. ¶ 53.)7
On July 28, 2020, Defendant posted an open Content and Asset Coordinator position, and
Plaintiff and four others subsequently applied for said position. (Id. ¶¶ 54–56.) Defendant
maintains that Ms. Bonafede did not select Plaintiff to interview for this position because of her
“attitude and inability to work with others,” (id. ¶ 57), while Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Bonafede
did not really believe that she was “toxic,” and further claims that Ms. Bonafede’s reasoning was
post hoc and inaccurate (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 57). Defendant further maintains that Ms. Bonafede’s
decision was driven in part by her feeling that Plaintiff “lacked the e-commerce skills required
for the Content and Asset Coordinator position,” in addition to the fact that Ms. Bonafede had

found issues with Plaintiff’s prior work with the company from years before. (Doc. No. 36 ¶
58.)8 Defendant asserts that these issues included poor writing style and grammar, as well as

6 These are both websites which allow individuals to find and pursue employment opportunities.
See Adams v. Interarch, Inc., No. 06-cv-02638, 2008 WL 5377757 at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2008)
(discussing the use of CareerBuilder); Gilbert v. Indeed, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 374, 383
(S.D.N.Y. 2021) (explaining that Indeed is “a search engine for job listings that connect
prospective employees with employers”).

7 Plaintiff concedes that Defendant chose not to hire her for any of the posted positions but
maintains that Plaintiff was qualified for several of the positions for which she applied. (Doc.
No. 48 ¶ 53.)

8 Plaintiff’s denial as to this contention includes a citation to Mr. Sachs’ deposition in which he
stated that he felt Plaintiff was overqualified for the Content and Asset Coordinator position.
Plaintiff’s omission of necessary information from data fields pertinent to the work product. (Id.
¶ 59.) Plaintiff maintains that Ms. Bonafede did not find issues with Plaintiff’s work product
because she gave Plaintiff positive evaluations. (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 59.)
By August 11, 2020, Defendant removed the advertisement for the Content and Asset
Coordinator position because it decided not to hire anyone. (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 60.)9 On October 5,

2020, Ms. Bonafede needed assistance due to increased business, so Ms. Torres was assigned to
Defendant by Staffing USA to help Ms. Bonafede on a part-time basis. (Id. ¶ 61.) Ms. Torres
began working full-time hours on November 24, 2020, before being hired as the full-time
Content and Asset Coordinator on December 6, 2021. (Id. ¶¶ 62–63.) Ms. Torres was forty (40)
years old at the time Defendant hired her to work full-time. (Id. ¶ 64.)
In late 2020, Plaintiff applied to be an E-Commerce Affiliate Marketing Manager with
Fox Chapel, a publishing company, and subsequently interviewed for the position. (Id. ¶¶ 65–
66; Doc. No. 37-33 at 11.) Fox Chapel thereafter “canceled” the position and never hired anyone
to assume the role. (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 67.) On December 29, 2020, Plaintiff applied to work as a

Print Production Assistant at Fox Chapel. (Id. ¶ 68.) Fox Chapel asked Plaintiff to provide a
reference from a former direct supervisor and Plaintiff provided Fox Chapel with the contact
information for Ms. Bonafede. (Id. ¶¶ 69–70.) Plaintiff did not notify Ms. Bonafede that she

(Doc. No. 48 ¶ 58 (citing Doc. No. 37-12 at 50–51).) Plaintiff also maintains that any issues
with her work from prior years could be attributed to others. (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 58.)

9 Plaintiff concedes that Defendant removed the advertisement for the position but argues that:
(1) Defendant hired Andrew DeBord (“Mr. DeBord”) to work as E-Commerce Senior
Coordinator, a position Plaintiff maintains is similar to the Content and Asset Coordinator
position; (2) Defendant eventually filled the Content and Asset Coordinator position with Tracey
Torres (“Ms. Torres”), after a period during which Ms. Torres worked part-time and performed
many of the tasks formerly performed by Plaintiff; and (3) Defendant made Ms. Torres a full-
time employee in December of 2021. (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 60.)
provided her contact information to Fox Chapel. (Id. ¶ 71.) Aubrey Vonada (“Ms. Vonada”),
Fox Chapel’s Human Resources and Payroll Manager, emailed Ms. Bonafede regarding the
reference. (Id. ¶ 72.) Ms. Bonafede sent this referral request to Julie Houseal (“Ms. Houseal”), a
member of Defendant’s HR Department. (Id. ¶ 73.) Defendant’s policy for referrals is “only to

verify dates of employment, wages, and title.” (Id. ¶ 74.) Ms. Bonafede informed Fox Chapel
about Defendant’s policy, and Ms. Vonada later confirmed that Defendant’s response sounded
like a standard practice, affirming that this interaction with Ms. Bonafede did not influence her
perception of Plaintiff’s application. (Id. ¶¶ 75–76.) None of Fox Chapel’s hiring managers
commented negatively to Ms. Vonada about Defendant’s response to Ms. Vonada’s information
request. (Id. ¶ 77.) Fox Chapel eventually hired another candidate for the position. (Id. ¶ 78.)
A few months later, the selected candidate resigned, and Fox Chapel reached out to Plaintiff to
gauge if she was still interested in the position for which she had previously interviewed. (Id. ¶
79.) On June 14, 2021, Fox Chapel hired Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 80.)
On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel mailed a letter to Defendant notifying it of

Plaintiff’s potential litigation alleging age discrimination pursuant to the ADEA and PHRA. (Id.
¶ 81.) On October 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
(“PHRC”). (Id. ¶ 82.) On April 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amended charge of discrimination
with both the EEOC and PHRC to include claims of retaliation. (Id. ¶ 83.)
B. Procedural Background

On July 20, 2022, Plaintiff initiated the above captioned action against Defendant,
asserting four claims. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff avers that she was discriminatorily terminated
pursuant to the ADEA and PHRA (Counts One and Three) and retaliated against in violation of
the same statutes (Counts Two and Four). (Id. at 8–12.) On September 13, 2022, Defendant
filed an answer. (Doc. No. 7.) After a case management conference and the filing of a joint case
management plan (Doc. No. 14), on December 13, 2022, the Court issued an Order scheduling a
period of limited discovery to end January 13, 2023 (Doc. No. 15). That same day, the Court
referred the instant action to a mediator. (Doc. No. 16.) On February 22, 2023, the mediator

filed a report informing the Court that the parties did not reach a settlement. (Doc. No. 17.)
The Court subsequently issued an Order setting the close of fact discovery on May 26,
2023. (Doc. No. 19.) The Court received and granted several motions to extend discovery in
this matter. (Doc. Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.) On August 17, 2023, the Court held a Post
Discovery Status Conference with the parties. (Doc. No. 26.) The next day, the Court set the a
deadline to file Daubert motions of September 8, 2023.10 (Doc. No. 27.) On September 8, 2023,
Defendant filed a motion to preclude the report and testimony of Mr. Sachs as expert opinion in
the instant action, as well as a brief in support of that motion. (Doc. Nos. 28, 29.) On September
22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion. (Doc. No. 32.)
Subsequently, on October 13, 2023, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts wherein the

parties agreed that Mr. Sachs could not offer expert opinions on certain topics, and that
Defendant would accordingly withdraw its motion to preclude Mr. Sachs’ expert testimony.
(Doc. No. 33.) On October 27, 2023, the Court approved (Doc. No. 34) the Joint Stipulation of
Facts, deeming Defendant’s motion (Doc. No. 28) to preclude Mr. Sachs’ expert testimony
withdrawn.
On November 22, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
(Doc. No. 35.) Defendant also filed a Concise Statement of Material Facts (Doc. No. 36), as

10 A Daubert motion permits parties to challenge the reliability of an expert opinion in
accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
well as dozens of exhibits relevant to its motion for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 37-1 through
37-37). On December 6, 2023, Defendant filed a brief in support of its motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. No. 40.) On December 27, 2023, the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission (“PHRC”) moved to participate as an Amicus Curiae in the instant action. (Doc.

No. 45.) That same day, the PHRC filed a brief in support of its motion (Doc. No. 46), and
Plaintiff filed her brief in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
47), as well as her Responsive Statement of Material Facts (Doc. No. 48). On January 2, 2024,
the parties filed a Joint Motion to Replace Unredacted Files with Redacted Versions. (Doc. No.
51.) The Court subsequently granted that motion, instructing the Clerk of Court to strike twenty-
three (23) exhibits from the docket of this matter, while permitting the parties to file new
versions with personal data identifiers redacted. (Doc. No. 52.) On January 10, 2024, Defendant
filed its reply brief in further support of its motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 53.)
On January 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a sur reply (Doc. No. 54), as
well as a brief in support of that motion (Doc. No. 55). On January 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an

unopposed motion requesting oral argument as to Defendant’s summary judgment motion. (Doc.
No. 57.) On January 30, 2024, Defendant filed a brief opposing in part Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to file a sur reply, arguing that the Court should permit only one subsection of Plaintiff’s
sur reply to be filed. (Doc. No. 58.) On April 12, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to file a sur reply, and granted the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission’s motion
for leave to participate as an Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 59.) Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is
warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute

is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law, and it is genuine
only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a
verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49
(1986). At summary judgment, the inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law. See id. at 251-52. In making this determination, the Court must
“consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” See A.W.
v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364

F.3d 135, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party’s claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion
with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal
memoranda, or oral argument.” See Berckeley Inv. Grp. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d
Cir. 2006); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party
“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is
warranted. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence that the
non-moving party must provide, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the
non-movant’s evidence is merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative. See Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249–50. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and
more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See id. at 252; see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Further, a party may not

defeat a motion for summary judgment with evidence that would not be admissible at trial. See
Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s motion seeks the entry of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADEA and
PHRA discrimination claims and her ADEA and PHRA retaliation claims. The Court first
examines Defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA
discrimination claims. In so doing, the Court initially evaluates Plaintiff and Amicus Curiae
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“Amicus”)’s argument that the Court should place
a heightened burden on Defendant as it pertains solely to Plaintiff’s PHRA discrimination claim.
After determining the applicable standard of review, the Court assesses the merits of Defendant’s

argument that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA discrimination
claims. Finally, the Court evaluates Defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA retaliation claims.
A. Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA Discrimination Claims

1. Whether Different Standards of Review Apply to Plaintiff’s ADEA
and PHRA Discrimination Claims

Defendant maintains that, in evaluating its motion for summary judgment as to both
Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA discrimination claims, the Court should apply the typical burden
shifting framework as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas
Corporation v. Green. (Doc. No. 40 at 15.) Citing Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hospital of
Pittsburgh, Defendant argues that the PHRA and ADEA have been interpreted “the same” and it
follows that “the same analysis is used for both statutes.” (Id. (citing Willis v. UPMC Children’s
Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015))).
In response, both Plaintiff and Amicus argue that the Court should place a greater burden

on Defendant at the summary judgment stage in ruling on Defendant’s summary judgment
motion as to Plaintiff’s PHRA discrimination claim. (Doc. Nos. 46; 47 at 16–22.) Amicus
argues that there are two types of employment discrimination cases: (1) pretext theory cases as
analyzed by the McDonnell-Douglas framework; and (2) “mixed motive” cases, in which a
plaintiff argues that an adverse employment decision was motivated by both legitimate and
discriminatory reasons. (Doc. No. 46 at 7–8.) Amicus maintains that the Court effectively has
two options for addressing age discrimination claims under the PHRA. (Id. at 9.) First, Amicus
argues that the Court could apply the framework set up by the Supreme Court in Gross v. FLB
Financial Services Incorporated, which requires a Plaintiff to prove, “by a preponderance of the
evidence, that age was the ‘but for’ cause of the challenged employment action.” See (id. (citing

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 178 (2009))). On the other hand, Amicus asserts
that the “1991 CRA [Civil Rights Act] framework” could and should apply in this case. (Doc.
No. 46 at 9–10.) Under the 1991 CRA framework, Amicus contends that a plaintiff who
demonstrates that “an illegitimate factor played a motivating part in an adverse employment
action, the fact that legitimate factors may also have led to the employment decision does not
relieve the employer of liability for employment discrimination.” (Id. at 15.)11

11 Plaintiff and Amicus ask the Court to apply the mixed motive framework, in which Plaintiff
must present “sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that [discrimination]
was either a motivating or determinative factor behind [the employer’s] adverse personnel
decisions.” See Garner v. Pennsylvania Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 16 A.3d 1189, 1201 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2011) (citing Prise v. Alderwoods Grp., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 564, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2009)).
Plaintiff argues that courts have interpreted the “best able and most competent” language
of the PHRA to place a higher burden on an employer, because the PHRA provides greater
protection to aggrieved employees than its federal counterpart. (Doc. No. 47 at 17–18.)
Plaintiff’s argument is essentially that: (1) the Court is not required to apply the traditional

McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting framework in evaluating Defendant’s summary judgment
motion as to Plaintiff’s PHRA discrimination claim; (2) the Court should recognize that in
PHRA claims involving other protected classes, such as racial minorities, state courts have
applied the “mixed motive” theory requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that discrimination was a
motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (3) the PHRA is the only antidiscrimination
statute operable in Pennsylvania and it would be perverse to assume that all claims do not receive
the same treatment; and (4) the Court should therefore heed several state court decisions and
apply this heightened standard, despite the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never
definitively ruled on this issue. (Doc. No. 47 at 19–20.)
In evaluating the arguments of the parties on the question of the appropriate standard of

review for Plaintiff’s PHRA age discrimination claim, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff and
Amicus’ arguments and therefore declines to deviate from the longstanding practice within this
Circuit of evaluating ADEA and PHRA discrimination claims under the same standard of review
and with the same burden shifting approach.
The Court first observes that nothing in the statutory text of the PHRA compels the Court
to place a higher burden on the employer at the summary judgment stage. The ADEA provides

Under this framework, if Plaintiff meets her burden, Defendant “can avoid liability by proving
that it would have made the same decision, even if it had not taken into account the employee’s
protected class.” See Garner, 16 A.3d at 1201.
that an employer shall not “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The
PHRA in turn provides that an employer cannot:

because of the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or non-
job related handicap or disability or the use of a guide or support animal because of
the blindness, deafness or physical handicap of any individual or independent
contractor, to refuse to hire or employ or contract with, or to bar or to discharge
from employment such individual or independent contractor, or to otherwise
discriminate against such individual or independent contractor with respect to
compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or
contract, if the individual or independent contractor is the best able and most
competent to perform the services required.

See 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 955(a). As a general matter, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) has held that “the interpretation of the PHRA is identical to
that of federal anti-discrimination laws, including the ADEA,” see Willis, 808 F.3d at 643, and it
follows that courts should analyze claims under both statutes through the same lens unless “there
is something specifically different in [the PHRA’s] language requiring that it be treated
different” see Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 567. Importantly, in Willis, the Third Circuit cited the
operable provisions and noted that “[t]he relevant provisions of the ADEA and the PHRA do not
provide any indication” that the differing language exception applies. See Willis, 808 F.3d at
643 n.4. The Court finds that the Third Circuit’s conclusion—that the anti-discrimination
provisions of the ADEA and PHRA are analogous and should be applied identically—to be
persuasive in this case.
While Amicus maintains that this Court should “liberally construe the PHRA’s
provisions for the accomplishment of [the statute’s] purposes,” (Doc. No. 46 at 13), neither
Plaintiff nor Amicus cite authority from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holding that the
“best able and most competent” language puts the PHRA on a higher plane than the ADEA. To
the contrary, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that:
the ‘best able and most competent’ language of our Human Relations Act has been
the source of considerable confusion. According to one view, this language
operates primarily in ‘disparate impact’ cases to establish a correlative of the
‘business necessity defense’ found in Title VII cases. Its effect in ‘disparate
treatment’ cases, such as the present, is limited to allocating the burdens of proof
in the same way as described in McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Aikens.
Another view treats the language as creating an element of any cause of action
under the section, whether under the disparate impact or disparate treatment theory,
and would assign the burden of proof as to that element to the plaintiff. Here, the
parties and the lower tribunals proceeded as though the ‘best able and most
competent’ language had no effect on the McDonnell Douglas elements of either
the employee’s prima facie case or the employer’s defense; the defendant has never
contended that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving that she was ‘best able and
most competent.’

See Allegheny Hous. Rehab. Corp. v. Com., Pennsylvania Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 532 A.2d 315,
317 n.2 (Pa. 1987) (citations omitted) (“Allegheny Housing”). While not necessarily clarifying,
Allegheny Housing’s declaration that the “best and most competent” language from the PHRA
has caused “considerable confusion,” see id., is nonetheless helpful in undertaking an analysis of
the statutory language. The opinion noted that many parties and lower courts have proceeded as
though the phrase did not affect McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting. See id. Because no more
recent opinions from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have clarified the meaning or operation
of the “best and most competent” language, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff and Amicus’
argument on this point.12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s ADEA
and PHRA discrimination claims should be assessed under the same analytical framework.

12 To the contrary, Pennsylvania courts evaluating age discrimination claims pursuant to the
PHRA continue to utilize the traditional McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting framework. See
Riemer v. II-VI, Inc., No. 338 WDA 2023, 2024 WL 749932, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 23,
2024) (noting that “Pennsylvania has adopted the same [McDonnell-Douglas] framework for
indirect evidence of age discrimination under the PHRA”); see also Rodrock v. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, 307 A.3d 169, 2023 WL 6862059 at *5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2023) (applying McDonnell-
2. Legal Standard Applicable to ADEA and PHRA Discrimination
Claims

Under the ADEA, an employer is prohibited from discharging or otherwise
discriminating against any individual “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In
order to prevail on an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must establish that age was the “but-for” cause of
the adverse employment action at issue. See Willis, 808 F.3d at 644 (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at
177–78). A plaintiff can sustain a claim of discrimination under the ADEA by presenting either
direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See Duffy v. Magic Paper Grp., Inc., 265
F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001). Where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the Court
reviews age discrimination claims pursuant to the three-part framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). See Willis, 808 F.3d at 644.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination. See Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1997)). When a plaintiff
satisfies the elements of a prima facie case, that creates an “inference of unlawful
discrimination.” See Willis, 808 F.3d at 644 (citing Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d
344, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)). The elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination are: (1) the
plaintiff is at least forty years old; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision; (3)

the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and (4) the plaintiff was ultimately
replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger so as to support an inference of a
discriminatory motive. See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).

Douglas in addressing a PHRA age discrimination claim).
Where the plaintiff is not directly replaced, the fourth element may be satisfied if the
plaintiff can provide facts which “if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors.” See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 352. Additionally,
“[r]ecognizing that the fourth element is inadequate in a reduction in force context, as opposed to

demotion or discharge cases,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also
specified that the “fourth element [can be] satisfied by showing that the employer retained a
‘sufficiently younger’ employee.” See Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citing Showalter v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 190 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1999)).
“Once the plaintiff has successfully established a prima facie case creating an inference
of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer who must ‘articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.’” See Willis, 808 F.3d at 644 (quoting
Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 412 (3d Cir. 1999)). At this stage, the employer is
not required to prove that the articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was the actual
reason for the adverse employment action, but need only provide evidence that would allow a

factfinder to determine that the decision was made for non-discriminatory reasons. See Fuentes
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). If the employer satisfies this prong, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer’s
proffered non-discriminatory reason was pretextual. See Burton, 707 F.3d at 726–27. In order
to survive summary judgment when an employer has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment action, a plaintiff must adduce some evidence that would allow a
factfinder to reasonably either “(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated reasons; or (2) believe
that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative
cause of the employer’s action.” See Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764).
To establish pretext based on disbelief, a plaintiff’s evidence must indicate “such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proffered legitimate reasons” to allow a factfinder to conclude that the employer’s actions could
not have been taken for non-discriminatory reasons. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 759. In the

alternative, to establish pretext based on the argument that a discriminatory reason was “more
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause,” a plaintiff must present evidence “with
sufficient probative force” to allow a factfinder to “conclude by a preponderance of the evidence
that age was a motivating or determinative factor.” See Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644–45 (citing
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111). Specifically, a plaintiff must point to evidence demonstrating that (1)
the defendant previously discriminated against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant discriminated
against others within the plaintiff’s protected class; or (3) the defendant has treated similarly
situated, substantially younger individuals more favorably. See Simpson, 142 F.3d at 645 (citing
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). “If this step is satisfied, at trial the plaintiff must convince the
factfinder that not only was the employer’s proffered reason false, but the real reason was

impermissible discrimination.” Willis, 808 F.3d at 645 (citing Fuentes, 32 F3d at 763 (internal
quotation omitted)).
3. Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA Discrimination Claims

a. Arguments of the Parties

At the outset, the Court notes a discrepancy between the complaint and the parties
briefing related to the pending summary judgment motion. As noted supra, Plaintiff’s complaint
raises four claims: (1) ADEA discrimination based on Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff; (2)
ADEA retaliation based on Defendant’s failure to rehire Plaintiff following the filing of her
EEOC charge; (3) PHRA discrimination; and (4) PHRA retaliation. (Doc. No. 1.) That said, in
its motion for summary judgment, Defendant discusses Plaintiff’s discrimination claim as if it is
comprised of two claims: (1) Defendant’s unlawful firing; and (2) Defendant’s failure to rehire
Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 40 at 24–31.) In her responsive brief, Plaintiff argues that the Court should
not grant summary judgment as to her discrimination claim based on Defendant’s failure to

rehire her. (Doc. No. 47 at 33–42.) The Court observes that Plaintiff did not raise a failure to
rehire discrimination claim in her complaint. Accordingly, the parties’ arguments as to that
claim, namely the relevant pretext inquiry discussed infra, will be addressed in connection with
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, which is the only ADEA claim based on Defendant’s failure to
rehire her for a position.13
For the purposes of its motion, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under the ADEA. (Doc. No. 40 at 15.) Defendant states that the
COVID-19 pandemic and the need to cut expenses due to the shuttering of the global economy is
the legitimate non-discriminatory reason supporting its decision to lay off Plaintiff. (Id. at 16–
17.) Defendant maintains that Plaintiff is unable to prove that its stated rationale was pretext for

unlawful discrimination. (Id. at 17.) Defendant cites cases supporting the proposition that
employees who are let go as part of workplace reorganization or a reduction in force carry a
heavier burden in making claims of discrimination. (Id. at 18 (citing Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28
F.3d 366, 375 (3d Cir. 1994)).) Defendant further alleges that Plaintiff “was not the oldest
person in the Marketing Department on April 3, 2020 when [Defendant] notified her of the
layoff.” (Doc. No. 40 at 18.) Defendant argues that, even if Plaintiff was the most senior

13 The Court’s interpretation of the briefing aligns with Plaintiff’s EEOC complaints, in which
she originally filed a discrimination charge and discussed her layoff, (Doc. No. 51-18 at 6–7),
and the failure to rehire her is not addressed until she filed an amended charge to include her
allegations of retaliation (id. at 9–10).
member of the Marketing Department at the time of her termination, this fact is insufficient
evidence to support a finding of pretext, because Defendant did not use seniority in selecting
whom to lay off. (Id. at 19.) Defendant maintains that this Court should not examine its
business decisions, asserting that Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s decision to post available

jobs beginning in summer of 2020 is proof that layoffs were never necessary is without merit and
not for this Court to evaluate. (Id.)
Next, Defendant argues that its decision to post a Content and Asset Coordinator position
on July 28, 2020 does not provide sufficient grounds for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
its stated non-discriminatory reason for laying Plaintiff off was pretextual. (Id. at 21.)
Defendant asserts that: (1) the Content and Asset Coordinator position differed from Plaintiff’s
former job as a Content Coordinator; (2) assuming the jobs were the same, the fact that it posted
this position four months after firing Plaintiff reflects a business decision and not age
discrimination; and (3) even if Defendant erred in laying Plaintiff off in the first place, this does
not mean that Defendant must have been discriminating against Plaintiff in so doing. (Id.)

In addition to the above arguments, Defendant also promulgates a statistical argument.
First, Defendant notes that Plaintiff was laid off at the same time as two other employees, neither
of whom was a member of the relevant protected class. (Id. at 22.) Second, Defendant argues
that, of the employees who remained in the Marketing Department after layoffs, three “were
either the same age as [Plaintiff] or older.” (Id.) Further, Defendant asserts that, after the Phase
One (1) layoff, the average age in the Marketing Department increased. (Id. at 23.)
In response, Plaintiff proffers several arguments in attempting to cast Defendant’s stated
rationale for Plaintiff’s firing as pretext for unlawful age discrimination. Plaintiff first asserts
that Mr. White’s statement that layoffs would target those who “would have the least immediate
financial impact on the business” was inaccurate and thus evidence that Defendant’s stated
rationale for laying Plaintiff off was mere pretext for age discrimination. (Doc. No. 47 at 28.)
Plaintiff maintains that Mr. White changed his mind about whom to layoff, altering his selection
criteria in the face of a question from Ms. Stoviak, in which she appeared to want the list to

include more male employees. (Id.) Following Ms. Stoviak’s query, Mr. White chose to layoff
Mr. Lehman, a forty-seven (47) year old man, who was significantly older than the two
employees Mr. White removed from the original layoff list. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that Mr.
White’s “ability to quickly pivot on his layoff selections is sufficient evidence to show pretext.”
(Id.)
As to her second argument in support of pretext, Plaintiff maintains that Mr. White’s
testimony, in which he claims to have consulted with Ms. Bonafede about the impact of laying
Plaintiff off, is contradicted by Ms. Bonafede’s own testimony. (Id. at 29.) Plaintiff argues that
this contradiction suggests pretext on the part of Defendant. See (id.). Plaintiff further notes that
“[a]dditional evidence of pretext is [that Defendant] tried to rehire [Mr.] Vang, age 28, in May

2020.” (Id. at 30.)
Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s discriminatory motive is evidenced by the fact that:
(1) Defendant ignored Ms. Stoviak’s proposal to potentially rehire Plaintiff; and (2) Defendant
later hired a significantly younger person to take on some of Plaintiff’s duties. (Id. at 31; Doc
No. 49-28.) Plaintiff asserts that statistical evidence in disparate treatment cases “should be
approached with caution and skepticism.” (Doc. No. 47 at 31 (citing Healy v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1217–18 (3d Cir. 1988)).) Plaintiff attempts to refute Defendant’s other
arguments, asserting that evidence of new hires after layoffs necessarily refutes the statistical
evidence cited by Defendant. (Doc. No. 47 at 32.)
b. Whether the Court will Grant Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA Discrimination Claims

As an initial matter, because Defendant concedes for purposes of the pending summary
judgment motion that Plaintiff can demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to
the ADEA and PHRA, the Court will confine its analysis to the pretext inquiry. The Court
follows the burden shifting framework enunciated by McDonnell-Douglas, providing that
“[o]nce the plaintiff has successfully established a prima facie case creating an inference of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer who must ‘articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.’” See Willis, 808 F.3d at 644
(citing Jones, 198 F.3d at 412). Defendant does so here, asserting that, as a business specializing
in travel related products, the need to lay off staff at the onset of the pandemic is a legitimate and
non-discriminatory reason justifying its removal of Plaintiff from her position. (Doc. No. 40 at
16.)
Accordingly, because Defendant has offered a non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s
firing, the burden then shifts to Plaintiff “to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.” See Willis, 808 F.3d
at 644. Plaintiff can do this in one of two ways. First, Plaintiff can “point to evidence that
would allow a factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s reason for the adverse employment
action.” See id. To do so, Plaintiff must cite record evidence revealing “such weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons to satisfy the factfinder that the employer’s actions could not have been
[taken] for nondiscriminatory reasons.” See id. at 644–45. In the alternative, Plaintiff can
demonstrate that Defendant’s stated rationale is pretextual by:
[p]oint[ing] to evidence that would allow a factfinder to believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause
of the employer’s action. Specifically, the plaintiff can show pretext this way by
presenting evidence with sufficient probative force so as to allow the factfinder to
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a motivating or
determinative factor. Pointing to evidence demonstrating any of the following
satisfies this second way to prove pretext: (1) the defendant previously
discriminated against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant discriminated against others
within the plaintiff’s protected class; or (3) the defendant has treated similarly
situated, substantially younger individuals more favorably.

See id. at 645 (cleaned up).
In attempting to meet that burden, Plaintiff points to several pieces of evidence she
maintains are sufficient for a factfinder to reasonably either disbelieve Defendant’s articulated
reason for her termination, or believe that a discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause of Defendant’s action. The Court examines each in turn.
First, Plaintiff asserts that the fact that Mr. White “rapidly switched his layoff selections,”
supports an inference that his reasoning for Plaintiff’s layoff is pretextual. (Doc. No. 47 at 28.)
Plaintiff cites evidence that Ms. Stoviak emailed Mr. White after Mr. White made his initial
layoff recommendations, prompting him to consider “replacing one or more females with a ‘male
equivalent,’” and the fact that Mr. White ultimately altered said recommendations. (Id.) The
Court finds that Mr. White’s choice to alter his recommendations as to who should be laid off
does not cast sufficient doubt on Defendant’s offered legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
Plaintiff’s layoff. No reasonable factfinder, in drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving
Plaintiff, could conclude that Mr. White’s process for determining who to lay off renders
Defendant’s pandemic-based rationale for dismissing several employees mere pretext for
unlawful age discrimination.
In her next attempt to cast Defendant’s stated reasoning for firing her as pretext, Plaintiff
cites Mr. White’s decision to retain “significantly younger and higher paid staff” and claims that
this decision renders Defendant’s offered rationale implausible. (Doc. No. 47 at 29.) It follows,
according to Plaintiff, that retaining younger staff with higher salaries makes any citation to the
“financial impact” on Defendant significantly “less likely to be real criteria” used in making lay
off decisions, indicating that this rationale is pretextual. See (id. at 29–30). The Court finds this

proffered evidence unavailing for several reasons. First, in evaluating Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the Court is mindful that the Third Circuit has instructed that “federal courts
are not arbitral boards ruling on the strength of ‘cause’ for discharge. The question is not whether
the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is
discrimination.” See Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)). It is not for this Court to
decide whether Defendant’s decision to retain some higher paid and younger employees was “the
best, or even a sound, business decision,” see Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109; rather, the Court is tasked
with viewing all record evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party,
and determining whether a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Defendant’s choice to

retain some higher paid employees renders its citation of pandemic-related financial concerns
mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Because the Court does “not sit as a super-personnel
department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions,” see Smith v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ., No. 05-cv-02834, 2006 WL 1887984, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2006), the Court declines to
make such a finding here. To the contrary, Plaintiff engages in speculation about the motives
behind Defendant’s decision-making pertaining to who would be retained during the pandemic.
Speculation without supporting record evidence cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.
See Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding
that “speculation and conjecture” are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment).
Relevant here, Defendant cites Mr. White’s testimony that he “considered critical
business functions and roles that would have the least immediate financial impact on the business
while maintaining sales-supporting outputs for new products, merchandising, and retail circulars
in deciding who to lay off in the Marketing Department, while meeting the target of a 25%

reduction in overall payroll.” (Doc. No. 53 at 13.) The Court’s task at summary judgment is to
determine whether a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Defendant’s decision to retain
younger and higher paid employees, while firing Plaintiff, renders its stated rationale—pandemic
related financial concerns—pretext for unlawful discrimination. Further, the Third Circuit places
the burden on Plaintiff, in attempting to demonstrate that Defendant’s proffered reason is mere
pretext, “to present evidence contradicting the core facts put forward by the employer as the
legitimate reason for its decision.” See Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir.
2005). Plaintiff offers disagreement with Defendant’s decision as to whom to lay off during the
pandemic while failing to cite evidence “contradicting the core facts” see id., Defendant put
forward. Defendant maintains that it had to lay off staff in response to financial uncertainty

during the pandemic and considered several factors in how to manage payroll obligations while
still successfully operating their business. To that end, the Court finds that the fact that some
higher paid and younger employees were retained does not, without something more in the
record, permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that Defendant’s stated rationale contains
“weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” see Willis, 808
F.3d at 644, such that no reasonable factfinder could believe that the stated reason motivated the
adverse employment action. And as a general matter, the Court “will not second-guess a
business entity’s managerial determination that a reduction-in-force was an economic reality.”
See Kenney v. Footlocker Worldwide, 55 F. App’x 35, 37 (3d Cir. 2002) (unpublished).14 Even
if the Court was inclined to examine the demographics of Defendant’s firing decisions, it is clear
from the record that the Phase I coronavirus layoffs did not target older employees, because the
average age of Marketing Department employees increased once the layoffs were implemented.

See (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 18; Doc. No 48 ¶ 18); see also Houser v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 216 F.
App’x 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (affirming a grant of summary judgment when the
employee’s pretext arguments “only questioned the methodology” of how firing decisions were
made but failed to show that “as a whole, the reduction in force focused on older employees
more than younger employees”).15 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s challenge to Mr.
White’s testimony unavailing.
Plaintiff’s next attempt to demonstrate that Defendant’s stated rationale for her firing was
pretextual cites the fact that Defendant tried to rehire Mr. Vang, who had been laid off as part of
pandemic related personnel cuts. (Doc. No. 47 at 30.) Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Vang, who was
twenty-eight (28) years old at the time Defendant explored rehiring him in May of 2020, was a

14 The Third Circuit has acknowledged that its unpublished opinions may nonetheless contain
persuasive reasoning. See Fuld, 604 F.3d at 823 (noting that an unpublished opinion is “as
persuasive as its reasoning”); see also Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 n.12 (following an unpublished
opinion based on “factual similarity” and “look[ing] to the [unpublished opinion] as a paradigm
of the legal analysis”). In Kenney, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit clearly delineated that courts should not second guess business decisions, particularly in
the reduction in force context. See Kenney, 55 F. App’x at 37. Further, the panel held that “we
agree with the District Court that the appellants failed to demonstrate that age was more likely
than not a motivating or determining cause of their terminations, in part because the vast
majority of the persons affected by the corporate reduction-in-force were under forty years of
age.” See id.

15 The Third Circuit has acknowledged that its unpublished opinions may nonetheless contain
persuasive reasoning. See Fuld, 604 F.3d at 823 (noting that an unpublished opinion is “as
persuasive as its reasoning”); see also Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 n.12 (following an unpublished
opinion based on “factual similarity” and “look[ing] to the [unpublished opinion] as a paradigm
of the legal analysis”).
younger employee whom Defendant wanted to re-employ in lieu of Plaintiff. See (id.). This fact
fails to cast doubt on Defendant’s stated rationale for firing Plaintiff. To the contrary, the fact
that Defendant considered rehiring Mr. Vang has no bearing on the pretext inquiry. Plaintiff,
without citing any record evidence, asks the Court to infer that, because Defendant attempted to

hire back one of the previously laid off workers who was younger than Plaintiff, it necessarily
follows that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant fired Plaintiff as a
result of pandemic related layoffs, or simply used the pandemic as an excuse to engage in age
discrimination. Because Plaintiff fails to cite to record evidence in asking the Court to make this
inference, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s speculative argument on this point. See
Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that
a party trying to defeat summary judgment cannot “rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory
allegations or suspicions”); see also McKnight v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 171 F. Supp. 2d 446,
448 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that “[u]nsubstantiated and subjective beliefs and opinions are not
competent summary judgment evidence”) (quotation omitted).

Plaintiff also supports her pretext argument by pointing to Defendant’s posting of the
Content and Asset Coordinator position, a position she contends is analogous to the one from
which she was removed, as well as Defendant’s subsequent decision not to interview or hire her
for said position. (Doc. No. 47 at 30.) Plaintiff’s contention fails to cast doubt on Defendant’s
stated non-discriminatory reason for her removal. Viewing the evidence of record in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot find that, even if the later-posted Content and Asset
Coordinator position “was the same as [Plaintiff]’s prior Content Coordinator position” (id.), the
posting of this position permits a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendant’s cited
rationale for Plaintiff’s firing was merely pretext for unlawful age discrimination.
Plaintiff essentially asks the Court, without any citation to record evidence, to infer that
Defendant’s posting of a position similar to the one from which Plaintiff was removed several
months after her firing means that Plaintiff was fired not as part of legitimate and non-
discriminatory pandemic related layoffs, but instead as pretext for age discrimination. Such

speculation is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Acumed LLC, 561 F.3d at 228.
The Third Circuit has held that “summary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up’ time for the
non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and
cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” See
Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd., 455 F.3d at 201. Additionally, while “proof of pretext does not have
to include evidence of discrimination,” record evidence suggesting that Defendant’s stated
rationale is false permits a reasonable factor to “infer from the falsity of the explanation that the
employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.” See Kautz, 412 F.3d at 467
(citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)). Plaintiff fails to
cite record evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could draw the inference that

Defendant’s stated reason for her removal is merely pretext for unlawful discrimination. Instead,
Plaintiff simply restates the timeline of events, discussing how her eventual replacement’s
relative youth, combined with Defendant’s decision not to rehire her, establishes an inference
that Defendant’s reasoning is pretextual. (Doc. No. 47 at 30–31.) These bare contentions simply
do not permit a reasonable finder of fact, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, to infer pretext on the part of Defendant in choosing to lay off Plaintiff.16 See Healy
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that the Court’s inquiry

16 Plaintiff cites her response (Doc. No. 47 at 30–31) to Defendant’s Concise Statement of
Material Facts (Doc. No. 36) in discussing the timeline of events that she finds pertinent to the
Court’s pretext inquiry.
“must concern pretext, and is not an independent assessment of how we might evaluate and treat
a loyal employee”). Accordingly, the Court is unpersuaded that Defendant’s posting of said
position and failure to consider Plaintiff’s application renders its stated pandemic-based rationale
for her firing mere pretext for age discrimination.

Plaintiff’s fifth and final attempt to demonstrate that Defendant’s stated rationale for
firing her is pretextual points to evidence of actions taken by Defendant in the months after she
was laid off. (Doc. No. 56 at 18.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s hiring of Ms. Torres and Mr.
DeBord, both of whom were younger than Plaintiff, demonstrates Defendant’s true motive of
discriminatory animus based on age. (Id. at 18–19.) Plaintiff maintains that Mr. White and Ms.
Bonafede worked in concert to remove Plaintiff from her position and replace her with younger
workers. (Id. at 20–21.) Viewing the record as a whole and construing all facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds no factual basis for Plaintiff’s desired inference that
Defendant’s post layoff actions, over a fifteen month period, could lead a reasonable factfinder to
infer that, when Defendant initiated layoffs during the pandemic and removed Plaintiff from her

position, Defendant’s cited rationale for the layoffs was mere pretext for unlawful discrimination
based on age. See Kenney, 55 F. App’x at 37 (stating that courts “will not second-guess a
business entity’s managerial determination that a reduction-in-force was an economic reality”).
Ultimately, the Court is unpersuaded that, viewing all evidence of record in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendant’s stated rationale for
Plaintiff’s termination was pretext for age discrimination. Accordingly, the Court will grant
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA discrimination
claims. The Court next evaluates whether Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.
B. Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA Retaliation Claims17

1. Applicable Legal Standard

Plaintiff also asserts retaliation claims pursuant to the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,
and the PHRA, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. As discussed supra regarding discrimination claims, the
Court similarly evaluates retaliation claims, in the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, under
the burden shifting framework enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green. See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. at 802–05).18 To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show:
(1) protected employment activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after
or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal
connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse
action.
See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193. Further,

[i]f an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation under the [relevant
statute], the burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for its adverse employment action. The employer’s burden at this stage is
relatively light: it is satisfied if the defendant articulates any legitimate reason for
the [adverse employment action]; the defendant need not prove that the articulated
reason actually motivated the [action].

See Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500–01 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “If the
employer advances such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that ‘the
employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the

17 The anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and PHRA are viewed analogously and thus the
same standard of review applies. See Fasold v. Just., 409 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2005).

18 Because the Americans with Disabilities Act, ADEA, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
contain “nearly identical” anti-retaliation provisions, the Third Circuit has found that “precedent
interpreting any one of these statutes is equally relevant to interpretation of the others.” See
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002).
adverse employment action.’” See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193 (citation omitted). The Third
Circuit further explained that, “[t]he plaintiff must prove that retaliatory animus played a role in
the employer’s decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative effect on the outcome of
that process. The burden of proof remains at all times with the plaintiff.” See Krouse, 126 F.3d

at 501 (cleaned up). Finally,
[t]o obtain summary judgment, the employer must show that the trier of fact could
not conclude, as a matter of law, (1) that retaliatory animus played a role in the
employer’s decisionmaking process and (2) that it had a determinative effect on the
outcome of that process. This may be accomplished by establishing the plaintiff’s
inability to raise a genuine [dispute] of material fact as to either: (1) one or
more elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case or, (2) if the employer offers a
legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action, whether the
employer’s proffered explanation was a pretext for retaliation.

See id.
With regard to establishing the first element of a prima facie retaliation claim—showing
that the plaintiff engaged in protected employment activity—the Third Circuit has held that the
filing of formal charges, in addition to “informal protests of discriminatory employment
practices, including making complaints to management,” see Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline
Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006), are protected
activities under the relevant statutes. To determine if the plaintiff sufficiently opposed
discrimination, “we look to the message being conveyed rather than the means of conveyance.”
See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 343 (3d Cir. 2006). “The complaint must
allege that the opposition was to discrimination based on a protected category, such as age or
race.” Daniels, 776 F. 3d at 193. Additionally,
although a plaintiff in a retaliation case need not prove the merits of the underlying
discrimination complaint, [he] must have act[ed] under a good faith, reasonable
belief that a violation existed. This standard requires an objectively reasonable
belief that the activity the plaintiff opposed constituted unlawful discrimination
under the relevant statute.
See id. at 193–94 (cleaned up). In other words, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must
present evidence that a reasonable person, standing in their shoes, would believe that they were
standing in opposition to discrimination on the part of the defendant. See Kengerski v. Harper, 6
F.4th 531, 537 (3d Cir. 2021).

As to the second element of a prima facie case—demonstrating adverse action by the
employer during or after the protected activity—the Third Circuit specified that:
the plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the
challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.

See id. at 195. Adverse actions include termination, see LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr.
Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007), as well as lateral transfers to other positions, see
Moore, 461 F.3d at 347–48. However, “petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place
at work” do not constitute adverse action under the ADEA. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). That said, “context matters such that an act that would be
immaterial in some situations is material in others.” See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 196 (citing
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 548 U.S. at 68).
Finally, as to the third element of the prima facie retaliation claim—requiring a causal
connection between the adverse employment action by the employer and the protected act by the
employee—the Third Circuit has articulated several types of evidence that courts should consider
when “determining whether a sufficient causal link exists to survive a motion for summary
judgment.” See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232. “Where the temporal proximity between the
protected activity and the adverse action is unusually suggestive, it is sufficient standing alone to
create an inference of causality and defeat summary judgment.” Id. However,
[w]here the temporal proximity is not unusually suggestive, we ask whether the
proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference. Among
the kinds of evidence that a plaintiff can proffer are intervening antagonism or
retaliatory animus, inconsistencies in the employer’s articulated reasons for
terminating the employee, or any other evidence in the record sufficient to support
the inference of retaliatory animus.

See id. at 232–33 (citing Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001)).

2. Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA Retaliation Claims

a. Arguments of the Parties

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of retaliation. (Doc.
No. 40 at 31–32.) Relevant to the third element of a prima facie case—requiring Plaintiff to
demonstrate “a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s
adverse action” see Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500—Defendant observes that Plaintiff’s attorney sent
Defendant a letter on September 28, 2020, notifying Defendant of Plaintiff’s potential litigation
against it. (Id. at 32.) According to Defendant, it follows that the relevant time period for
establishing a prima facie case is September 28, 2020 to December 28, 2020, citing several cases
in this Circuit delineating that “a period of three months or more does not establish any causal
connection based on timing.” See (id. (citing LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 233; Hughes v. Allegheny
County Airport Auth., No. 15-cv-00221, 2017 WL 2880875 at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 6,
2017), aff’d, 728 F. App’x 140 (3d Cir. 2018))). Defendant further argues that courts in this
Circuit have declined to infer retaliatory discrimination—even when the temporal proximity is
suspect—in instances where an employee is treated similarly both before and after engaging in
protected activities under the relevant statutes. (Doc. No. 40 at 32–33.) Defendant asserts that
Plaintiff applied for and was not hired for several jobs with Defendant both before and after
Plaintiff’s counsel sent the letter informing Defendant about the prospect of litigation and
therefore an inference of retaliation is inappropriate. (Id. at 33.)
Defendant next argues that, even if Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation,
Plaintiff cannot provide evidence showing that Defendant’s stated non-retaliatory reasons for
failing to rehire Plaintiff—her failure to meet the minimum qualifications for the positions, the
incompatibility of her prior experience with later job postings, or her poor employment record—

are pretext for unlawful discrimination. (Id. at 34.)
Responding to Defendant’s arguments, Plaintiff maintains that she can demonstrate a
prima facie case of retaliation and provide evidence sufficiently establishing that Defendant’s
stated rationale for failing to rehire her was pretextual. First, Plaintiff notes that she sent both a
Notice of Preservation to Defendant and filed a charge with the EEOC. (Doc. No. 47 at 43.)
Plaintiff asserts that these are protected activities under the ADEA and thus satisfy her burden
under the first element of a prima facie case. As to the second element of a prima facie
retaliation case—requiring adverse action by an employer—Plaintiff maintains that she applied
for eighteen jobs with Defendant without being asked to interview or receiving any offer of
employment. (Id.) Plaintiff cites 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) for the proposition that “[d]enying a

qualified applicant, the opportunity to be considered for an open job is an adverse action.” (Id.
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)).)19 Plaintiff then focuses her argument in support of the second

19 The language of 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) reads as follows:

[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against
any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member
thereof or applicant for membership, because such individual, member or applicant
for membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because
such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation
under this chapter.

See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
element of her retaliation claim on the jobs she applied for “that clearly align with the strongest
aspects of her skillset.” (Doc. No. 47 at 44.)
As to Defendant’s Purchasing Coordinator position, a position for which Plaintiff
submitted applications on October 7, 2020, October 29, 2020, and December 8, 2020, Plaintiff

maintains that: (1) the position did not require more than a high school degree or equivalent; (2)
the essential job duties were similar to her Content Coordinator duties; and (3) she worked with
the Purchasing Department during her time with Defendant. (Id. at 44–45.) Plaintiff maintains
that the Court should view the Purchasing Coordinator job description as analogous to the
Content Coordinator position, and this fact, in addition to Ms. Stoviak’s suggestion that
Defendant should hire back employees who had been laid off, combine to establish an inference
that the failure to give Plaintiff an interview was retaliatory. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that
“there is evidence [Ms.] Stoviak responded to the news of [Plaintiff]’s application in a manner
that could be interpreted not to address pay rate or skill set, but antagonism towards [Plaintiff.]”
(Doc. No. 56 at 26.) Plaintiff cites an email sent by Mr. Stoviak to Ms. Elizabeth Hoover (“Ms.

Hoover”), an HR Support worker with Defendant, in which Ms. Stoviak writes “[w]ow, do not
pass to them” referring to sending the hiring managers Plaintiff’s application to be Purchasing
Coordinator. (Id. (citing Doc. No. 51-20 at 3).) Plaintiff also asserts that she was qualified for
the Product Data Specialist position, for which she sent applications on November 11, 2020 and
December 8, 2020. (Doc. No. 47 at 45.)
In her next attempt to demonstrate that Defendant retaliated against her by failing to
consider her for a position for which she was qualified, Plaintiff cites the eCommerce
Coordinator position and states that Defendant’s failure to post this job opening publicly in
September of 2020 rendered her unable to apply for it in the first place. (Doc. No. 47 at 46.)
Plaintiff argues that Mr. DeBord, who was eventually hired to fill the role following the re-
posting of the position in the spring of 2021, lacked the requisite career experiences to qualify
him for the position, even bearing in mind the fact that he has a college degree, which was a job
requirement. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that the work in this position was very similar to the work

she undertook as Defendant’s Content Coordinator. (Id.) It follows, according to Plaintiff, that
“a jury could find that [Plaintiff] was qualified for the eCommerce position and [Defendant]
retaliated against her when she applied for the job in March 2021.” (Id. at 47.)
Plaintiff next argues that she was qualified for and retaliated against following the April
26, 2021 submission of her application to serve in the Picker/Packer position. (Id. at 44, 47.)
Plaintiff asserts that the mere fact that Defendant never called her to permit her to interview for
this job would allow a “trier of fact to conclude [that Defendant] had decided to not hire her for
any position because she filed a discrimination charge.” (Id. at 47.) As it pertains to Plaintiff’s
application to Fox Chapel, Plaintiff maintains that Ms. Bonafede refused to give her an
employment reference upon Ms. Vonada’s request. (Id.)

In trying to demonstrate the third element of a prima facie retaliation claim—which
requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity
and the employer’s adverse action, see Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500—Plaintiff cites Defendant’s
receipt of its Notice of Preservation Letter on October 1, 2020 and subsequent failure to send
Plaintiff’s application for the Purchasing Coordinator position to the hiring manager just seven
days later, asserting that this timeline is suggestive of causation. (Doc. No. 47 at 49.) More
broadly, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s failure to adhere to its stated goal of rehiring laid
off employees, combined with the similarities between the open positions and the position from
which she was fired, provides sufficient evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could
conclude that Defendant acted with retaliatory intent in refusing to rehire her. See (id.).
In support of her argument that Defendant’s stated rationale—Plaintiff lacked the
qualifications for the positions for which she applied due to her attitude and poor teamworking

skills, Plaintiff’s dearth of eCommerce ability, and Defendant’s post layoff discovery of alleged
performance issues—is pretextual, Plaintiff points to several pieces of evidence. First, Plaintiff
maintains that Ms. Bonafede did not actually believe that Plaintiff was “toxic” because she never
informed Plaintiff of her feelings until the commencement of this litigation. (Id. at 37.) Plaintiff
argues that she has several positive evaluations to counter the purportedly negative evaluations
cited by Defendant. (Id. at 38.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Bonafede believed her
work was of good quality, and that any purported performance deficiencies were not discovered
by Ms. Bonafede until after Defendant removed the job posting for the Content and Asset
Coordinator position, indicating that Ms. Bonafede and Defendant’s stated reasons for not
rehiring her are pretextual. (Id. at 40–41.) Finally, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant fails to

offer a satisfactory or consistent reason for removing the listing for the Content and Asset
Coordinator position in the summer of 2020, suggesting that Defendant and its employees face
credibility issues on this question better suited for a jury to evaluate than for this Court to
analyze at the summary judgment stage. (Id. at 42.)
b. Whether Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA Retaliation Claims
As an initial matter, the Court need not examine whether Plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case of retaliation pursuant to the ADEA and PHRA, because even assuming that she can,
and viewing all of the evidence of record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence demonstrating that Defendant’s stated non-
retaliatory rationale for failing to rehire her—her lack of the requisite qualifications, the
mismatch between her prior experience and the posted job descriptions, and the positions’
requirement of a minimum level of co-worker interaction for which Plaintiff was not equipped—
was pretext for retaliatory animus. To reiterate,

[i]f an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation under the [relevant
statutes], the burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for its adverse employment action. The employer’s burden at this stage is
relatively light: it is satisfied if the defendant articulates any legitimate reason for
the [adverse employment action]; the defendant need not prove that the articulated
reason actually motivated the [action].

See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500–01. Should the employer satisfy its burden, the “plaintiff must be
able to convince the factfinder both that the employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that
retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action.” See id. at 501. In attempting
to meet that burden, Plaintiff points to several pieces of evidence that she maintains demonstrate
that Defendant’s explanation was false and that she would not have suffered adverse
employment action but for her protected activity. The Court examines each in turn.
Plaintiff first asserts that Defendant’s stated rationale for failing to rehire her is pretextual
because Ms. Bonafede, who cited Plaintiff’s “toxicity” and “attitude” during her deposition, did
not actually believe that she was toxic. (Doc. No. 47 at 37.) Plaintiff cites Ms. Bonafede’s
evaluation of her, in which that Ms. Bonafede found Plaintiff’s workplace performance to be
“fully satisfactory.” (Id.) Plaintiff further maintains that Ms. Bonafede never disciplined
Plaintiff and argues that this necessarily implies that Ms. Bonafede must have thought Plaintiff’s
performance was sufficiently strong such that she did not need to be disciplined. (Id. at 37–38.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s contentions on this point amount to pure speculation. Plaintiff’s
citation of an earlier evaluation includes evidence that Ms. Bonafede did in fact rate her
performance as “fully satisfactory” as it pertains to work competencies. (Doc. No. 49-1 at 2.)
However, in the same evaluation, Ms. Bonafede notes the “negative” reaction Plaintiff exhibited
to customers in interacting with them, while highlighting that her teamwork “needs
improvement” because her reactions to team members requesting help were negative and not
indicative of someone who wants to assist others. (Id. at 4, 6–7.) In examining whether

Defendant’s stated rationale for choosing not to rehire Plaintiff is pretext for unlawful retaliation,
“the record is examined for evidence of inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an
inference that the employer did not act for its stated reasons.” See Sempier v. Johnson &
Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir. 1995). To the contrary, Ms. Bonafede’s earlier evaluation of
Plaintiff directly supports one of Defendant’s stated rationales for failing to rehire her,
specifically that the positions for which she applied required a minimum level of co-worker
interaction for which Plaintiff was not equipped. Upon consideration of the foregoing, it appears
that the record evidence is consistent with Defendant’s stated legitimate non-retaliatory rationale.
See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193. Accordingly, viewing the evidence of record in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff’s speculation as to Ms. Bonafede’s true

feelings on her job performance is sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
retaliatory animus, and not a legitimate concern regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work with others,
motivated Defendant’s decision not to rehire her or that retaliatory animus was the real reason
for Defendant’s decision.
As to the second piece of evidence Plaintiff maintains permits a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that Defendant’s reasoning for failing to rehire her was mere pretext for unlawful
retaliation, Plaintiff maintains that Ms. Bonafede “knew [she] had the eCommerce skills
required” for the Content and Asset Coordinator position. (Doc. No. 47 at 39.) Plaintiff argues
that: (1) she objectively had the skills to perform the Content and Asset Coordinator position; (2)
Ms. Bonafede felt that that this was an entry level position, negating her purported concerns that
Plaintiff could not perform the duties of the position; and (3) Ms. Bonafede erroneously thought
that Mr. DeBord, whom she interviewed for the position, was qualified “except he didn’t have
any eCommerce experience.” (Id.) Defendant states that it did not elect to fill the position when

they posted the opening, deciding to cancel the position without offering it to anyone. (Doc. No.
53 at 16.) Defendant claims that the decision to cancel the position was based on legitimate
reasons, namely that it reconsidered its needs and found that they could be met “through a
combination of assigning tasks to existing employees and then using a temporary staffing
agency.” (Id.)
As discussed supra, the Court does not sit as a super personnel department, examining
business decisions and evaluating their propriety. See Smith, 2006 WL 1887984, at *5.
Defendant offered a legitimate and non-retaliatory reason for cancelling the Content and Asset
Coordinator position, and Plaintiff simply fails to point to record evidence which permits a
reasonable finder of fact to conclude that this choice reflected pretext for unlawful retaliation.

See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193. Plaintiff cites Mr. DeBord’s resume and claims that his lack of
qualifications renders Ms. Bonafede’s testimony—that Plaintiff lacked eCommerce experience—
suspect, since Mr. DeBord was considered for the same position even without specific
qualifications. (Doc. No. 47 at 39.) Plaintiff also cites the fact that, in his deposition, Mr. Sachs
found Plaintiff to be overqualified for the position. (Doc. Nos. 47 at 39; 48 at 38–39.) Even
accepting these assertions as true and viewing all record evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the Court finds that the evidence referenced by Plaintiff would not permit a reasonable
finder of fact to conclude that Defendant’s stated reasoning for eliminating the posting and
choosing not to hire anyone to fill the position was pretext for unlawful retaliation. Defendant
asserts that it eliminated the position because its staffing needs could be met “through a
combination of assigning tasks to existing employees and then using a temporary staffing
agency.” (Doc. No. 53 at 16.) Plaintiff fails to cite to “inconsistencies or anomalies that could
support an inference that the employer did not act for its stated reasons” see Sempier, 45 F.3d at

731. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proffered evidence on this point fails to
support a reasonable finder of fact’s conclusion that Defendant’s stated rationale for failing to
rehire Plaintiff was pretextual, nor that retaliation motivated its actions.
Plaintiff next points to the job qualifications of four positions for which she applied and
was not hired, addressing her own qualifications for those positions, that she claims renders
Defendant’s stated rationale for its failure to rehire her—that Plaintiff did not meet the requisite
qualifications, her prior experience did not match the job descriptions, and the positions required
a minimum level of co-worker interaction for which Plaintiff was not equipped— pretext for
unlawful retaliation. (Doc. No. 47 at 44–47.) The Court examines each position in turn.
First, Plaintiff asserts that she was qualified for the Purchasing Coordinator position, a

position for which Plaintiff applied on October 7, 2020, October 29, 2020, and December 8,
2020. (Id. at 44–45.) Defendant maintains that the position required the coordinator to work in a
“team-oriented environment,” while Plaintiff had “demonstrated over many years an inability to
work with others.” (Doc. No. 53 at 22.) Defendant is correct when it asserts that Plaintiff
“offers no evidence that this explanation was pretext for retaliation.” (Id. at 23.)20 It is not for
the Court to decide whether Plaintiff can sufficiently demonstrate her qualifications such that

20 In her sur reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s assertion that she did not work well with
others is an “issue of fact.” (Doc. No. 56 at 24.) Plaintiff also maintains that Ms. Stoviak cited
pay range and skillsets in explaining why Plaintiff could not fill the position, thus rendering
Defendant’s invocation of her issue working on a team to be mere pretext for retaliation. (Id. at
25.)
Defendant’s stated reason for choosing not to rehire her was pretext for unlawful retaliation. See
Brewer, 72 F.3d at 332. “[T]o avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff’s evidence rebutting the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of
the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or

otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis
added). Here, viewing all record evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, even if the
Court credited Plaintiff’s cited evidence that she was qualified for the position, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff fails to cite to record evidence rendering Defendant’s other stated
reasons, namely her inability to work on a team, pretext for unlawful retaliation.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that she was qualified for the Product Data Specialist position, for
which she applied on November 11, 2020 and December 8, 2020, because her previously held
position with Defendant included data entry. (Doc. No. 47 at 44–45.) In response, Defendant
claims that Plaintiff was unqualified for the position because it required her to work with
“warehouse staff to identify problem items or packaging” and thus “her inability to work with

others” rendered her unqualified. (Doc. No. 53 at 23.) The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to cite
record evidence rendering Defendant’s stated reasoning for not hiring Plaintiff for this position,
namely her inability to work well with others, implausible or inconsistent such that a reasonable
finder of fact could infer retaliation. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 759. Further, “[i]n evaluating the
employer’s reasons, our focus is upon whether the reasons honestly motivated the decision at
issue, not whether the reasons are factually accurate.” See Oliver v. Clinical Pracs. of Univ. of
Pennsylvania, 921 F. Supp. 2d 434, 449 (E.D. Pa. 2013). Defendant has adduced sufficient
evidence suggesting that several of its employees felt that Plaintiff struggled to work in a team
setting. See (Doc. Nos. 37-12 at 82–83 (deposition testimony of Mr. Sachs discussing Plaintiff’s
“inability to interact productively with the team”); 37-18 (email from Mr. Lehman discussing
Plaintiff’s performance and noting that she “doe[s] not play well with others”); 37-20 (email
from Ms. Bonafede discussing co-worker complaints about Plaintiff); 49-1 at 6–7 (Ms.
Bonafede’s evaluation of Plaintiff denoting her poor team skills)). Accordingly, the Court is

unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument on this point.
In her next attempt to demonstrate that Defendant engaged in retaliation by not
interviewing or hiring her for positions for which she was qualified, Plaintiff cites the
eCommerce Coordinator position, a position for which she submitted an application on March 6,
2021, six (6) months after the filing of her EEOC and PHRC complaints, and claims that Mr.
DeBord, who later filled this position, lacked the qualifications necessary for the position. (Doc.
No. 47 at 44, 46.) Plaintiff further asserts that a reasonable jury could find that, when Defendant
established a degree requirement for this position, said requirement was used “as a means to keep
[Plaintiff] from applying and being hired for the position.” (Id. at 46.) Defendant contends that
Plaintiff’s assertion that it added the degree requirement solely to preclude her from applying is

baseless, while further noting that Plaintiff was not hired for this position because she did not
possess a bachelor’s degree in Business, Marketing, or Communications, as the job required.
(Doc. No. 53 at 23.) The Court finds Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant implemented a degree
requirement for the eCommerce Coordinator position solely to preclude Plaintiff from applying,
with no citation to record evidence in support, amounts to pure speculation that is insufficient to
cast doubt on Defendant’s stated reason as to demonstrate that “retaliation was the real reason for
the adverse employment action.’” See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193; see also Fireman’s Ins. Co. of
Newark, N. J. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that a party trying to
defeat summary judgment cannot “rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions”).
Additionally, in her sur reply, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s hiring of a temporary
worker, Ms. Torres, to perform some of the duties previously performed by Plaintiff, was a sham

to prevent Plaintiff from being hired back. (Doc. No. 56 at 21.) In support of this premise,
Plaintiff cites a note from Ms. Stoviak to Mr. Abel and Ms. Bonafede, alleging that the note’s
skepticism about creating this position and hiring Ms. Torres to fill it reflects inconsistency on
Defendant’s part, because this decision amounted to creating a new position analogous to
Plaintiff’s prior held position while electing not to rehire Plaintiff. (Id.) However, Defendant
correctly points out that Ms. Torres was hired to fill the Content and Asset Coordinator position
twenty-one (21) months after Plaintiff was laid off. (Doc. No. 53 at 17.) Defendant posted the
position from August 3, 2020 through August 11, 2020, several weeks before Plaintiff’s counsel
mailed Defendant a letter notifying it of Plaintiff’s potential litigation or the filing of Plaintiff’s
EEOC and PHRC complaints. (Doc. Nos. 36 ¶¶ 81–82; 53 at 15.) As discussed supra,

Defendant posted and then removed the posting for the Content and Asset Coordinator position
in the summer of 2020, citing how it reconsidered its needs at that time and found that they could
be met “through a combination of assigning tasks to existing employees and then using a
temporary staffing agency.” (Doc. No. 53 at 16.) Defendant offered a legitimate and non-
retaliatory reason for cancelling the Content and Asset Coordinator position, and its decision
almost two years later to reestablish the position and hire someone to fill it does not cast doubt
on the legitimate non-retaliatory reason proffered by Defendant. Because Plaintiff cites no
record evidence of “inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an inference that the
employer did not act for its stated reasons” see Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731, the Court finds
Plaintiff’s argument unavailing. Additionally, because the cancelling of the position occurred
before Plaintiff’s protected activity, the Court finds that no reasonable factfinder could conclude
retaliation on the part of Defendant, because Plaintiff failed to show that the “adverse action by
the employer” occurred “either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected

activity.” See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500.
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate pretext by arguing that a “jury could just as well
determine that [Ms.] Bonafede’s lower rating of [Plaintiff]” in her evaluations “is pretext.”
(Doc. No. 56 at 23.) Plaintiff also asserts that “[a] jury could question the veracity of the toxicity
allegation.” (Id.) It follows, according to Plaintiff, that she has sufficiently demonstrated a
genuine dispute of material fact such that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
Defendant’s stated reasons for not rehiring her—that Plaintiff did not meet the requisite
qualifications, her prior experience did not match the job descriptions, and the positions required
a minimum level of co-worker interaction for which Plaintiff was not equipped—were pretext
for unlawful retaliation. However, Defendant cites a series of evaluations, correspondence, and

depositions in which its employees highlight serious concerns about Plaintiff’s performance,
largely with respect to her ability to work with others. See supra at 44–45. Plaintiff does not cite
to any record evidence indicating that any of Defendant’s decision makers did not honestly
believe this negative feedback. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s pretext argument
largely amounts to conjecture and speculation about Defendant’s actual motivation, while failing
to cite to record evidence reflecting “inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an inference
that the employer did not act for its stated reasons.” See Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731. Accordingly,
the Court is unpersuaded that, viewing all evidence of record in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendant’s stated rationale for choosing
not to rehire her was pretext for unlawful retaliation.21 Therefore, the Court will grant
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s ADEA and PHRA retaliation claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion in its entirety. An

appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, District Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

21 Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant retaliated against her by denying her an employment
reference when she applied to work at Fox Chapel. (Doc. No. 47 at 47.) However, Defendant
asserts, and Plaintiff admits, that: Fox Chapel asked Plaintiff to provide a reference from a
former direct supervisor; Plaintiff named Ms. Bonafede; Ms. Bonafede then executed
Defendant’s policy for referrals to verify dates of employment, wages, and title; Fox Chapel’s
hiring managers did not negatively respond to Ms. Bonafede’s referral; and after initially not
selecting Plaintiff, Fox Chapel later hired her. (Doc. Nos. 36 ¶¶ 65–80; 48 ¶¶ 64–79.)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10667556. Public record. Not legal advice.